10 Clientelism and party politics in the Philippines

Julio C. Teehankee

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

> *[The] Philippine polity, unlike those of most present-day Western democracies, is structured less by organized interest groups or by individuals who in politics think of themselves as members of categories, i.e. of distinctive social classes or occupations, than by a network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individuals . . . To a large extent the dyadic ties with significance for Philippine politics are vertical ones, i.e. bonds between prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients.*
>
> Carl Landé (1965: 1)

Introduction

For more than four decades, much of the academic work on Filipino elections and party politics continued to be a postscript to the patron–client factional framework (*pcf)* advanced by Carl Landé and other scholars in the 1960s. The basic argument of the *pcf* is that "Philippine politics revolves around interpersonal relationships – especially familial and patron–client ones – and factions composed of personal alliances" (Kerkvliet 1995: 401). While the *pcf* has endured time and continues to be cited by political analysts, it has also been criticized for reifying the role of socio-cultural values in structuring politics first in rural and peasant-based economies, and later, in modernizing urban communities (Kawanaka 2002, Sidel 1999).[1] However, clientelism has proven to be resilient and highly adaptable to a range of political, economic, and cultural settings (Hicken 2011). Especially, though not only, in developing polities, clientelism plays a crucial role in the process of continuity and change associated with the growth – and decline – of political institutions (Archer 1989).

In the Philippines, clientelism continues to shape the organization of party politics to a great extent. Since 1987, an average of 33.5 percent of all lower house representatives elected to Congress has switched parties in pursuit of resources allocated through clientelistic networks. Tellingly, 60.2 percent of these party switchers usually jumped into the party of the sitting president thereby producing monolithic (albeit short-lived) political behemoths. Fueled by presidential patronage, these monolithic parties have dominated Philippine politics under the past five administrations, notably the *Laban ng Demokratikong*

Pilipino (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos, LDP) during the term of Corazon Aquino, followed by the Lakas NUCD-UMDP founded by Fidel Ramos, the *Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino* (Struggle of the Patriotic Filipino Masses, LAMMP) of Joseph Estrada, and, most recently, the Liberal Party (LP) under Benigno Aquino III. Not surprisingly, 57 percent of the legislators from the dominant party belong to political clans. Around 160 of these political clans have had two or more members who have served in Congress, and they account for more than 400 of the 2,407 men and women who have been elected to the national legislature since 1907.

Since the formation of the first political parties under American colonial rule, political parties have continued to exist (in one form or another), even under extremely undemocratic periods of Philippine history such as the Japanese Occupation during the Second World War and the period of dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos.[2] But they never evolved into strong and credible political entities, even after the restoration of democracy in 1986. This absence of strong and credible political parties, caused to a large extent by the persistence of clientelistic networks, continues to exact a prime democratic deficit on the Philippine political system.

What accounts for the persistence of clientelism in Philippine party politics? Following recent developments in the theory and practice of clientelistic politics, this chapter will present an institutional view of clientelism and delineate current mechanisms for clientelistic practices by political parties in the Philippines. Specifically, it seeks to provide an overview of how clientelism shapes party organization and how party organization may determine the kind of clientelistic strategies a party would pursue.

Rethinking clientelism and patronage

There is no single accepted definition of clientelism, but there have been many definitions offered in the literature.[3] One of the classic definitions was coined by James Scott (1972: 92) who described clientelism as a relationship

> in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering generous support and assistance, including personal service, to the patron.

More recently, political scientists like Hicken (2011), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), or Stokes (2007) have linked clientelism directly to elections. Kitschelt and Wikinson (2007: 2), for example, refer to clientelism as ‘the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services’. Regardless of the context, clientelism is usually marked by a number of key characteristics, most notably iteration, status inequality and reciprocity (see Tomsa and Ufen in Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume).[4]

While the terms patronage and clientelism are often used interchangeably, clientelism is treated here as a much broader phenomenon than patronage, in which patronage is simply a specific strategy that may or may not be used as part of a clientelistic exchange. Moreover, an important difference lies in the position and types of resources available to the patron. In patronage, the patron must be an office holder or have access to state resources. In clientelism, the patron may or may not hold public office and must rely on alternative means of exchange (i.e., private resources, party resources, etc.).

Clientelistic parties from a comparative perspective

A number of political systems around the world are still rooted in either patronage-based or clientelistic practices, in which parties reward their supporters with private goods after being elected to office. Under clientelistic systems, 'parties create direct bonds with voters, usually through side payments such as pork barrel' (Scheiner 2006: 3–4). Contrary to popular perception that the practice of clientelistic politics is limited to poor and underdeveloped countries, resilient clientelistic structures have been observed even in established party systems in advanced industrial democracies such as Italy, Japan, Austria, and Belgium (Kitschelt 2007). Of course, it goes without saying that the influence of clientelism is still prevalent and even more pronounced in many developing countries, where a growing body of evidence reveals the remarkable extent to which parties engage in machine politics (Gans-Morse 2010).

Under clientelistic systems, the party that delivers the most material inducements gets the most competitive advantage over rival parties. Thus, clientelism also impacts on the nature of party competition in a political system. In examining the once dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, Ethan Scheiner (2006) observed that clientelism is necessary but not sufficient to bring about party competition failure. Rather, a combination of clientelism and two other factors – centralized governmental fiscal structure and institutionalized protection of political clienteles – stack the advantage against opposition parties.

In terms of clientelistic practices, the Philippines shares a lot of similarities with the Japanese case. However, one major point of divergence is that in the Philippines, it is the combination of clientelism and a weak centralized bureaucracy that has led to the perpetuation of patronage-based, vote-seeking organizations largely built around dominant local political clans and warlords. The institutional basis and mechanics of party-based clientelism in the Philippines will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

Institutional roots of clientelistic parties in the Philippines

Clientelistic practices have largely shaped the organization of political parties in the Philippines, in the same way that party organization influences the type of clientelistic strategies a political party will implement (Hicken 2011). Over time, political parties in the Philippines have evolved primarily into 'office-seeking

parties' – a category that Wolinetz (2002: 150) refers to as 'primarily interested in securing the benefits of office, getting its leaders into government, enjoying access to patronage, etc. – even if this means sharing power with others or pursuing strategies which fail to maximize its share of the vote.'

The following paragraphs will outline how three specific institutional factors have shaped clientelistic practices among Filipino political parties. First, institutional choices can influence future decision making of individuals through a process of path dependency.[5] Second, territorial boundaries of administrative structures interface with the political structures, especially at the local level. Third, the 'rules of the game' can provide incentives and disincentives for individuals to maximize their utilities. What follows is a discussion of how these institutional effects have shaped clientelistic practices among Filipino political parties.

Roots in colonial state-building

In his groundbreaking analysis of the impact of party origins on patterns of party-voter linkages, Martin Shefter (1994) argues that a party's decision to pursue or eschew a patronage-based strategy largely depends on the sequence and timing of two events: the formation of a constituency for bureaucratic autonomy and the mobilization of a mass electorate. In societies where 'internally mobilized' or 'insider' parties develop before the establishment of a professional bureaucracy, there are greater opportunities to raid the public coffers in order to distribute patronage goods to supporters. Applying Shefter's 'critical experience approach' to the Philippine case brings back the role of state structures and institutions in shaping political competition, economic accumulation, and social relations (Sidel 1999).

Political parties were implanted in the Philippines during the period of colonial rule. The process of colonial state-building was undertaken in the following manner: first, local autonomy preceded the development of central authority; second, party formation preceded national elections; and third, elections preceded bureaucratic institutionalization. Adapting the 'indirect rule' strategy of the previous Spanish colonizers, the American colonial administration relied heavily on local clans or principalia to consolidate colonial power throughout the archipelago (Cullinane 2003; Hutchcroft 2000; Paredes 1989).

