



Gender, Education, and Occupation: How Founder Experiences Influence Firm Outcomes

Journal:	<i>Academy of Management Discoveries</i>
Manuscript ID	AMD-2017-0069.R2
Manuscript Type:	Revision
Keywords:	Event studies < Analysis < Research Methods, Founder characteristics < Entrepreneurship < Topic Areas, Technology and innovation management (General) < Technology and Innovation Management < Topic Areas
Abstract:	<p>This study analyzes the gender, education and occupational backgrounds of high-technology firm founders and the outcomes of their firms by asking three main questions: 1) What are the backgrounds of women entrepreneurs of technology firms? 2) Do female founders of technology firms have similar educational and occupational backgrounds to male founders? 3) What is the relationship of a high technology entrepreneur's gender, educational and occupational backgrounds, and firm outcomes? Exploring these questions furthers our understanding of how high-technology founders' experiences influence their firms' outcomes taking into consideration gender. The data show the variety of career paths that lead to women starting technology firms. The study discovers that female and male high-technology entrepreneurs have very similar education and occupational backgrounds. However, the backgrounds of founders play a significant role in the likelihood that their firms suffer a negative closure, is acquired, or obtains venture capital, but in different ways depending on gender. These results confirm the importance of examining heterogeneity in women entrepreneurs' background. Moreover, the study highlights that similar types of human capital can be regarded and experienced differently. Implications for science and innovation policy are discussed.</p>

1
2
3 ***Gender, Education, and Occupation: How Founder Experiences Influence Firm Outcomes***
4

5
6 **Jennifer L. Woolley***
7 Associate Professor
8 The Leavey School of Business
9 Santa Clara University
10 500 El Camino Real
11 Santa Clara, California 95053
12 408-5544685
13 jwoolley (a) scu.edu
14
15

16 Acknowledgements: This study was made possible by generous research grants from the
17 Kauffman Foundation and Santa Clara University. The author would like to thank the editor,
18 two anonymous reviewers and participants of the 2017 Kauffman Diana Conference, 2017 ISA
19 Conference, 2016 Strategic Management Society's Annual Conference for their invaluable
20 feedback.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Gender, Education, and Occupation: How Founder Experiences Influence Firm Outcomes

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the gender, education and occupational backgrounds of high-technology firm founders and the outcomes of their firms by asking three main questions: 1) What are the backgrounds of women entrepreneurs of technology firms? 2) Do female founders of technology firms have similar educational and occupational backgrounds as male founders? 3) What is the relationship of a high technology entrepreneur's gender, educational and occupational backgrounds, and firm outcomes? Exploring these questions furthers our understanding of how high-technology founders' experiences influence their firms' outcomes taking into consideration gender. The data show the variety of career paths that lead to women starting technology firms. The study discovers that female and male high-technology entrepreneurs have very similar education and occupational backgrounds. However, the backgrounds of founders play a significant role in the likelihood that their firms suffer a negative closure, is acquired, or obtains venture capital, but in different ways depending on gender. These results confirm the importance of examining heterogeneity in women entrepreneurs' background. Moreover, the study highlights that similar types of human capital can be regarded and experienced differently. Implications for science and innovation policy are discussed.

Keywords: entrepreneurship, gender, founding teams, backgrounds, acquisition, venture capital

Gender, Education, and Occupation: How Founder Experiences Influence Firm Outcomes

Academic literature and popular press often lament the dearth of women in technology fields, especially in start-ups. Less than five percent of new high technology firms are started by women in Europe and the United States (Cohoon, Wadhwa, & Mitchell, 2010; European Commission, 2008; Wadhwa, 2012), compared to about 30 to 40 percent of all firms (European Commission, 2014; Morelix, Fairlie, & Tareque, 2017). As high technology entrepreneurship is a critical driver of a country's economic health, employment, productivity growth, and technological advancement (Hathaway, 2013), women entrepreneurs remain an overlooked resource for innovation and economic growth. Consequently, policy makers and organizations around the world have created initiatives to support women in high technology careers, particularly entrepreneurship (e.g., U.N. Women Innovation and Technology, Girls in Tech, Million Women Mentors, Girls Who Code, ASTIA).¹ Previous work has examined why so few women start technology firms and identified supply (e.g., individual characteristics and human capital) and demand (e.g., discrimination and exclusion) concerns that hinder female participation (e.g., Ding, Murray, & Stuart, 2006; Fuentes-Fuentes, Cooper, & Bojica, 2012; Stephan & El-Ganainy, 2007). While we know why few women start high technology firms, we know little about the educational backgrounds and careers of those women who do start these firms and how their backgrounds influence their firms' trajectories. Given the magnitude of resources being directed toward supporting females in technology entrepreneurship around the world, a better comprehension of the backgrounds, career paths, and trends of women who

¹ See UN Women Innovation and Technology: www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/innovation-and-technology; Girls in Tech: girlsintech.org; Million Women Mentors: www.millionwomenmentors.org; Girls Who Code: girlswhocode.com; and ASTIA: astia.org

1
2
3 launch successful high technology companies is needed. Thus, this study turns the lens to
4
5 examine those who create high technology firms instead of those who don't.
6

7
8 Another critical component of understanding how to support the development of women
9
10 entrepreneurs is to determine how technology firms created by women perform and if this differs
11
12 from those led by men. Unfortunately, work on how female-led firms perform more generally
13
14 has yielded inconsistent and conflicting results, depending on the methods used, measures
15
16 employed, and contexts in which the studies were conducted (Jennings & Brush, 2013; Kalnins
17
18 & Williams, 2014). Therefore, the relationship between founder gender and firm performance
19
20 remains unclear. This puzzle remains, in part, due to the treatment of women as homogeneous,
21
22 which is remarkable given the amount of work looking at the variety of founders' human capital
23
24 more broadly (e.g., Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). Indeed,
25
26 the heterogeneity of women founders in *high technology* and the performance of their firms has
27
28 been neglected in research (Blume-Kohout, 2014; Wynarczyk & Renner, 2006). Furthermore,
29
30 while human capital theory argues that education and work experience influence the ability of
31
32 founders to obtain resources, it does not adequately address how similar types of human capital
33
34 can be regarded and experienced differently depending on gender. Congruity and other theories
35
36 do not explain how women succeed in a role for which they are incongruent in terms of sector
37
38 (technology being considered masculine, see Marlow & McAdams, 2012) and occupation
39
40 (entrepreneurship being considered masculine, see Ahl, 2006; Stephan & El-Ganainy, 2007).
41
42 Consequently, knowledge about women high technology entrepreneurs, their backgrounds and
43
44 the outcomes of their firms does not match that regarding male entrepreneurs (de Bruin, Brush,
45
46 & Welter, 2007; Jennings & Brush, 2013).
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 The goal of this study is to empirically explore some of the unresolved questions about
4 which women become technology entrepreneurs and how the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs'
5 backgrounds influences the outcomes of their firms. In addition to providing detailed data
6 regarding the state of women entrepreneurs in technology, this study asks three main questions:
7
8 1) What are the backgrounds of women entrepreneurs of technology firms? 2) Do female
9 founders of technology firms have similar educational and occupational backgrounds to male
10 founders? 3) What is the relationship of a high technology entrepreneur's gender, educational
11 and occupational backgrounds, and firm outcomes? Exploring these questions furthers our
12 understanding by examining how the diversity in the experiences of female technology
13 entrepreneurs influence their firms' outcomes (Hughes & Jennings, 2012; Jennings & Brush,
14 2013). Using a database of all nanotechnology firms started before 2011, this study is able to
15 examine entrepreneurship across industries, but within a related field. The database compiles
16 and matches 30 years of longitudinal firm-level data from several sources to provide a rich view
17 of the field. As such, the data provide empirical insight into the diversity of technology
18 founders' education and career trajectories. Hence, the study contributes advancing current
19 discourse on gender, entrepreneurship, and organizational-level theory building (Joshi, Neely,
20 Emrich, Griffiths, & George, 2015).

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42 The study shows that female and male high technology entrepreneurs have very similar
43 education and occupational backgrounds. However, women and men with similar backgrounds
44 obtain different outcomes for their firms, a finding that confirms the need for additional work
45 concerning how men and women experience analogous circumstances differently. For example,
46 in contrast with previous work that suggests that universities are not supportive environments for
47 female academic entrepreneurship (e.g., Ding & Choi, 2011; Murray & Graham, 2007; Rosa &
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Dawson, 2006; Stephan & El-Ganainy, 2007), the findings show the percentage of founders with
4 academic backgrounds is the same for women and men. However, women are more likely to
5 have previous careers as research scientists than men, which raises questions about the *career*
6 *specific* norms, perceptions and motivations that support or deter entrepreneurship.
7

8
9
10 Heterogeneity in terms of founders' gender, education, and occupational background provide
11 different human capital, experiences and resources for a nascent firm, which are not independent
12 of the contextual pressures and motivations that shape an entrepreneur's actions. Research on
13 this interdependence provides more granular insights into how a founder's background
14 influences the development of the firm. Thus, this study contributes to the understanding of
15 entrepreneurial microfoundations by being one of the first to explore the relationship between
16 gender, educational and occupational backgrounds, and firm outcomes in high technology
17 sectors. Additionally, the findings provide support for improving science and innovation policy
18 by establishing a set of facts regarding women in technology entrepreneurship.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35 **BACKGROUND**

36
37 The percentage of firms started by women has increased over time, but female
38 entrepreneurs remain underrepresented in technology fields. As mentioned, women start about
39 30 percent of new businesses in Europe and about 40 percent of those in the U.S. (European
40 Commission, 2014; Morelix et al., 2017). However, only about five percent of European and
41 about three percent of American high technology firms are founded by women (Cohoon et al.,
42 2010; European Commission, 2008; Wadhwa, 2012). Should the percentage of high technology
43 firms founded by women match that in other sectors, the number of female technology
44 entrepreneurs would increase ten-fold. Approximately 20,000 new technology firms are started
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 in the U.S. annually (Haltiwanger, Hathaway, & Miranda, 2014; Hathaway, 2013), which would
4
5 equate to about 7,000 more female entrepreneurs starting high technology firms each year.
6

7
8 While the stream of research on women's entrepreneurship has grown considerably, little
9
10 work has examined women who found high technology firms (Jennings & Brush, 2013; Blume-
11
12 Kohout, 2014). Resoundingly, work on women and entrepreneurship has yet to discover if the
13
14 backgrounds of female and male founders of high technology firms differ or how differences, if
15
16 any exist, affect firm performance (for reviews of the literature, see Jennings & Brush, 2013;
17
18 Link & Strong, 2016; Sullivan & Meek, 2012). The following section reviews work on women's
19
20 entrepreneurship most relevant to high technology ventures and founders' backgrounds.
21
22
23
24
25

