John Fernald

• Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

The UK's slow productivity growth since 2007 has been referred to as a “puzzle,” as if it were a particularly UK‐specific problem. We highlight how the United States and northern Europe experienced very similar slowdowns. In all three regions, the slowdown in total factor productivity (TFP) growth accounts for the slowdown in labor productivity gro...

Dale W. Jorgenson was a central contributor to a wide range of economic and policy issues over a long and productive career. His research was characterised by a tight integration of economic theory, appropriate data that matches the theory, and sound econometrics. Jorgenson’s groundbreaking work on the theory and empirics of investment established...

We use a new growth accounting method to quantify the drivers of world total factor productivity (TFP) growth during 1996–2014 and uncover four main results. World productivity growth is volatile from year to year. This mainly reflects reallocation of labor across country-industries. The contribution of country-industry level productivity growth to...

This paper reviews advanced‐economy productivity developments in recent decades. We focus primarily on the facts about, and explanations for, the mid‐2000s labor‐productivity slowdown in large European countries and the United States. Slower total factor productivity (TFP) growth was the proximate cause of the slowdown. This conclusion is robust to...

This paper reviews how productivity has evolved around the world since the pandemic began in 2020. Productivity in many countries has been volatile. We conclude that the broad contours of productivity growth during this period have been heavily shaped by predictable cyclical patterns. Looking at U.S. industry data, we find little evidence that the...

This paper reviews advanced-economy productivity developments in recent decades. We focus primarily on the facts about, and explanations for, the mid-2000s labor-productivity slowdown in large European countries and the United States. Slower total factor productivity growth was the proximate cause of the slowdown. This conclusion is robust to measu...

The U.S. economy came into the pandemic, and looks likely to leave it, on a slow-growth path. The near- term level of potential output has fallen because of shortfalls in labor that should reverse over time. Labor productivity, to a surprising degree, has followed an accelerated version of its Great Recession path with initially strong growth follo...

The UK’s slow productivity growth since 2007 has been referred to as a “puzzle”, as if it were a particularly UK-specific challenge. In this paper, we highlight how the United States and northern Europe experienced very similar slowdowns. The common slowdown in productivity growth was a slowdown in total factor productivity (TFP) growth; we find li...

We use Chinese imports, measured as reported exports of trading partners, as a benchmark to gauge the accuracy of alternative Chinese indicators (including GDP) of fluctuations in economic activity. Externally-reported imports are likely to be relatively well-measured and free from domestic manipulation. Using principal components, we derive activi...

We use Chinese imports, measured as reported exports of trading partners, as a benchmark to gauge the accuracy of alternative Chinese indicators (including GDP) of fluctuations in economic activity. Externally-reported imports are likely to be relatively well-measured and free from domestic manipulation. Using principal components, we derive activi...

In the years since the Great Recession, many observers have highlighted the slow pace of labor and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in advanced economies. This paper focuses on the European experience, where we highlight that trend TFP growth was already low in the runup to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This suggests that it is important...

The U.S. economy faces sizeable headwinds to keeping GDP growth even at 2% over the next decade. Demographics imply that labor force growth will be much slower than historical norms. The enormous twentieth century increase in average educational attainment is unlikely to be repeated. And the best guess for productivity growth is that it will contin...

U.S. output has expanded only slowly since the recession trough in 2009, even though the unemployment rate has essentially returned to a precrisis, normal level. We use a growth-accounting decomposition to explore explanations for the output shortfall, giving full treatment to cyclical effects that, given the depth of the recession, should have imp...

U.S. output has expanded only slowly since the recession trough in 2009, even though the unemployment rate has essentially returned to a precrisis, normal level. We use a growth-accounting decomposition to explore explanations for the output shortfall, giving full treatment to cyclical effects that, given the depth of the recession, should have imp...

US labor and total factor productivity have historically been procyclical—rising in booms and falling in recessions. After the mid-1980s, however, total factor productivity became much less procyclical with respect to hours while labor productivity turned strongly countercyclical. We find that the key empirical “fact” driving these changes is reduc...

In the years since the Great Recession, many observers have highlighted the slow pace of productivity growth around the world. For the United States and Europe, we highlight that this slow pace began prior to the Great Recession. The timing thus suggests that it is important to consider factors other than just the deep crisis itself or policy chang...

After 2004, measured growth in labor productivity and total factor productivity slowed. We find little evidence that this slowdown arises from growing mismeasurement of the gains from innovation in information technology related goods and services. First, the mismeasurement of information technology hardware is significant preceding the slowdown. B...

