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“Glory to Breivik!”: the Russian Far Right and the 2011 Norway Attacks

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Introduction

“*Slava Andersu Breiviku!* [Glory to Anders Breivik!]”. The chant rang out in a central Moscow street on November 4, 2012, voiced by about two dozen participants in the annual Russian March, the country’s largest nationalist gathering. Such vocal displays of public support for the Norwegian terrorist have hardly occurred in Western European far-right milieus.¹ In Russia, however, the chant reflects a larger and surprisingly vibrant pro-Breivik cultivation.

This article contributes to current research on political violence and extremism in two ways. First, it enriches the literature on right-wing extremism by providing new insight into Russia’s far right.² In the past decade, Russia has been home to Europe’s most violent right-wing extremist movement,³ presenting us with an *extreme case* of this phenomenon.⁴ Accordingly, studying the Russian case can yield insights that may help answer the important and understudied question of why some right-wing extremist movements grow more violent than others. Second, the article contributes to the emerging literature on the 2011 attacks in Norway. So far this literature has elaborated on the ideology of the perpetrator, analyzed his use of the internet, or discussed how to prevent lone wolf terrorism.⁵ To date, no one has looked

systematically at how Breivik has been received and put to use among like-minded audiences. In doing so, this article partly challenges the assumption that Breivik's extreme violence overshadowed his political message.⁶ The article finds that while this apparently did happen in Western European countries, his message found more resonance on the Russian far right.

A variety of open sources, including news articles, communication on social media, and interviews, have been used to answer two key questions: First, to what degree and in what ways has Breivik's legacy been openly cultivated (closed, non-public settings are not considered)⁷ on the far right in Russia and Western Europe? Second, to the extent that the Russian case differs from Western Europe, what accounts for the difference? The article finds that right-wing extremists in Russia have openly embraced, heroized, and even staged public manifestations in support of Breivik in ways unheard of in Western Europe, where actors on the far right mostly either condemned or remained silent about the attacks. I argue against the importance of official Putinist "ultra-nationalism" in explaining why the Russian case stands out, instead highlighting three other factors. First, social stigmatization of right-wing extremism is much less prevalent in Russia, meaning that a major disincentive against publicly using Breivik for propaganda and inspirational purposes is absent. Second, the general level of violence in Russian society is much higher than in Western European countries. Arguably, this results in desensitization and greater acceptance for violence as a means to achieve one's ends. Third, a vibrant tradition of iconizing right-wing militants and terrorists exists on the Russian far right. Breivik fitted neatly into an existing Russian pantheon of right-wing extremist heroes.

I concentrate on the Russian far right and use Western Europe, including Scandinavia, as a comparative yardstick. Russia has been studied in depth while Western European countries have been considered less thoroughly. One might object that key data may thus easily have been

overlooked. However, the Norwegian press is highly sensitive to any Breivik-related news emerging from abroad. Being based in Norway, the author has been well placed to pick up and register the most important stories. It is highly doubtful that significant shows of public support for Breivik in Western European countries should have gone unnoticed in the Norwegian press.

The article proceeds as follows. It first maps the reactions to Breivik and the 22/7 attacks on the far right in Russia and Western Europe. Second, it proposes and discusses factors that may account for the observed variation. Third, it sums up the main findings and suggests their implications.

Far-Right Reactions to the 22/7 Attacks in Russia and Western Europe

Russian Reactions

Among leading Russian right-wing radicals, statements about the Norwegian terrorist have been ambiguous, ranging from condemnation to vague approval. Vladimir Zhirinovskii, head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, known for his aggressive xenophobic public statements, condemned the attacks in unambiguous terms.⁸ Dmitrii Demushkin, who founded the now-banned neo-Nazi Slavic Union and currently heads the nationalist organization *Russkie*, refrained from commenting on Breivik's ideology, but condemned the murderous methods used.⁹ Zhirinovskii and Demushkin seem to be the only prominent Russian right-wingers to have publicly condemned Breivik's acts.

Aleksandr Belov (Potkin), the other leader of *Russkie* and formerly head of DPNI (Movement Against Illegal Immigration, banned as extremist in 2011), went a step further in his remarks on Breivik, telling a Newsweek reporter in 2011 that Breivik was "an effective manager".¹⁰ Without neither praising nor condemning the terrorist, Belov has repeatedly stressed

the large extent to which Russian nationalists view Breivik positively, even as a hero, and explained this view by reference to the immigration situation in Russia.¹¹

A fourth figure on the Russian radical right who has expressed views on Breivik is Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent intellectual and Putin loyalist known for his fierce anti-Westernism and fascist affinities.¹² Dugin posted a piece about Breivik on his personal blog three weeks after the 22/7 attacks. In Dugin's view, Breivik is just another symptom of European decay. Dugin did not discuss ideology or why Breivik did what he did, but expressed a desire to see more Breiviks in the West, as this would further the inevitable collapse: "The end is coming to Europe. [...] Let there be multiculturalism, Freemasonry, gay pride, and Breiviks. Let all this European filth destroy itself [...]. The more Breiviks [...] the better."¹³ Dugin's response to 22/7 thus fits into and serves to promote his apocalyptic vision of the future of the West, whereby multiculturalism and tolerance are poisonous seeds that breed people like Breivik.

If radical right-wingers have been ambiguous in their statements about Breivik, leading figures on the Russian extreme right have praised Breivik in no uncertain terms.

One of the most popular right-wing extremist leaders in Russia in recent years, Maksim Martsinkevich, also known as *Tesak* ("Hatchet"), has stated on more than one occasion that Breivik is "a holy man", "a fantastic person", and that his acts were "well done [*molodets*]"¹⁴ Martsinkevich's organization Restrukt, founded in 2011, posted propaganda images featuring Breivik on its official *Vkontakte* (VK – Russia's largest social networking website) community page.¹⁵ In July 2013 an article was published on Restrukt's website looking back on the Breivik attacks. The anonymous author states that the once-proud and great Scandinavian people is currently "crawling slowly towards its grave" because of immigration and multiculturalism. Breivik's acts "lit up" in the darkness and "opened everyone's eyes to what was going on". The

main lesson learned, according to the author, is that “in most cases only loud actions such as those of Breivik or mass disturbances may force the government to listen to the opinions of the nationally-minded population”.¹⁶

A similar position was taken by Aleksandr Usovskii, an author of several books on World War II who in the late 2000s contributed articles to the website of the National Socialist Society (NSO), a right-wing terrorist group.¹⁷ On July 24, 2011, he posted an article on his personal website stating that Breivik by his acts “demonstrated to all inhabitants of Norway and the government that far from all subjects of King Harald V are ready to silently suffer the barbarian invasion from the south”.¹⁸