The country's first political party – the Partido Federalista – was founded by Filipino elite politicians in 1900 to facilitate clientelistic relations with their American colonial patrons (Paredes 1989). It was established long before the holding of the first national election under American colonial rule. By the time the first election for the national legislature was held in 1907, colonial support had already shifted to the younger set of provincial-based political leaders who formed the Nacionalista Party[6] (Cullinane 2003). Building on their base of local notables, *caciques*, and political clans, the Americans gradually introduced elections from the municipality (1901) to the province (1902), the national legislature (1907) and culminating in presidential elections under the Philippine Commonwealth (1935).

The introduction of political parties and elections as institutional mechanisms for selecting representatives to the legislature created an avenue for fostering national linkages among local political clans in the country. The establishment of the Philippine Assembly, the precursor of the Philippine Congress, in 1907 opened the way for local politicians to aspire for national power. With the use of local bailiwick support, the *caciques* were able to entrench themselves in the legislature (Anderson 1988).

Manacsa and Tan (2005) present three reasons why political parties failed to develop along social cleavages in the latter period of Philippines political history. First, the extensive budgetary and allocative powers bestowed upon the post-war Philippine executive prevented politicians from sustaining credible opposition for fear of being shut out of the patronage structure. Second, the Anti-Sedition Law of 1901 and the crackdown on left-wing parties after the Second World War inhibited the formation of a counter-elite along class-based lines. Lastly, the post-war political parties suffered from weak internal organization, structure, and discipline, which resulted in weak party loyalties and constant party-switching.

For almost three decades, the pattern of inter-party competition solidified behind two parties – the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP). The rivalry between the two parties dominated Philippine politics from 1946 until 1972 despite their essentially identical structures, social make-up, and policies. This intra-elite competition was then ruptured by 14 years of authoritarianism under the Marcos dictatorship. The ouster of Marcos in 1986 and the restoration of democratic rule offered an opportunity to reboot the Filipino party system. However, the same pre-martial law patterns of competition emerged, just with more than two parties.

Roots in central–local relations

The nature of central–local relationships is one of the main determinants of Philippine politics. Local politics in the Philippines, since the time of the American colonial period, has largely revolved around two major concerns: one, who is best at generating funds from the central government and control its allocation and two, who controls the major economic activities (both legal and illegal) in the community (Rocamora 2004). Ironically, while the American colonial period has left a legacy of overly centralized administrative decision-making structures in Manila, the capital has long demonstrated its seemingly weak capacity for sustained administrative supervision of provincial and local officials (Hutchcroft 2000).

For four decades, the American colonial administration embarked on an institution-building project under the rubric of Filipino ‘self-government’. Provincial governors were indirectly elected by municipal officials in 1902, followed by their direct election (albeit by the elite electorate) in 1906. In reality, the early elections encouraged the emergence of extensive intraprovincial linkages and factions that tied into a larger network of provincial politics. These

10 487 Party ch10.indd 190

27/7/12 12:41:12

provincial elites became the major building blocks of a national elite with their election into the national legislature in Manila by 1907. Paradoxically, a highly restricted elite found its political fortunes expanded to increasingly higher levels of government (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003). Under this process, the American colonial administration coopted members of the elites including many landowners, merchants, and professionals, all of whom held key local positions in the late Spanish colonial era (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

The emergence of the local economic elite and its subsequent transformation into a powerful political-economic elite came on the heels of the deliberate creation of new political institutions by the American colonial government. Thus, as Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003: 263) argued, 'institutional rather than socio-economic factors are most important to understanding the stature that this elite came to possess during the early American period (and which this elite has, indeed, enjoyed ever since)'.

During the colonial period, the contentious struggles between central authority and local autonomy under US Governor General William Howard Taft were gradually resolved in favor of the provincial elites who were empowered by the structures of governance institutionalized by the American colonial administration. As a result, the Filipino quest for self-government became synonymous with the quest for local autonomy, national legislative authority, and patronage opportunities (Hutchcroft 2000).

The establishment of a national legislature in 1907 provided the institutional arena for the expression of local interests. The institutional innovations introduced by the Americans created a solid, visible 'national oligarchy' (Anderson 1998). Hutchcroft (2000: 292) notes how the 'provincial-elites-turned-national-politicos elected to the Assembly skillfully utilized their new authority, and consistently worked both to consolidate their power at the national level and extend their autonomy at the local level.' From the ranks of these local elites emerged political clans who built dynasties in their respective communities sustained by patronage derived from the national government. Thus, in 'the Philippine context, a key political mechanism used to negotiate contentious state-society linkages driven by powerful family and clan interest has been an electoral process fuelled by a pervasive system of patronage linking national and local political elites' (Rivera 2011: 61).

Moreover, central–local relations in the Philippines have been aggravated by the highly centralized, yet weak presidential system of government. Historically, a powerful chief executive has exercised vast control over fiscal powers and patronage resources. Given the absence of a programmatic party system, the president is dependent on local political bosses and clans to mobilize electoral support and implement central government policy. Consequently, '[p]residents and local bosses are therefore equally powerful (if at different stages in the political cycle) – a strange political system which is neither centralized nor decentralized' (Rocamora 2004: 55). The legacy of this highly centralized administrative bureaucracy juxtaposed with weak political institutions continued throughout various junctures of Philippine political history. From the Commonwealth

administration of President Manuel L. Quezon to the authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand Marcos and beyond, the primary consideration has always been to centralize patronage resources rather than to centralize administrative structures.

Roots in the rules of the game

The combination of a powerful presidency and the electoral system for the House and the Senate also served to amplify the historical and sociological deficiencies of the Filipino party system.[7] In fact, these two institutional features have remained relatively constant across the pre- and post-authoritarian periods (Hicken 2009). Aside from these two, patronage has also been a constant feature of Filipino politics in the two historic junctures.

Interestingly, post-1986 party politics resembled the pre-Marcos era in substance, but not in form. The return to democracy brought with it a whole host of new parties rather than the return to prominence of the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties. Kasuya (2009) has attributed the increased number of parties competing in elections to the increase in the number of viable presidential candidates in the post-Marcos period. In her ‘presidential bandwagon framework’, the introduction of a single term limit for the office of the presidency destabilized the legislative party system since legislative candidates now tended to affiliate themselves with the most viable presidential candidates by switching parties. Aspiring presidential candidates think they have a higher chance of winning without an incumbent running for re-election. The absence of an incumbent vying for reelection coupled with weak party loyalties serve as incentives for potential presidential aspirants to launch new parties and entice legislative candidates to switch parties with the promise of access to patronage. Unlike in the pre-Marcos era in which there were only two viable candidates who used two party labels, NP and LP, the post-Marcos era saw an increase in the number of viable presidential candidates and new parties resulting in the wide fluctuation in the set of parties from one election to another.

Party-based clientelistic politics at the national level

Thus, the two-party system that was institutionalized in the pre-authoritarian postwar republic was replaced by a ‘labyrinthine’ (Ufen 2008: 335) multiparty system under a restored presidential form of government.[8] Most of these new parties emerged from the organizations, mass movements, and individual politicians that comprised the anti-Marcos coalition.[9] At the same time, individual politicians and political clans closely identified with the ousted regime began abandoning Marcos’ political party – the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (New Society Movement, KBL) – to form their own parties or switch to the other side. Thus, the party system remained fluid and underdeveloped as these newly emergent parties failed to consolidate into large, mass-based national parties.