After 2004, measured growth in labor productivity and total factor productivity slowed. We find little evidence that this slowdown arises from growing mismeasurement of the gains from innovation in information technology–related goods and services. First, the mismeasurement of information technology hardware is significant preceding the slowdown. B...

US labor and total- factor productivity growth slowed prior to the Great Recession. The timing rules out explanations that focus on disruptions during or since the recession, and industry and state data rule out “bubble economy” stories related to housing or finance. The slowdown is located in industries that produce information technology (IT) or...

Modern growth theory suggests that more than three-quarters of growth since 1950 reflects rising educational attainment and research intensity. As these transition dynamics fade, US economic growth is likely to slow at some point. However, the rise of China, India, and other emerging economies may allow another few decades of rapid growth in world...

We use a broad set of Chinese economic indicators and a dynamic factor model framework to estimate Chinese economic activity and inflation as latent variables. We incorporate these latent variables into a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) to estimate the effects of Chinese monetary policy on the Chinese economy. A FAVAR approach is par...

This note examines labour market performance across countries through the lens of Okun's Law. We find that after the 1970s but prior to the global financial crisis of the 2000s, the Okun's Law relationship between output and unemployment became more homogenous across countries. These changes presumably reflected institutional and technological chan...

Financial institutions often do not charge explicit fees for the services they provide, but are instead compensated by the spread between interest rates on loans and deposits. The lack of explicit fees in lending makes it difficult to measure the output of banks and other financial institutions. Effective measurement should distinguish between inco...

We derive aggregate growth-accounting implications for a two-sector economy with heterogeneous capital subsidies and monopoly power. In this economy, measures of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in terms of quantities (the primal) and real factor prices (the dual) can diverge from each other as well as from true technology growth. These disto...

Potential output is an important concept in economics. Policymakers often use a one-sector neoclassical model to think about long-run growth, and they often assume that potential output is a smooth series in the short run -- approximated by a medium- or long-run estimate. But in both the short and the long run, the one-sector model falls short empi...

This chapter presents a general equilibrium approach to measuring bank output, an approach that turns out to be quite different from Fixler's in some important respects. In contrast to deflating nominal asset holdings by a user cost price index, the chapter suggests that direct measures of the services rendered by consuming financial services be co...

Total factor productivity - a measure of the efficiency with which labor and capital are used - has fallen during the current recession. But, after adjustment for lower utilization of labor and capital, such productivity has risen strongly over the past two years. These growth-accounting measures suggest that efficiency gains have continued during...

Many people point to information and communications technology (ICT) as the key for understanding the acceleration in productivity in the United States since the mid-1990s. Stories of ICT as a ‘general-purpose technology’ suggest that measured total factor productivity (TFP) should rise in ICT-using sectors (reflecting either unobserved accumulatio...

Structural vector autoregressions with long-run restrictions are extraordinarily sensitive to low-frequency correlations. Recent literature finds that the estimated effects of technology shocks are sensitive to how one treats hours per capita. However, after allowing for (statistically and economically significant) trend breaks in productivity, res...

Strong productivity growth is essential for improving living standards and can have an important impact on economic policy, yet economists are far from being experts at predicting when the trend of productivity growth might shift. In the 1960s, productivity growth boomed, growing at an average annual rate of 2-1/2%. It weakened in the early 1970s,...

This Economic Letter summarizes the papers presented at the conference “Financial Innovations and the Real Economy” held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco by the Bank’s Center for the Study of Innovation and Productivity on November 16–17, 2006.

This paper updates our earlier work (Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and Schindler, 2003) on whether China, with its huge pool of labor and an allegedly undervalued exchange rate, is hurting the export performance of other emerging market economies in Asia. We continue to find that while exchange rates matter for export performance, the income growth of...

Most analysis of bank productivity and efficiency relies on ad-hoc measures of traditional and non-traditional output even while the theory of banks allows for more consistent measurement. In this paper we analyze and measure the output of U.S. commercial banks from the point of view of banks as reducers of information asymmetries. This proves to b...

Structural vector-autoregressions with long-run restrictions are extraordinarily sensitive to low-frequency correlations. This paper explores this sensitivity analytically and via simulations, focusing on the contentious issue of whether hours worked rise or fall when technology improves. Recent literature finds that when hours per person enter the...

Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for aggregation effects, varying utilization of capital and labor, nonconstant returns, and imperfect competition. On impact, when technology improves, input use and nonresidential investment fall sharply. Output changes little. With a lag of several years, inputs and investmen...

The sharp slowdown in housing and the inverted yield curve have led to concerns that the odds of a recession have risen. For instance, Dow Jones Newswire reported on November 2 that one model based on the yield curve put the probability of a recession over the next four quarters at more than 50%. This Letter presents and discusses various estimates...