One finds public support for Breivik also among convicted right-wing terrorists, the most prominent of which is Nikolai Korolev. Korolev was behind the bombing of the Cherkizovo marketplace in Moscow in September 2006, which killed 14 people and injured 61. In May 2008 he was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. On April 25, 2012, a letter to Breivik from Korolev written on behalf of his Association for White Political and War Prisoners was posted on a Russian blog. Here Korolev praises Breivik’s deeds and ideas.¹⁹ Korolev has continued to elevate Breivik as a symbol of the “holy war” against racial and political enemies. In the second volume of his *Bibliia skinkheda* [The Skinhead Bible], published online in January 2014, Korolev devotes several pages to describing and commenting on Breivik’s motivation and actions. Korolev hails Breivik as someone who proved how much a single determined person can do in fighting “the System”.²⁰

Korolev is not the only Russian right-wing militant to have publicly praised Breivik’s actions. Aleksei Voevodin, found guilty of several murders and attacks on non-Slavic persons and sentenced to life in prison in 2011, heroized Breivik in a 2013 interview published on a

right-wing extremist VK page.²¹ Moreover, an anonymous activist representing the militant NS/WP (National-Socialism/White Power) group in Moscow gave the following statement when asked about Breivik in a 2011 interview:

He is a living example showing that you have to act either on your own or in a small group, rather than waving your arms at demonstrations organized by adventurers of various calibers [...]. There should be more Breiviks, to set an example for the posers. For me personally, he evokes a sense of undisguised respect. The history of the right-wing resistance is created by persons like him, like Timothy McVeigh, for instance, who point out the goal worth striving for.²²

Even though militant neo-Nazis and white power activists like Korolev and Voevodin have been the most fervent in fully embracing and heroizing the Norwegian terrorist, it is precisely within this milieu that *anti-Breivik* attitudes have been most strongly articulated. While this might seem paradoxical, the reason is clear: The neo-Nazi rejection of Breivik is based on statements made in his manifesto that imply a positive attitude toward Israel, Jews, and Zionists. For neo-Nazis whose antisemitic beliefs trump their hatred for government-sponsored multiculturalism, Breivik's stance on Jews and Zionism automatically disqualifies him as a potential role model. For instance, the NS/WP internet forum administration announced in July 2013 that anyone who expresses sympathy for Breivik in any way will be permanently banned from the forum.²³

The general tendency on the extreme Russian right, however, has been to express vocal support for the Norwegian terrorist. Most notably, apart from utterances such as those cited above, several cases of public support have been documented.

Breivik supporters have been vocally present at the Russian March, a nationalist rally held on November 4 each year in Moscow and across Russia. In the 2011 march in Novosibirsk, activists were photographed carrying large posters featuring Breivik's portrait. Marchers reportedly chanted, "Matthews, Breivik, David Lane! Death to the system!"²⁴ Moreover, some two dozen participants in the 2012 Russian March in Moscow were filmed while chanting "*Slava Andersu Breiviku* [Glory to Anders Breivik]".²⁵ Similar expressions were observed in the 2013 march.²⁶

Another demonstration of support took place in the central Russian city of Samara on July 22, 2013, on the second anniversary of the attacks, as activists put up a number of pro-Breivik posters in public places. The posters advertised "Breivikism" as "the ideology of the new century", referring to a website containing information about Breivik, including a partial translation of the compendium. The posters featured an image of Breivik, along with the following text:

On 22 July 2011 the hero of Europe Anders Breivik shot 69 enemies and traitors of the white race at Utøya. [...] Socialists, internationalists, multiculturalists, islamists, and other scum who betray their race: remember this. The hour of retribution is steadily approaching.²⁷

The latest documented case of a pro-Breivik public manifestation took place in Syktyvkar, capital of the Komi republic in northern Russia, during an anti-immigration protest meeting in September 2013. In his speech Aleksandr Kamarov, leader of a local neo-Nazi organization, praised Breivik as a "great man" and described his acts as "a good deed for the well-being of the

nation”. Kamarov went on to threaten that “Russian Breiviks” would appear if migration policies continued as before: “A sea of blood will flow [...] but there is no other solution. There will be a Russian revolution! There will be white terror! Glory to the white race!”²⁸

Alongside such acts of public support, the pro-Breivik discourse has also found its way onto items of clothing. T-shirts and sweaters with Breivik symbolism have appeared for sale in webshops that sell clothing and accessories used by far-right activists. One t-shirt features Breivik’s name along with the Norwegian flag and a silhouette of an automatic rifle;²⁹ another displays Breivik’s silhouette with the text “Free Breivik”.³⁰ A third variant features an image of Breivik with a rifle and the words (in Norwegian), “Breivik party, Utøya-Tyrifjorden [one location of the attacks]” on the front; on the back there is a map of Europe and the words, “Norway 22.07.2011, Fight for the people”.³¹

On social media too, right-wing extremist support for Breivik has been vocal and substantial. In the hours following the first reports of the 22/7 attacks, expressions of support began to appear on the Russian internet. Breivik was hailed by one blogger as “the white hero of Norway”.³² Others called for new “heroes” to come forth in Russia and follow the example set by Breivik, stating that national struggle is an end for which all means are justified. According to one observer, an “avalanche” of such messages appeared on the Russian-language internet.³³

Another journalist described the situation as follows:

Moderators of Russian social media sites are struggling to delete every new support group. Russian-language sites have had to close down the comments field on articles about the tragedy in Norway because they are filled not with compassion for the victims, but a stream of praises addressed to Breivik, who is styled as a hero.³⁴

Indeed, many pro-Breivik support groups were formed on VK, Russia's largest social network site, in the hours and days following the attacks. VK moderators blocked groups whose members were openly calling for the terrorist attacks to be repeated in Russia and elsewhere.³⁵ Yet as it turned out, several obviously pro-Breivik groups were allowed to exist. While most of them have only a handful of subscribers, the three largest ones had 600, 3350 and 3500 members as of summer 2014.³⁶

While there are no clear-cut calls to action on these VK groups (which would likely result in the group being closed), glorification of Breivik and direct praise for the misdeeds are not uncommon. A typical example is a post by the administrator of the group "Breivikism" submitted on the anniversary of the attacks featuring a portrait of Breivik and the text, "One year ago, on July 22, Anders Breivik carried out a heroic deed [*sovershil podvig*]."³⁷ This particular post received 224 public "likes". Another popular post, shared by 64 and "liked" by 268, featured portraits of Breivik and a Russian translation of a comment submitted by him in 2009 on a Norwegian blog which said that the combination of Islam and multiculturalism has resulted in "hundreds of thousands of European women" being raped.³⁸

Breivik has been supported and lionized not only within designated pro-Breivik VK communities; similar examples may also be found on the walls of larger right-wing extremist communities. For instance, the organization Restrukt posted a comment about Breivik on the wall of its VK community, followed by thousands, on the second anniversary of the attacks. The post, which received just short of a thousand "likes" and was shared by 236, featured an image of Breivik with a raised fist and styled him as "the last viking of a dying Norway" who committed a "heroic deed" on July 22, 2011.³⁹ On the wall of the VK community "WotanJugend", at the time

followed by more than 16 000, a tribute to Breivik likewise appeared on July 22, 2013. Here too, the terrorist acts were hailed as a “heroic deed” and “the first step in a well-planned struggle for European survival”. The post, consisting largely of one of Breivik’s court statements, was “liked” by 788 and shared by 234 users.⁴⁰

