

PhD R. Crane

PhD R. Alas

(Estonian Business School, Tallinn)

Msc J. Dumetz

(Plekhanov Russian Economic University)

PAVING THE PATH TO PEACE IN THE CEE: IS CULTURE A WAY TO PEACE?

It has been famously said that «Character is Destiny». Similarly, it might be stated that «Culture is National Destiny». What is national culture and how does it (partially) determine the course of historical events? «National Culture» might be defined as the beliefs and values of a given group of people which form their way of perceiving each other and the world. This «national mindset» is based on certain culturally key past events which have crystallized into a particular worldview, which in turn is transmitted from generation to generation, most importantly during childhood.

Keywords: *National culture, norms and beliefs, mindset, foreign policy, Russia, Ukraine, Baltic states.*

Introduction

It has been famously said that «Character is Destiny». Similarly, it might be stated that «Culture is National Destiny». What is national culture and how does it (partially) determine the course of historical events? «National Culture» might be defined as the beliefs and values of a given group of people which form their way of perceiving each other and the world. This «national mindset» is based on certain culturally key past events which have crystallized into a particular worldview, which in turn is transmitted from generation to generation, most importantly during childhood.

An example of this phenomenon is the victory of the Germanic tribes over three Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD (CE). In this battle, the Germanic tribes, which might be described as disorganized rabble, attacked three Roman legions of highly disciplined professional Roman soldiers in the forest. The former defeated, and annihilated the latter. Indeed, in what has been called «Rome's greatest defeat», the Germanic tribes under Arminius changed the course of history and put paid to the supposed invincibility of Rome. With this victory, those who were to become Germans centuries later realized they could challenge and vanquish the greatest military power of their time. This lesson was not lost on later generations. The battle is still celebrated in

Germany with children wearing the war bonnets of the tribes.

Our purpose here is to apply the tools of cross cultural study to the current (incipient or live) conflicts involving Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. Our goal is to unearth the cultural traits of three of the countries concerned (Russia, Ukraine, and Estonia) and examine them for possible sources of conflict, much like on a crime scene. We then widen our scope to evaluate the cross cultural relations probable among Russia, the European Union, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The «border», as it were, between East and West Europe is largely between Russia on one side and the E.U. and NATO on the other. Without wishing to refer to Samuel Huntington's well known division of the Earth into distinct, often warring cultural zones in his «The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order» (Touchstone, New York, 1996), we recognize that there is a clear cultural fault line in Europe between Russia in the East and the European Union in the West. This cultural fault line is similar in nature to the one separating Mexico and Latin America from the United States and Canada. Two largely mutually misunderstanding and distrustful cultures face each other on the same geographical surface.

Setting the Scene

For most of 2014 and again in 2015, Ukraine has been the center of attention in Eastern Europe. A succession of crises struck the country. Among the events were the following:

- Peaceful, then violent «Maidan» protests in Kiev;
- a change in the Ukrainian government amid turmoil;
- a peaceful military take-over (or return?) of Crimea to Russia.

The appearance of militarized pro-independence groups in the far East of Ukraine: a full-blown military conflict between the Ukrainian army supported by self-equipped volunteers and a military force composed of «pro-Russia» fighters (for lack of a better term).

While the Ukrainian government received some non-military support from Western countries, the «pro-Russia» fighters were officially helped by Russian army «volunteers» and unofficially by the Russian government, which appeared to have sent military equipment and kept the Russia-Ukraine border open to both fighters and equipment.

This escalation on the ground was mirrored by a severing of relationships between the Russian Federation and the «West», in particular the European Union, the United States and NATO, the North Atlantic military alliance which includes North American countries (the USA and Canada) and most of Europe, plus Turkey. Economic sanctions by the West were answered by counter-sanctions. Russia was expelled from the Group of 8 and suspended from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (the oldest Europe-wide political body). In the meantime, Russia launched the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs union with neighboring Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia, all former Soviet republics. Even if the situation on the ground were to stabilize, the relationship between the West and Russia is likely to be damaged for a long period of time. Moreover, in 2015, both Belarus and Kazakhstan – both erstwhile members of the Eurasian Economic Union – began aiding Ukraine.