26 **Founder Education and Gender**

27
28 Both male and female entrepreneurs tend to be better educated than non-entrepreneurs
29
30 (Dolinsky, Caputo, Pasumarty, & Quazi, 1993) though it is not clear if there is any difference in
31
32 the average education of female and male entrepreneurs. For instance, Cowling and Taylor
33
34 (2001) find that female entrepreneurs tend to be more educated than male entrepreneurs in the
35
36 U.K., while McGraw (1998) finds that male entrepreneurs have higher levels of post-secondary
37
38 education than female entrepreneurs in Canada. Other studies find no relationship between
39
40 education and self-employment (Blanchflower, 2004; Brush, 1992; Burke, FitzRoy, & Nolan,
41
42 2002). Indeed, Minniti and Nardone (2007) find that, "the relationships between the likelihood
43
44 of starting a business and age, household income, work status, and education do not depend on
45
46 gender" (2007: 235).
47
48
49
50

51 Founders of high technology firms tend to be well educated, many with degrees in
52
53 STEM-(science, technology, engineering and math) fields (Wadhwa, Freeman, & Rissing, 2008).
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Robb and colleagues (2014) find that, indeed, the primary owners of technology-based firms in
4 the Kauffman Survey of businesses tended to be highly educated, with over two-thirds holding a
5 college degree and almost a third achieving post-graduate education (compared to 12 percent of
6 the general U.S. population²). Table 1 shows the percentage of doctoral degrees earned by
7 women between 1988 and 2015 by field. Figure 1 further illustrates the total number of doctoral
8 degrees in STEM fields awarded each year between 1981 and 2015, the number awarded to men
9 and women, and the percentage of those earned by women (shaded). The table and figure show
10 that the percentage of women earning STEM-related doctoral degrees has generally increased
11 over time. In fact, the graduation rates of STEM doctoral programs in the U.S. have reached
12 near parity, with the percentage of women graduates rising from 23 percent in 1981 to over 40
13 percent in 2015 (National Science Foundation, 2016). In Europe, women make up about 42
14 percent of science, math, and computing doctoral graduates and almost 30 percent of doctoral
15 graduates in the fields of engineering, manufacturing, and construction (European Commission,
16 2016). One argument for the low number of women founders in high technology fields is the
17 lack of supply since, historically, fewer women have earned doctoral degrees in STEM fields
18 than men (Blume-Kohout, 2014). By reason of these trends, one would expect that the number
19 and percentage of high technology firms founded by women with doctorates in STEM fields
20 would also increase over time. However, the percentage of high technology firms founded by
21 women remains at or below five percent (European Commission, 2008; Wadhwa, 2012).

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47 -----
48 Insert Figure 1 & Table 1 about here
49 -----
50
51
52
53

54
55 ² Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1994–2015 Current Population Survey
56 www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20-578.pdf
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 It would be rational to expect the percentage of women founders to remain the same if
4 firm founding and doctoral graduation rates mirrored one another. However, the increase in the
5 founding of high technology firms by women is less than half that of the growth in doctoral
6 degrees earned by women each year. In the U.S., the number of high technology firms started
7 each year increased from about 11,000 in 1980 to about 20,000 in 2012, or over 80 percent
8 (Haltiwanger et al., 2014; Hathaway, 2013). During the same period, the number of STEM
9 doctoral degrees awarded to men increased from about 18,000 to 35,000, a 94 percent increase,
10 and those earned by women from 4,200 to over 14,300, a 240 percent increase (see Figure 1).
11 Thus, the supply of women with technology-related doctoral degrees increased faster than the
12 supply of men with similar degrees. It is intriguing that the near parity in STEM-related doctoral
13 degrees has not translated into an increase in women starting STEM-related or high technology
14 firms. It remains unclear whether or how policies to further improve gender parity in STEM
15 doctoral programs influence the participation of women in creating high technology firms. We
16 need to discover whether the educational backgrounds of high technology founders differ by
17 gender to assess the meaning of the apparent disparity between STEM education and
18 entrepreneurship in related fields.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 **Previous Occupations of Founders and Gender**

43
44 The occupational history of entrepreneurs provides insight into how a person's career
45 influences their likelihood of starting a firm, the type of firm created, and how prior experience
46 shapes a founder's opportunity enactment. Few studies have compared the occupational
47 backgrounds of entrepreneurs by gender, and the little work that exists offers conflicting
48 findings. For example, Fairlie and Robb (2009) find that male and female business owners in the
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 U.S. have similar managerial experience and years of work experience, although women have
4
5 fewer years of experience in businesses similar to their new venture. However, Boden Jr. and
6
7 Nucci (2000) find that female sole-proprietors tend to have less managerial experience than male
8
9 sole-proprietors. One reason for the conflicting results may be the differences in samples; sole-
10
11 proprietors are a subset of business owners, which includes other forms of firm structures such as
12
13 corporations and partnerships. This leads to confusion regarding the differences and similarities
14
15 between men and women entrepreneurs with regards to their work experience.
16
17
18

19 Research focusing on entrepreneurs in high technology sectors has almost universally
20
21 looked at the likelihood of starting a firm based on intellectual property (IP) from universities
22
23 (academic spin-offs), since universities often provide IP or founders for high technology firms
24
25 (Blume-Kohout, 2014; McQuaid, Smith-Doerr, & Monti 2010). One exception is Woolley
26
27 (2017), who finds that almost half of nanotechnology firms founded before 2003 were started by
28
29 founders employed at universities just before becoming entrepreneurs, and over 40 percent were
30
31 based on university-derived IP. However, this study did not investigate the occupations of the
32
33 founders and provides little insight into the distinctions of occupational backgrounds.
34
35
36
37

38 By and large, work has shown that academic women in the sciences are less likely to
39
40 found firms than their male counterparts (e.g., Ding & Choi, 2011; Murray & Graham, 2007;
41
42 Rosa & Dawson, 2006; Stephan & El-Ganainy, 2007). Since academic entrepreneurship tends to
43
44 occur when professors are in their later career stages (Ding & Choi, 2011; Stephan & Lewin,
45
46 1996), the lack of female academic founders may be due to the lower overall number of female
47
48 faculty in STEM-related fields, particularly at the tenured level. Indeed, the percentage of
49
50 female tenure track faculty in four-year U.S. educational institutions in STEM fields ranges from
51
52 15 percent in engineering to 33 percent in biology while reaching 52 percent in psychology and
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 38 percent in the social sciences broadly (National Science Foundation 2018, table 9–23). In the
4
5 U.S., women across academia earn less and are promoted to full professor at a slower rate than
6
7 their male counterparts (e.g. Krefting, 2003; National Science Foundation, 2018, table 9–24;
8
9 Yoder, 2017). Women are also disproportionately overrepresented among part-time, temporary,
10
11 and non-tenure-track faculty (Curtis, 2011; National Science Foundation, 2018, table 9–24), as
12
13 well as post-doctoral researchers (post-docs) and junior faculty positions (Blume-Kohout, 2014).
14
15 In U.K, female academics also hold more junior positions, have less prior experience running
16
17 businesses and are less likely to be involved in spinout activities (Abreu & Grinevich, 2017;
18
19 Rosa & Dawson, 2006). The lack of women in advanced academic positions leads to several
20
21 challenges including an overburdening of those few women in these roles (Ward & Wolf-
22
23 Wendel, 2012) and a lack of role models for the next generation (Blickenstaff, 2005). Indeed,
24
25 studies have shown that women faculty in STEM fields are often burdened with a heavier
26
27 service and teaching load than their male colleagues (Guarino & Borden, 2017; Hart, 2016).
28
29
30
31
32

33 Given the dominance of men in the upper echelons of academia, there should be little
34
35 surprise that female academics are less likely to start a firm than male academics. Digging
36
37 further, work on academic entrepreneurship has highlighted both the supply and demand
38
39 concerns that underlie the underrepresentation of women in high technology entrepreneurship
40
41 (see Blume-Kohout, 2014; Ding et al., 2006; Fuentes-Fuentes et al., 2012; Stephan & El-
42
43 Ganainy, 2007). Supply concerns involve potential entrepreneurs and their perceptions about
44
45 entrepreneurial careers, technology and the ecosystem. This include individual perceptions and
46
47 attitudes, such as risk aversion, competition, perception of selling science, opportunity-seeking
48
49 behavior, and family concerns, thwart the involvement of women in academic technology
50
51 entrepreneurship (Blume-Kohout, 2014; Haeussler & Colyvas, 2011; Stephan & El-Ganainy,
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 2007). Demand concerns are social and environmental factors that hinder participation in
4 entrepreneurship. On the demand side, external barriers that deter women from science-based
5 academic entrepreneurship include exclusion from relevant networks, venture capitalists' bias,
6 infrequent invitations to participate, gender discounting, overt and embedded discrimination, and
7 masculine norms surrounding entrepreneurship (Martin, Wright, Beaven, & Matlay, 2015;
8 Stephan & El-Ganainy, 2007). Also, careers in academia are considered to be masculine
9 endeavors (Fotaki, 2013). The social and professional norms of academia specifically are less
10 supportive of women entrepreneurs, often involving exclusion from commercialization
11 opportunities or networks (Etzkowitz, Kemelgor, & Uzzi, 2000; Meng, 2016; Murray & Graham,
12 2007; Whittington, 2018). These factors have resulted in fewer women in STEM-related
13 patenting (Ding et al., 2006; Whittington & Smith-Doerr, 2005), commercialization (Colyvas,
14 Snellman, Bercovitz, & Feldman, 2012; Murray & Graham, 2007; Rosa & Dawson, 2006) and
15 entrepreneurship (e.g., Ding & Choi, 2011; Hsu, Roberts, & Eesley, 2007; Lowe & Brambilia,
16 2007; Rosa & Dawson, 2006).

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Previous research has started with the context and asked what the likelihood is that a
person would start a company. For example, studies have examined the context of academia and
determined that women there are less likely to start firms than men in academia. While useful,
this work does not provide insight into those who do start firms. And outside of research on
women's experience in academia-related entrepreneurship, no known studies have explored the
occupational backgrounds of technology venture founders by gender. Research has shown that
the technology work environment is considered hostile toward women as is the entrepreneurial
realm where masculine norms prevail (e.g., Ahl, 2006; Martin et al., 2015; Stephan & El-
Ganainy, 2007). As such, entry into high technology entrepreneurship can be daunting when

1
2
3 faced with “deeply held assumptions about male and female expertise” (Martin et al., 2015: 542).
4
5 Even outside of entrepreneurship, women leave STEM occupations at higher rates than men
6
7 (Fouad, Fitzpatrick & Liu, 2011) or women in other professions (Glass, Sassler, Levitte, &
8
9 Michelmores, 2013). The subsequent lack of existing women entrepreneurs in technology sectors
10
11 to act as mentors (Orser, Riding, & Stanley 2012) as well as the ‘chilly climate’ in the social
12
13 settings of technology and science workplaces (Blickenstaff, 2005) constructs a significant
14
15 barrier for women entering these fields considered masculine (Powell, Bagilhole, & Dainty, 2009).
16
17
18
19