Another window onto the Russian reception of Breivik is opinion polls. Four Russian polls with a substantial number of respondents are known, one professionally conducted and three others conducted informally online. The professional poll was carried out in 2012 by the Public Opinion Fund (FOM), with 1500 respondents across the Russian Federation. While two thirds of respondents said they were informed about Breivik’s acts, only one fifth said they knew anything about his ideology. When the latter group of respondents was asked whether there is “something in his views and convictions you agree with”, 21 percent replied in the positive (four percent of the total). However, among Moscow-based respondents who said they knew about Breivik’s views, the percentage replying in the positive jumped to 53 percent (14 percent of the total).⁴¹ The problem here is that the implications of “agreeing with something in [Breivik’s] views and convictions” are unclear. After all, Breivik’s stated views consist of a variety of elements, including ethnic nationalism, racism, anti-feminism, and, most important, the view, detailed in the manifesto and borne out by his acts, that terrorism is a necessary and justified response to current developments.⁴² To agree with one or more of the former elements is not equal to embracing the latter. Hence, the poll results are ambiguous, and might reflect the general level of “ordinary” xenophobia in Russian society rather than a high degree of support for the terrorist acts as such.

Three additional polls are more interesting, if also more problematic. They have not been conducted professionally, but informally on far-right community pages at *Vkontakte*. The data

from these polls are questionable in three ways. First, we cannot know to what extent respondents have registered multiple votes. However, doing so would require considerable time and effort. For each additional vote one would need to establish a new VK account, which requires registration by phone number. Second, the respondents obviously do not represent a random sample of the Russian population. Rather, they represent a sample of VK users who frequent far-right VK communities. Third, VK users may only view poll results upon submitting a vote. Many users may have submitted a random vote just to see the results. Even so, the polls were anonymous and received a substantial number of votes. As such they are still worth taking into consideration as one element of a larger picture of the attitude toward Breivik on the Russian far right. In all three polls, a large part of respondents expressed support not only for Breivik’s ideas, but also, most explicit in the second poll, for his actions.

The first poll was carried out in February 2012 on the wall of the VK community “Right Hardcore Crew”, which promotes neo-Nazi rock music. Close to two thousand users voted on their opinion towards Breivik, with the following results:

Hero of the white movement, fighter against islamization	38.7% (765)
A f***ed-up schizophrenic who wanted fame	22% (435)
An ordinary man who carried out his civic duty	19.2% (380)
A freemason, a puppet of ZOG	15.9% (314)
Other	4.3% (85)

The second poll was announced in November 2012 by the pro-Breivik VK community “Breivikism”. 1598 users voted on to what degree they share Breivik’s views:

I fully share them (ideas and methods)	42.6% (680)
Only the ideas	21.7% (347)
I only agree partly with him	20.2% (322)

I do not share them	15.6% (249)
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The third poll was set up by the VK community “Restrukt” in November 2012, with 1165 users voting on whether Breivik is worthy of support despite his acts of mass murder. The results were as follows:

I support this man. Perhaps I will not say so out loud, but I support him.	75% (874)
No, murder is murder no matter what the goals are.	25% (291)

Despite the questionable representativity of these results, in the larger picture they tend to reinforce the impression gained from studying the broader record of public statements and manifestations of support, namely that the Breivik reception on the Russian far right has been largely positive. As will be shown below, the far right in Western European countries reacted differently.

Western European Reactions

Among parties and organizations on the Western European radical right—from the National Front in France via the Sweden Democrats to the English Defence League in Britain—official condemnation of the attacks and distancing from the terrorist has been the rule (with certain exceptions occurring among rank-and-file activists).⁴³ This differs somewhat from the Russian case, where leading radical right-wingers were more ambiguous.

On the extreme right, Western Europeans differed starkly from their Russian counterparts in their response to the 22/7 attacks. Rather than heroizing Breivik, they refrained from publicly addressing the subject, condemned the perpetrator as a murderer of white people, or dismissed

him as a Zionist-controlled puppet.⁴⁴ There are no known cases similar to that of Maksim Martsinkevich, a leading right-wing extremist publicly praising Breivik's acts. There are also no known cases of public manifestations in support of the terrorist as observed in Russia.⁴⁵

Moreover, on Facebook nothing on the scale of the Breivik support that appeared on *Vkontakte* has been documented. Facebook currently has a few dozen groups and pages with "Breivik" in the name, most with a minuscule number of members or supporters. The great majority of them are anti-Breivik, as are all groups with more than a dozen members.⁴⁶

Much of the online discussion of Breivik among far-right activists in Western Europe seems to be concentrated on the international white pride/neo-Nazi forum Stormfront, where dozens of threads (in English as well as other languages) may be found dedicated to the Breivik question. The issue is divisive. Some have expressed approval of Breivik's methods, arguing, like one user did, that "killing traitors" is justified in the current context (this user, like others expressing approval for violence and thus contravening forum rules, was subsequently banned for a certain period).⁴⁷ More frequently, however, one encounters negative opinions on Breivik denouncing him as a Zionist agent or a madman who did much harm to the White Nationalist movement.⁴⁸

No professional opinion polls asking people in Western European countries about their attitudes toward Breivik have been found to exist. Among informal polls on far-right and general forums, most are of little relevance, with only a few dozen respondents. For instance, in a February 2012 poll on the white supremacist *Vanguard News Network*, 32 of 67 respondents voted for Breivik as a "hero", the rest responding negatively. On a forum hosted by *Digital Spy*, an entertainment and technology site, a poll posted in April 2012 with 312 respondents found that 84% condemned Breivik's actions. 8% condemned the acts but supported the views, while

5% voted “I don’t condemn what he did”.⁴⁹ Only one online poll with a substantial number of respondents has been discovered. Posted on Flashback, Sweden’s largest internet forum, the question asked was: “Do you support the actions of Anders Behring Breivik?” At the time of writing, 18% of the 5600 respondents have voted “Yes”, while the rest voted “No”.⁵⁰

To sum up: While actors on the Russian far right have openly and extensively shown their support for Breivik, their counterparts in Western Europe have mostly kept silent, condemned the attacks, or dismissed the perpetrator. Available opinion polls indicate similar tendencies. In the following section I discuss and suggest factors that may help explain this difference.

What Explains the Difference?

Putinist “Ultra-Nationalism”?

Arguably, Putin’s government has been marked by a growing nationalist tendency reflected in policies and official statements. Marcel van Herpen finds that Russia under Putin has gradually been turning to “ultra-nationalism”, which, combined with other developments, leads him to claim that we have been witnessing “the slow rise of a radical right regime” in Moscow.⁵¹ Based on this analysis, one might argue that Russia’s official nationalist stance has helped create a political and discursive climate in which right-wing extremists feel more free than they would otherwise do to openly voice support for someone like Breivik. Such an argument, however, disregards the fact that Russia under Putin has basically remained committed to the preservation of a multiethnic state. It is true that Putin has pursued a policy of “managed nationalism” involving attempts to co-opt and domesticate the nationalist opposition.⁵² However, Putin has not incorporated racism and ethnic hostility into government policy. On the contrary, laws against

incitement to ethnic hatred have been actively used to curb offenders.