10 487 Party ch10.indd 192 27/7/12 12:41:12

Since 1987, a number of parties and coalitions have been organized and dissolved in successive local and national elections. The effective number of parties (ENP) nationwide in the post-authoritarian Philippines has been placed at 2.6 (Hicken 2009), though abstract figures do not capture the complexities of party mergers and switching of legislators between parties (see Tomsa in Chapter 2 of this volume). Generally though, between 1992 and 2010, two parties have consistently demonstrated positive votes/seats conversion, while another party has steadily declined in performance. In the 2010 national elections, two pre-martial law political parties have experienced a resurgence while only one among the post-Marcos parties – Lakas – has consistently enjoyed positive gains as compared to the LDP and NPC (see Table 10.1). The relative strength of Lakas was drawn from its performance as the ruling party under two presidential administrations (Fidel Ramos and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo). The LDP has continuously lost its share of the votes while NPC has managed to maintain its modest share. The two traditional parties – NP and LP – have shown positive signs of revived strength as they slowly gain modest shares of the votes. However, the constant shifting of candidates from one party to another has also contributed to the high volatility in the voters' choice.

The regular split and merger of political parties into ad hoc coalitions further weakens party linkages in society, thus replacing 'democratic accountability' with 'clientelistic accountability'. Clientelistic accountability 'represents a transaction, the direct exchange of citizens' vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services' (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2). The weak citizen–party linkages can be further observed with the results of the public opinion surveys conducted by Pulse Asia in March 2010 where an extremely high 91 percent of respondents did not identify with any political party (see Table 10.2). Only 3.8 percent identified with the Liberal Party (LP), 1.9 percent with the Nacionalista Party (NP), 0.9 percent with the Pwersang Masang Pilipino (Force of the Pilipino Masses, PMP), and only 0.4 percent with the Lakas Kampi CMD. Among these parties, the two traditional parties enjoyed support across all demographic characteristics. On the other hand, the populist PMP of former President Joseph Estrada and the once dominant Lakas party of two presidential administrations both performed dismally even among its core constituencies.

The institutional configurations that emerged in the post-Marcos period serve to propagate and sustain clientelistic exchanges among parties and voters. But what are the mechanisms for clientelistic exchange in the Philippines? Figure 10.1 presents the logic of clientelism in the House of Representatives. The following sections will discuss the elements that bind parties and voters into clientelistic linkages, with specific focus on legislative parties. Particular attention will be paid to the prevalence of political clans, the phenomenon of party switching, the emergence of dominant yet short-lived parties as well as pork barrel arrangements.

Table 10.1 Percentage of votes/seats obtained by all relevant parties in the House of Representatives, 1992–2010

	Lakas Kampi CMD		*LDP*		*NPC*		*LP*		*NP*	
	Votes	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*
1992	21.2	20.1	45.0	66.7	18.7	15.1	6.9[a]	4.2	3.9	3.5
1995	40.7[b]	49.0	10.8	8.3	12.2	10.8	1.9	2.5	0.8	1.0
1998	49.0	53.9	26.7[c]	27.0	4.1	4.4	7.3	7.3	–	–
2001	35.0	35.6	10.0	10.2	21.0	19.5	7.0	9.2	0.1	–
2004	35.3	44.3	7.6	5.2	19.6	25.2	11.0	13.8	0.5	1.0
2007	25.5	38.0	1.5	1.3	10.9	11.6	8.7	6.6	1.5	3.3
2010	38.5	37.1	0.5	0.7	15.3	10.8	20.3	15.8	11.4	9.0

Source: Commission on Elections (COMELEC), various years.

Notes

a In coalition with the PDP-Laban fielded common slate of candidates

b The Lakas NUCD-UMDP and the LDP formed a national coalition but also fielded separate congressional slates

c The LDP was the core party in the Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Struggle of the Nationalist Philippine Masses, LAMMP)coalition, together with the NPC and the Partido ng Masang Pilipino (Party of the Filipino Masses, PMP)

10 487 Party ch10.indd 194 27/7/12 12:41:13

Table 10.2 Citizen–party linkages based on Pulse Asia survey, March 2010*

	None	*LP*	*NP*	*PMP*	*Lakas*	*NPC*	*Others*
Total	91.0	3.8	1.9	0.9	0.4	0.0	1.3
Occupation							
Working	90.1	3.5	2.2	1.5	0.5	0.1	2.4
Government	88.3	2.9	2.3	–	1.6	–	5.7
Private	92.0	3.1	1.5	1.3	0.5	–	1.9
Self-employed	89.0	3.5	2.6	1.9	0.4	0.1	2.5
Farmer/Fisherfolk	91.6	3.8	2.2	1.4	0.3	–	1.2
Not working	91.9	4.2	1.5	0.5	0.4	0	1.1
Classa							
ABC	84.4	8.6	3.8	0.3	0.6	–	2.2
D	91.6	3.8	1.2	0.9	0.4	0.0	1.4
E	91.5	2.7	2.7	1.2	0.3	0.1	1.5
Locale							
Urban	89.1	4.6	2.0	1.0	0.4	0.1	3.2
Rural	92.9	3.1	1.8	1.0	0.4	–	1.3

Source: Pulse Asia (2010).

Note
* Respondents who identified with a political party or not.

Political clans

In the Philippines, clans, not parties, have been the building blocks of politics. Through the years, the adaptive strategies of the political clans have mirrored the country's shifting contours within the socio-economic and political terrain. More than the seemingly immutable and unequal socio-economic structure, continuing clan dominance is both the reason for as well as a product of the failure to develop a truly democratic electoral and party system[10] (Teehankee 2001, 2007).

As part of the Filipino politicians' effort to internalize the benefits of political office, the 'political clan' has become the most prevalent and preferred form of organization in local politics. In the absence of stable party organizations, the clan provides a ready corps of supporters through longstanding personal networks (De Dios 2007). As McCoy (1994: 10) emphasizes,

> such familial coalitions bring some real strengths to the competition for political office and profitable investments. A kinship network has a unique capacity to create an informal political team that assigns specialized roles to its members, thereby maximizing condition and influence.

Dependence on local political clans as the vehicle for clientelistic exchanges by national level politicians (i.e., president and senators) provides a strong disincentive for the institutionalization of political parties. Moreover, congress acts as a nexus for national–local clientelistic exchanges, thereby encouraging

10 487 Party ch10.indd 195 27/7/12 12:41:13

PRE-ELECTION

Political clans

Yes

No
(may or may not join
administration party)

Administration party

Yes
('pork barrel' in
aid of re-election)

No
(opposition party)

Strong presidential
candidate

Yes

No

Switch parties
('bandwagon effect')

POST-ELECTION

Winning
presidential
candidate

Yes

No

Switch parties

Dominant party
(access to
'pork barrel' and
legislative
committees)

REPEAT IN NEXT
ELECTION CYCLE

Figure 10.1 Mechanics of party-based clientelism in the House of Representatives.

10 487 Party ch10.indd 196 27/7/12 12:41:13

party-switching and the formation of short-lived dominant parties. Table 10.3 presents the percentage of political clan members who were affiliated with the ruling party from 1984 to 2010. For the 15th Congress elected in 2010, Table 10.4 presents the percentage breakdown of dynastic and non-dynastic members based on a study conducted by Mendoza *et al.* (2011).[11]

The political clan makes it possible to accumulate political capital beyond the term limits, even the lifetime, of a single politician. Indeed, families readily provide a vehicle for long-term generational clientelistic bonds (Muno 2010). One of the main adaptive strategies for clan survival is to build 'political dynasties' in which members of the same clan seek to occupy as many local positions available, and to continuously succeed each other in these positions. This is usually achieved by capturing the most potent combination of local executive power with access to national resources (e.g., holding the congressional district seat together with the gubernatorial seat or big city mayoralty seat) (De Dios 2007).