20 **Founder Gender and Firm Funding**

21
22 Financial support is critical to a company’s growth and longevity. One stream of
23
24 research has focused on the financial support (venture capital, angel investments and debt) of
25
26 women-owned firms. This work has highlighted the difficulties women face when seeking
27
28 funding, such as fighting legitimacy challenges (Eddleston, Lang, Mitteness, & Balachandra,
29
30 2016) and receiving discouraging signals from investors (Alsos & Ljunggren, 2016). Studies
31
32 typically find that female entrepreneur raise less capital overall than male entrepreneurs (Brush,
33
34 de Bruin & Welter, 2009; Greene, Brush, Hart, & Saporito, 2001), and women are more likely to
35
36 rely on personal resources to start their companies (Coleman & Robb, 2009). Consistently, less
37
38 than five percent of venture capital (VC) funding goes to women-owned firms (Brush et al.,
39
40 2004; Brush, Greene, Balachandra, & Davis, 2017; Zarya, 2017). Moreover, women are less
41
42 likely to seek angel investment (nine percent of proposals come from women), but are equally
43
44 likely to obtain angel funding (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007). The results of research on gender
45
46 differences in debt financing are mixed. Some studies find that women raise less debt than men
47
48 (Coleman & Robb, 2009). Other studies have not found gender differences in bank lending,
49
50 either in terms of access or amount (Eddleston et al., 2016; Fabowale, Orser, & Riding, 1995;
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Orser et al., 2006), but find discriminatory lending practices in the form of bankers requiring
4 higher information disclosure of women entrepreneurs (Carter, Shaw, Lam, & Wilson, 2007;
5 Constantinidis, Cornet, & Asandei, 2006) and women being charged higher interest rates (Wu &
6 Chua, 2012). Generally, the evidence suggests that women are disadvantaged in the financing of
7 their start-up. Reasons theorized for the disparity in funding have centered on differences in
8 entrepreneurs' confidence and motivations (Brush et al., 2009; Coleman and Robb, 2009;
9 Manolova, Brush, & Edelman, 2008) and the stereotypes and perception of role incongruence by
10 financiers who perceive a mismatch between women and entrepreneurship (Kanze, Huang,
11 Conley, & Higgins, 2018; Malmstrom, Johansson, & Wincent, 2017). These funding challenges
12 have long-term ramifications for the economy, since a lack of financial support hinders firm
13 growth (e.g. Alsos, Isaksen, & Ljunggren, 2006; Brush et al., 2004; Coleman & Robb, 2009;
14 Marlow & Patton, 2005) and industries more broadly.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31 This body of work has largely treated women as a homogeneous group, neglecting the
32 specific human capital of the founders that has proven essential for investors' evaluation of firms
33 (Matusik, George, & Heeley, 2008). Indeed, VC decision-making has been well studied, mainly
34 the positive role of the founder's human capital such as entrepreneurial experience (Hsu, 1997;
35 Matusik et al., 2008), managerial experience and technical expertise (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri,
36 2011; Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990). Similarly, founders with advanced degrees are more likely to
37 obtain VC funding (Gimmons & Levie, 2010; Hsu, 1997). Logic suggests that women with
38 doctoral degrees may obtain VC with fewer challenges than other founders. Human capital
39 theory does not attend to the differences in outcomes when human capital is the same but
40 experienced differently, such as men and women with STEM-related doctoral degrees. Treating
41 women as a homogeneous group neglects to take into the heterogeneity of human capital and,
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 more importantly, how similar human capital may be experienced in multiple ways and regarded
4
5 by investors differently.
6
7

8 9 10 **Founder Gender and the Performance of New Ventures**

11
12 Work on the performance of nascent ventures with regards to founder gender has resulted
13
14 in conflicting findings, depending on the methods and the context of the studies (Jennings &
15
16 Brush, 2013; Kalnins & Williams, 2014). For example, some studies find that women-owned
17
18 businesses are less likely to survive than other firms (e.g., Boden Jr. & Nucci, 2000; Carter,
19
20 Williams, & Reynolds, 1997; Fairlie & Robb, 2009; Robb, 2002) and that female entrepreneurs
21
22 are more likely to close their firms voluntarily than male entrepreneurs (Justo, DeTienne &
23
24 Sieger, 2015). Similarly, work has shown that firms started by women have lower sales than
25
26 those started by men (Chaganti & Parasuraman, 1996). Other studies find that gender-specific
27
28 differences in survival and growth disappear when models control for industry and size (e.g.,
29
30 Chell & Baines, 1998; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000;
31
32 Kalleberg & Leicht, 1991; Rosa et al., 1996). In fact, Robb and Watson (2012) find that firms
33
34 started by women did not perform significantly differently than other firms on three performance
35
36 measures: survival, return on assets, and risk-adjusted Sharpe ratio. In certain industries, such as
37
38 advertising, business services, education, and clothing, firms owned by women perform better
39
40 than those owned by men (Kalnins & Williams, 2014). Hence, the relationship between founder
41
42 gender and firm performance remains unclear.
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 One reason for the inconsistent results may be the treatment of each gender as a
50
51 homogeneous group, as discussed. In fact, conflicting results should be expected; comparing
52
53 firms by the gender of their founders is an oversimplification. It is illogical, for example, to
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 expect all male-led firms to perform the same. Instead, understanding the heterogeneity of
4
5 women founders will lead to more consistent expectations of their firms' performance and will
6
7 enhance theory building. Nonetheless, there is a dearth of work in this area and confusion
8
9 remains (Blume-Kohout, 2014; Wynarczyk & Renner 2006).
10
11

12 On the one hand, given the depth and breadth of the challenges women entrepreneurs in
13
14 technology face, one could expect their firms to perform poorly. Women founding firms in
15
16 STEM-related fields face both career and field-specific obstacles. For one, management
17
18 literature finds that entrepreneurship is considered a masculine endeavor (Ahl, 2006; Bird &
19
20 Brush, 2002; Eddleston et al., 2016; Gupta, Turban, Wasti, & Sikdar, 2009). At the same time,
21
22 STEM fields are considered masculine (Marlow & McAdams, 2012). Gender role congruity
23
24 theory underscores the inherent discord between women and heightened masculine settings, such
25
26 as high technology entrepreneurship (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Indeed, women technology
27
28 entrepreneurs must overcome stereotypes, discrimination, and exclusion from networks (Blume-
29
30 Kohout, 2014; Haeussler & Colyvas, 2011; Rosa & Dawson, 2006; Stephan & El-Ganainy,
31
32 2007), which typically lead to difficulty building legitimacy and firm growth (Eddleston et al.,
33
34 2016).
35
36
37
38
39

40 On the other hand, women starting firms in technology fields may have qualities and
41
42 characteristics that make them better prepared to succeed. Also, the incongruity of gender and
43
44 role may be beneficial. For example, women with technology careers have chosen to work in a
45
46 fairly unsupportive environment, which may suggest that they are aware of the challenges and
47
48 may even be well-suited to thrive in this setting. Similarly, overcoming the inherent obstacles
49
50 for a woman founding a technology firm indicates the tenacity and perseverance necessary for
51
52 successful entrepreneurs: some may even find these challenges motivating. Indeed, women who
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 stay in engineering careers are reported to have higher self-efficacy, identify with the profession,
4 and be motivated by the challenges of engineering (Buse, Bilimoria, & Perelli, 2013). As such,
5
6 we would expect their firms to perform better. Thus, the question about the performance of high
7
8 technology firms founded by women remains unresolved.
9

14 **Teams**

15
16
17 It is well established that team heterogeneity in function and education are beneficial to a
18
19 firm's performance, due to the wider range of voices for decision-making (e.g., Ensley &
20
21 Hmieleski, 2005; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003; Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007). For
22
23 founding teams, heterogeneity with regards to blending the backgrounds of founders (e.g.,
24
25 including those with academic and those with business backgrounds) is linked to better employee
26
27 and sales growth (Visintin & Pittino, 2014). Yet, it is unclear if founding teams also benefit
28
29 from gender heterogeneity as studies have shown that teams more broadly with gender diversity
30
31 do not perform better or worse (Chowdhury, 2005; Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, & Van Praag,
32
33 2013). Work on corporate boards of directors suggest that a critical mass is needed before
34
35 gender diversity influences a firm's financial performance or innovation (Konrad, Kramer, &
36
37 Erkut, 2008; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011; Westphal & Milton, 2000). Founding teams,
38
39 which average fewer than three members, tend to be smaller than corporate boards, which
40
41 average nine members (Beckman et al., 2007; Lukomnik, 2017). Thus, establishing the role of
42
43 critical mass is less relevant in nascent firms. Nevertheless, female founders may help the firm
44
45 establish a broader understanding of the technology and market by bringing unique and under-
46
47 represented views to the team (Post & Byron, 2015). The addition of a woman's social capital
48
49 and experience diversifies and expands the founding team's resources. Godwin and colleagues
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 (2006) argue that women can overcome concerns of gender role incongruity and legitimacy by
4 partnering with a male co-founder, particularly in male-dominated contexts. This does not take
5 into account the female entrepreneurs human capital that may outweigh the benefit of simply
6 adding a male co-founder. As noted above, gender is an over-simplistic view of diversity. We
7 should ask: Is a founder's gender, education or work experience more salient to the external
8 audience? Team members' experiences and backgrounds also contribute to the team's decision-
9 making performance and ability to obtain resources. Thus, the *type* of heterogeneity may be
10 more important than the amount.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 **Summary**

25
26 In summary, several questions remain about this important phenomenon that are poorly
27 addressed with current theories. First, we know little about women who start high technology
28 firms. It is not clear if there is any difference in education or occupational backgrounds for
29 technology entrepreneurs by gender. Conflicting results from studies on firm performance has
30 led to little consensus regarding how firms started by women and men differ in this regard. It
31 remains unclear if heterogeneity in women's backgrounds leads to different outcomes such as
32 VC funding. In response, this study explores the backgrounds of female and male high
33 technology entrepreneurs to generate new evidence and theory on a timely and important topic.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 **METHODS**

49 **Research Setting**

50
51 To examine the backgrounds of women founders of high technology firms, this study
52 uses a database of U.S. nanotechnology firms. Nanotechnology is an exceptionally useful setting
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 to study STEM, since the field incorporates each of the four STEM areas: science, technology,
4 engineering and math. Nearly every industry, ranging from biotechnology to consumer products,
5 uses nanotechnology (National Nanotechnology Coordination Office, 2007). Nanotechnology
6 was developed over the history of science, but in 1981 the scanning tunnelling microscope
7 (STM) was invented, which enabled scientists to observe, move, and modify a nanoscale sample
8 in three dimensions (Rothaermel & Thursby, 2007; Smalley, 1999). The STM is considered the
9 foundational technology supporting nanotechnology because intrinsic in nanotechnology is the
10 ability to modify at the nanoscale. As such, no nanotechnology-specific firm was founded before
11 1981 (Woolley, 2010). Thus, the year 1981 signifies the earliest year of possible
12 nanotechnology entrepreneurship and serves as the year of the earliest relevant data. This study
13 starts here, ensuring that the data are not left-censored, whereby the origins of an event occur
14 before the opening of the observation window (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2002; Yamaguchi, 1991).
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 **Data**