Russia's official response to 22/7 reflected the commitment to statist as opposed to ethnic nationalism. Just like Western countries, Russia officially condemned the attacks in strong terms.⁵³ Putin, at the time Russia's Prime Minister, dubbed the attacks "a crime for which there can be no justification", adding that society needs to "establish an atmosphere in which any ideology of this sort is condemned as unacceptable" in order to contain extremism.⁵⁴ The reaction demonstrated that the Russian government, which presides over a multiethnic country whose social and political stability depends on keeping ethnic tensions in check, considers it important to counter exclusionary nationalism and racism such as that espoused by Breivik and his sympathizers.⁵⁵ Rather than being encouraged by a nationalism-promoting government, Russians expressing pro-Breivik opinions more likely did so in a show of anti-government scorn and defiance, in the spirit of Breivik's anti-establishment agenda.

A more pertinent factor in explaining how Breivik has been received in Russia is found in public discourse, where social stigmatization of right-wing extremism is near absent compared to Western Europe.

A Weaker Social Stigma

A weaker social stigma attached to right-wing extremism may help explain the popularity of Breivik among the Russian extreme right. This argument rests on the assumption that right-wing extremist activists in general, being violently opposed to "racial enemies" and governments that support immigration, will seize any opportunity to capitalize on major events from which they can benefit. When Russian right-wing extremists publicly capitalized on Breivik and the 22/7 attacks, they did so because they *could*, given the relative absence of a strong social stigma.

Conversely, most of their Western European counterparts refrained from doing so because of the disincentives resulting from a powerful social stigma. For them, trying to capitalize on 22/7 would have been counter-productive, resulting in much negative and unwanted attention.

Evidence for the claim of a weaker social stigma in Russia than elsewhere may be found by examining two main indicators: First, commentary on the 22/7 attacks in the mainstream press, and second, the incidence of civil-societal “gut reactions” against manifestations of right-wing extremism in general.

What stands out in the discourse on Breivik in the Russian press compared to that of Western Europe is the prevalence of views that do not locate the source of the destruction within the terrorist himself or his ideology, but instead finds the 22/7 attacks to be either a tragic by-product of naïve immigration policies or a more or less well-placed rebellion against a treacherous government.

Many Russian observers portrayed Breivik as a product of flawed immigration policies and multiculturalism. As one commentator stated in the major newspaper *Izvestiia*, Breivik did more than anyone else “to lay bare the crisis of multiculturalism”.⁵⁶ The director of a major polling institute similarly argued that “the true cause of the Oslo tragedy” was to be found “in the negative context created by globalization and mass immigration [...] and the related moods of protest”.⁵⁷ The role of ideology was not a major topic in the Russian press. Rather, pundits usually ignored the whole question, interpreting the 22/7 attacks as growing more or less directly out of the ills of immigration and multiculturalism. For instance, an op-ed appearing three days after the events in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Russia’s largest daily, observed that, “A great many saw in Breivik a victim of circumstances, a concerned [*neravnodushno*] man driven to extremes by globalization and multiculturalism.” The author went on to say that those adopting such a

view were essentially right, as Europe had been cultivating a policy of “internationalism” that “leaves it with few choices”.⁵⁸ An opinion piece in the weekly business journal *Profil* suggested that the Breivik case demonstrates the “challenge” of multiculturalism, which might force Norway and the wider European society to “reconsider its views on humanism in all its meanings”.⁵⁹ In a third example, the daily *Trud* published an opinion piece entitled “The Euro-butcher” arguing that the Breivik case demonstrates Europe’s march into “an unbelievable ideological quagmire” of naïve multiculturalism and misguided tolerance.⁶⁰

Some media commentators even portrayed Breivik as a righteous rebel against the government, thereby reproducing a central part of the terrorist’s own narrative of justification. On 24 July 2011, the *Moskovskii komsomolets*, a major Moscow tabloid, ran an op-ed entitled “Black and Whites” in which Breivik was said to have “rebelled against [...] the suicidal idea of multiculturalism, tolerance, and satiety” and a Norwegian government “blinded by treacherous tolerance”. Norway’s policies of multiculturalism and tolerance, the author continued, would result in giving “power to the blacks [*vlast chernym*]”, which in turn explains why Breivik did what he did.⁶¹ Another example is an opinion piece published on the popular internet news site KM.ru in August 2012, in which the authors compared Breivik to the crusaders of the Middle Ages: Just like the crusaders, who demonstrated much cruelty when scrambling to defend and restore Christian lands conquered by Muslims, Breivik reacted “barbarically” to a “barbarian invasion” of non-Western immigrants [*otvetil varvarski, no - na varvarskoe nashestvie*].⁶² In the same vein another commentator, the chief editor of the right-wing nationalist weekly *Zavtra*, stated his view of the Norwegian terrorist as “a rebellious, stormy soul,” who by his acts “demonstrated a total rejection” of “vulgar and liberal” Norwegian society. According to the author, Breivik could be described as “a symbol of struggle against the world order”.⁶³

By contrast, Western European media discourse rarely focused on immigration and multiculturalism as the root problem. Rather, coverage of the 22/7 attacks in major European news outlets concentrated on the dangers of hateful right-wing extremist ideology.⁶⁴ The difference in mainstream press commentary seems to indicate a corresponding difference in the degree of social stigma attached to right-wing extremism. In the Western European public climate, the 22/7 attacks reinforced this stigma, while in Russia the absence of a similar stigma was reflected in the portrayals of Breivik as a victim and rebel.

Another indicator of the difference in social stigma is the incidence of civil-societal “gut reactions” against right-wing extremism. In Western Europe, civil society tends to protest vigorously. Following the 2001 murder of a dark-skinned boy by neo-Nazis in Oslo, some 40 000 people went out in the streets of Norway’s capital in a show of protest.⁶⁵ Demonstrations by right-wing extremists in Western European cities are usually met with fierce counter-demonstrations that are often considerably larger in size.⁶⁶ Moreover, radical right parties find it necessary to take disciplinary action against Breivik supporters among their own ranks. One highly placed member of the Sweden Democrats was forced to step down after posting online comments expressing approval for Breivik’s ideas and saying that the terrorist may be proven right since continued immigration might force “native Europeans” to take up arms.⁶⁷ In France, Front National suspended one party member for hailing Breivik as a “resistance leader” in the struggle against “the Muslim invasion”, and reprimanded another for pointing to immigration as the cause of the attacks.⁶⁸ In Austria, a member of the federal parliament belonging to the Freedom Party (FPÖ) was excluded from the party and forced to retire from Parliament after making remarks relativizing Breivik’s acts by pointing to a greater “Islamic threat”.⁶⁹ In Norway, a “counterjihad” blogger known by the pseudonym “Fjordman” (whose writings were

reproduced and praised by Breivik in his compendium), claimed he lost his job and was forced to leave the country after the 22/7 attacks, apparently as a result of being associated with Breivik.⁷⁰ Adherents of right-wing extremist ideology in Western European countries expect to face trouble at home, at school, and in the workplace if their views become known.⁷¹