Limited party competition as a result of dynastic and clientelistic politics is not limited to developing democracies like the Philippines. Even in well-developed democracies like Japan, hereditary politicians or *Seshū Giin* 'inherit' their parliamentary seats through family connections and well-oiled political

Table 10.3 Percentage of political clan members affiliated with the ruling party, 1984–2010*

Year	*Dominant party*	*Political clan (%)*
1984	KBL	36.8
1987	LDP	54.0
1992	Lakas NUCD	52.1
1995	Lakas NUCD-UMDP	62.7
1998	LAMMP	55.9
2001	Lakas CMD	52.4
2004	Kampi	67.7
2007	Lakas Kampi CMD	60.8
2010	Liberal Party	50.7

Source: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives, various years.

Note
* Based on party affiliation in the legislature.

Table 10.4 Percentage of dynastic and non-dynastic members of political parties in the 15th Congress

Party	*Dynastic (%)*	*Non-dynastic (%)*
NP	81	19
Lakas Kampi	76	24
NPC	74	26
LP	57	43

Source: Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap (2011).

machines. For each parliamentary election, the average percentage of dynastic legislators elected is about 25 percent (Asako *et al.* 2010). The incidence of dynastic politics in the Philippines, however, is higher compared to other selected legislatures in the world. Currently, the Philippine Congress has the highest percentage of elected dynastic legislators at 68 percent; followed by Mexico at 40 percent; Japan at 33 percent; and Argentina at 10 percent. The US Congress has only 6 percent elected dynasts (Mendoza *et al.* 2011).

Party switching

Another constant element in clientelistic practices in Philippine politics is party switching.[12] The party switching behavior of individual politicians relates to the policy switching behavior of parties (Montinola 1999). Widely practiced in the Philippines, party switching often occurs twice in an election cycle: (1) *pre-election party switching* – when candidates file their nomination papers and raise campaign funds; and, (2) *post-election party switching* – when elected officials affiliate themselves with the winning party to gain access to patronage. Kasuya (2009: 121) observes, on average

> about 40% of incumbent House members and about 25% of incumbent Senators switched their party affiliation from one election to the next during the period from 1946 to 2004. These ratios are comparable to or even higher than Brazil, where party switching is known to be rampant.

Table 10.5 summarizes the incidence of party switching in the House of Representatives, from the 8th to 15th Congress between 1987 and 2010. An average of 33.5 percent of district representatives elected to the House shifted parties. This rate of party switching during this period is at par with the Italian case where approximately a quarter of the members of the Italian lower house switched parties at least once during the 1996–2001 legislature; and, the Brazilian case where more than one-third of MPs elected in 1986 had transferred from one party to another by the late 1990s (Heller and Mershon 2009).

Heller and Mershon (2011) distinguish party switching between ‘outswitch’ and ‘inswitch’. The former refers to the abandonment of one party label in favor of another, while the latter points to the formal adoption of a new label after having another label. Usually (but not always) one leads to another. In terms of direction, an average of 60.05 percent of all party switchers between 1987 and 2010 moved to the ruling or dominant party (Table 10.6). In fact, party switching has greatly contributed to the post-Marcos era emergence of short-lived dominant parties.

Dominant parties

Party-switching has fueled the rise of monolithic parties that have dominated several administrations in the past three decades – from the *Kilusang Bagong*

Table 10.5 Party switching in the House of Representatives, 8th to 15th Congress (1987–2010)

	1987	*1992*	*1995*	*1998*	*2001*	*2004*	*2007*	*2010*
Total Number of District Reresentatives	200 (100%)	201 (100%)	203 (100%)	208 (100%)	211 (100%)	211 (100%)	219 (100%)	229 (100%)
District Representatives who shifted parties	154 (77.0%)	100 (49.8%)	39 (19.2%)	92 (44.2%)	20 (9.5%)	77 (36.5%)	17 (7.8%)	55 (24.0%)
District Representatives who did not shift parties	46 (23.0%)	101 (50.2%)	164 (80.8%)	116 (55.8%)	191 (90.5%)	134 (63.5%)	202 (92.2%)	174 (76.0%)
District Representatives who shifted to dominant party	150 (75.0%)	88 (43.8%)	14 (6.9%)	86 (41.3%)	5 (2.4%)	38 (18.0%)	7 (3.2%)	28 (12.2%)

Source: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives, various years.

Table 10.6 Percentage of party switchers who switched to the dominant party, 1987–2010*

Year	*Dominant party*	*Party switchers (%)***
1987	LDP	97.4
1992	Lakas NUCD	88.0
1995	Lakas NUCD	35.9
1998	LAMMP	93.5
2001	Lakas CMD	25.0
2004	Kampi	49.4
2007	Lakas Kampi CMD	41.2
2010	Liberal Party	50.9

Source: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives, various years.

Notes
* based on party affiliation in the legislature.
** based on total number of House party-switchers from 1987 to 2010.

Lipunan (New Society Movement, KBL) under Ferdinand Marcos, to the *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (Fight of the Filipino Democrat, LDP) during the term of Corazon Aquino, followed by the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP (Strength-National Union of Christian Democrats-Union of Muslim Democrats) founded by Fidel Ramos, and the *Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino* (Struggle of the Nationalist Philippine Masses, LAMMP) of Joseph Estrada. These parties, however, were largely built around vast networks of well-entrenched political clans and dynasties that constantly switch their affiliation from one administration party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage.

In the post-Marcos period, the Lakas NUCD-UMDP became the country's dominant political party, when it defeated the LDP in the 1992 presidential elections. The LDP (founded in 1988) was the dominant party in the ruling coalition under the administration of President Corazon Aquino. Lakas, on the other hand, was formed in 1991 by allies of President Aquino who opted to support Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos and not the LDP presidential candidate.

Under the administration of President Ramos, the LDP entered into a short-lived coalition with Lakas NUCD-UMDP to contest the 1995 congressional elections. In 1998, the LDP coalesced with the opposition NPC and a minor party to form the *Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino* (LAMMP) to defeat the Lakas presidential candidate. In the 2004 synchronized elections, the ruling Lakas CMD, LP and a handful of minor parties formed the victorious *Koalisyonng Karanasan at Katapatan sa Kinabukasan* (Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future, K4). On the other hand, the LDP together with some minor opposition parties formed the *Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino* (Coalition of United Filipinos, KNP). The NPC split its ranks to support both the administration and opposition coalitions. The *Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino* (Partner of the Free Filipino, Kampi), the political party founded by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 1997, only had one seat in the House of Representatives in 2001. By 2007, the party had increased its number to 51 seats, making it the

second largest party in the lower chamber. In 2010, Lakas CMD merged with Kampi to form the Lakas Kampi CMD (LKC).

After 45 years out of power, the Liberal Party (LP) recaptured the presidency and a significant number of congressional seats in the tightly contested national elections of 2010. Being the second oldest and longest functioning political party in the country, the LP has found itself either dispensing or being starved of patronage at different junctures of its existence. From 1946 to 1972, it regularly alternated into power with the Nacionalista Party (NP) under a formal two-party system until authoritarianism became the only game in town under the Marcos dictatorship.