34
35 The database consists of all nanotechnology firms started in the U.S. before 2011,
36 compiled from 10,000 pages of industry lists, directories, press releases, university websites,
37 scientific publications, and web sites related to nanotechnology.³ These data were aggregated
38 and augmented with information about nanotechnology firms from PR Newswire and
39 PriceWaterhouseCoopers' VC site. To be included in the database, each firm was analyzed to
40 determine if it fit the criteria for being a nanotechnology firm: a single-business venture, founded
41 to develop, produce, and sell nanotechnology products on the merchant market. Specifically,
42 included firms must have more than 50 percent of their activities, such as products, R&D, or
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54
55 ³ Data sources include Nano Science and Technology Institute, NanoInvestorNews, NanoMarkets, NanoTechWire,
56 Small Times Media, Lux Capital, and the Foresight Institute.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 sales, derived from or related to nanotechnology. If a firm could not manipulate components at
4 the nanoscale, it was not considered to use nanotechnology and was excluded from the database.
5
6 When data were unavailable about a firm's sales or finances, its level of nanotechnology activity
7
8 was identified by the firm's products, patents, and technology data. Several sources of data
9
10 supplied these details, such as the firms' websites, the United States Patent and Trademark
11
12 Office, press releases, and news articles. This classification process is similar to previous works
13
14 that also identified new technology firms (e.g., Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990;
15
16 Woolley, 2017). The database consists of 613 firms and 18 firms were dropped due to lack of
17
18 reliable data for the founding teams. The resulting sample totaled 595 firms.⁴
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26 *Dependent variables.*

27
28 Firm survival is often used as a dichotomous measure of success: either the firm succeeds
29 and is alive or fails and is dead (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010). For the most
30 part, all firm exits have been treated as a failure in the literature. However, not all firms that stop
31 operations do so due to their failure in the market. For example, firms that are acquired are often
32 targeted because of their strong market performance or valuable assets. Investors encourage the
33 acquisition of their portfolio firms as a mechanism to obtain a return on their investments. Some
34 entrepreneurs actively aspire to have their firms acquired. Thus, this study uses acquisitions and
35 firm dissolutions as contrasting mechanisms for firm exits (Fortune & Mitchell, 2012). Recent
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47
48 ⁴ A subset of these data was compared with that from researchers who used a similar process to identify
49 nanotechnology firms. Resulting inter-rater agreement was almost 90 percent (see Wang & Shapira, 2012 and
50 Woolley, 2017). Any firms not in agreement were analyzed using the discussed criteria. No additional firms met
51 the criteria. Although it is likely that nearly all new nanotechnology firms have been captured in this database, if the
52 founders of a company with nanotechnology capabilities chose to not be involved in the nanotechnology
53 community, had no nanotechnology-related patents or grants, did not expose their existence, and were not known to
54 other community members, the firm would not be included in this study. Since nanotechnology is science-based and
55 there are very few people with the substantial knowledge of the technology needed for such a commercial endeavor,
56 it is unlikely that a firm would remain undetected.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 research has started to distinguish between firms that end in distress (low performance) and those
4 that are closed while performing well (Bates, 2005; Wennberg et al., 2010; DeTienne & Cardon,
5 2012; Woolley, 2017). To capture the variation in firm closures, this study differentiates
6
7 between business closures due to acquisition or merger and those due to bankruptcy, liquidation,
8 and dissolution. Additionally, obtaining VC funding is a positive milestone for start-ups, as it
9 indicates external validation of their business model by experienced investors. In high
10 technology fields, VC is particularly important, since starting a firm in this market is especially
11 costly. Thus, obtaining VC can be an alternative measure of success. For each type of outcome,
12 the following variables were collected or constructed: a dichotomous variable of outcome
13 attainment, year of outcome, and time between firm founding and outcome.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 *Independent variables.*

29
30 A total of 1178 founders were identified for these firms. Data were collected on each
31 founder, including education, work history and gender, from online databases and profiles such
32 as those listed above, university websites, faculty profiles, curriculum vitae, firm listings,
33 Crunchbase, and LinkedIn. Next, separate variable using binary measures capture the founder's
34 level of education (bachelor, master, doctorate, or other). Separate variables with binary
35 variables represent the founder's work history in terms of position (professor, research scientist,
36 student, C-level executive, non-C-level manager, serial entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur
37 executive).⁵ Position and employer variables are not mutually exclusive, as founders sometimes
38 held more than one position simultaneously. As each individual could have more than one role
39 (e.g., professor and serial entrepreneur), the proportion of founders with each background was
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54
55 ⁵ Research scientists were identified as those faculty and post-doc researchers who did not have professorship titles
56 or designations.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 calculated out of the total number of founders.⁶ The models examining team composition (e.g.,
4 team with female professor and male serial entrepreneur) used a binary designation if both types
5 of founder were listed on the firm's documentation at the time of start-up.
6
7
8
9

10 11 12 ***Control variables.*** 13

14 Since the year a firm was started can influence its mortality (Singh, Tucker, & House,
15 1986), the models control for the year of the firm's founding. The number of nanotechnology
16 firms alive each year and the square of that number were included to control for density
17 dependence (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1988). To ensure that the outcomes
18 of firms are not simply a reflection of overall firm activity in the economy, the number of firm
19 closures each year in the U.S. was included (Hannan & Freeman, 1988), as well as the year-end
20 NASDAQ composite. Models for obtaining VC funding included a control for VC funding in
21 the U.S. All such environmental control variables were taken at a two-year lag to provide time
22 for the macro-level condition to have an effect and were standardized.⁷ Finally, all models
23 control for the firm's industry and whether the firm was founded by a team or solo entrepreneur.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 **Analysis** 41

42 Descriptive statistics for female and male founders were generated and analyzed using t-
43 tests. The models report Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom, since the variances of the two
44 groups are not assumed to be equal. This is a more conservative approach that lessens the
45 likelihood of errors (Zaiontz, 2017).
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53 ⁶ As robustness checks, all models were run using dummy variables for the existence of a founder with a particular
54 background on the team (e.g., team with at least one female serial entrepreneur). Results were the same.

55 ⁷ As robustness checks, geography and the number of founders were included as controls, but did not show
56 significance and were thus not included in the models.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Firm outcomes were analyzed using event history analyses on the data using STATA
4
5 with maximum likelihood estimation and robust standard errors. Data with consistently
6
7 decreasing survival prospects are best modeled with Weibull, Gompertz, and exponential
8
9 distributions. The Weibull distribution was chosen to accommodate the monotonic effect of
10
11 time, since the hazard rates observed in these data were not constant over time (see Box-
12
13 Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997). Models can be compared by considering the difference in the log-
14
15 likelihood ratios, using the chi-square distribution (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2002). This
16
17 comparison showed that the best fitting survival model for the data was the Weibull failure
18
19 (event) time model.⁸ The equation for the Weibull distribution (Allison, 2014) is:

$$\log h(t) = b_0 + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + c \log t$$

24
25 where $h(t)$ is the hazard function, b_0 , b_1 , b_2 , and c are constants to be estimated, and t signifies
26
27 time. Hazard ratios were estimated such that values over 1 indicate an increase in the likelihood
28
29 that the covariate influenced the dependent variable, and values under 1 indicate a lower
30
31 likelihood of influence by the covariate.
32
33
34
35
36
37

38 FINDINGS

39
40 The first section of the findings provides an overview of founders' backgrounds and the
41
42 types of firms. The years of firm founding, education trends, and the industries of the firms are
43
44 examined to discern macro-level patterns. The second section of the findings discusses firm
45
46 outcomes; specifically, the models of the likelihood that a firm suffers from a negative closure, is
47
48 acquired, or obtains VC funding.
49
50
51

52
53 ⁸ As a robustness check, all models were compared to their equivalent using the exponential distribution. The
54
55 findings did not vary. Additionally, models were run using a dichotomous measure for independent variables
56
57 indicating the existence of a type of person on the founding team (e.g., at least one male serial entrepreneur on the
58
59 team). These models varied little from those using the proportion of each founder type.
60

Founders and Their Firms

In total, about 15 percent of nanotechnology firms started before 2011 had women on the founding team. However, the percentage started each year by women founders fluctuated greatly, peaking in 2004. The types of firms that these entrepreneurs start provide insight into the context, founding team backgrounds, and firm outcomes. Figure 2 shows the number of new nanotechnology firms founded each year from 1994 through 2010 and the percentage with women founders. Of the firms with women founders, 13 percent were founded by solo entrepreneurs, or about 2.2 percent of the total sample. Women tended to found firms with men, but not with other women: only 1.3 percent of all firms were started with more than one woman on the founding team. All of the firms with more than one female entrepreneur founder were started after the year 2000 and only one of these firms has closed. Conversely, 96 percent of the firms had men on the founding team and 33 percent of firms were started by solo men.

Insert Figure 2 about here

Table 2 shows the founders' background, including education and work experience, along with the results of t-tests comparing men and women founders. Looking at the academic background of the founders, women are more likely to have worked at universities than men, but with different roles. Difference in academic occupations had marginal significance. Men are more likely to have been professors than women (30 percent versus 22 percent, respectively), and women are more likely to have worked as research scientists and post-docs than men (11 percent vs 6 percent, respectively), both only at a 0.1 significance level. Almost two-thirds of

1
2
3 both female and male founders have doctorates. Together, these findings debunk the myth that
4
5 women entrepreneurs are less likely to have academic backgrounds than men.
6

7
8 The breakdown of founders' prior occupations outside of academia is also shown in
9
10 Table 2. Since most serial entrepreneurs were also C-level executives, the table differentiates
11
12 between serial entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneur C-level executives. Over half of both female
13
14 and male founders have backgrounds in business roles. Women are less likely to have had
15
16 executive positions before starting their firms than men, but the significance level of the
17
18 difference is negligible at 0.1. Though lower, there is no significant gender difference in the
19
20 percentage of founders who are serial entrepreneurs. Overall, these data indicate that there is
21
22 little difference in the educational and occupational backgrounds of female and male
23
24 entrepreneurs of high technology firms.
25
26
27

28
29 In the sample of nanotechnology firms analyzed here, 63 percent of the female founders
30
31 earned doctoral degrees. To examine the nuances of education and occupation, the female
32
33 founders' fields of study were obtained and triangulated across multiple sources including their
34
35 curriculum vitae, website biographies, and LinkedIn profiles.⁹ Almost all of the doctorates
36
37 earned by female nanotechnology entrepreneurs (97 percent) are in STEM related fields. Over
38
39 one-third (36 percent) are in chemistry-related fields, such as chemistry, chemical engineering,
40
41 or biochemistry. Almost 20 percent are in physics and bio-physics, 20 percent are in engineering
42
43 and materials sciences, and another 20 percent are in biology-related fields, such as
44
45 bioengineering and molecular biology. Although the fields are similar, the institutions from
46
47 which the doctorates were earned varied. In fact, 45 different universities are represented in the
48
49 sample. Furthermore, the timing of their doctoral education was diverse; almost half of the
50
51
52
53
54

55
56 ⁹ The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 female founders with doctorates earning their graduate degree in the 1990s and one-quarter
4 earned it after 2000. Two percent of firms were started by teams of professors and their graduate
5
6 students, for both women and men. Thus, there is little evidence of overlap in mentoring or
7
8 institutional experiences at universities among these women. Of the women who started firms
9
10 with one or more co-founders, half had worked with at least one of her co-founders before
11
12 starting their new ventures (either in academia or business environments) and one-third started
13
14 firms with male serial entrepreneurs.
15
16
17
18