In Russia, on the other hand, similar reactions are rarely observed. Anti-racist demonstrations are both less common and smaller than those organized by nationalists. The annual nationalist “Russian March”, which has gathered 5000-6000 people in Moscow in recent years, rarely faces substantial counter-demonstrations. Public displays of right-wing extremist convictions, even to the extent of supporting Breivik, fail to provoke public reactions. The best example is Maksim Martsinkevich, a prominent figure on the extreme right in Russia best known for his lead role in the “Occupy Pedophilia” movement. Previously a neo-Nazi skinhead leader, Martsinkevich generally does not conceal his right-wing extremist views. On one occasion in June 2012, he publicly voiced his opinion of Breivik as a hero. Such statements would undoubtedly have reduced him to *persona non grata* in Western Europe. In Russia, however, major state-controlled TV channels (Channel One and NTV) featured him as a guest on popular talk shows on two occasions in July 2012 and September 2013. In neither case was Martsinkevich confronted with his political stance. Instead, he was presented as a “social activist” fighting against pedophiles.⁷²

In sum, right-wing extremists in Russia do not expect to be rejected, scorned, attacked, or discredited for their views or behavior in the same way their Western European counterparts do. In other words, they do not experience similar social stigmatization. This circumstance suggests that in Russia, a major disincentive against publicly embracing and instrumentalizing a right-wing terrorist such as Breivik is largely absent.

A More Violent Culture

Because violence generally is more widespread in Russian society than in the West, right-wing extremists in Russia may be more prone to the use of violence than their counterparts in Western countries. Arguably, where there is more violence, desensitization occurs and even acts of spectacular violence such as those committed by Breivik lose some of the instinctively repulsive effect they have on people in less violent societies. Higher acceptance of violence in general makes it more acceptable to embrace Breivik's actions.

There can be little doubt that post-Soviet Russia has been more violent than Western Europe. In 2010, the Russian homicide rate was 10.1 per 100 000, or ten to fifteen times greater than that of countries such as Germany, UK, France, and Norway.⁷³ Also, the rate was considerably higher in the 1990s and early 2000s, when most members of today's right-wing extremist movement grew up. Russia also has higher levels of domestic violence than countries in Western Europe. Current estimates by Russian officials and NGOs working with victims suggest ten to fourteen thousand women die every year at the hands of husbands or other relatives, or between 7 and 10 per 100 000.⁷⁴ For Germany, France, and the UK, available data suggest a corresponding figure of 0.1 to 0.2 per 100 000.⁷⁵

Given the level of violence on Russian streets and in Russian homes, it is safe to assume that acceptance of violence is higher among the Russian population than in Western Europe. Surrounded by violence to a larger degree, a larger proportion of the Russian population regard the use of violence as an inevitable, natural, acceptable, or effective solution to problems. Findings from violence research strengthen this supposition. In particular, there is strong evidence that exposure to violence (both witnessing violence and being directly subjected to it)

increases a person's risk of becoming a perpetrator of violence.⁷⁶ Studies have also found that people who have been subjected to violence tend to view it as more acceptable. Children, especially boys, who witness adult domestic violence tend to view violence as an effective way of addressing problems and a means to enhance one's self-image.⁷⁷ One German study found that Russian youths were more inclined than their German counterparts to think that violence gets you ahead in life.⁷⁸

While the less powerful social stigma and the more violent culture are macro-level factors that help account for the embrace of Breivik on the Russian far right, it is also useful to zoom in and look for clues within the Russian far-right movement itself.

The Tradition of Iconizing Right-Wing Militants

The Russian far right has a much more violent recent history compared to similar movements elsewhere. The conscious nurturing and exploitation of this history by Russia's right-wing extremists may help explain the tendency to embrace and heroize Breivik.

Since 2004, at least 600 people have been killed and at least 3800 injured in Russia as a result of right-wing extremist violence.⁷⁹ Activists are not oblivious to this tradition of violence. On the contrary, they consciously cultivate and exploit it by glorifying convicted and deceased militants and terrorists, hailing them as "resistance fighters", "prisoners of conscience" and "heroes of will [*geroi voli*]". The work done to maintain the tradition takes several forms, such as projects to support imprisoned militants (e.g., *Geroi voli*, *PO Feniks*, *P.O.W. Kholod* and the Association for White Political and War Prisoners), demonstrations, and a diverse cultural production including music, artworks portraying right-wing militants as saintly figures, documentary films that lionize right-wing terrorists, and panegyric texts and poems.⁸⁰

After the attacks in Norway, Breivik was accorded a place within this Russian pantheon of right-wing extremist heroes. For instance, a poem by the imprisoned militant Aleksei Voevodin encouraging activists to stop talking and start acting included the following lines: “Go follow Breivik’s example! Be on a par with Borovikov!” (Dmitrii Borivikov led a group of right-wing militants together with Voevodin before being killed while trying to escape the police). After the poem was posted and re-posted on right-wing extremist VK pages, the rock group *Trezvyi zariad* [Sober Charge] wrote a song based on the poem. In a further spin-off, an image featuring Breivik and Borovikov and the above-mentioned line from Voevodin’s poem was created and published as a VK post along with a link to the song. Such posts were “liked” and shared by hundreds.⁸¹

Traditions of hero cultivation do exist among Western European right-wing extremists as well, but focus mainly on historical figures, the most prominent of which is Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy. The memorial marches in his honor and the pilgrimage visits to his grave by neo-Nazis are well known. However, they are of a different order than the Russian glorification of imprisoned and deceased “comrades-in-arms”. Hess is history, and the cult surrounding him serves to emphasize the “good” side of Nazism, with Hess being mythologized as a peaceful, noble, unselfish and loyal National Socialist hero. According to German scholars Dörfler and Klärner, “Hess has become a kind of Ché Guevara for the extreme right”.⁸² By contrast, the contemporary icons of the Russian extreme right, including Breivik, are glorified precisely because of their will to take violent and murderous action against present-day racial and political enemies. There seems to be no comparable culture of publicly iconizing contemporary right-wing terrorists in Western Europe.

The heroization of Breivik on the Russian extreme right, then, was modeled on a pre-

existing pattern. The vibrant tradition of iconizing the protagonists of Russia's exceptionally violent right-wing extremist movement made the embrace of Breivik a natural part of the larger effort to promote racist nationalism.

Conclusion

The reception of Breivik on the Russian far right stands out compared to Western European countries. While the radical right in Western Europe generally condemned the terrorist, leading right-wing radicals in Russia were ambiguous. Some responded by condemning the acts, others by insinuating approval. A more striking difference was found among the extreme right. While right-wing extremists in Western Europe mostly kept Breivik at arm's length (at least in public), their counterparts in Russia openly embraced him. In a variety of ways, Russian right-wing extremists have sought to capitalize on Breivik and his terrorist acts. They have done so for propaganda purposes, to inspire continued struggle and encourage activists, and to instill fear by raising the threat of "Russian Breiviks" if migration policies continue as before.