With the restoration of democratic rule in 1986, it contented itself with being a junior coalition partner to the various party monoliths that dominated the post-Marcos electoral terrain. Riding on a crest of strong anti-corruption voters' sentiment and the immense popularity of the son of the late democratic icon Corazon Aquino, the LP succeeded in getting Benigno S. Aquino III elected as the fifteenth president of the Philippines. No sooner than the proclamation of the new president had been announced, defectors from the losing parties started jumping onto the LP bandwagon. Thus, from an original number of 45 elected representatives, the party's ranks in the lower chamber nearly doubled, enabling it to capture the House speakership.[13] Like previous dominant parties, the LP managed to attract party defectors through the promise of pork and privilege.

Pork-barrel politics

The mobilization and use of 'pork barrel' for clientelistic politics is one of the legacies of American colonial tutelage in the Philippines.[14] Pork barrel allocations are 'budgetary spending intended to benefit limited groups of constituents in return for their political supports' (Noda 2011: 3). The first pork barrel legislation in the Philippines was the 1922 public works act (Act No. 3044) passed by the National Assembly during the American colonial period. From 1922 to 1949, the pork barrel portion of the annual public works act came in the form of lump sum appropriation. However, an innovation was introduced in 1950 that allowed Congress to identify the projects. By 1955, another innovation was introduced that completely segregated legislature-sponsored items of public works from all other items in the national budget. From 1956 to 1962, these pork barrel items called 'community projects' were further divided into congressmen's projects and the senators' 'nationwide selected projects' (Gutierrez 1998).

Pork-barrel politics was interrupted during the Marcos dictatorship when he centralized patronage under his authoritarian regime. With the restoration of the bicameral Congress in 1987, the practice of pork barrel was revived and was instrumental in mobilizing legislative and political support for the presidency. Thus, the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) was created in 1990 with an initial funding of P2.3 billion for projects in all congressional districts and the national constituency of senators. In 2000, the CDF was replaced by the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) (Nograles and Lagman 2008).

Under its current incarnation, legislative pork barrel is divided into two types: 'soft' and 'hard' infrastructure projects. The former are identified and implemented under the PDAF and refer to non-infrastructure projects like scholarship programs, medical assistance to indigent patients in government hospitals, livelihood support programs, the purchase of IT equipment and financial assistance to Local Governments Units (LGUs). The latter are small infrastructure projects reflected in the General Appropriations Act under individual district allocations and under the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) locally funded nationwide lump sum appropriations (Nograles and Lagman 2008).

Pork-barreling, according to Kasuya (2009), is the first major method of providing patronage in the Philippines. Through credit claiming and political machine building, a Filipino politician can translate pork barrel into political advantage leading to re-election. Kawanaka (2007) identifies two kinds of explanation for pork barrel distribution in Congress: 'supply-side' and 'demand-side'. The former focuses on leadership discretion and control over party members in congress through the mobilization of pork barrel. The latter emphasizes the legislator's status in congress, their expertise and seniority, as determining factors in the distributions. Noda (2011), however, stresses that pork-barrel politics takes place on four major stages during the course of budget formulation; namely, (a) lump-sum allocations, (b) congressional insertions, (c) disbursement specification/impoundment, and (d) initial basic allocation.[15] While a truly comprehensive empirical and historical study of pork-barrel politics based on complete datasets still remains to be written, Table 10.7 presents a snapshot view of how the power over pork barrel distribution is wielded by a sitting president.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the then ruling Lakas party utilized the allocation of pork for consolidating political support amidst allegations of fraud committed by her party in the 2004 presidential election. The allegation of fraud was only substantiated in June 2005, with the release of recordings of wiretapped conversations between the president and a high-ranking election official. Arroyo

Table 10.7 Amount of pork barrel distributed to representatives according to party affiliation, 2005–2006

Parties	*Amount (in Pesos)*	*Share (%)*
Lakas CMD	404,486,000	40.8
Kampi	210,000,000	21.2
NPC	160,000,000	16.1
Liberal (administration)	102,070,000	10.3
Nacionalista	55,000,000	5.5
LDP	29,900,000	3.0
Independents	20,000,000	2.0
Liberal (opposition)	10,748,500	1.1
Total	992,204,500	100

Source: Data culled from Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

avoided impeachment primarily through the use of pork-barrel politics. The bulk of pork barrel releases for the fiscal year 2005–2006 went to the ruling party (40.8 percent) and the rest of its coalition partners (47.6 percent). Pork barrel releases were withheld from most of the members of the main opposition party, the Liberal Party (LP). It got the lowest pork barrel share at 1.1 percent.

Clientelistic cluster networks at the local level

The previous section discussed national-level clientelistic relationships between the chief patron (the president) and his/her clients (members of Congress). The next section will discuss the mechanics of local clientelistic networks. It will delineate the decline of the traditional patron–client factional (*pcf)* ties and the emergence of new forms of clientelistic cluster networks (*ccn*).

From dyads to clusters

New forms of patron–client ties emerged from the gradual erosion of social and economic status of traditional landowners in the Philippines, as in most developing societies. While democracy creates space for representation and accountability, it also provides incentives for nurturing new kinds of clientelistic bonds (Szwarcberg 2009). The emergence of the 'broker', for example, resulted from the increased linkages between what formerly had been relatively isolated communities ruled by one or more traditional landowners and the outside world (Archer 1989). The 'broker' emerged as a mediator between patron and client, particularly where patrons have many clients. Thus, the personal ties between patron and client have diminished and the dyad is transformed into a triad or even more complex relations, even though dyadic relationships may still be at the core of the clientelistic exchanges that occur between patrons, brokers and clients. In essence, the broker is the client of a patron and performs the role of patron to lower-tiered clients by distributing resources from the upper-tiered patron (Muno 2010).

Muno (2010) contests Kitschelt and Wilkinson's (2007) characterization of clientelism as a principal-agent relationship. He finds it problematic to treat electoral constituents as principals and politicians as agents since this turns the social relationship between patron and clients upside down. The principal-agent approach, Muno proposes, is a better description of the relationship between the patron and broker. In his view, the patron is the principal instructing the broker as the agent with the management of his affairs, thereby, creating a triangular relation that can cover various levels: a clientelistic pyramid, a complex hierarchical organization, and a hierarchical network system.

However, in the Philippines, the delineation of these network systems is often amorphous and not as clear-cut to be illustrated in the traditional clientelistic, pyramidical, and hierarchical organizations. At the local level, patrons can be brokers and clients; and brokers can be clients of higher patrons, while most clients do not know their patron nor each other. The clan also plays a big role in

cementing the ties that bind these networks. As De Dios (2007: 175) astutely observes,

> Neat as the categories of patron, boss and broker are, it is unhelpful to pose a static image for political leaders; categories shade into each other. One and the same local official may be seen to perform differing roles at different times, a possibility that may perplex observers wont to prefer neater distinctions. A benevolent 'patron' could in the next instance act as a warlord, or then again use massive money inducements to stay in power.

Thus, it may be more appropriate to speak of 'clientelistic cluster networks' (*ccn*) to capture the fluidity of power relations in Philippine local politics. Figure 10.2 is a stylized infographic of the typical configuration of 'clientelistic cluster networks' in the Philippine province, city, or municipality.[16]

The crucial role of the broker in the organization and sustenance of clientelistic networks in Philippine local politics remains relatively unexplored by scholars and academics. Unlike the literature in Latin America (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia) and other countries in Southeast Asia (especially Thailand, see Bjarnegård and Sirivunnabood in Chapters 8 and 9 of this volume), not much has been written about political brokers in the Philippines. The following is an initial discussion of the rise of brokers – more popularly known as 'political operators' – in contemporary Philippine politics.



Figure 10.2 Clientelistic cluster networks at the local level.