Methodology: Using cross-cultural management tools in international relations

To return to the theoretical side of the question, cross-cultural management is an interdisciplinary field that draws upon the results obtained in other humanities. Originating in ethnology and sociology [7], it has developed in the last few decades by adapting the existing tools of psychology to analysing and comparing corporate and national cultures.

A series of worldwide country surveys have been conducted [9; 10; 16] offering researchers and practitioners practical tools for comparing national cultures.

By «national culture», cross-cultural management means ethno-national cultures, i. e. countries. Much debated among the community [9; 11], this unit remains today the most commonly used to analyse similarities and differences in behaviors of groups of individuals belonging to various cultures, despite its shortcomings.

Derived from the various models and tools developed by researchers, the existing cultural dimensions allow for the analysis of national cultures, most often with applications to international management. This factor analysis provides simple ways to situate the likelihood of a given behaviour by members of a particular culture when confronted with an identified situation between two extremes or axes.

While the models using behavioural dimensions are numerous, the dimensions themselves are frequently the same [5]. In this article, the authors attempt to use cultural dimensions to analyse the various viewpoints of countries and groups of countries involved in the crisis in Ukraine.

Russia – Ukraine: two similar cultures

Clearly, the Russia-Ukraine situation is not strictly speaking cultural, from a cross-cultural communication perspective. However, cultural dimensions can be used to suggest fruitful indications as to the type of current relationship between the two nations.

Particularism/universalism is about choosing between agreed upon rules or bending existing rules to fulfill engagements in a relationship [16]. Both Russian and Ukrainian cultures favor relationship over rules and thus are

particularistic. This cultural characteristic frequently leads to corruption and a «driving» leadership style. Hence, Russian and Ukrainian cultures are similar from many points of view. From their own point of view, Russians have perceived themselves (since the Fall of Constantinople, some would say) as a beacon to the world, a country with a unique calling. Indeed, Russians see themselves as very special. For instance, it took a long time for Russia to accept the status of a mere member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Normality is not what the country is used to. So, when the U.S. and Europe started to criticize the attitude of Russia towards Ukraine, not only did the criticism have no effect on their subsequent actions, it actually encouraged the Kremlin to continue along the same path. Particularistic cultures also do not mind deforming the truth to support their claims. While, unfortunately, distorting reality is common worldwide (Colin Powell at the UN...), in Particularistic societies it is not really seen as morally wrong, but rather as a needed step towards a greater goal. The ends justify the means. Because Ukraine is also Particularistic, it is hard to believe any of the claims made by politicians on either side.

Ukraine and Russia are also *Diffuse cultures*. It means the split between one's public and private life is not really clear. In other words, you belong to the inner circle of your friends, and you ignore (at best) the individuals outside your life (Trompenaars, 1993). Diffuse cultures treat relationships in a very simple way: we are friends or foes. You are with us or against us. The vague term «acquaintance» is for another type of culture, the Specific culture within which you can enjoy a very fruitful professional relationship with someone you personally dislike, an experience diplomats are accustomed to encountering. Thus, as long as the relationship between the two countries was officially good, many examples were cited by both sides to explain how similar the countries were (a notion akin to the «Soviet brotherhood» spirit during sporting events). Many Russians feel their Ukrainian? brothers? broke the trust that bound them together, and therefore they are now considered enemies. In sum, once the mob ousted the Kremlin's protégé Yanukovich, the relationship made a 180° turn. Not only did established

agreements become meaningless (such as the 1994 Budapest agreement), but tensions quickly escalated to physical violence. As has been known since the time of Cain and Abel, no one fights more fiercely than brothers.