19 -----
20 Insert Table 2 and Figure 3 about here
21 -----
22
23

24 **Industries**

25
26 Figure 3 shows the breakdown of nanotechnology firms by industry. Over one-third of
27
28 all nanotechnology companies, regardless of founders' gender, are in the materials industry.
29
30 These firms manufacture nanoscale materials, such as graphene and carbon nanotubes. Almost a
31
32 quarter (24 percent) of firms founded by women are in biotechnology, compared to 14 percent of
33
34 firms started by men. These findings concur with McQuaid and colleagues (2010) findings that
35
36 21 percent of New England biotechnology firms started in 2006 had women founders. The
37
38 pharmaceutical industry is also more popular for women founders than male founders, who are
39
40 more likely to start firms in the instrumentation and energy industries.
41
42
43

44 As mentioned earlier, Table 1 summarizes the percentage of doctorates earned by women
45
46 in science and engineering fields. The table indicates that, while the overall number of STEM
47
48 doctorates is increasing, the increases across fields vary considerably. These data show a
49
50 relationship between the fields in which STEM degrees are earned and the industries in which
51
52 women are starting firms. The fields most relevant to nanotechnology firms are engineering,
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 physical sciences, mathematics, computer sciences, and biology/agricultural sciences. Notably,
4
5 the fields with the highest increase in the percentage of women earning doctoral degrees from
6
7 1988 to 2015—earth, atmospheric, and ocean sciences (an increase of 24 percent), and biological
8
9 and agricultural sciences (an increase of 20 percent)—are closely associated with those
10
11 nanotechnology industries with the most women founders, namely, biotechnology and
12
13 pharmaceuticals. Engineering has the lowest percentage of female doctoral recipients (23
14
15 percent) and is closely linked to the nanotechnology-related industries with the lowest percentage
16
17 of women founders, semiconductors and electronics, (three percent and zero percent
18
19 respectively). While much attention has been paid to increasing the number of women in STEM
20
21 fields broadly, the variance of representation in fields, both in doctorates and start-ups, suggests
22
23 that more attention should be paid to the heterogeneity of fields within the STEM arena.
24
25
26
27

28 -----
29
30 Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
31 -----
32

33 **Firm Outcomes**

34
35 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations of the firm-level data. Table
36
37 4 shows the results from the event history analysis for bankruptcies, asset sales, and other firm
38
39 closures that are not attributable to favorable circumstances such as an acquisition (Models 1-4).
40
41 Table 5 reports the results for the likelihood that a firm was acquired, and Table 6 reports the
42
43 likelihood that the firm received VC funding. The first model in each of these tables includes the
44
45 control variables. Model 2 (Table 4) shows that firms with women founders are not more or less
46
47 likely to suffer a negative closure than those without women founders. Model 3 specifies the
48
49 founders' previous employment roles and shows that firms with founders who were female
50
51 professors or male executives are more likely to suffer a negative closure than other firms, while
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 female research scientists or serial entrepreneurs are less likely to have their firm close for a
4 negative reason. Model 4 shows that founders with doctoral degrees, both women and men, are
5 less likely to have a firm with a negative closure.
6
7
8
9

10 Table 5 shows the event history analysis for firm acquisitions and includes Models 5
11 through 8. Model 5 includes the control variables. Model 6 shows no relationship between
12 founder gender and firm acquisitions. Model 7 indicates that firms started by male serial
13 entrepreneurs or women professors are less likely to be acquired, with the latter at a marginal
14 significance level. However, firms started by research scientists and post-docs, either women or
15 men, are more likely to be acquired. Model 8 shows that firms founded by a female with a
16 doctoral degree are 59 percent less likely to be acquired than other firms.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26 Obtaining VC is the dependent variable in Table 6, which includes Models 9 through 12.
27 Model 9 is the control model, while Model 10 shows that, similar to the findings in previous
28 studies (Brush et al., 2009; Brush et al., 2017; Greene et al., 2001; Zarya, 2017), firms started by
29 women are less likely to obtain VC. Looking at the employment backgrounds of the founders,
30 Model 11 shows that firms started by female professors, research scientists, and executives are
31 less likely to obtain VC, while female serial entrepreneurs and male executives and entrepreneurs
32 are more likely to obtain VC. Model 12 shows that firms started by women with doctoral
33 degrees are 39 percent less likely to obtain VC than other firms, while those started by men with
34 doctoral degrees are 24 percent more likely.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47 To examine how team founders might complement one another, Models 13 through 15 in
48 Table 7 examine how heterogeneous founder backgrounds influence outcomes.¹⁰ The direct
49 effects of the founder backgrounds are consistent with previous models. Model 13 indicates that,
50
51
52
53
54

55 ¹⁰ These models include dichotomous measures to indicate if a type of founder is on the team.
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 while firms by female professor or male executives are more likely to suffer a negative closure,
4
5 pairing these founders together actually leads to a lower likelihood of a negative closure. Model
6
7 14 considers the team composition with regard to firm acquisitions. Unfortunately, the low
8
9 number of these types of teams with acquisitions restrict the analyses. However, it is worth
10
11 noting that teams with women entrepreneurs and male professors were highly likely to be
12
13 acquired, compared to other firms. Taken together, teams with female entrepreneurs and male
14
15 professors are generally likely to close on both positive and negative terms, which may be related
16
17 to obtaining VC funding, as shown in Model 15. Teams with female entrepreneurs and male
18
19 professors were less likely to obtain VC funding, even though women serial entrepreneurs are
20
21 more likely to obtain funding. In contrast, the combination of female executives and male
22
23 professors strengthened a firm's likelihood of obtaining VC.
24
25
26
27

28
29 -----
30 Insert Tables 5-7 about here
31 -----
32
33

34 **DISCUSSION**

35
36 Despite undermining stereotypes and unsupportive norms, women from a variety of
37
38 backgrounds are actively pursuing careers in high technology entrepreneurship. Extant work has
39
40 identified the supply and demand concerns that discourage women, particularly those from
41
42 academia, from entrepreneurial careers (e.g., Blume-Kohout, 2014; Ding & Choi, 2011; Jennings
43
44 & Brush, 2013). To date, however, limited work has examined the women who transcend these
45
46 concerns and start firms in technology-related fields. I embarked upon this study to improve our
47
48 understanding of who these women are, their backgrounds and human capital, and the firms that
49
50 they create. Thus, I contribute to the entrepreneurship and founding team literature by clarifying
51
52 the diversity and significance of high technology founders' education and career trajectories with
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 respect to gender. Importantly, the findings dispel the myth that women and men who start high
4 technology firms have different education and occupation backgrounds while highlighting that
5 similar human capital can be regarded and experienced differently. These discoveries open new
6 territories for research and policy, which are elaborated below.
7
8
9
10

11
12 In contrast to work that indicates that academia does not produce women entrepreneurs,
13 about one-third of all nanotechnology founders in this study – both women and men – are either
14 professors or research scientists. Additionally, female founders of nanotechnology firms are
15 more likely to have previously worked for a university as a professor or research scientist than to
16 have previously worked as an executive at a firm (Table 2). However, female and male founders
17 were employed in different roles before starting their firms: female founders were less likely to
18 have been professors than male founders (22 percent versus 30 percent, respectively) and more
19 likely than to have been research scientists and post-doc researchers (11 percent versus 6 percent,
20 respectively). This raises questions about how these career paths differ in their conduciveness
21 for entrepreneurship. Previous work regarding women entrepreneurship in academia has not
22 differentiated between professors and research scientists (e.g., Ding et al., 2006; Ding & Choi,
23 2011; Stephan & El-Ganainy, 2007) and there may be both supply- and demand-based concerns
24 that encourage entrepreneurship for female research scientists more than professors. For
25 example, it is possible that female research scientists and post-docs find the career prospects in
26 academia unattractive (Whittington & Smith-Doerr, 2005) or see fewer avenues for success in
27 academia as a career and turn to entrepreneurship as an alternative. The few female faculty
28 members who work in STEM fields feel singled out to take on extra work because of their
29 unique, yet isolating position as a woman in science, sometimes the only one in the department
30 (Ward & Wolf-Wendel, 2012) and as one of the few role models (Bilimoria, Joy, & Liang, 2008;
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Blickenstaff, 2005). Unfortunately, being one of the few women working in a stereotypically
4 masculine field can bring attention and extra work, but not positive recognition (Chatman,
5
6 Boisnier, Spataro, Anderson, & Berdahl, 2008). Additionally, since female professors contribute
7
8 more service to the profession than their male colleagues (Guarino & Borden, 2017), they may
9
10 find it difficult to engage in entrepreneurial activities that can lead to founding new ventures.
11
12 Female research scientists most likely notice the inequity that comes with a professorial role and
13
14 consider career options deeply. How a person conceives of and identifies with a role or field can
15
16 shape her perception of self-efficacy and the likelihood that she undertakes an entrepreneurial
17
18 careers (Leung & Fast, 2017). How female research scientists and professors identify with their
19
20 own occupations could shape their perception of opportunities within academia and elsewhere.
21
22 Additional studies on how women and men experience their occupations differently and how this
23
24 influences the decision to transition into entrepreneurship will enrich the field greatly.
25
26
27
28
29

30
31 This study is one of the first to explore the relationship of an entrepreneur's gender,
32
33 educational and occupational backgrounds, and firm outcomes in high technology sectors. Here
34
35 we see that the simple indicator of founder gender alone provides little insight. When the
36
37 heterogeneity of founders' backgrounds is taken into consideration with gender, a more nuanced
38
39 understanding emerges. Notably, the findings suggest that it is not just the founders'
40
41 backgrounds that are relevant, but what they take away from their experiences that influences
42
43 how they develop their new ventures and their eventual outcomes. Just as social and
44
45 professional norms vary by educational field, degree, and occupation, women and men
46
47 experience these norms differently as well. Furthermore, I argue that women and men may
48
49 experience similar backgrounds differently and that these experiences generate distinct human
50
51 capital for founders, which, in turn, influences the success of their firms. As discussed, female
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 professors tend to dedicate more hours to professional service than their male colleagues
4
5 (Guarino & Borden, 2017; Hart, 2016), which could reduce the time available for developing
6
7 their entrepreneurial ventures. Studies have not established if these expectations or norms are
8
9 the same for research scientists who are at different points in their careers. Contrasting career
10
11 specific norms within academia may explain the firm outcome trends for ventures started by
12
13 professors versus research scientists. However, current theory does not address adequately how
14
15 similar types of human capital can be regarded and experienced differently depending on gender.
16
17 This is an important distinction that is undertheorized in the literature, but an exciting
18
19 opportunity for development with implications for both theory and policy.
20
21
22
23

24 While aspirations and motivations vary by gender, these need to be considered in
25
26 conjunction with a person's background instead of as a separate variable. For example, in
27
28 contrast with female research scientists, female professors are more likely to start firms that
29
30 suffer negative closures. While both have careers in academia, they have different career
31
32 experiences and skill sets that influence how and why they develop their firms. Just as women
33
34 and men often start firms for different reasons (e.g., Carter, Gartner, Shaver, & Gatewood, 2003;
35
36 Cohoon, 2011; DeMartino & Barbato, 2003; Thebaud, 2015), I propose that founders'
37
38 aspirations and definitions of success vary depending on how they experience their career or
39
40 educational backgrounds, which in turn, influences the outcomes of their entrepreneurial
41
42 endeavors. For example, research scientists who arguably have shorter career histories, will
43
44 likely have different reasons for starting firms than professors or those founders with business
45
46 backgrounds, which can help explain why firms created by research scientists are more likely to
47
48 be acquired and less likely to suffer negative closures. Female professors may aspire to create
49
50 firms that do not fit the typical mold for acquisition targets, which could lead to lower likelihood
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 of acquisition. In contrast, firms started by female professors may be less scalable and thus less
4 likely to be acquired or funded. These speculations cannot be address by this study, but I hope
5 that my findings provoke others to investigate such interesting questions.
6
7
8
9

