Jon R. Moen

University of Mississippi | UM · Department of Economics

Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financia...

Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of financial crisis specifically focusing on the Panic of 1907, the final severe panic of the National Banking Era (1863–1913). We trace the transmission of the crisis from New York City trust companies to the New York City national banks through direct and indirect interco...

The clearing-house system is becoming a definitely recognized power in the financial methods of the United States. It is as yet in its infancy, and the powers that the various clearing-houses possess are capable of development and expansion to an indefinite degree. The clearing-house, which was begun simply as a labor saving device, has united the...

Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market’s liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financia...

Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of financial crisis specifically focusing on the Panic of 1907, the final severe panic of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). We trace the transmission of the crisis from New York City trust companies to the New York City national banks through direct and indirect interco...

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were extensions of credit by the New York Clearing House to its members. These cert...

In late-nineteenth-century North America, privately financed retirement emerged as a recognized phenomenon. While scholars acknowledge these origins, the prevalence of retirement remains intensely debated. The 1901 Canadian census explicitly required the enumerator to ask respondents if they had retired. The question makes it possible to correct es...

In late-nineteenth-century North America, privately financed retirement emerged as a recognized phenomenon. While scholars acknowledge these origins, the prevalence of retirement remains intensely debated. The 1901 Canadian census explicitly required the enumerator to ask respondents if they had retired. The question makes it possible to correct es...

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were essentially “bridge loans” arranged between clearing house members. They enabl...

Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawals hm intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balance sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse,...

This note draws attention to an important data error that is at the center of our paper “Gold Shocks, Liquidity, and the United States Economy during the National Banking Era” (this journal 1998). The gold stock series we used was compiled from the annual reports of the US Treasury, which contains a large drop between May and June, 1907. This drop...

The Bank Panic of 1907 was the final banking crisis of the National Banking Era (1863–1913); it was significant in that it led to the Federal Reserve Act. The panic began when the spectacular attempt by F. Augustus Heinze to corner the stock of United Copper Company collapsed on 16 October 1907. The collapse revealed the extensive links of Heinze t...

We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were extensions of credit by the New York Clearing House to its members. These cert...

We identify incentives generated by the Bretton Woods II system that may have contributed to the sub-prime liquidity crisis now working its way through the international monetary system. We then evaluate the persistent conjecture that the liquidity crisis is or will become a balance of payments crisis for the United States. Given that it happens, t...

Alarmed by child labor in factories and mills, Progressive-era reformers criticized immigrants and immigrant cultures for sanctioning exploitation of their young. Neither qualitative nor quantitative appraisals find much evidence that ethnicity had any important effect on the likelihood that a child would work. Relative and absolute poverty were mo...

The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specifically, the authors highlight the role of New York banking interests in the legislations affecting the creation or expiration of central banking institutions. In our previous research we have detected that New York City banking entities usually exert subs...

The call loan market in New York City played a central role in funding the expansion of economic growth and capital investment in the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Changes in the identity of the intermediaries providing those funds help explain why the movement for the establishment of a central bank in the United States took hol...

Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawals from intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balance-sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse...

Well into the 20th century, elderly people relied on traditional means of support, such as children's financial contributions or continued labor force activity. After the institution of Social Security in the late 1930s, retirement--permanent withdrawal from the labor force with financial arrangements made for support--became an expected part of th...

We identify incentives generated by the Bretton Woods II system that may have contributed to the sub-prime liquidity crisis now working its way through the international monetary system. We then evaluate the persistent conjecture that the liquidity crisis is or will become a balance of payments crisis for the United States. Given that it happens, t...

The fall in the labor force participation rate of older men in the United States has been dramatic. In 1860 approximately 76% of men 65 and older were in the labor force. Today less than 20% work. Much of the decline has been explained in terms of a shift from agricultural occupations to manufacturing or industrial occupations, where participation...

During the Panic of 1907, New York City trust companies were not members of the New York Clearinghouse whereas trust companies in Chicago were members of the Chicago Clearinghouse. We argue that the apparent isolation of New York City trust companies from the pool of bank reserves controlled by the New York Clearinghouse led to the large-scale depo...

The trend toward greater provision of payments services by nonbank providers raises a question for regulators: What if these nonbank institutions suffer unfavorable balances or experience a run? The authors of this article look to the Panic of 1907 as an example of how private market participants, in the absence of government institutions, react to...

Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawals from intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balance-sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in dema...

The Bank Panic of 1907 was one of the most severe financial crises in the United States before the Great Depression. Although contemporaries realized that the panic in New York City was centered at trust companies, subsequent research has relied heavily on national bank data. Balance sheet data for trust companies and state banks as well as call re...

The Bank Panic of 1907 was so serious that it became a catalyst for the creation of America's central bank. This study, which examines the circumstances leading to and the inter- vention measures taken during the panic, particularly focuses on trust companies' function as a financial intermediary. Unequal regulation among financial organizations, t...

The author creates an alternative concept of the labor force that would allow the production of estimates that are consistent over time. "The concept of the labor force that is emphasized and developed in this paper is based on the principle of gainful employment that was used by the United States census from 1850 through 1930. Under gainful employ...

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale a...

: Monetary historians conventionally trace the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to the turbulence of the Panic of 1907. But why did the successful movement for creating a U.S. central bank follow the Panic of 1907 and not any earlier National Banking Era panic? The 1907 panic displayed a less severe output contraction than other...

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Economics, August 1987. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 150-153).