Trust as a cross-cultural dimension deals with the amount of trust existing naturally between individuals [3]. In other words, are we engaged in a relationship with trust (e. g. father and son), or without trust (e. g. a client and a banker). When trust exists, time and money are saved (a handshake will do). When there is no trust, time and bureaucracy take over (for example security checks in airports). Ukraine and Russia belong to the countries with no trust. Indeed, one must have the right connections, or to have known someone for a long time to be ready to work with him. Direct marketing such as Oriflame or Amway are very popular in those countries, whereas door-to-door sales are often viewed as suspect. Now that the trust between Russia and Ukraine is broken, it will take a tremendous effort and a long time to restore it. The main obstacle to a peace agreement is most probably the high level of mistrust between the negotiating parties.

External vs. Internal *locus of control* concerns how much individuals believe they control their own lives. Ukraine and Russia both feel quite externally controlled (like most countries in the world), which means they believe external forces shape their lives [14]. In other words, both countries are rather fatalistic. Not only are horoscope predictions taken very seriously by a large part of the population (Chinese New Year is increasingly celebrated in Russia), but conspiracy theories abound. Since supposed external influences exonerate one from taking responsibility for one's decisions when things turn out badly, fatalistic cultures also tend not to question the official media. Hence, the people of these cultures become prey to all types of propaganda.

Hierarchy is also called Power Distance in cross-cultural management [8]. This is a simple concept to understand: some cultures enjoy hierarchical relationships among their members (at work, in the street, or at home), while others, more egalitarian, value equality. Ukraine and Russia probably hold the top two scores for hierarchical behavior in Europe (Russia scores 93 in Hofstede's PDI; Ukraine is not ranked).

Both societies are conservative as far as the roles of men and women are concerned, or regarding their degree of (in)tolerance towards «non-traditional» lifestyles behaviors, such as homosexuality. The GLOBE study shows Russia ranked 41st among 63 nations for egalitarianism. This hierarchical propensity explains also why displaying one's status is seen as a way to get one's way. More importantly today, it explains why both countries favour «strong leaders» over «democratic» ones. In a 2011 poll by the Pew Foundation, Russians, by a margin of 57% to 32%, preferred to rely on strong leadership rather than democracy to deliver good government¹. A quick review of the leaders involved in the Ukrainian crisis (from Viktor Yanukovich, to Yulia Timoshenko, Vitali Klitschko, Petro Poroshenko, and Vladimir Putin) confirms this preference. Because no win-win conflict resolution is acceptable in these cultures, a realistic solution to a conflict needs to take into account saving the face of the leaders involved, as each side must show their base that they «won» and the other one «lost». The positive aspect of such a need to save face lies in the probable acceptance by both sides of disguising the truth to achieve peace.

According to Hofstede's *Masculinity index* [8], the so-called «Feminine» societies have a preference for resolving conflicts by compromise and negotiation, while in masculine countries there is a feeling that conflicts should be resolved in an assertive way. We are here confronted with a statistical problem as country rankings present Russia as a feminine country (MAS index is 36) and Ukraine is not listed [8]. This is partially explained by the date of the index (generated during Soviet times), but also because Russians truly value comfort of life over achievement. However, other tools² rank the degree of cooperation vs. competition and both countries score high on competition. Taking into account the high hierarchical preferences, this means both countries have difficulties cooperating on equal terms.

Ukrainian and Russian folk traditions are full of stories where reason is always defeated

by emotion. When analyzing displays of *emotions*, the term often used in Russian is «душа», which can be translated in English as «soul» or «spirit». Statistically, Russia belongs to the middle group of countries in terms of assertiveness [10]. It means individuals are not particularly aggressive in their relationships. Therefore, at an individual level, most Russians and Ukrainians enjoy warm relationships, even during troubled times. Nevertheless, both cultures can be very explicit in their communication, showing both passion and emotion³.

Time is a major element of cross-cultural management. Among the topics of interest within this category, the *Past/Present/Future* orientation of both countries is most instructive for this cultural review [16]. They are usually considered «Past» oriented which means past events are of major importance in the present (Brand reputation is more important than being perceived as innovative for instance). According to GLOBE's future orientation practices, Russia holds the very last position among 63 countries surveyed. It is no surprise then to hear both sides going back to World War II to find convincing proof of their actions. Another element of Time is whether cultures are short or long term orientated. Here, we are clearly dealing with cultures that are short term orientated, using many tactics but little strategy.