The findings presented here do not necessarily imply that new Breiviks are brewing on the Russian extreme right. We do not know whether his example has contributed to new, real acts of violence. The amount and quality of the Breivik cultivation would at least suggest that for activists contemplating the use of violence and terrorism, Breivik has become a major source of inspiration. As of yet, however, no "copycats" have emerged in Russia. Across Europe, only one allegedly Breivik-inspired terrorist plot has surfaced so far. In November 2012, the Polish chemist Brunon Kwiecien was arrested for planning to blow up the Polish parliament. As of December 2014, he is in jail awaiting trial. Kwiecien's plans appear to have come about as a result of a sting operation by Polish intelligence agents acting as a group of co-conspirators.⁸³

While the Kwiecien case does not seem to reflect any widespread far-right cultivation of Breivik in Poland, more research would be needed to measure the impact of the 22/7 attacks on other far-right milieus than those considered in the present study.

This article highlights Russia as a hotspot for right-wing extremist activities in Europe. Russian activists' fascination with and public use of Breivik shows how they are working to encourage violence and terrorism as a part of the political struggle. This is not new—for at least a decade, the Russian right-wing extremist movement has been exceptionally violent. While increased efforts by Russian law enforcement to curb the violence in the mid-to-late 2000s appear to have had a positive effect, the level of violence remains high, with reports suggesting right-wing killings may be on the rise again.⁸⁴ Moreover, the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian conflict have embroiled many Russian right-wing activists in armed battle. What effect this combat experience will have on returning activists and the larger movement remains to be seen. Looking forward, researchers and other interested parties have good reason to study the development of right-wing militancy in Russia.

Studying the reasons for the positive Breivik reception on the Russian far right may offer clues to answering another important and understudied question in right-wing extremism studies, namely why some movements become more violent than others. What are the conditions and mechanisms conducive to right-wing extremist violence? This article offers insights that could inform future research in this direction. Two of the factors suggested to help explain why Breivik was received more positively in Russia than elsewhere—the lack of a powerful social stigma and a more violent culture—could also help account for cross-national variations in right-wing violence. The premise here is that less stigmatization lowers the cost of violent and violence-promoting activism, while high levels of violence in a given society removes social and

psychological barriers against using violence. Comparative, cross-national research could evaluate the explanatory power of these factors, with a view to increasing our understanding of right-wing violence and terrorism.

Notes

¹ The terms “far right”, “radical right”, and “extreme right” are often used interchangeably. In this article I use “far right” as an umbrella for the latter two. I distinguish between radicals and extremists based on actors’ attitudes toward and use of violence. While radicals may have much in common with extremists ideologically, extremists stand out by their explicit advocacy, or direct use, of violence as a means to political ends.

² While valuable, the best account in English of post-Soviet Russia’s far-right movement is by now dated: Vera Tolz, “Right-wing extremism in Russia: the dynamics of the 1990s”, in *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century*, ed. by Peter H Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003), 251–271.

³ Reports by the Moscow-based SOVA Center (www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/ [accessed 14 August 2014]) suggest that at least 600 people have been killed in Russia as a result of right-wing extremist violence since 2004. Many attacks go unreported. Counting only the registered cases, the number of right-wing extremist killings in Russia appears to exceed for example that found in the USA (whose population is more than double that of Russia) by nearly 300 percent. For US figures, see See Arie Perliger, *Challengers from the sidelines understanding America’s violent far-right* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012), 100. By further comparison, right-wing extremist killings in the whole of Western Europe (18 countries) over a period of four decades (1965-2005), according to the Domestic Terrorist Victims dataset, amounted to about 640. See Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “The quantity and quality of terrorism The DTV dataset”, *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 1 (2011): 49–58. The dataset is available at www.march.es/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/datasets.asp#domestic [accessed 13 November 2013].

⁴ On the value of extreme cases, see John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 101–2.

⁵ Mattias Gardell, “Crusader Dreams: Oslo July 22, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2013): 129–155; Lars Erik Berntzen and Sveinung Sandberg, “The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 0, no. 0 (2014): 1–21; Katie Cohen et al., “Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 1 (2013): 246–256; Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Anders Behring Breivik’s use of the Internet and social media”, *Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 2 (2013): 172–185; Raffaello Pantucci, “What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?”, *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, no. 5–6 (2011); Sindre Bangstad, *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia* (London: Zed Books, 2014).

⁶ Jacob Ravndal, “A Post-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik”, *CTC Sentinel* 5, no. 3 (2012), www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-post-trial-profile-of-anders-behring-breivik [accessed 8 August 2014].

⁷ While studying the activity on closed internet forums could yield interesting insights into the internal far-right discussion of Breivik and his deeds, this article refrains from doing so. The reason is practical: gaining access to closed forums used by militant activists would require active deception and dissimulation efforts on the part of the researcher, which would violate the ethical research guidelines of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

⁸ “Zhirinovskii: Prichina prestupleniia Breivika -- v ideologii”, *Rosbalt.ru*, 16 April 2012, rosbalt.ru/main/2012/04/16/970455.html [accessed 22 April 2014].

⁹ “Lider ‘Slavianskoi sily’ Demushkin otritsaet, chto sotrudnichal s terroristom Breivikom”, *Gazeta.ru*, 4 August 2011, gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/08/04/n_1952941.shtml [accessed 14 March 2014].

¹⁰ Anna Nemtsova and Owen Matthews, “Fascist Russia?”, *Newsweek Magazine*, 7 August 2011.

¹¹ Ibid.; Øystein Bogen, “Russiske nynazister hyller barnemorderen Breivik”, *TV 2*, 7 October 2012, www.tv2.no/nyheter/utenriks/russiske-nynazister-hyller-barnemorderen-breivik-3893769.html [accessed 13 March

2014]; Aleksandr Belov, interview by Pål Kolstø, Moscow, 29 October 2013 (courtesy of *Nation-building and nationalism in today's Russia*, a joint project by the Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, financed by the Norwegian Research Council).

¹² Alan Ingram, "Alexander Dugin: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia", *Political Geography* 20, no. 8 (2001): 1029–51; Anton Shekhovtsov, "The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth in Aleksandr Dugin's Worldview", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9, no. 4 (2008): 491–506.

¹³ Aleksandr Dugin, "O Breivike (kratko)", *LiveJournal*, 19 August 2011, dugin.livejournal.com/3307.html [accessed 22 April 2014].

¹⁴ "Tesak o Breivike", YouTube video, 2:29, posted by "MultiNvision", 1 August 2012, youtube.com/watch?v=eFUnzEaQLnw; Bogen, "Russiske nynazister hyller barnemorderen Breivik".

¹⁵ VK page *Restrukt Life*, 25 January 2013, vk.com/restruct_life?z=photo-42214697_296743616%2Fphotos-42214697 [accessed 28 February 2014].

¹⁶ "Anders Breivik. Dva goda spustia", *Restrukt.me*, 24 July 2013, restrukt.me/anders-breyvik-dva-goda-spustya/ [accessed 3 September 2014].