Enter the political operators

The literature basically defines a broker as 'a mediator between patron and client, especially, when the patron has many clients' (Muno 2010: 3). Brokers serve as 'intermediaries on whom parties rely to target and distribute inducements while monitoring voter participation' (Szwarcberg 2009: 2). They are generally tasked with targetting potential voters, mobilizing them for local political rallies, and getting them out to vote (or not to vote) through whatever means possible.

In the Philippines, the role of brokers in the maintenance of clientelistic networks in the post-authoritarian period has largely been unexplored. Except for some accounts by investigative journalists, not much has been written about the growing influence of political operators. A political operator is usually tasked with carrying out both legitimate and illegitimate 'special operations' for political campaigns.[17] In the local political parlance, a political operator is 'a politically oriented person capable of linking up with local leadership' (Tordesillas 1998: 76). In recent years, three types of political operators have emerged in the Philippine political scene: *(1) the fiscal brokers; (2) the insiders; and, (3) former communist activist organizers.* Again, these categories are not clear-cut and may often overlap with one another. They also operate on different levels or tiers of national and local government.

The 'fiscal brokers' are upper-tier operators (usually nationally elected politicians or their brokers strategically appointed to key positions in the bureaucracy) who presume a 'mandate to speak on behalf of their home province and, to a lesser extent, the region [that] could be leveraged to reinforce their national influence' (De Dios 2007: 174). Often, fiscal brokers are also patrons to smaller groups of clients. They are akin to the traditional regional brokers who were often used to expand the control of the central government and to increase its political integration (Kettering 1988). In the past, a quintessential example of a successful fiscal broker was Sergio Osmeña Sr. of Cebu, who parlayed his role as House Speaker during the American colonial rule and second President of the Commonwealth to earn a reputation for delivering central government funding into his province and region in the form of infrastructure projects. Osmeña Sr was not from the traditional landed class, nor was he involved in warlord violence predominant in those days. The clan he founded instead cultivated a reputation for 'delivering the goods' to their regional, provincial, and city constituents (Mojares 1994; De Dios 2007).

Presently, fiscal brokers tend to maintain a close network of public works contractors, who are reliable sources of campaign funds and money to oil the local political machines. A recent trend in Philippine politics is the emergence of 'politician contractors' – public work contractors who have successfully ran for congressional and local seats. They have become a sizable bloc in the House of Representatives and have managed to defeat old time political clans in their respective constituencies. Once elected, they spend most of their time lobbying for their public works contracts with the national government (Ronqullo 2009).

The 'insiders' are upper-to-middle tier operators who have spent a large part of their professional careers in national and/or local government agencies. Their stint in government has enabled them to form important networks within and outside the bureaucracy, which enables them to offer their services to prospective clients such as local candidates and aspiring national politicians. The Marcos-era Ministry of Local Governments, for example, under then-Minister Jose Roño has produced an impressive network of master strategists who would make names for themselves long after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. They include Ronaldo Puno – key strategist in the electoral victory of three presidents (Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo) and Gabriel Claudio – political affairs adviser to two presidents (Fidel Ramos and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo) (Ronqullo 2009). Virgilio Garcillano of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is another perfect example of an inside political operator. Garcillano's wiretapped conversations with Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on cheating in the 2004 presidential elections triggered a full-blown crisis of legitimacy in 2005. As an election technocrat and career bureaucrat, he has accumulated deep knowledge on election laws and procedures drawn from 40 years of field experience. More importantly, he has developed a wide network of operatives, especially in Mindanao where historically most electoral frauds have been committed. Consequently, Garcillano was a 'technocrat of fraud' whose expertise included the setting up of infrastructure for large-scale election cheating (Coronel 2005)

Finally, the 'former communist activist organizers' can be considered low-tier operatives since they conduct their activities exclusively at the local level. They are former members of the underground Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) who have left the revolutionary movement and have become political operators. Given their unique skills in political organizing in the community, they have become a key component in national and local campaign organizations throughout the country. A number of former revolutionaries, for example, formed the grassroots campaign machinery that catapulted former actor Joseph Estrada to the presidency in 1998. Ironically, it was also another group of former communists who participated in the ouster of Estrada in 2001 through a people power uprising (Rimban 2004).

Most of these former revolutionaries left or were forced to leave the party during the intense ideological conflict that split the CPP into several factions. Pragmatism has pushed them to offer their services to politicians in order to earn a living. The organizing skills they have honed through years of mobilizing people are put to good use through rallies, motorcades, house-to-house campaigns, and other election campaign activities. In effect, the former Leftists 'have an edge in the sense that they represent a hybrid of conventional election campaigns and guerilla tactics' (Rimban 2004: 20). In addition, they have established an informal network around the country which they can easily tap into for their campaign activities.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Rise of the machines

The advent of modernity, and corresponding shifts in the local political economy, have resulted in the depersonalization of the dyadic patron–client in rural areas and the emergence of political machines. Hence, the nature of the relationship between leaders and their followers has also been transformed from consensual to contractual (Machado 1974).

Political machines are specialized organizations set up for the purpose of mobilizing and influencing voter outcome through the dispensation of social, economic or material benefits. These benefits are essentially patronage in the form of jobs, services, favors, and money distributed to voters and supporters. Patronage-driven parties built around coalitions of political machines have become vehicles for raiding the state and distributing political and economic largesse.

In Philippine local politics, political machines are the main organizational expression of clan politics. Kinship networks, for example, serve to consolidate wealth and power, and provide the base for the establishment of a political machine. Beyond the utilization of personal wealth, access to state resources serves as an additional means of mobilizing electoral support through political machines. When the machine functions properly, there is no need to utilize coercion or violence. A combination of adaptive strategies has enabled political clans to maintain their dominance in congressional and local politics.

Looking back at Figure 10.2, the typical local clan manages to reproduce itself by running for as many elective positions as its members can, and bequeathing these posts to clan members upon reaching their term limits. Aside from the wealth and resources they accumulate by using their political offices, they also raid the national and local bureaucracy for patronage and clientelistic goods that are used to oil their political machine. The machine is also embedded in the local bureaucracy by putting their trusted lieutenants in key positions such as District School Superintendent, Police Director, Military Commander, Election Supervisor, Barangay or Village officials, etc.

The reach of the clan's machine may extend to the local economy with local businesses as sources of bribes and campaign funds. Sources of funds may come from both legitimate and illegitimate sources such as regular campaign contributions from the Filipino Chinese (*Tsinoy*) community or kickbacks (commonly called 'Standard Operating Procedure' or SOP) facilitated by government contractors. Another source of illicit funds are underworld activities such as the illegal lottery (known as *jueteng*) or drug-trafficking (labelled as narco-politics).

In terms of local political marketing and communications, it is usually helpful to seek the assistance of local print and broadcast media, particularly local journalists and radio commentators. In some areas, the local clan invests in local newspapers and radio stations. Another recent trend is the use of media and sports celebrities in endorsing local candidacies. Some political machines even recruit these celebrities to their ticket and encourage them to run for local (and even national) positions. One example is world boxing champion Manny Pacquiao who was elected representative of his province in Mindanao.

The machine's political operators play an integral role of networking with the various sectors of civil society. One important source of support are the local faith-based organizations. While the parishes run by the Catholic priests continue to wield some influence in the local community, it is the *Iglesia ni Cristo* (Church of Christ or INC) – an indigenous Christian religious organization – that is a reliable source of votes in local and national elections. The INC practices bloc voting depending on the endorsement of its Executive Minister. Social Weather Stations (SWS) surveys have placed its vote conversion rate between 68 and 84 percent (Laylo 2001). In recent years, the Catholic charismatic group El Shaddai has similarly practiced bloc voting and has actively supported both local and national elections.