From a cross-cultural perspective, the wounds opened over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are here to stay. We are in the presence of two cultures that favor emotional arguments over reason and only an approach, which takes into account all of those dimensions has a chance of success in reviving peace and friendship between them.

Russia – Estonia

Three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania have adapted to traditions from the West. They are connected to the Nordic cultures, but are closest to Finland [6]. Their languages are not related to Slavic languages. Estonia is close to Finland: Both countries share a common Finno-Ugric ethnic and linguistic background [12]. The languages of Lithuania and Latvia are quite different.

The three Baltic states share much history and many traditions. All three suffered from Russian occupied. At the same time, during the

¹ URL: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/05/chapter-1-views-of-democracy>

² TMC Cultural Navigator. – Russia profile. – 2015.

³ Ibid.

decades of independence between the World Wars, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania underwent a period of swift development and industrialization. Western values relating to attitudes toward work, individualism and free enterprise were adopted and institutions common to a market economy were established [2]. Estonia and Finland had relatively close cultural ties during this period [13. – P. 16]. During the period after Soviet occupation in 1940, the Soviet Union undertook rapid Sovietisation of the Baltic States which involved the pursuit of two goals: state socialism and Russification [15. – P. 106].

At the same time there are also differences in identification among the Baltics. Estonians

consider themselves as part of Nordic Europe. Latvians identify with Central Europe, and Lithuanians are Eastern-Europeans. None of these countries is Orthodox like Russia. Lithuania is Catholic and in Latvia and Estonia, the most common church is Lutheran.

The cultural dimensions according to Hofstede's study are to be found in Figure 1. Among the three Baltic countries only Estonia participated in the GLOBE study which identified nine cultural dimensions as opposed to the six defined by Hofstede. For this reason, we will also compare the cultures of Estonia and Russia. Between the two cultures, there are a great many differences. [1; 10].




Figure 1. Cultural dimensions according to the Hofstede study

Source: URL: <http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html>

The biggest difference between Russia and the three Baltic countries according to the Hofstede study, is in power distance. The three Baltic countries are quite similar and have a much lower power distance than Russia. Similarly, In the Globe study, the power distance in Estonia is much lower than that in Russia: Russia is 14th and Estonia 35th among 63 countries. It indicates that the Russian community accepts and endorses authority, power differences and status privileges more willingly than Baltic societies.

Individualism is highest in Latvia among the Baltics, followed by Lithuania and Estonia, leaving Russia far behind. According to the GLOBE study in Estonia, the level of collectivism is much lower than in Russia. As concerns «institutional collectivism», Russia is

18th among 63 countries and Estonia is among last 10 countries. As for «In-group collectivism», Russia is 19th and Estonia in the middle group.

Masculinity is highest in Russia, followed by Estonia and Lithuania. Latvia shows the lowest score. According to the GLOBE study, Russia does not value gender egalitarianism highly. Russia is 12th from the end in this category, while Estonia is in first group. At the same time and according to the real situation, Russia is second among the 63 countries, Estonia is 21st and in the first group. So, Russia tends to differentiate gender roles more than Baltic states do.

Uncertainty Avoidance is significantly higher in Russia than in the three Baltic countries: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Uncertainty avoidance involves the extent to which ambiguous situations are threatening to individuals, the extent to which rules and order are preferred and the extent to which uncertainty is tolerated in a society. According to the GLOBE study among 63 countries, Uncertainty Avoidance is valued by Russia more than by Estonia. Russia is in the first group and Estonia is among last third of countries. In reality, Uncertainty Avoidance is evaluated as being lowest in Russia. This phenomenon indicates that the real situation in organizations and in society does not meet people's expectations. Estonia is in 35th position according to the real situation. This indicates more need for rules in Russia and less detailed planning and more spontaneous change for adaptation in Estonia and the other Baltic states than in Russia.

Long term orientation is lowest in Latvia compared to the three other countries. According to the GLOBE study, Russia values future orientation more than Estonia. But in reality, the future orientation in Estonia is higher than in Russia: As concerns future orientation practices, Estonia holds 15th position among 63 countries and Russia is the last country with the lowest score. This statistic reflects the degree to which a collectivity encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviors, such as planning and delaying gratification.