¹⁷ See, for instance, his article "Falshivye lozungi – falshivye tseli", *NSO-korpus*, 8 October 2007, archive.today/edg5E [accessed 3 September 2014].

¹⁸ Aleksandr Usovskii, "Anders Bering Breivik—poslednyi berserk iz roda vikingov", *Usovski.ru*, 24 July 2011, usovski.ru/?p=1308 [accessed 3 September 2014].

¹⁹ "Mezhdunarodnaia Assotsiatsiia Belykh Politzakliuchennykh i Voennoplennykh napravila pismo Andersu Breiviku", *LiveJournal*, spas-history.livejournal.com/35820.html [accessed 4 September 2014].

²⁰ N. V. Korolev, *Bibliia skinkheda II* (Moscow, 2013), 283–87. The book may be downloaded at spas-history.livejournal.com/55245.html [accessed 3 September 2014].

²¹ Aleksei Voevodin, interview by Greenline Front, VK page *Greenline Front*, 9 September 2013, vk.com/glf_public?w=wall-43034511_4999 [accessed 3 September 2014].

²² "Geroi nashikh dnei: Eksklusivnoe intervju s NS/VP-Moskva", *Pravye novosti*, 16 September 2011, <http://pn14.info/?p=78760> [accessed 8 April 2014].

²³ Mad Forester, "Nasha pozitsiia: Breivik i NS/WP", 11 July 2013, *NS/WP forum*, <https://ns-wp.ws/forum/index.php/topic,5311.0.html> [accessed 9 April 2014]. In another example, the (unregistered) Party to Defend the Russian Constitution (PZRK), whose 2006 founders included former members of the Russian National Unity (RNE), a neo-Nazi organization active in the 1990s, similarly published an article denouncing Breivik as a puppet manipulated by Zionists behind the scenes to discredit the white nationalist movement. See "Breivik - pravyi, levy ili idiot?", *Partiia zashchita rossiiskoi konstitutsii*, undated, pzrk.ru/publikaczii/breivik-pravyyj-levyj-ili-idiot.html [accessed 10 April 2014].

²⁴ "Russkii marsh v Novosibirsk: 'Svobodu Breiviku!'", posted on VK page *Breivikizm - ideologija XXI veka?*, 6 November 2011, vk.com/breivikizm?z=photo-28975919_270066529%2Fwall-28975919_849 [accessed 14 March 2014]; "V Novosibirsk na Russkom marshe vyrazili solidarnost s Breivikom", *Pravye novosti*, pn14.info/?p=87241 [accessed 14 March 2014]. David Lane (1938-2007) and Robert Jay Matthews (1953-1984) were prominent American white nationalist revolutionaries.

²⁵ Video available at vk.com/video223234925_167449668?list=840770f1d943d65265 and vk.com/im?sel=223234925&z=video-29789916_163736209%2Fb7ded0339749129c66 [both accessed 3 April 2014]. See also "Swastika & 'Long live Breivik': Nationalists march in Moscow", YouTube video, posted by "RussiaToday", 4 November 2012, youtube.com/watch?v=LmA06QE6IIw [accessed 3 April 2014].

²⁶ "Russkii marsh". Reportazh", *Snob.ru*, 4 November 2013, snob.ru/selected/entry/67009 [accessed 3 April 2014].

²⁷ VK page *Breivikizm - ideologija XXI veka?*, 22 July 2013, vk.com/abbcharm?w=wall-35749782_5824%2Fall [accessed 24 February 2014].

²⁸ "V Syktyvkare proshel piket protiv migratsionnoi politiki", *SOVA Center*, 19 September 2013, sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2013/09/d27954/ [accessed 11 March 2014]. For a video recording, see "Rech Aleksandra Karmanova na mitinge", YouTube video, posted by "Mezaks", 23 September 2013, youtube.com/watch?v=Gmb7h5qNVf8 [accessed 6 May 2014].

²⁹ VK page *Internet-magazin "Solnechnyi Krest" Moskva*, 16 October 2013, vk.com/sk_moscow?z=photo-46227790_312756462%2Fphotos-46227790 [accessed 3 April 2014].

³⁰ VK page *Breivikizm - ideologija XXI veka?*, 27 June 2013, vk.com/breivikizm?z=photo-28975919_305840896%2Falbum-28975919_00%2Frev [accessed 3 April 2014].

³¹ VK page *Magazin Weisthor (Moskva)*, 27 February 2014, vk.com/wall-66888578_14, announcing that only sizes L and S are left of the Breivik t-shirt. For examples of people wearing this t-shirt in public, see wall post at VK page *Restrukt-Sibir18*, 16 March 2014, vk.com/id2561499?w=wall-46022408_6141 and Bogen, “Russiske nynazister hyller barnemorderen Breivik” [all accessed 13 August 2014].

³² “Belaia rasa nastupaet”, *LiveJournal*, 23 July 2011, ramrus.livejournal.com/117448.html [accessed 22 April 2014].

³³ Sergei Baimukhametov, “Anders Breivik. Ego poklonniki i opravdateli”, *Chaika (Seagull Magazine)*, 16 August 2011, chayka.org/node/4276 [accessed 25 March 2014].

³⁴ Nikolai Svanidze, “Geroi Rossii ubiitsa Breivik”, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 26 July 2011.

³⁵ “VKontakte’ zablokiroval gruppu v podderzhku Breivika”, *BBC Russkaia Sluzhba*, 25 July 2011, bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/07/110725_breivik_vkontakte_groups.shtml [accessed 24 February 2014].

³⁶ vk.com/abbcharm, vk.com/breivikizm, vk.com/breivik [accessed 15 July 2014]. As of October 2014, vk.com/breivikizm has been deleted.

³⁷ VK page *Breivikizm - ideologija XXI veka?*, 22 July 2012, vk.com/breivikizm?w=wall-28975919_6728 [accessed 24 February 2014].

³⁸ VK page *Breivikizm - ideologija XXI veka?*, vk.com/wall-28975919_9674 [accessed 3 April 2014].

³⁹ VK page *Restrukt Life*, 22 July 2013, vk.com/restruct_life?w=wall-42214697_41099 [accessed 3 April 2014].

⁴⁰ VK page *WotanJugend*, 22 July 2013, vk.com/wall-39340950_35208 [accessed 3 September 2014].

⁴¹ “Ideologija ‘norvezhskogo strelka’: Chto dumaiut rossiiane ob ubezhdenniakh Andersa Breivika”, *Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie*, 13 September 2012, fom.ru/Bezopasnost-i-pravo/10628 [accessed 24 February 2014]. This result is in harmony with recent findings from polls showing that the Moscow population expresses more hostile attitudes towards immigrants than do Russians in general. See, for instance, “‘Russkii marsh’ poluchil odobrenie”, *Levada-tsentr*, 1 November 2013, www.levada.ru/01-11-2013/russkii-marsh-poluchil-odobrenie [accessed 14 April 2014].

⁴² For closer elaboration on Breivik’s ideology, see Ravndal, “A Post-Trial Profile”; Gardell, “Crusader Dreams”.

