Juan Ruiz Manero

• University of Alicante

En este artículo muestro mis observaciones a “El escepticismo ante las reglas replanteado”. Estas afectarán, primero, a la propia manera de cómo en ese texto se traza la tipología de las teorías de la interpretación jurídica; segundo, a algunas distinciones (o a algunos aspectos de algunas distinciones) contenidas en él; tercero, a la manera en que...

p>RESUMO: O presente texto pretende apresentar como se desenvolveu o debate acerca da distinção entre princípios e regras na Teoria do Direito contemporâneo. O que se propõe é tratar de dar uma resposta a algumas das perguntas fundamentais que suscitam os princípios no Direito: em primeiro lugar, que traços estruturais diferenciam os princípios das...

The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the critiques that Ferrajoli addresses to Kelsen in his latest -still unpublished- book, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, and to make some criticism of the theses held in it by Ferrajoli himself. Major criticisms that the author believes should be addressed in this regard t...

In this paper the author defends the need to make two further distinctions beyond that one existing between strong and weak permissions. One of them is also related to the legal system – the distinction between protected and unprotected permissions – and the other one is related to the process of the application of the law, that is, the distinction...

En este trabajo el autor defiende la necesidad de completar la distinción entre permisos fuertes y débiles con otras dos distinciones: una de ellas relativa también al sistema jurídico -la distinción entre permisos protegidos y permisos no protegidos- y la otra relativa al proceso de aplicación del derecho: la distinción entre permisos prima facie...

This chapter advocates for the inherent (nearly necessary) defeasibility of law, based on the idea (originally elaborated by Dworkin) that contemporary law is made on two axiological levels - principles and rules - and that defeasibility is but the 'gap' between these two levels: more precisely, it is the failure of the rule to give a correct imple...

RESUMEN. En este trabajo, el autor sostiene que la polémica desarrollada en el número precedente de Doxa a propósito del constitucionalismo de Ferrajoli muestra la persistencia de dos des-acuerdos entre éste y los autores principialistas: el primero de ellos afecta al entendimiento de las normas constitucionales que atribuyen derechos y el segundo...

El autor llama unilateralismo a la presentación de nuestros sistemas de normas e instituciones como si obedecieran a un único valor inspirador. El unilateralismo, en este sentido, implica la negación, explícita o implícita, de que tales normas e instituciones están atravesadas por tensiones internas que obedecen a que tratan de realizar valores que...

The author calls unilateralism to the presentation of our systems of rules and institutions as if they were obeying a single inspirational value. Unilateralism, in this sense, implies the denial, explicit or implicit, that such rules and institutions are permeated by internal stresses that are due to the fact that they are trying to make values whi...

Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen's concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart's concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has a...

RESUMEN. En este diálogo, los autores comparan el enfoque de los principios constitucionales «re­ gulativos» o «en sentido estricto» y de las directrices constitucionales en el «constitucionalismo garantista» defendido por Ferrajoli y en el «constitucionalismo principialista» en el que se reco­ noce ruiz Manero. ABSTRACT. In this dialogue, the auth...

O artigo inicia com uma analise das relacoes entre casos e normas juridicas naquilo que se pode chamar “modelo classico” de Alchourron e Bulygin, correspondente a obra “ Normative Systems ”, de ambos os autores. O autor assinala como as teses desse “modelo classico” impedem dar conta dos desacertos entre os juristas e contrastam fortemente com as c...

RESUMEN. Este texto se ocupa de dos cuestiones relacionadas con la teoría kelseniana del Derecho: en primer lugar, del trasfondo que explica los rasgos centrales de esa misma teoría; en segundo lugar, de lo que sigue vivo y lo que debe considerarse muerto en la construcción de Kelsen. A juicio del autor, los elementos más relevantes del trasfondo d...

In this paper, the author replies to the article by E. Bulygin «On the Pragmatic Equivalence between Permission and Non-prohibition», published in this issue of Doxa. The criticism the author directs at E. Bulygin can be summarized in these two points: firstly, Bulygin’s attitude with regard to beliefs shared by the legal community means ignoring t...