There are some scales in the GLOBE study which are missing from the Hofstede study. For example, In Estonia, performance orientation is higher than in Russia. Estonia belongs to the middle group, while Russia is only two places before the last country concerning performance orientation practices. Estonia encourages and rewards innovation, high standards and performance improvement more than Russia.

In Estonia, assertiveness is higher than in Russia, although both belong to the middle group. People in Estonia are encouraged more to be assertive, aggressive, and tough in social relationships.

As relates to «human orientation», both countries are in last two groups of four: Russia is in the 3rd group and Estonia in the 4th. This indicator shows to what degree society or organisations encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others. Both countries,

Estonia and Russia, value human orientation more.

Russia versus Nato and the E.U.

Of course, it would be challenging to compare the «culture» of the E.U. with that of Russia but it is not really possible. For instance:

- The E.U. is very Universalistic. One consequence is the strict respect for contracts, such as agreements guaranteeing the territorial integrity of countries;

- Also, its organization is quite Egalitarian: there is no strong leader as in France or the U.S. Each country has one vote in the Council. Even the parliament is quite egalitarian, with a fully proportional voting system;

- Were Hofstede to rank it, the E.U. would surely appear to be Feminine. The European Court of Justice regularly sides with minorities and the freedom of speech, for instance;

- Europe is not very Past oriented. It appears to be more Future oriented. In any case, it is definitely not short term oriented! Citizens frequently complain about how slowly things move;

- Emotionally speaking, the E.U. Is quite calm. It is a political/economic organization with a poor communication record and limited means of sending messages. As an organization (versus an entity personified by a leader), its communication is factual, neutral and is clearly Low context oriented, yet quite indirect in its communication style (diplomatic);

- The locus of control is much more inwardly controlled in the E.U. than in Russia. It is hard to imagine the head of the European Central Bank (ECB) explaining: «The Euro is falling; there's nothing we can do about it; it is the fault of foreign powers...».

Such a quick review reveals a considerable gap between Russia and the E.U. from a cultural perspective. This gap might explain in large part the difficulties the two «powers» have in communicating about many issues including the current conflicts.

A Cross Cultural Overview of the E.U., NATO, and Russia by «Cultural Cluster»:

Inherent in any comparison of the European Union and/or NATO with any other entity is, as noted elsewhere, the difficulty of defining the «culture» of these two composite organizations. One path to addressing this issue is the «cluster» of cultures approach adopted by the previously mentioned GLOBE group [10].

This highly inclusive study of cultural issues divides the world into ten cultural clusters and seeks to examine, inter alia, six culturally endorsed implicit leadership theories (CLT) across the ten clusters. Of the ten cultural clusters, one – Eastern Europe – corresponds to Russia while five – Eastern Europe, Latin Europe, Nordic Europe, Anglo, and Germanic Europe – correspond to both the E.U. and NATO. The CLT leadership dimensions identified are: Charismatic/Value-Based Leadership, Team Oriented Leadership, Participative Leadership, Humane Oriented Leadership, Autonomous Leadership, and Self-Protective Leadership. Our hypothesis is that the leadership qualities desired in Eastern Europe on the one hand and in the five clusters on the other hand will largely reflect the cultural divide between Russia and the two Western organizations.

To help the reader follow the two sets of criteria, the definitions of the six CLT leadership dimensions and associated terms as well as a Summary of Societal Cluster Rankings for CLT Leadership Dimensions for the clusters concerned are given at the end of this paper.

The GLOBE study finds that several leadership styles are endorsed by all ten cultural cultures. However, while Charismatic/Value-Based leadership is endorsed by all ten culture clusters, the level of endorsement varies from one cluster to another. Moreover, certain leadership styles were universally rejected as inhibitors of effective leadership. Finally, a third group of leadership styles were found to vary in acceptance by the culture clusters. It was also noted that both national and corporate cultures played a role in defining which management styles were considered effective and which were not. All of the leadership styles were graded on a seven point scale by the respondents to the questionnaire administered in the 62 countries, seven being the best grade for a management style.

