Jon Hovi

Jon Hovi
University of Oslo · Department of Political Science

Dr. Philos

About

73
Publications
18,465
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1,337
Citations
Additional affiliations
August 1984 - present
University of Oslo
Position
  • Professor (Full)

Publications

Publications (73)
Article
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Using a novel agent-based model, we study how US withdrawal might influence the political process established by the Paris Agreement, and hence the prospects for reaching the collective goal to limit warming below 2°C. Our model enables us to analyze to what extent reaching this goal despite US withdrawal would place more stringent requirements on...
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Aiming to reduce the number of brown (polluting) cars on the road, several countries currently promote the purchase and use of green (emission-free) cars through financial and non-financial incentives. We study how such incentives affect consumers who continue to drive brown cars. Using a simple model, we analyze the effects of policy instruments s...
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The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation? – ERRATUM - Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz, Håkon Sælen, Arild Underdal
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On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and th...
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Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreement’s effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment—based...
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Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventu...
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Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behav-ioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S....
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This thematic issue of Politics and Governance serves as a Festschrift in honor of Professor Dr. Philos. Arild Underdal on his 70th birthday. In this editorial, the guest editors summarize a few of Professor Underdal’s many academic merits and achievements. They also provide a synopsis of each of the ten contributions to the Festschrift, which focu...
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The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, and reasonably high on the depth of the parties' commitments (ambition), its Achilles' heel will likely be compliance. Co...
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The limited success of the UNFCCC negotiations has enticed scholars, environmentalists, and policymakers alike to propose alternative approaches to climate cooperation. This article reviews the scholarly literature concerning one such proposed alternative — climate clubs. According to the club approach, it would be promising to start with small gro...
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Climate engineering in general and solar radiation management (SRM) in particular raise profound and complex political, legal, social, and ethical questions that go well beyond technical feasibility issues. We consider three such questions. First, can existing EU decision-making processes accommodate sufficient public engagement to ensure legitimat...
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We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that comp...
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European integration has grown increasingly differentiated. EU member countries now integrate at different speeds and frequently resort to opt-out clauses, while occasionally voicing deep discontent with the direction of the integration process. Nevertheless, European integration essentially remains a single-track enterprise, whereby member countri...
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We review formal (and some more informal) models of climate cooperation derived from economics and political science. These models convey two main messages. On one hand, they suggest that the prospects for effective climate cooperation are bleak: The standard view is that stable coalitions are small and that renegotiation-proof equilibria require t...
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More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effecti...
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More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effecti...
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Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment,...
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Grundig, Frank, Jon Hovi, Arild Underdal, and Stine Aakre. (2012) Self-Enforcing Peace and Environmental Agreements: Toward Scholarly Cross-Fertilization? International Studies Review, doi: 10.1111/misr.12003 Enforcement of agreements can be a major challenge in international politics. However, the interest in mechanisms of self-enforcement seems s...
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The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comp...
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Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend...
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Can a conditional commitment by a major actor (for example, the European Union) induce other major actors (such as the USA, China, India, or Japan) to do more to mitigate global climate change? We analyse this question by first estimating the impact of emission reductions by one of these actors on the mitigation costs of the others and, second, by...
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According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed 26 German, Norwegian, and US participants in and observers of the climate negotiations concerning their views on three explanation...
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Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment,...
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While political science has much to offer, at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models. Nevertheless, we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing, combining, or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science. We d...
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This paper reports a puzzling result from an experiment based on an indefinitely repeated N-player Prisoners' Dilemma game carried out in a PC lab. The experiment used real monetary payoffs, and was conducted in the context of international cooperation to curb cli-mate change. It was puzzling that after the experiment, a large ma-jority of subjects...
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We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS's compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US S02, but vastly more...
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As a quintessential long-term policy problem, climate change poses two major challenges. The first is to develop, under considerable uncertainty, a plan for allocating resources over time to achieve an effective policy response. The second is to implement this plan, once arrived at, consistently over time. We consider the second of these two challe...
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We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring...
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Several scholars have suggested that the United States can be compelled to reengage in the Kyoto process by linking cooperation on climate change to cooperation on trade or technology research and development. We argue that such issue linkage would likely fail and suggest that a more promising road to U.S. cooperation is to develop an alternative c...
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Using a repeated-game model, we demonstrate that by limiting the punishment for non-compliance, a climate agreement with full participation can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium even without watering down abatement levels.
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The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This paper repo...
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The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This paper repo...
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This paper considers the theory of rational abstention from the angle of Elsrer's categories of social contradictions. It is demonstrated that Downsian expected utility maximizing voters will be trapped in a state of counterfinality, which is one of these categories. Realizing this, citizens may alter their behavioral assumptions, and come to base...