The role of the political operators is also important in networking with the numerous people's organizations, advocacy groups, and non-government organizations operating in the local community. Since most political operators are former activists themselves, they can use their personal ties to solicit political support from these organizations. In other cases, the operators also negotiate with local armed groups composed of insurgent organizations like the Communist Party of the Philippines; secessionist movements like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and even local terrorist cells like the Abu Sayyaf for permission to campaign in the areas controlled by these groups.

Conclusion: persistence of patronage, endurance of clientelism

A century of party politics, four party systems, a multitude of parties; and yet Filipino political parties are still largely built around vast networks of well-entrenched political clans and dynasties that constantly switch their affiliation from one administration party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage. Far from developing into vehicles for programmatic citizen–party linkages, Filipino parties have evolved into patronage-based, office-seeking organizations largely built around dominant local political clans and warlords and anchored on clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than on issues, ideologies, and party platforms.

Scholars have prematurely dismissed the influence of clientelism in shaping political exchange in developing societies. In the Philippines, clientelism (usually expressed in the form of patronage politics) has proven to be more resilient and adaptive to the shifting contours of economy and society. In the heydays of the largely agricultural-based economy, dyadic ties between prosperous patrons and dependent clients at the local level formed the basis for the national two party system. With rapid urbanization came the decline of plantation-based patron–client ties based on consensual political exchange, and the emergence of the urban-based machine politics anchored on contractual political transactions.

A combination of weak central bureaucracy and strong local autonomy has contributed to the capture and weakening of state autonomy by competing and diverse social interests that include dominant social classes, political clans,

10 487 Party ch10.indd 208 27/7/12 12:41:14

powerful families, and other entrenched particularistic groups. These groups have managed to perpetuate themselves in power by building local political dynasties that constantly negotiate political exchanges with the national political leadership through the president and Congress. Through credit claiming and political machine building, a Filipino politician can translate pork barrel into political advantage leading to re-election.

In post-authoritarian Philippine politics, party-based national clientelistic politics continues to be based on local clientelistic and brokerage networks. The traditional patron–client factional (*pcf)* dyads have morphed into more complex clientelistic cluster networks (*ccn*). The political operator has emerged as the main broker of clientelistic goods and services at the local level. Political operators are the wheels that crank the local political machines with money, jobs, and services as lubricant.

The root cause of the underdeveloped parties and party system in the Philippines is the weak institutionalization of citizen–party linkages. The weak party linkage in society results in the rise and fall of transient parties, a process that weakens democratic accountability and enhances clientelistic accountability. Citizen participation is the critical foundation upon which democracy is built. Political parties are vehicles for enabling citizens to engage and reconnect with the institutions and processes of democracy. Citizenship is nurtured on values, knowledge, and practice. Parties can perform an integral function in citizen education and voter education activities as part of their constituency-building activities. The challenge for political reformers is to foster greater citizen–party linkages by replacing clientelistic accountability with democratic accountability. A difficult but attainable task.

Notes

1 The *pcf* framework is a derivative of the socio-cultural approach in politics – exploring the variations in social structure or political culture and correlating these to electoral and party behavior. Recently, the literature has shifted focus to emphasize the significance of state and institutions instead of social relations and culture. Tan and Manacsa (2005: 750), for example, argue ‘that certain types of institution can significantly inhibit the ability of parties to endow social conflicts with a political form.’

2 The first political party established in the Philippines was the *Partido Federalista* founded in 1900. The Philippines has experienced four party systems: a predominant party system during the American colonial period (1900–1935); a formal two-party system during the postwar republic (1946–1972); an authoritarian dominant party system during the Marcos dictatorship (1978–1986); and the current multiparty system (since 1987).

3 The word ‘clientelism’ originated from the Latin term ‘cluere’, which means ‘to listen, to obey’. In ancient Rome, ‘clientela’ were a group of persons who had someone speaking for them in public, the ‘patronus’ (Muno 2010: 3).

4 For some authors, clientelistic relationships also need to be personal and voluntary. However, these elements are more contested in the literature than iteration, status inequality, and reciprocity. For a comprehensive review of the literature on clientelism see Muno (2010).

5 The institutional argument known as 'path dependency' asserts that 'when a government program or organization embarks upon a path there is inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to persist. That path may be altered, but it requires a good deal of political pressure to produce that change' (Peters 1999: 63).

6 The Nacionalista Party (NP), or one of its factions since it was divided between the Quezon and Osmeña camps twice in 1922 and 1933, dominated electoral politics throughout the pre-war period. It continued its dominance from the inauguration of the Commonwealth Government in 1935 until the establishment of the Third Philippine Republic in 1946.

7 Hicken (2009) asserted that presidentialism generally discourages the development of a structured party system. Moreover, the electoral systems for the House (single majority district plurality) and Senate (national block vote system) give candidates strong incentives to pursue a personalistic strategy while discounting the value of party label.

8 Article IX-C, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides that 'a free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people…'

9 Since President Corazon C. Aquino refused to form her own political party, an assorted array of political parties that supported her candidacy in 1986 formed a coalition to carry the administration banner. The *Lakas ng Bayan* coalition was composed of the *Partido Demokratiko Pilipino – Lakas ng Bayan* (PDP-Laban), Liberal Party (LP), *Lakas ng Bansa* (*Lakas*), United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD), and the *Bansang Nagkaisasa Diwa* at Layunin (BANDILA).

10 Collins (2004: 231) defines a clan as 'an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds. Affective ties of kinship are its essence, constituting the identity and bonds of its organization. These bonds are both vertical and horizontal, linking elites and non-elites, and they reflect both actual blood ties and fictive kinship.'

11 Mendoza *et al.* (2011) define 'dynasty' as 'The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congresses, and at least one legislator from the 15th Congress, and at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007, and at least one local government official elected in 2010.'

12 Heller and Mershon (2009: 9) provide a general definition of party switching as a 'change in party affiliation.'

13 Unlike its predecessors, however, the LP placed a limit to the number of switchers accepted into the party. Just enough to secure and maintain its hold on the speakership post.

14 'Pork barrel' refers to 'state resources over which individual politicians exercise dispensal powers … and … the source of funding for many a politician's electoral base' (Gutierrez 1998: 59).

15 The initial results of the empirical analyses of Kawanaka (2002) and Noda (2011) both point to a lack of statistical significance in the conventional view that political alliance with the President is the determining factor for infrastructure budget allocation. However, both studies suffered from limited data. Moreover, the two admitted to their inability to account for party switching as among the possible sources of inaccuracy in their model.

16 The infographic was adapted from the Social Forces Map found in the 2011 Philippine Civil Society Index but the illustrated configuration in this chapter was originally conceptualized by this author.

17 Special operations can cover a wide range of election tactics from opposition research, black propaganda, psychological warfare, to outright cheating and vote-buying.

10 487 Party ch10.indd 210

27/7/12 12:41:14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

References

Abinales, P. N. and Amoroso, D. J. (2005) *State and Society in the Philippines*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.

Anderson, B. (1988) ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams’, *New Left Review*, 169(3): 3-31.

Archer, R. P. (1989) *The Transition from Traditional to Broker Clientelism in Colombia: Political Stability and Social Unrest*. Available at: http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa1989/files/ArcherRonald.pdf (accessed 14 February 2012).

Asako, Y., Iida, T., Matsubayashi, T., and Ueda, M. (2011) *Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan*. Online. Available at: www.yasushiasako.com/dynasty.pdf (accessed 11 September 2011).

Collins, K. (2004) ‘The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from Central Asian Trajectories’, *World Politics*, 56(2): 224–261.