As regards the results of the leadership style survey, the Eastern Europe cluster (Albania, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia and Slovenia) was similar to the rest of Europe and indeed the rest of the world in ranking the Charismatic/Value-based and

Team-Oriented CLT leadership dimensions most highly. However, Eastern Europe, contrary to others, had the highest ranking for Autonomous leadership and was among the lowest clusters for Participative leadership and was also among the highest for Self-Protective leadership. In short, as the GLOBE study concludes the Eastern European cluster prefers a leader who: «is somewhat Charismatic/Value-Based, Team-Oriented, and Humane-Oriented, but is his or her own person, does not particularly believe in the effectiveness of Participative leadership, and is not reluctant to engage in Self-Protective behaviors if necessary» [10. – P. 685].

As can be seen from the Table at the end of this paper, Eastern Europe is the only one of the five clusters forming NATO and the E.U. to give a high ranking to Self-Protective leadership and a low ranking to Participative leadership. In this position, Eastern Europe is the exact opposite of three of the major NATO/E.U. clusters, i. e. Germanic Europe, Nordic Europe, and the Anglo cluster. There is closer proximity to Latin Europe which is mid level for both Self-Protective and Participative leadership styles.

As a conclusion to this brief treatment of the GLOBE study, we can observe that Eastern Europe permits and even favors a style of leadership (Self-Protective) which the majority of NATO/E.U. nations reject or – in the case of the Nordic group – even loathe.

Possible outcomes: Some observations

Without being geopolitical experts, the authors can use cross-cultural studies to suggest future outcomes based upon the observed facts. Other studies have showed that Russia is likely to rank among the ethnocentric countries when using the Milton Bennett scale (Figure 2). The E.U., by definition inclusive, is more ethnorelative. Combining the Bennett scale with Hamden-Turner approach to dilemma reconciliation, several variants can be considered: Denial, confrontation and cooperation.

For the whole of 2014 and 2015, Russian authorities have been in denial of the involvement of their country in the Ukrainian situation. This is logical in view of the strong sense of patriotism (another variant of

ethnocentrism) among the Russian population. Such a position is difficult to maintain for the long term. At one point, whether forced or

voluntarily, the Russian leadership will have to stop this denial and choose another option.




Figure 2. Bennett scale

On the Ukrainian side, the cultural proximity with Russia implies a similar pattern of conflict resolution based upon ethnocentric logic. The Defense stage is here synonymous with violent response, which currently has become open warfare. Ukraine's accepting and adapting to the situation in a peaceful manner would imply an ethnorelative move, something nearly impossible during a conflict without the support of third parties.

The E.U., so far, has adopted a position of Acceptance, following a period of desired Integration (The TACIS programs in the 90s and other E.U.-led projects). The conflict in Ukraine is not at the top of the public agenda (the economic crisis is), but is keeping diplomats of the Old Continent very busy. Although the annexation of Crimea gave rise to economic sanctions by the E.U., there was, in reality, little strong reaction to a «fait accompli», hence proving the «Acceptance» mode of the Union.

The E.U. has no military forces capable of large-scale operations. Such a force would be contrary to its culture of reconciliation and peace. In reality, the E.U. army is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. While NATO is dominated by the U.S., no military operation in Europe could be engaged on the continent without the support of the E.U. This balance of power between the E.U. and the U.S. within NATO has been the key to the survival of the organization over time, even after the collapse of the USSR, the prime and original enemy of the Alliance. This balance is unlikely

to change because of this crisis on the fringes of Europe, as Ukraine is not a member of the Alliance. Thus, either NATO intervenes militarily with the active support of the E.U., or NATO will not engage at all.

Military confrontation, therefore, is unlikely to happen over Ukraine, especially taking into account that Ukraine is a member neither of the E.U., nor of NATO. Acceptance of the status quo is more likely to emerge from the E.U. bloc, while Russia is likely to strive for minimization of the situation, negotiating for a land corridor between the territory it holds and Crimea, in exchange for peace in the «separatist» regions.

