
Jens Josephson- PhD
- Professor at Stockholm University
Jens Josephson
- PhD
- Professor at Stockholm University
About
17
Publications
1,598
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252
Citations
Introduction
Jens Josephson is a Senior Lecturer in finance at the Stockholm Business School of Stockholm University and a research affiliate at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics. Jens does research in Financial Economics and Microeconomics.
Current institution
Additional affiliations
January 2017 - present
January 2017 - present
January 2009 - December 2016
Publications
Publications (17)
Many countries' insolvency systems focus on restructuring financial liabilities, and ignore operational liabilities such as leases and long-term supplier contracts. We model insolvency procedures with and without operational restructuring options. Such options avoid excessive liquidation of firms with significant non-financial obligations. Ex-ante,...
We review the literature on public sector outsourcing to explore if the theoretical predictions from the incomplete contracts literature hold up to recent empirical evidence. Guided by theory, we arrange services according to the type and magnitude of their contractibility problems. The empirical studies point at rather favourable outsourcing outco...
The poor performance of credit ratings of structured finance products in the financial crisis has prompted investigation into the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs)in designing and marketing these products. We analyze a two-period reputation model in which a CRA both designs and rates securities that are sold both to investors who are constraine...
In many countries, poorly functioning bankruptcy procedures force viable but insolvent firms to restructure out of court, where banks may have a bargaining advantage over other creditors. We model the choice of restructuring process and derive implications for the corporate mix of bank and bond financing. Empirical patterns match the model: ineffic...
In many countries, poorly functioning bankruptcy procedures force viable but insolvent firms to restructure out of court, where banks may have a bargaining advantage over other creditors. We model the choice of restructuring process and derive implications for the corporate mix of bank and bond financing. Empirical patterns match the model: ineffic...
In this paper, we show how the interaction between costly screening and competition in decentralized markets may prevent efficient matching. We examine this phenomenon in a simple dynamic model of a professional labor market, where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability. Inefficiencies aris...
In many countries, bankruptcy is associated with low recovery by creditors. We develop a model of corporate credit markets in such an environment. Corporate credit is provided by either a bond market or risk-averse banks. Restructuring of insolvent firms happens out of court if in-court bankruptcy is inefficient, giving banks an advantage over bond...
We analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations containing best repliers, better repliers, and imitators. Individuals select strategies by applying a personal learning rule to a sample from a finite history of past play. We give sufficient conditions for convergence to minimal closed sets under better r...
In this paper, we define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using simulations, we then apply this criterion to three types of symmetric 2×2 games for a class of learning rules that can be represented by the parametric model of Camerer and Ho [1999. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica 67, 8...
In this paper, we analyze a model where individuals from finite populations are repeatedly drawn to play a finite game and
in every period choose a weakly better reply to a sample distribution from a finite history of past play. For all finite games
and sufficiently incomplete information, we prove convergence to minimal sets closed under better re...
We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics must be such that the action profiles that appear in it constitute a closed set under the “same or better reply” correspondence (CUSOBR set) that does not contain a smaller product set that is closed und...
That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent res...