10 The finding that female serial entrepreneurs are more likely to obtain VC while other
11 female founders were less likely also highlights the limitations in prior studies that treat women
12 entrepreneurs as a homogeneous group, and this discovery is an important distinction in our
13 understanding of start-up financing. Potentially, these founders may have had previous
14 experience with VC funding that enabled them to overcome the difficulties reported by women
15 seeking investments for their firms (see Benner, 2017; Mundy, 2017). However, the data in this
16 study do not indicate if these founders had obtained VC for previous firms. Previous studies
17 have argued that female entrepreneurs tend to value independence over financial success, status
18 and innovation compared to male entrepreneurs who value financial gains, self-realization, and
19 autonomy (Carter, Gartner, Shaver, & Gatewood, 2003; Manolova et al., 2008), but both female
20 and male serial entrepreneurs are more likely to obtain VC funding than other firms. Further
21 inquiry would prove useful for the next generation of female technology entrepreneurs and those
22 organizations seeking to empower women through greater equality and opportunities.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 In contrast to previous studies (Gimmons & Levie, 2010; Hsu, 1997), this study finds that
41 the positive relationship between doctoral degrees and VC funding is not universal. For
42 nanotechnology firms, female founders do not benefit the same way that male founders do, in
43 that women with doctoral degrees are less likely to obtain VC funding and men with doctoral
44 degrees are more likely to obtain VC funding than other founders. These findings challenge the
45 premise of role congruity theory since women with STEM doctorates have an identity more
46 consistent with high technology entrepreneurship than female founders who lack such an
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 advanced degree. A STEM-related doctorate indicates advanced scientific education (Watson,
4 Stewart, & BarNir, 2003; Sapienza & Grimm, 1997) and in-depth technology knowledge (Ding
5 & Choi, 2011; Clarysse, Wright, & Van de Velde, 2011), both of which benefit high technology
6 start-ups. Although the academic environment in STEM is not friendly towards women, having
7 an academic background (e.g. doctorate, work experience) in a STEM-related field should
8 reduce the perceived incongruity between gender and high technology careers. However, these
9 attributes were not beneficial enough to attract investment. Given the importance of experience
10 and technological expertise, these findings are unexpected and worthy of further study. Thus,
11 extending role congruity theory to incorporate gender and context is natural development for
12 future research.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26 Challenges continue and female academics and executives continue to have difficulty
27 raising VC. These findings are generally consistent with previous studies that find female
28 entrepreneurs raising less financing than male entrepreneurs (Brush et al., 2009; Malmstrom et
29 al., 2017; Verheul & Thurik, 2001). These results may be due to fewer women in these positions
30 seeking VC, or perhaps that their firms are less attractive due to perception, opportunity, quality,
31 or gender homophily (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007). On one hand, female executives were able
32 to improve the likelihood of obtaining funding by partnering with a male professor, indicating
33 that heterogeneity in gender and background benefited teams in this regard. On the other hand,
34 female professors and entrepreneurs were not able to benefit by diversifying their teams in terms
35 of gender and occupation. This discovery underscores the fact that heterogeneity is more
36 complicated than simply having a mix of genders and occupational background. Getting the
37 right people together is clearly more important than meeting quotas.
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Team composition and collaboration trends provided useful insight into how founders
4 find cofounders. The findings show that a minority of nanotechnology firms had a woman on
5 the founding team (15 percent) while almost all firms had men on the founding team (96
6 percent). Almost 87 percent of the firms founded by women had more than one founder on the
7 team, compared to 60 percent of firms with male founders, indicating that women are more
8 likely to collaborate with others during start-up. However, women do not collaborate with other
9 women to found firms, as only about 10 percent of the firms started by women had more than
10 one female founder. As a 13 percent of firms founded by women had solo entrepreneurs, over
11 74 percent of firms started by women had a male collaborator. This may be due to the relatively
12 small number of women active in the entrepreneurial space. Of the 1178 founders of the 595
13 firms in the database, only 99 were women, 17 percent of whom had started more than one
14 company (see Table 2). Women entrepreneurs with business backgrounds used their networks to
15 find co-founders, principally in their places of work as half of those who founded the
16 nanotechnology firm in teams had worked with at least one of her co-founders before starting
17 their new ventures. Likewise, half of academic women founders also worked with their co-
18 founders before starting their firms (not as students). Additionally, one-third of the women
19 started firms with male serial entrepreneurs. These figures indicate that opportunities for
20 collaboration between coworkers maybe an understudied mechanism to bolster women
21 entrepreneurship in high technology fields. While studies have shown that gender diversity in
22 teams does not equate to differences in performance (Chowdhury, 2005; Hoogendoorn et al.,
23 2013), in terms of patenting, women are more productive when collaborating with other women
24 (Whittington, 2018). This implies that an increase in the number of women in science will
25 benefit not only their productivity, but also innovation more broadly. Future research developing
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 theory regarding gender, collaboration and entrepreneurship may prove useful in understanding
4 career trajectories and motivations more deeply, especially with regards to the role of mentoring
5 and collaboration.
6
7
8
9

10 The study has implications for policymakers. For one, instead of encouraging more
11 women to start high technology firms, policymakers should identify the backgrounds,
12 characteristics, and motivations of potential founders that are most aligned with technological
13 success. Simply starting more firms is not a strong goal if those firms are destined to fail. It is
14 imperative that policymakers encourage entrepreneurship for the right reasons. Supporting the
15 creation of firms with a high likelihood of economic potential, such as jobs or revenue growth,
16 could prove more useful to society. Additionally, program and policy goals should match the
17 aspirations of the founders. Research shows that women and men entrepreneurs have
18 contrasting, yet similar reasons for starting firms (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Thebaud, 2015); it is
19 not clear how these motivations differ when career path and mentoring are considered. For
20 example, given the norms and training differences between women and men in academia, it
21 follows that their aspirations would differ when starting a firm. This may or may not, be true for
22 entrepreneurs with industrial backgrounds. The differences between founding rates and
23 outcomes between women entrepreneurs from academia suggests that university administrators
24 and policymakers should consider additional support for academic spinouts by women.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44 As with any study, this work is constrained by limitations that suggest additional
45 opportunities for future research. For example, the data do not identify the personal or
46 professional motivations of these founders. Justo and colleagues (2015) find that women
47 founders in spousal relationships cited personal reasons for closing their company, while male
48 founders in spousal relationships cited the ability to pursue other opportunities. In the case of
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 bankruptcy, personal motivations to avoid bankruptcy may vary by gender, family status, or
4
5 occupation. The study is also limited by the lack of data regarding the field of founders'
6
7 education or profession. The data indicate a relationship between the growth of STEM doctoral
8
9 degrees and start-ups when field and industry are taken into consideration. As professional
10
11 norms vary by field, founders inevitably experience variation despite experience in STEM fields.
12
13 The findings control for industry, but not for field of study or previous employment. Additional
14
15 data on founder education may help clarify the relationship between education, professional field
16
17 and firm performance. Similarly, the benefit of the cross-industry setting of nanotechnology is
18
19 also a liability. While nanotechnology enables the examination of founders across STEM fields,
20
21 representative of high technology sectors, the findings may not be generalizable in specific
22
23 fields. For example, the professional norms and contextual pressures in materials and nano-
24
25 biotechnology, the two fields with the most firms with female founders as shown in Figure 3,
26
27 may differ from other STEM-based fields. Unfortunately, the low number of firms in each
28
29 industry prevented a comparative study. Future research drawing from a larger sample of
30
31 STEM-based firms would prove valuable for a comparative study between fields.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 CONCLUSIONS

41
42 Work in the area of high technology entrepreneurship has concentrated on new ventures
43
44 resulting from IP from universities (academic spin-offs), with comparatively limited research
45
46 examining of the relationship between gender, technology, and entrepreneurship outside of
47
48 academia (Wynarczyk & Renner 2006). In this study, I attempt to advance our understanding of
49
50 this relationship by establishing a set of facts regarding women in high technology
51
52 entrepreneurship. Without knowing the current state of the field, policy makers are ill-equipped
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 to make effective decisions on interventions to support nascent entrepreneurship for women in
4 high technology sectors. This study helps establish a baseline by which we can measure the
5 effectiveness of policy instruments enacted.
6
7
8
9

10 I also attempt to improve our understanding of which women start technology firms and
11 how their backgrounds are related to the outcomes of their firms. Often, researchers are plagued
12 with the difficulty of determining which variables are salient and how to measure them. The
13 results confirm that the gender of a founder is but one characteristic of a founding team. More
14 research identifying other relevant aspects of human capital heterogeneity, not only of firm
15 founders, but also of investors and acquiring firm executives, will surely prove worthwhile.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 The experience of women in technology is just one example of how social norms and
25 conventions change over time. Almost half of the female founders with doctorates earned their
26 doctoral degrees in the 1990s and one-quarter earned that degree after 2000, but the year of
27 doctorate was not related to the firm outcomes. Indeed, all of the firms with more than one
28 female entrepreneur founder were started after the year 2000, indicating that entrepreneurial
29 collaboration among women is increasing. However, the volume of reports from female
30 entrepreneurs about the challenges, stereotypes, and harassment they experience in high-
31 technology sectors (see Benner, 2017; Mundy, 2017) indicates that this is a setting in which
32 gender is exceptionally salient and difficulties for women remain. Organizations such as the
33 WISE (Women In Science and Engineering) Campaign and social media campaigns such as
34 #WomenInSTEM, and #distractinglysexy¹¹ are challenging the assumptions and stereotypes
35 pervasive across technology. It will be exciting to see how customs and norms further evolve.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53 ¹¹ #WomenInSTEM started in 2009 to recognize Rebecca Robinson for her work to promote science and
54 engineering to women. #distractinglysexy emerged in 2015 in response to Dr. Tim Hunt's comment working with
55 "girls" in laboratories being difficult because: "Three things happen when they are in the lab: you fall in love with
56 them, they fall in love with you, and when you criticize them they cry."
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

TABLES AND FIGURES

8 Table 1. Percentage of doctorates awarded to women by field of study – 1988, 1997, 2006, and
9 2015.

10
11

Field	1988	1997	2006	2015	'88-'15 change
Science and engineering, total	27.0%	32.8%	38.4%	40.8%	13.8%
Engineering	6.8%	12.3%	20.2%	23.2%	16.4%
Sciences	32.1%	38.8%	44.2%	46.9%	14.8%
Physical sciences	16.9%	22.4%	27.8%	31.5%	14.6%
Earth, atmospheric, & ocean sciences	19.4%	23.7%	35.3%	43.2%	23.8%
Mathematical/computer sciences	14.0%	20.2%	25.3%	24.7%	10.7%
Biological/agricultural sciences	33.0%	40.7%	47.9%	52.5%	19.5%
Psychology	54.7%	66.6%	71.3%	72.0%	17.3%
Social sciences	34.8%	38.7%	45.7%	49.1%	14.3%
Non-S&E, total	49.0%	53.8%	57.6%	59.0%	10.0%
Health	62.2%	65.7%	67.4%	68.5%	6.3%
Humanities	43.7%	47.2%	50.0%	50.6%	6.9%
Education	55.2%	62.8%	65.1%	68.4%	13.2%
Professional / other	32.3%	39.4%	47.8%	51.7%	19.4%