The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Asia are the fastest-growing economies in the world since 1960. A clear understanding of their rapid development remains elusive, with continuing disputes over the roles of technology growth, capital accumulation, and international trade and investment. We reconcile seemingly contradictory explanations b...

This paper updates our earlier work (Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and Schindler, 2003) on whether China, with its huge pool of labor and an allegedly undervalued exchange rate, is hurting the export performance of other emerging market economies in Asia. We continue to find that while exchange rates matter for export performance, the income growth of...

Many people point to information and communications technology (ICT) as the key for understanding the acceleration in productivity in the United States since the mid-1990s. Stories of ICT as a 'general-purpose technology' suggest that measured total factor productivity (TFP) should rise in ICT-using sectors (reflecting either unobserved accumulatio...

We describe new evidence that technological change is biased toward producing durables goods. Existing evidence in favor of the importance of change to growth and business cycles is based on the price deflators for investment and consumption goods. Our evidence is based on additional data, including industry specific goods prices, factor inputs, fa...

A familiar old saw about the conduct of monetary policy is that it's like trying to drive a car while looking only in the rearview mirror. The idea is that policymakers are trying to steer a course that will keep the economy close to full employment with low, stable inflation, while their only knowledge of the road ahead is based on data about the...

Economic theory suggests that the economy's response to a technology shock depends on the final-use sector that it affects. We provide a unified framework for measuring innovations to final-goods technology using industry-level innovations and the input-output tables. Our approach enables us to relax and test the assumptions maintained in the liter...

Oil prices have increased substantially over the last several years. When oil price increases of this magnitude occurred during the 1970s, they were associated with severe recessions. Why hasn't that happened this time around? This Letter explores some answers to that question.

Recent empirical work using structural VARs with long-run restrictions assesses whether hours worked per capita rises or falls following a technology improvement. This literature reaches divergent conclusions on the sign of this effect, depending on whether hours worked enters the VAR in log-levels or growth rates. In contrast, I find that once one...

This paper addresses the proper measurement of financial service output that is not priced explicitly. It shows how to impute nominal service output from financial intermediaries’ interest income and how to construct price indices for those financial services. We present an optimizing model with financial intermediaries that provide financial servi...

Under standard conditions, total factor productivity (TFP) growth measures the pace of innovation or technological change in the economy. This article focuses on the period since the mid-1990s, when TFP accelerated. The authors find that most of the acceleration is accounted for by industries that use, rather than sectors that produce, information...

Do increases in China's exports reduce exports of other emerging Asian economies? We find that correlations between Chinese export growth and that of other emerging Asian economies are actually positive (though usually not significant), even after controlling for trading-partner income growth and real effective exchange rates. We also present resul...

We argue that unmeasured investments in intangible organizational capital associated with the role of information and communications technology (ICT) as a general purpose technology' can explain the divergent U.S. and U.K. TFP performance after 1995. GPT stories suggest that measured TFP should rise in ICT-using sectors, perhaps with long lags. Con...

Do increases in China's exports reduce exports of other emerging Asian economies? We find that correlations between Chinese export growth and that of other emerging Asian economies are actually positive (though usually not significant), even after controlling for trading-partner income growth and real effective exchange rates. We also present resul...

Solow's paradox has disappeared in the United States but remains alive and well in the United Kingdom. In particular, the U.K. experienced an information and communications technology (ICT) investment boom in the 1990s in parallel with the U.S., but measured total factor productivity has decelerated rather than accelerated in recent years. We ask w...

Recent research reports contradictory estimates of productivity growth for the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Asia. In particular, estimates using real factor prices find relatively rapid TFP growth; estimates using quantities of inputs and output find relatively low TFP growth. The difference is particularly notable for Singapore, where...

Most macroeconomists remained skeptical about the new economy until the late stages of the last expansion. Certainly, the business press and a few high-profile economists (including Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan) were quicker to proclaim a new era of faster productivity growth. But macroeconomists were naturally cautious, aware that produ...

From book synopsis: The NBER Macroeconomics Annual presents pioneering work in macroeconomics by leading academic researchers to an audience of public policymakers and the academic community. Each commissioned paper is followed by comments and discussion. This year's edition provides a mix of cutting-edge research and policy analysis on such topics...

Many companies on China's stock markets have traditionally had separate, restricted classes of shares for domestic residents and foreigners. These shares are identical other than for who can own them, but foreigners have generally paid only about one-quarter the price paid by domestic residents. We argue that the generally higher level (and volatil...