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To enhance effective cooperation, the Marrakesh Accords provide a compliance system for the international climate regime. An innovative part of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorised to apply punitive consequences against countries that fail to comply with their Kyoto obligations. While previous research has primarily focused on the abilit...
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One of the ways to induce compliance is for an international enforcement mechanism to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, such consequences should not cause significant damage to other (compliant) countries. The compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol fails to meet this requirement. The Enforcemen...
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The US government is being pressured by both international and domestic influences to re-engage in international climate control. This paper considers whether the international “pull” and the domestic “push” will be strong enough to accomplish this. First, we discuss whether changes in the architecture of the current climate regime might induce the...
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Arild Underdal's work on the Law of the Least Ambitious Program (LLAP) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the logic of international collaboration. The LLAP, however, applies only under particular conditions. After comparing the law to the joint decision trap and the veto player concept, we discuss four observations that tend to...
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The Marrakesh Accords provide a detailed compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. An innovative feature of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorized to apply punitive measures or “consequences” in the second commitment period to Annex I Parties that have been found to be in non-compliance in the first commitment period. However, even after t...
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One of the proposed alternatives to Kyoto's cap-and-trade approach is a regime based on an internationally harmonized carbon tax. In this paper, we consider and compare the enforcement problems associated with a tax regime and a cap-and-trade regime, respectively. The paper tries to convey two main points. First, both types of regime require an eff...
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This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision, such as mitigation of climate change, is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global treaty. Previous research suggests that, at best, a global environmental treaty will achieve very little. At worst, it will fail to enter into force. Using a s...
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The Kyoto Protocol does not require developing countries to restrict their emissions of greenhouse gases. This article provides an account of some significant political and institutional barriers to binding commitments by developing countries in the climate regime. Furthermore, it examines the developing countries' views on certain core elements in...
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Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially u...
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This article reviews basic insights about compliance and "hard" enforcement that can be derived from various non-cooperative equilibrium concepts, and evaluates the Marrakesh Accords in light of these insights. Five different notions of equilibrium are considered - the Nash equilibrium, the subgame perfect equilibrium, the renegotiation proof equil...
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Abstract International,regimes,rarely operate,completely,independent,of each,otherin
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Over the past two decades or so, the idea of causal “mechanisms” has become extremely widespread in both the philosophy of the social sciences and in applied social science. Recently, it has also turned up in the literature on international environmental regimes. A common motivation for invoking the concept seems to be a desire to open up the black...
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In international regimes research, one of the most important questions is how effective regimes are in delivering what they were established and designed to achieve. Perhaps the most explicit and rigorous formula for measuring regime effectiveness is the so-called Oslo-Potsdam solution. This formula has recently been criticized by Oran Young, himse...
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Global Environmental Politics 3.3 (2003) 105-107 The Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness has been the subject of a fruitful scholarly exchange in Global Environmental Politics. From our point of view, the exchange has been very rewarding. In this rejoinder, we briefly summarize our own position and identify some remaining issues...
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The United States, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, is not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the foreseeable future. Yet, a number of countries have decided to stay on the Kyoto track. Four main explanations for this apparent puzzle are considered. The first is that remaining Annex I countries still expect the Kyoto Protocol to...
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While there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is Fearon (1998), who models international cooperation as a two-stage process, in which the bargaining process is constrained by a ne...
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The author demonstrates that economic sanctions accomplish intended results more often than many analysts seem to believe. Drawing on a recent study by Daniel Drezner, it is argued that influential prior studies in the field suffer from serious selection bias. When sanctions are imposed, it usually means that implicit and/or explicit threats of san...
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The ethical merits of three major strategies to confront global warming - prevention, adaptation and geoengineering - are considered. From the point of view of consequentialist ethics, the choice between prevention and adaptation depends on the exact set of consequences taken into consideration. Adaptation is likely to be the preferable option if o...
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This article focuses on the possible relevance of unrealistic models for empirical political science. The author rejects both the covering law program, according to which there is no place for unrealistic assumptions, as well as the Friedman-instrumentalist position, which argues that the validity of a model's assumptions is irrelevant. Instead, a...
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The circumstances under which it pays for an outsider to join an existing group of collaborators are investigated, using the compound Prisoner's Dilemma supergame as a model. Two different regimes are considered; one where discriminating behaviour is allowed, one where it is effectively banned. It is shown that an incentive for outsiders to join th...
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The essay offers a review of Steven J. Brams' book Superpower Games. In this book, Brams uses 2 x 2 games to investigate important aspects of the superpower relationship. Particular attention is given to problems of deterrence, armaments, and verification — the aim being partly to explain actual behavior by the superpowers, and partly to provide po...
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Problems of public goods provision are categorized according to attributes of the good to be provided, and properties of the group of potential beneficiaries. It is argued that not all such problems are Prisoner's Dilemmas. Other games of interest include Chicken, the Volunteer's Dilemma, a variant of the Assurance Came and several others. Which pa...
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Hovi, J. & Rasch, B. E. Hegemonic Decline and the Possibility of International Cooperation: Comments on Duncan Snidal's 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory'. Cooperation and Conflict, XXI, 1986, 241-251. This research note offers some support for Duncan Snidal's proposition that declining hegemony does not necessarily mean vanishing internati...
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Economists have recently taken an interest in "social preferences", meaning that each player's welfare depends positively or negatively on the welfare of other agents. Previous research has demonstrated that such preferences explain behaviour in a number of games where standard economic theory produces anomalies. This paper studies the infinitely r...

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