32
33 SOURCE: National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Earned
34 Doctorates: Science and engineering (S&E) doctorates awarded to women (2016).
35
36
37

38 Table 2. Comparison of Individual Founders' Backgrounds of Nanotechnology Firms
39

40

	Male Founders		Female Founders		All		t (S.df.)	p
	n=1079	S.E.	n=99	S.E.	n=1178	S.E.		
Professor	30.2%	(0.01)	22.2%	(0.04)	29.5%	(0.01)	1.8 (121)	^
Research Scientist	5.8%	(0.01)	11.1%	(0.03)	5.4%	(0.01)	-1.7 (108)	^
Serial Entrepreneur	23.5%	(0.01)	17.2%	(0.04)	23.0%	(0.04)	1.6 (122)	
Executive (non-ENT)	17.5%	(0.01)	11.1%	(0.03)	17.0%	(0.01)	1.9 (126)	^
Ph.D.	63.6%	(0.01)	62.6%	(0.05)	63.5%	(0.01)	0.2 (117)	
University	41.4%	(0.02)	46.5%	(0.05)	41.9%	(0.01)	-1.0 (116)	
Business	59.6%	(0.01)	52.5%	(0.05)	59.0%	(0.01)	1.3 (116)	

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. One-tail t-test was applied, $\wedge p < 0.1$, $* p < 0.05$.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (Firm Level) and Correlation Table

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 Negative closure	0.31	0.46	1.00								
2 Firm Acquired	0.16	0.37	-0.27	1.00							
3 Firm Obtained VC	0.42	0.49	-0.11	0.07	1.00						
4 Year Founded	2003.18	4.62	-0.02	-0.21	0.03	1.00					
5 NASDAQ (Year end)	3444.40	968.20	-0.49	-0.49	0.06	0.29	1.00				
6 Nano firm Density	489.09	93.31	-0.35	-0.42	0.05	0.37	0.82	1.00			
7 US Firm Closures (K)	389.21	34.35	0.40	0.42	-0.04	-0.17	-0.82	-0.52	1.00		
8 US VC Investment (MM)	28.64	5.02	-0.17	-0.17	0.10	0.11	0.39	0.30	-0.27	1.00	
9 Team	0.65	0.48	0.04	0.04	0.16	0.17	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.05	1.00
10 Women on Team	0.15	0.36	-0.06	-0.03	-0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	-0.06	0.01	0.18
11 Professor - Women	0.02	0.10	-0.03	-0.05	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.09	-0.08	0.02	0.09
12 Scientist / Post Doc - Women	0.01	0.07	-0.05	-0.03	-0.07	0.01	0.06	0.05	-0.05	0.02	-0.01
13 Serial Entrepreneur - Women	0.02	0.10	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.06	0.08	0.06	-0.05	0.02	0.01
14 Executive - Women	0.01	0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.06	-0.01	0.05
15 Professor - Men	0.26	0.37	-0.05	-0.03	0.08	0.00	0.07	0.05	-0.09	0.09	0.07
16 Scientist / Post Doc - Men	0.05	0.18	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.03	0.04	0.01	-0.05	0.00	0.01
17 Serial Entrepreneur - Men	0.21	0.33	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.10	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07	0.04
18 Executive - Men	0.16	0.31	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05	-0.09	-0.06	0.13	-0.01	-0.05
19 PhD - Women	0.05	0.18	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	0.07	0.10	0.10	-0.08	0.02	-0.01
20 PhD - Men	0.59	0.40	-0.08	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	0.09	0.07	-0.10	0.02	-0.01

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Table 3. Correlation Table – continued

Variable	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
10 Women on Team	1.00										
11 Professor - Women	0.40	1.00									
12 Scientist / Post Doc - Women	0.27	-0.02	1.00								
13 Serial Entrepreneur - Women	0.37	0.10	0.27	1.00							
14 Executive - Women	0.32	-0.02	-0.02	0.06	1.00						
15 Professor - Men	-0.13	-0.03	0.00	-0.06	-0.07	1.00					
16 Scientist / Post Doc - Men	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.10	1.00				
17 Serial Entrepreneur - Men	-0.12	-0.08	-0.05	-0.03	0.00	-0.14	-0.09	1.00			
18 Executive - Men	-0.14	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.20	-0.12	-0.17	1.00		
19 PhD - Women	0.70	0.49	0.35	0.25	0.05	-0.11	-0.07	-0.12	-0.13	1.00	
20 PhD - Men	-0.28	-0.11	-0.08	-0.12	-0.08	0.38	0.17	-0.10	-0.24	-0.26	1.00

Table 4. Event History Analysis for Negative Closures

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p
Year Founded	4.82	(0.32)	***	4.82	(0.39)	***	4.83	(0.32)	***	4.80	(0.31)	***
NASDAQ (Year end)	0.90	(0.06)		0.90	(0.06)		0.90	(0.06)		0.89	(0.06)	^
Nano Firm Density	0.70	(0.19)		0.70	(0.46)		0.77	(0.23)		0.61	(0.17)	^
Nano Firm Density - Squared	0.01	(0.01)	***	0.01	(0.00)	***	0.01	(0.01)	***	0.02	(0.01)	***
US Firm Closures (K)	1.25	(0.04)	***	1.25	(0.09)	***	1.21	(0.05)	***	1.24	(0.04)	***
VC Investment	0.84	(0.03)	***	0.84	(0.03)	***	0.81	(0.03)	***	0.83	(0.03)	***
Team	1.01	(0.05)		1.01	(0.06)		1.02	(0.05)		1.02	(0.05)	
Women on Team				0.97	(0.06)							
Professor - Women							2.36	(0.61)	***			
Research Scientist - Women							0.23	(0.06)	***			
Serial Entrepreneur - Women							0.63	(0.18)	^			
Executive - Women							0.84	(0.27)				
Professor - Men							0.98	(0.06)				
Research Scientist - Men							1.03	(0.17)				
Serial Entrepreneur - Men							0.97	(0.07)				
Executive - Men							1.31	(0.12)	**			
PhD - Women										0.67	(0.09)	**
PhD - Men										0.79	(0.04)	***
Constant	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***
Log pseudolikelihood		501.56			501.62			514.80			509.34	
Degrees of freedom		11			12			19			13	
Wald chi2		3244.17	***		3264.81	***		3546.05	***		3264.85	***

n= 595, Closures = 185, /ln_p = 2.58 (0.04). Standard errors in parentheses. Includes industry controls, ^ p< 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001

Table 5. Event History Analysis for Acquisitions

Variable	Model 5			Model 6			Model 7			Model 8		
	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p
Year Founded	1.22	(0.01)	***	1.22	(0.01)	***	1.23	(0.01)	***	1.22	(0.01)	***
NASDAQ (Year end)	0.51	(0.04)	***	0.51	(0.04)	***	0.50	(0.04)	***	0.52	(0.04)	***
Nano Firm Density	1.05	(0.31)		1.05	(0.31)		1.23	(0.36)		1.06	(0.31)	
Nano Firm Density - Squared	0.70	(0.22)		0.70	(0.22)		0.57	(0.18)	^	0.69	(0.22)	
US Firm Closures (K)	1.15	(0.06)	**	1.15	(0.06)	**	1.11	(0.06)	^	1.16	(0.06)	**
VC Investment	1.78	(0.13)	***	1.78	(0.13)	***	1.92	(0.15)	***	1.76	(0.13)	***
Team	1.89	(0.15)	***	1.87	(0.15)	***	1.98	(0.16)	***	1.95	(0.15)	***
Women on Team				1.06	(0.10)							
Professor - Women							0.28	(0.19)	^			
Research Scientist - Women							11.01	(2.75)	***			
Serial Entrepreneur - Women							1.77	(0.72)				
Executive - Women							0.85	(0.26)				
Professor - Men							1.03	(0.11)				
Research Scientist - Men							2.02	(0.32)	***			
Serial Entrepreneur - Men							0.67	(0.09)	***			
Executive - Men							0.93	(0.12)				
PhD - Women										0.41	(0.12)	***
PhD - Men										1.03	(0.09)	
Constant	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***
Log pseudolikelihood		-1853.86			-1853.68			-1818.07			-1847.78	
Degrees of freedom		11			12			19			13	
Wald chi2		1731.53	***		1743.22	***		1935.83	***		1749.04	***

n= 595, Acq = 107, /ln_p = 1.14 (0.04). Standard errors in parentheses. Includes industry controls, ^ p< 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001

Table 6. Event History Analysis for Venture Capital

Variable	Model 9			Model 10			Model 11			Model 12		
	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p
Year Founded	2.56	(0.07)	***	2.57	(0.07)	***	2.60	(0.07)	***	2.58	(0.07)	***
NASDAQ (Year-end)	0.62	(0.03)	***	0.63	(0.03)	***	0.61	(0.03)	***	0.62	(0.03)	***
Nano Firm Density	0.09	(0.01)	***	0.09	(0.01)	***	0.09	(0.01)	***	0.10	(0.01)	***
Nano Firm Density - Squared	0.11	(0.02)	***	0.10	(0.02)	***	0.11	(0.02)	***	0.10	(0.02)	***
US VC Investment (MM)	0.96	(0.01)	***	0.95	(0.01)	***	0.96	(0.01)	**	0.95	(0.01)	***
Team	1.02	(0.04)		1.09	(0.05)	*	1.10	(0.05)	*	1.04	(0.04)	
Women on Team				0.72	(0.04)	***						
Professor - Women							0.58	(0.07)	***			
Research Scientist - Women							0.26	(0.08)	***			
Serial Entrepreneur - Women							4.94	(0.72)	***			
Executive - Women							0.18	(0.04)	***			
Professor - Men							1.03	(0.06)				
Research Scientist - Men							0.95	(0.10)				
Serial Entrepreneur - Men							1.15	(0.08)	*			
Executive - Men							1.38	(0.09)	**			
PhD - Women										0.61	(0.07)	***
PhD - Men										1.24	(0.06)	***
Constant	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***
Log pseudolikelihood =		-1472.29			-1457.00			-1424.38			-1450.31	
Degrees of freedom		10			11			18			12	
Wald chi2		4173.46	***		4226.98	***		4054.16	***		4187.36	***

n= 595, VC = 252, /ln_p = 1.26 (0.02). Includes industry controls. Standard errors in parentheses ^ p< 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001