However, bearing in mind the cross-cultural differences examined in this article, it is safe to forecast a profound change in the relationship between the E.U. and Russia, even if a permanent peace is reached. While a Particularistic and Emotional Russia will likely seek to warm the relationship with signs of cooperation at various levels, a Universalistic/neutrally emotional E.U. is likely to keep its distance with this neighbor now qualified as untrustworthy and which does not respect agreements.

Conclusions

Seasoned connoisseurs of the cultures of Russia, Estonia and the European Union are not surprised at the tensions which have existed since spring 2014 around the Ukrainian situation. A cultural analysis of each participant shows deep gaps among their identities, gaps which are hard to reconcile.

The conflict has shattered the fragile trust among the countries involved, trust built painstakingly over the last 25 years through exchanges at various levels. Conflict rarely builds bridges among countries, particularly those with wide cultural gaps.

Might not the real outcome be that the E.U. and NATO find it difficult, if not impossible, to build upon their perception of a solid base of treaties reflecting commitment with a Russia

which pays little heed to such agreements, preferring to function from a foundation which sacrifices encumbering written agreements to ultimate emotionally-conceived goals? In such a context, mutual misunderstanding and mistrust are guaranteed. Only genuine goodwill and mutual perception of the other's culture can lead to a positive result. As we suggested at the beginning of our paper, for nations, culture is destiny.

References

1. Alas R. Ethics in Countries with Different Cultural Dimensions, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 2006, No. 69 (3), pp. 237–247.
2. Barnowe J. T., King, G., Berniker E. Personal Values and Economic Transition in the Baltic States, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 1992, No. 23 (2), pp. 179–190.
3. Covey M. The SPEED of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything, *FreePress*, 2008.
4. Crane R. Building Bridges Among the BRICs, *Prentice-Hall*, 2015.
5. Dumetz J. et al. Cross-Cultural Management Textbook, *CreateSpace*, 2012.
6. Foster D. The Global Etiquette Guide to Europe, 2000.
7. Hall E. T. The Hidden Dimension, *Anchor Books*, 1966.
8. Hofstede G. Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values. Beverly Hills, CA : Sage Publications, 1980.
9. Hofstede G. Dimensions do not Exist: A Reply to Brendan McSweeney, *Human Relations*, 2002, No. 55 (II), pp. 2–7.
10. House R. J., Hanges P. J., Javidan M., Dorfman P. W., Gupta V. (Eds.) Culture, Leadership, and Organizations. The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, *Sage Publications*, 2004.
11. McSweeney B. The Essentials of Scholarship: A Reply to Geert Hofstede, *Human Relations*, 2002, No. 55 (II), pp. 1363–1372.
12. Nurmi R. Estonia and Finland: Culture and Management, a Conjectural Presentation, *Publications of the Turku School of Economics and Business Administration*. Turku, 1994, Series A-9, p. 19.
13. Raun T. Finland and Estonia: Cultural and Political Relations, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 1987, No. 18 (1), pp. 5–20.
14. Rotter J. B. Generalized Expectancies of Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcements, *Psychological Monographs*, No. 80, 1966.
15. Taagepera R. Estonia – Return to Independence, *Westview Press*, 1993.
16. Trompenaars F. Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Global Business. Chicago, IL : Irwin Professional Publishing, 1993.

Крейн Р., Алас Р., Дюметц Ж.

КУЛЬТУРА КАК СРЕДСТВО ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ МИРА В СТРАНАХ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ И ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЕВРОПЫ?

Несомненно, что культура – это в какой-то мере менталитет и судьба нации. Данная статья дает ответ на вопрос, что такое национальная культура и каким образом она (пускай частично) определяет ход исторических событий страны. В статье проанализирован вопрос норм и ценностей групп людей и то, каким образом они влияют на их восприятие мира, а также предлагается комплексная концепция использования культуры в международных политических ситуациях.

Ключевые слова: Национальная культура, менталитет, нормы и ценности, международная политика, Россия, Украина, Прибалтика.