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In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and the timing of the investment. Innovators privately learn the cost of investing. The investor has to compensate the innovators for their reservation wages, but competition makes screenin...
In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and the timing of the investment. Innovators have to provide costly, but observable effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. The investor has to compensate the innovators for...
Interactions of private information, moral hazard and competition are studied for an investment timing problem. The owner of some investment project (a real option) needs specialized expertise in order to make the investment. More than one supplying firm has the required knowledge, and these expert firms compete about a contract that gives the cont...
An investor owns a right to invest in a project that generates positive cash flows when the investment is undertaken. Both the value of the future cash flows and the investment cost follow stochastic processes. Thus, the investment project takes the form of an exchange option of American type. In the paper we analyze this investment project when th...
Preliminary draft In this paper real option theory and auction theory is combined. A decision maker has a real option consisting of a right to implement an investment project by pay-ing an investment cost. Two or more agents have private information about the constant investment cost. The owner of the project organizes auction, where the privately...