Coronel, S. (2005) ‘Virigilio Garcillano*: Master Operator’, I-Report*. Online. Available at: http://pcij.org/i-report/special/garcillano.html (accessed 19 March 2012).

Cullinane, M. (2003) Ilustrado Politics: *Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

De Dios, Emmanuel S. (2007) ‘Local Politics and Local Economy’, in Hill, H. and Balisacan, A. C. (eds), *The Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in Southeast Asia*. City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., and Nichter, S. (2010) *Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections*. Online. Available at: http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jlg562/documents/Gans- MorseMazzucaNichter--clientelism.pdf (accessed 11 September 2011).

Giliomee, H. B., and Simkins, C. E. W., (1999) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. London: Routledge

Gutierrez, E. (1998) ‘The Public Purse’, in Coronel, S. S. (ed.) *Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.

Heller, W. B., and Mershon, C. (2009) *Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Hicken, A. (2009) *Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hicken, A. (2011) ‘Clientelism’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14, 289-310.

Hopkin, J. ‘Conceptualizing political clientelism: Political exchange and democratic theory’, paper presented at American Political Science Association annual meeting, Philadelphia, 31 August–3 September 2006.

Hutchcroft, P. D. (2000) ‘Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900–1913’, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 59(2): 277–306.

Hutchcroft, P. D., and Rocamora, J. (2003) ‘Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines’, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 3: 259-292.

Kasuya, Y. (2009) *Presidential Bandwagon: Parties and Party Systems in the Philippines*, Manila: Anvil.

Kawanaka, T. (2002) *Power in a Philippine City*. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies/Japan External Trade Organization.

Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (1995) Toward a More Comprehensive Analysis of Philippine Politics: Beyond the Patron-Client, *Factional Framework. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 26(2): 401-419.

Kettering, S. (1988) 'The Historical Development of Political Clientelism', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 23(3): 419-447.

Kimura, M. (1997) *Elections and politics: Philippine style (A case in Lipa)*. Manila: De La Salle University Press.

Kitschelt H. (2007) 'The Demise of Clientelism in Affluent Capitalist Democracies', in Kitschelt, H., and Wilkinson, S. I. (eds) *Patron, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. I. (2007) 'Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction', in Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. I. (eds) *Patron, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Landé, C. H. (1965) *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics*. Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.

Landé, C. H. (1977) 'The dyadic basis of clientelism', in Schmidt, S. W., Scott, J. C., Landé, C. H., and Gusty, L. (eds.), *Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Lane, J. E. and Ersson, S. O., 2000, *The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes*. London: Routledge.

Laylo, J. (2001). '*INC Solid as Usual, Muslims and Couples for Christ Go for PPC – ABS-CBN/SWS Exit Poll'*, Online. Available at:
http://www.sws.org.ph/exit01/ex01rpts.htm (accessed 12 March 2012)

Lemarchand, R., and Legg, K. (1972). Political clientelism and development: A preliminary analysis. *Comparative Politics*, 4(2): 149-178

Machado, K. G. (1974) From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 33(4): 523-547

Manacsa, R. C., and Tan, A. C. (2005) 'Manufacturing Parties: Re-examining the Transient Nature of Philippine Political Parties', *Party Politics*, 11(6): 748- 765.

March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (2006) 'Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"', in Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S.A., and Rockman, B. A. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Oxford University Press: USA.

McCoy, A. C. (ed.) (1994) *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Mendoza, R., Beja, E., Venida, V., and Yap, D. (2011) *An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress*. Online. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969605 (accessed 12 February 2012).

Mojares, R. B. (1994) 'The Dream Goes On and On: Three Generations of the Osmenas, 1906-1990', in McCoy, A. (ed.) *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Montinola, G. R. (1999) 'Politicians, Parties, and the Persistence of Weak States: Lessons from the Philippines', *Development and Change*, 30(4): 739-774.

Muno, W. (2010) *Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism*. Online. Available at: www.giga-hamburg.de/content/.../paper_neopat_workshop_muno.pdf (accessed 20 December 2011).

Noda, K., (2011) *Politicization of Philippine Budget System: Institutional and Economic Analysis on 'Pork-Barrel'*. Online. Available at: http://www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/discussion_paper/ron219.pdf. (accessed 21 September 2011).

Nograles and Lagman (2008), *Understanding the "Pork Barrel"*. Online. Available at: http://www.congress.gov.ph/pdaf/news/pork_barrel.pdf (accessed 21 September 2011).

Panebianco, A. (1988) *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge University Press.

Paredes, R. R. (1989) *Philippine Colonial Democracy*, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City.

Paulus, M. (2010) *Clientelism in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela*. Online. Available at: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/content/fsp1/pdf/
neopat/paper_neopat_workshop_paulus.pdf (accessed 11 September 2011).

Rimban, L. (2004) 'The X-Men: The Story of Activists-turned-Political Consultants', *I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine*, 5(1-2): 18-21.

Rivera, T. C. (2011) 'In Search of Credible Parties and Elections', in Miranda, F. B., Rivera, T. C., Ronsd, M. C., and Holmes, R. D. (eds). *Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy*. Quezon City: Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines.

Rocamora, J. (2004) 'Party Building and Local Governance in the Philippines', *Dialogue + Cooperation*, 3: 51-68.

Ronquillo, M. V. (2009) 'Contractors in Congress', *The Sunday Times*. Online. Available at: http://archives.manilatimes.net/ national/2009/feb/01/yehey/opinion/20090201opi3.html (accessed 20 March 2012)

Scheiner, E. (2006) *Democracy Without Competition in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scott, J. C. (1972) 'Patron-Client and Political Change in Southeast Asia', *The American Political Science Review*, 66(1): 91-113.

Shefter, M. (1994) *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Sidel, J. T. (1999) *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. A., and Longstreth, F. (eds) (1992) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stokes, S. C. (2007) 'Political Clientelism', in Boix, C. and Stokes, S. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Szwarcberg, M. (2009) *Making Local Democracy: Political Machines, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Latin America*. Online. Available at: www.marielaszwarcberg.com/Mariela.../Szwarcberg_Précis.pdf (accessed 10 February 2012)

Teehankee, J. C. (2001) 'Emerging Dynasties in the Post-Marcos House of Representatives', *Philippine Political Science Journal*, 22(45): 55-78.

Teehankee, J. C. (2002) 'Electoral politics in the Philippines, in Croissant, A., Bruns, G., and John, M. (eds) *Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia*, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Teehankee, J. C. (2006) 'Electoral Campaigning in the Philippines', in Schafferer, C. (ed.) *Election Campaigning in East and Southeast Asia: Globalization of Political Marketing*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Teehankee, J. C. (2006) 'Consolidation or Crisis of Clientelistic Democracy? The 2004 Synchronized Elections in the Philippines', in Croissant, A. and Martin, B. (eds)

Between Consolidation and Crisis: Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia, Berlin: Lit Verlag.

Teehankee, J. C. (2007) *And the Clans Play On.* Online. Available at: http://pcij.org/stories/and-the-clans-play-on/ (accessed 20 September 2011).

Teehankee, J. C. (2010) ‘Image, Issues, and Machineries: Presidential Campaigns in Post-1986 Philippines’, in Kasuya, Y., and Quimpo, N. G. (eds) *The Politics of Change in the Philippines*, Pasig City: Anvil.

Tordesillas, E. (1998) ‘The Operator’, *I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine*, 4 (1–2): 76-79.

Wolinetz, S. B. (2002) ‘Beyond the catch-all party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies’, in R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, and J. J. Linz (eds) *Political parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 136-165.