En el libro publicado en 1996 Las piezas del Derecho, Manuel Atienza y Juan Ruiz Manero criticaron la tesis de Robert Alexy de los principios como mandatos de optimización y sostuvieron que tal caracterización resultaba adecuada únicamente para aquellos principios (en sentido genérico) que es usual llamar directrices o normas programáticas, pero no...

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the definition of the concept of stability of political systems put forward by Ernesto Garzón Valdés in his work El concepto de estabilidad de los sistemas políticos. Ernesto Garzón proposes that we define the concept of stability of political systems using the concept of rule of recognition as a basis. In th...

El artículo tiene como fin argumentar que el positivismo jurídico, en sus distintas variantes –excluyente, incluyente y axiológico–, es incapaz de servir como herramienta para dar cuenta y operar dentro de la nueva realidad del Estado constitucional, pese a la importante contribución que hiciera en el pasado para renovar las áreas de la filosofía d...

The discussion about principles in recent legal theory started with a now famous article by Ronald Dworkin, published in 1967 under the title ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’ (later included as ch. 2 in Dworkin 1978). As most readers will know, the fundamental purpose of that article was what Dworkin himself called an “attack” on legal positivism, and e...

After having treated, in the first two chapters, the problems of mandatory norms — rules and principles — and of power-conferring rules, purely constitutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sentences. In order to do this, we will first present what, in our view, are the main positions on this matter in contemporary l...

So far, we have been occupied with different kinds of legal sentences. The purpose was to clarify what kinds of pieces the machinery of the law consists of. In this chapter, our aim is rather to examine that machinery as a whole. As is commonly known, in the legal theory of the positivist tradition, the unity of the legal system has been seen as a...

In this chapter, we will try to grapple with one of the most controversial questions in contemporary legal theory: the question about the nature of the norms that confer normative powers or, in a terminology that is more common among legal scholars, of the norms that confer competences (in public law) or capacities (in private law).

In the previous chapters we have repeatedly mentioned values. For instance, when we examined principles we said that principles in the strict sense imply the assumption of “values regarded as categorical reasons with respect to any interest”. Therefore, we said, norms transporting those values — i. e., principles in the strict sense — always prevai...

In the course of the previous chapters, we have tried to show what basic types of legal sentences there are, and how they should be understood. We have, however, presented them in a polemic, rather than a systematic way, starting from recent controversies in legal theory about how to understand sentences expressing principles, power-conferring rule...

Preface. I: Mandatory Norms: Principles and Rules. 1. Introduction. Types of Principles. 2. Principles and Rules. 3. The Explanatory, the Justificatory and the Legitimatory Dimension of Principles. Appendix: Reply to our Critics. 1. Mandatory Rules as Peremptory Reasons, and Principles as Non-Peremptory Reasons the 'closed' or 'open' Configuration...

. In the first part of the paper the authors analyze how the distinction between mandatory rules, principles in the strict sense and policies can be understood in structural terms and in terms of reason for action. In the second part, they attempt to clarify which kind of legal provisions embrace constitutional statements recognizing liberty rights...

I. Introducción H ay diversas formas en las que un modelo teórico puede ser puesto en tela de juicio. Una de ellas consiste en mostrar que su implementación no permite captar aquello que interesa respecto de un problema, o que lo hace de un modo notoriamente defectuoso. Ésta es una de las críticas que se le formulan al modelo positivista cuando se...

Sostiene esta obra que los ilícitos atípicos se oponen a los principios del sistema jurídico, no a sus reglas; y para ello encarnan en tres figuras: el abuso del derecho, el fraude de la ley y la desviación de poder.

Obra que analiza la filosofía y la teoría política y del derecho marxista con el fin de destacar los aportes que esta corriente de pensamiento ha realizado en la configuración de nuevas teorías en la ciencia del derecho, los derechos humanos y la filosofía del derecho.

Estudio que desarrolla una teoría para interpretar la producción normativa que emana del legislativo. Contiene: 1. Las normas regulativas: principios y reglas; 2. Las normas constitutivas; 3. Los enunciados permisivos; 4. Los valores en el derecho; 5. La regla de reconocimiento; 6. Conclusiones.

Incluye bibliografía