Measured productivity growth increased substantially during the second half of the 1990s. This paper examines whether this increase owes to an increase in the rate of technological change or whether it can be explained by non-technological factors relating to factor utilization, factor accumulation, or returns to scale. It finds that the recent inc...

China did not succumb to the Asian crisis of 1997-99, despite two apparent sources of vulnerability: a weak financial system and increased export competition from the Asian crisis economies. This article argues that both sources of vulnerability were more apparent than real. China's experience (especially its use of capital controls) does not offer...

Productivity rises in booms and falls in recessions. There are four main explanations for this procyclical productivity: (i) procyclical technology shocks, (ii) widespread imperfect competition and increasing returns, (iii) variable utilization of inputs over the cycle, and (iv) resource reallocations. Recent macroeconomic literature views this sty...

By bureaucratic institutions or bureaucracy, we mean the rules and regulations that are implemented by government agencies. Burdensome bureaucratic institutions are leading obstacles to economic development and therefore the target of economic reform of many countries in today's world. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze th...

Productivity rises in booms and falls in recessions. There are four main explanations for procyclical productivity: (i) procyclical technology shocks, (ii) widespread imperfect competition and increasing returns, (iii) variable utilization of inputs over the cycle, and (iv) resource reallocations. Each of these explanations has important implicatio...

: Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for imperfect competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation effects. On impact, when technology improves, input use falls sharply, and output may fall slightly. With a lag of several years, inputs return to normal and output rises strongly. These resu...

: We assess links between China and the rest of emerging Asia. Some commentators have argued that China's apparent devaluation in 1994 may have contributed to the Asian financial crisis. We argue that the devaluation was not economically important: The more-relevant exchange rate was a floating rate that was not devalued, and high Chinese inflation...

Productivity rises in booms and falls in recessions. There are four main explanations for procyclical productivity: (i) procyclical technology shocks, (ii) widespread imperfect competition and increasing returns, (iii) variable utilization of inputs over the cycle, and (iv) resource reallocations. Each of these explanations has important implicatio...

Does the positive correlation between infrastructure and productivity reflect causation? If so, in which direction? The author finds that, when growth in roads (the largest component of infrastructure) changes, productivity growth changes disproportionately in U.S. industries with more vehicles. That vehicle-intensive industries benefit more from r...

China's strong growth in the midst of the Asian crisis is striking. We explore features of China's financial system that helped insulate it from the crisis, and then try to assess whether China has avoided crisis or simply deferred it. We argue that regardless of whether the Asian crisis resulted from weak fundamentals or from "country runs" by inv...

Several commentators have suggested that competition from China—in particular its 1994 `devaluation' and strong export performance during 1994–95—may have contributed to the Asian crisis of 1997–98. We provide evidence against this view. We show that the devaluation was not important in economic terms, and China's strong export performance in 1994–...

China's strong growth in the midst of the Asian crisis is striking. We explore features of China's financial system that helped insulate it from the crisis, and then try to assess whether China has avoided crisis or simply deferred it. We argue that regardless of whether the Asian crisis resulted from weak fundamentals or from "country runs" by inv...

Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for imperfect competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation effects. On impact, when technology improves, input use falls sharply, and output may fall slightly. With a lag of several years, inputs return to normal and output rises strongly. These result...

Many companies on China's stock markets have separate, restricted classes of shares for domestic residents and foreigners. Other than who can own them, these shares are identical, but foreigners pay only about one-quarter the price paid by domestic residents. We show that plausible differences--about 4 percentage-points--in expected rates of return...

We assess links between China and the rest of emerging Asia. Some commentators have argued that Chinaâ s apparent devaluation in 1994 may have contributed to the Asian financial crisis. We argue that the devaluation was not economically important: The more-relevant exchange rate was a floating rate that was not devalued, and high Chinese inflation...

Aggregate productivity and aggregate technology are meaningful but distinct concepts. We show that a slightly modified Solow productivity residual measures changes in economic welfare, even when productivity and technology differ because of distortions such as imperfect competition. Our results imply that aggregate data can be used to measure chang...

Aggregate productivity and aggregate technology are meaningful but distinct concepts. We show that a slightly-modified Solow productivity residual measures changes in economic welfare, even when productivity and technology differ because of distortions such as imperfect competition. We then present a general accounting framework that identifies sev...

At a macroeconomic level, infrastructure and productivity are positively correlated in the United States and other countries. However, it remains unclear whether this correlation reflects causation, and if so, whether causation runs from infrastructure to productivity, or the reverse. This paper focuses on roads, and finds that vehicle-intensive in...