⁴³ See Cathrin Kahlweit and Michael Frank, “Schnelles Wegducken”, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 July 2011, sueddeutsche.de/politik/europas-rechtspopulisten-nach-den-attentaten-schnelles-wegducken-1.1124524 [accessed 28 April 2014]; Johannes Radke, “Deutschlands Rechtspopulisten fürchten um ihr Image”, *Zeit Online*, 26 July 2011, zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-07/norwegen-attentat-reaktionen-rechtsextremismus/komplettansicht [accessed 28 April 2014]; “(SD) kopplar inte sin politik med Breivik – Rapport”, YouTube video, posted by “wolfingerful”, 6 August 2011, youtube.com/watch?v=8YsYIRmkmTY [accessed 28 April 2014]; “Our thoughts on the Norwegian tragedy”, *English Defence League*, 2 August 2011, englishdefenceleague.org/our-thoughts-on-the-norwegian-tragedy-the-edl-editorial-team/ [accessed 28 April 2014]; “Norway attacks: National Front member suspended for defending Anders Behring Breivik”, *The Telegraph*, 26 July 2011, telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/8664568/Norway-attacks-National-Front-member-suspended-for-defending-Anders-Behring-Breivik.html [accessed 28 April 2014]; “FPÖ kicks out MP for Norway killing theories”, *Austrian independent*, 29 July 2011, austrianindependent.com/news/Politics/2011-07-29/8578/FP%25D6_kicks_out_MP_for_Norway_killing_theories [accessed 28 April 2014]. For exceptions, mostly consisting of Facebook statements by individual activists, see Mark Townsend, “British far-right extremists voice support for Anders Breivik”, *The Guardian*, 1 September 2012, theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/01/far-right-support-anders-breivik [accessed 3 September 2014]; “Danish Defence League: Fra menneskerettigheder til voldelig virkelighed”, *Redox*, 26 August 2014, redox.dk/nyheder/danish-defence-league-fra-menneskerettigheder-til-voldelig-virkelighed [accessed 4 October 2014]; Margrethe Rasmussen, “Militant Breivik-supporter var med i Aarhus”, *P77*, p77.dk/debat/392/militant-breivik-supporter-var-med-i-aarhus [accessed 4 October 2014].

⁴⁴ For statements from Danish and Swedish right-wing extremists suggesting that Breivik operated on behalf of “Zionists”, see Lars Wittmann, “Anders B. Breivik: In service for the new world order”, *PZRK “Russia”*, undated, pzrk.ru/english-version-of-pzrk-russia/anders-b-breivik-in-service-for-the-new-world-order.html [accessed 28 April 2014]; Fredrik Vejedland, “Terrorn i Norge: Gärningsmannen sionist?”, *Nordfront*, 23 July 2011, nordfront.se/terrorn-i-norge-garningsmannen-sionist.smr [accessed 28 April 2014].

⁴⁵ One possible exception concerns the German clothing company Thor Steinar, popular in the neo-Nazi

milieu, which decided in 2012 to open a store named *Brevik* in the town of Chemnitz (the name was later changed following public outcry). See “Neo-Nazi clothes brand opens ‘Brevik’ shop”, *The Local*, 6 March 2012, thelocal.de/20120306/41173 [accessed 29 April 2014].

⁴⁶ The only Facebook community page discovered with anything resembling a pro-Breivik orientation and more than a handful of members is Polish, and thus beyond the scope of the Russia-Western Europe comparison. See [facebook.com/Anders.Behring.Breivik.najwiekszy.zbrodniarz](https://www.facebook.com/Anders.Behring.Breivik.najwiekszy.zbrodniarz) [accessed 23 May 2014]. Possibly, a more strict Facebook policy on hate speech may account for the relative lack of pro-Breivik communities compared to VK. A number of such communities were established shortly after the attacks, only to be shut down by the site administration. Thanks to Jacob Ravndal for this piece of information.

⁴⁷ Stormfront post by Britannic Nationalist, 27 July 2013, stormfront.org/forum/t983035-23/#post11415365 [accessed 29 April 2014].

⁴⁸ See, for instance, the Stormfront thread “What did Breivik want to say to the world?”, started 27 July 2013, stormfront.org/forum/t983035/ [accessed 29 April 2014].

⁴⁹ VNN Forum post, 9 February 2012, vnnforum.com/showthread.php?t=138648; Digital Spy forum post, 22 April 2012, forums.digitalspy.co.uk/showthread.php?p=57796824 [both accessed 2 September 2014].

⁵⁰ Flashback post, 23 July 2011, flashback.org/t1851775 [accessed 3 September 2014].

⁵¹ Marcel van Herpen, *Putinism: the slow rise of a radical right regime in Russia* (Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

⁵² Robert Horvath, “Russkii Obraz and the politics of ‘managed nationalism’”, *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 3 (2014): 469–488.

⁵³ “Soboleznovaniia Koroliu i Premer-ministru Norvegii”, *Prezident Rossii*, 23 July 2011, kremlin.ru/news/12082 [accessed 3 September 2014].

⁵⁴ “V.Putin: Prestupleniia A.Breivika net nikakogo opravdaniia”, *RBK*, 9 August 2011, top.rbc.ru/society/09/08/2011/609654.shtml [accessed 3 September 2014].

⁵⁵ The official stance against exclusionary ethnic nationalism is not new. Putin stated in 2003 that people who promote the slogan “Russia for the [ethnic] Russians [*Rossiiia dlia russkikh*]” are “either idiots or provocateurs”. This official line apparently still holds. See, for instance, “Putin: zakryvat glaza na ekstremistskie vykhodki nedopustimo”, *ITAR-TASS*, 21 March 2014, itar-tass.com/politika/1065119 [accessed 5 September 2014].

⁵⁶ Aleksandr Pavlov, “Kazus s Breivikom”, *Izvestiia* 28 August 2012.

⁵⁷ Valeriia Sycheva, “Posle Breivika”, *Itogi*, 1 August 2011, itogi.ru/vokrug/2011/31/167865.html [accessed 4 September 2014].

⁵⁸ Vladimir Vorsobin, “Otkuda v Rossii poklonniki Breivika?”, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 25 July 2011, kp.by/daily/25723.5/2716145/ [accessed 4 September 2014].

⁵⁹ Sergei Karaganov, “Kazus Breivika”, *Profil*, 9 July 2012.

⁶⁰ Sergei Frolov, “Evropalach”, *Trud*, 19 April 2012.

⁶¹ Vadim Rechkalov, “Chernoie i belye”, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 24 July 2011.

⁶² Sergei Cherniakhovskii, “Breivik i Pussy Riot: dve storony odnoi medali”, *KM.ru*, 28 August 2012, km.ru/v-rossii/2012/08/27/rezonansnye-sudebnye-protsessy-v-rossii/breivik-i-pussy-riot-dve-storony-odnoi-m [accessed 2 April 2014].

⁶³ Evgenii Lukianitsa, “Pochemu u norvezhtsa, ubivshego 76 chelovek, nashlis sochuvstvuiushchie”, *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 26 July 2011, irk.kp.ru/daily/25724/2716340/ [accessed 4 September 2014].

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