Table 7. Event History Analysis of Founding Teams Composition

	<i>Negative Closure</i>			<i>Acquired</i>			<i>VC</i>		
	Model 13			Model 14			Model 15		
	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p	H.R.	S.E.	p
Year Founded	4.84	(0.32)	***	1.22	(0.01)	***	2.60	(0.07)	***
NASDAQ (Year-end)	0.89	(0.06)	^	0.50	(0.04)	***	0.59	(0.03)	***
Nano Firm Density	0.88	(0.26)		1.24	(0.38)		0.08	(0.01)	***
Nano Firm Density - Squared	0.01	(0.00)	***	0.57	(0.19)	^	0.12	(0.02)	***
US Firm Closures (K)	1.21	(0.04)	***	1.11	(0.06)	^			
VC Investment	0.82	(0.03)	***	1.87	(0.14)	***			
Team	1.03	(0.05)		2.08	(0.18)	***	1.03	(0.05)	
US VC Investment (MM)							0.97	(0.01)	**
Professor - Woman on team	1.61	(0.31)	**	0.58	(0.23)		0.70	(0.06)	***
Serial Entrepreneur - Woman on team	0.31	(0.06)	***	0.95	(0.33)		2.23	(0.34)	***
Executive - Woman on team	1.22	(0.25)		0.89	(0.13)		0.38	(0.03)	***
Professor - Man on team	0.91	(0.04)	*	1.00	(0.08)		1.03	(0.04)	
Serial Entrepreneur - Man on team	0.83	(0.05)	***	0.70	(0.06)	***	1.06	(0.05)	
Executive - Man on team	1.13	(0.06)	*	0.87	(0.08)		1.34	(0.06)	***
Team woman prof & man entrepreneur	3.88	(0.88)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	1.12	(0.12)	
Team woman prof & man exec	0.57	(0.11)	**	0.00	(0.00)	***	1.30	(0.21)	
Team woman entrepreneur & man prof	7.04	(1.82)	**	7.91	(4.15)	***	0.35	(0.07)	***
Team woman exec & man prof	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	12.84	(2.15)	***
Constant	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***	0.00	(0.00)	***
Log pseudolikelihood		536.24			-1822.99			-1412.29	
Degrees of freedom		21			21			21	
Wald chi2		13683.75	***		14826.77	***		4501.51	***
Time at risk		67232			68617			52249	
/ln_p	2.58	(0.04)		1.14	(0.04)		1.26	(0.02)	

n= 595, Includes industry controls, ^ p< 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Figure 1. U.S. STEM Doctorates Total and Percentage Awarded to Women, Annually from 1986-2015.¹²




¹² Data from National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics. 2016. Survey of Earned Doctorates: www.nsf.gov/statistics.

Figure 2. Number of New Nanotechnology Firms Founded Annually and the Percentage with Women Founders, 1994-2010.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Figure 3. Industry of Nanotechnology Firms by Genders of Founders.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

REFERENCES

- 1
2
3
4
5
6 Abreu, M., & Grinevich, V. 2017. Gender patterns in academic entrepreneurship. *Journal of*
7 *Technology Transfer*, 42(4): 763–94.
- 8 Ahl, H. 2006. Why research on women entrepreneurs needs new directions. *Entrepreneurship*
9 *Theory and Practice*, 30: 595–621.
- 10
11 Allison, P. 2014 *Event History and Survival Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data*.
12 Los Angeles: Sage Publishing.
- 13
14 Alsos, G. A., Isaksen, E. J. & Ljunggren, E. 2006. New venture financing and subsequent business
15 growth in men- and women-led businesses. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 30(5):
16 667-86.
- 17
18 Alsos, G. A. & Ljunggren, E. 2016. The role of gender in entrepreneur–investor relationships: A
19 signaling theory approach. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 41: 567–590.
- 20
21 Bates, T. 2005. Analysis of young, small firms that have closed: Delineating successful from
22 unsuccessful closures. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 20(3): 343-358.
- 23
24 Becker-Blease, J. R., & Sohl, J. E. 2007. Do women-owned businesses have equal access to angel
25 capital? *Journal of Business Venturing*, 22(4): 503-521.
- 26
27 Beckman, C. M., Burton, M. D., & O'Reilly, C. 2007. Early teams: The impact of team demography
28 on VC financing and going public. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 22(2): 147-173.
- 29
30 Benner, K. 2017. Women in Tech Speak Frankly on Culture of Harassment. *New York Times*.
31 [www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-harassment.html)
32 [harassment.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-harassment.html) Accessed December 1, 2017.
- 33
34 Bilimoria, D., Joy, S., & Liang, X. 2008. Breaking barriers and creating inclusiveness: Lessons of
35 organizational transformation to advance women faculty in academic science and
36 engineering. *Human Resource Management*, 47: 423–441.
- 37
38 Bird, B., & Brush, C. 2002. A gendered perspective on organizational creation. *Entrepreneurship*
39 *Theory and Practice*, 26(3): 41–66.
- 40
41 Blanchflower, D. G. 2004. *Self-employment: More may not be better* (NBER Working Paper No.
42 10286). National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- 43
44 Blickenstaff, J. 2005. Women and science careers: leaky pipeline or gender filter?. *Gender and*
45 *Education*, 17(4): 369-386.
- 46
47 Blossfeld, H. P., & Rohwer, G. 2002. *Techniques of Event History Modeling*. Mahwah, NJ:
48 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- 49
50 Blume-Kohout, M. 2014. *Understanding the Gender Gap in STEM Fields Entrepreneurship*.
51 www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Gender%20Gap%20in%20STEM%20Fields_0.pdf Accessed
52 August 25, 2015.
- 53
54 Boden Jr., R. J., & Nucci, A. R. 2000. On the survival prospects of men’s and women’s new business
55 ventures. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 15: 347–362.
- 56
57 Box-Steffensmeier, J., & Jones, B. 1997. Time is of the essence: Event history models in political
58 science. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(4): 1414-1461.
- 59
60

- 1
2
3 Brush, C. G. 1992. Research on women business owners: Past trends, a new perspective and future
4 directions. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 16(1): 5–30.
5
6 Brush, C. G., Carter, N., Gatewood, E., Greene, P. & Hart, M. 2004. *Gatekeepers of Venture
7 Growth: A Diana Project Report on the Role and Participation of Women in the Venture
8 Capital Industry*. Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership.
9
10 Brush, C. G., de Bruin, A., & Welter, F. 2009. A gender-aware framework for women’s
11 entrepreneurship. *International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship*, 1(1): 8–24.
12
13 Brush, C. G., Greene, P., Balachandra, L., & Davis, A. 2017. The gender gap in venture capital-
14 progress, problems, and perspectives. *Venture Capital*, 1(1):1–22.
15
16 Burke, A. E., Fitzroy, F. R., & Nolan, M. A. 2002. Self-employment wealth and job creation: The
17 roles of gender, non-pecuniary motivation and entrepreneurial ability. *Small Business
18 Economics*, 19(3): 255-270.
19
20 Buse, K., Bilimoria, D., & Perelli, S. 2013. Why they stay: women persisting in US engineering
21 careers. *Career Development International*, 18(2): 139-154.
22
23 Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. 1989. Density dependence in the evolution of populations of
24 newspaper organizations. *American Sociological Review*, 54(4): 524-541.
25
26 Carter, N., Gartner, W., Shaver, K., & Gatewood, E. 2003. The career reasons of nascent
27 entrepreneurs. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 18(1): 13–39.
28
29 Carter, S., Shaw, E., Lam, W., & Wilson, F. 2007. Gender, entrepreneurship, and bank lending: The
30 criteria and processes used by bank loan officers in assessing applications. *Entrepreneurship
31 Theory and Practice*, 31: 427–444.
32
33 Carter, N. M., Williams, M., & Reynolds, P. D. 1997. Discontinuance among new firms in retail: The
34 influence of initial resources, strategy, and gender. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 12(2):
35 125-145.
36
37 Chaganti, R., & Parasuraman, S. 1996. A study of the impact of gender on business performance and
38 management patterns in small businesses. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 21(2):
39 73-75.
40
41 Chatman, J. A., Boisnier, A. D., Spataro, S. E., Anderson, C., & Berdahl, J. L. 2008. Being
42 distinctive versus being conspicuous: The effects of numeric status and sex-stereotyped tasks
43 on individual performance in groups. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
44 Processes*, 107(2): 141-160.
45
46 Chowdhury, S. 2005. Demographic diversity for building an effective entrepreneurial team: Is it
47 important? *Journal of Business Venturing*, 20(6): 727–746.
48
49 Chell, E., & Baines, S. 1998. Does gender affect business “performance”? A study of
50 microbusinesses in business services in the UK. *Entrepreneurship and Regional
51 Development*, 10: 117–135.
52
53 Clarysse, B., Wright, M., & Van de Velde, E. 2011. Entrepreneurial origin, technological knowledge,
54 and the growth of spinoff companies. *Journal of Management Studies*, 48(6): 1420-1442.
55
56 Cohoon, J. M. 2011. Which gender differences matter for high tech entrepreneurship? *Technology
57 Innovation Management Review*, 5(7): 20-30.
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Cohoon, J. M., Wadhwa, V., & Mitchell, L. 2010. Are successful women entrepreneurs different
4 from men? [dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.1604653](https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1604653). Accessed December 8, 2017.
5
- 6 Coleman, S., & Robb, A. 2009. A comparison of new firm financing by gender: Evidence from the
7 Kauffman Firm Survey. *Small Business Economics*, 33: 397-411.
8
- 9 Colyvas, J. A., Snellman, K., Bercovitz, J., & Feldman, M. 2012. Disentangling effort and
10 performance: A renewed look at gender differences in commercializing medical school
11 research. *Journal of Technology Transfer*, 37: 478-489.
12
- 13 Constantinidis, C., Cornet, A., & Asandei, S. 2006. Financing of women-owned ventures: The
14 impact of gender and other owner and firm-related variables. *Venture Capital*, 8(2): 133-
15 157.
16
- 17 Cooper, A. C., Gimeno-Gascon, F. J., & Woo, C. Y. 1994. Initial human and financial capital as
18 predictors of performance. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 9: 371-395.
19
- 20 Cowling, M. & Taylor, M. 2001. Entrepreneurial women and men: Two different species? *Small
21 Business Economics*, 16(3): 167-176.
22
- 23 Curtis, J. W. 2011. Persistent Inequity: Gender and Academic Employment. Prepared for “New
24 Voices in Pay Equity” An Event for Equal Pay Day, April 11, 2011. American Association
25 of University Professors.
26
- 27 Da Rin, M., Hellmann, T. F., & Puri, M. 2011. *A Survey of Venture Capital research* (No. w17523).
28 National Bureau of Economic Research.
29
- 30 Davidsson, P., & Honig, B. 2003. The role of social and human capital among nascent entrepreneurs.
31 *Journal of Business Venturing*, 18(3): 301-331.
32
- 33 De Bruin, A., Brush, C. G., & Welter, F. 2007. Advancing a framework for coherent research on
34 women’s entrepreneurship. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 31(3): 323-39.
35
- 36 DeMartino, R., & Barbato, R. 2003. Differences between women and men MBA entrepreneurs:
37 Exploring family flexibility and wealth creation as career motivators. *Journal of Business
38 Venturing*, 18: 815-832.
39
- 40 DeTienne, D. R., & Cardone, M.S. 2012. Impact of founder experience on exit intentions. *Small
41 Business Economics*, 38: 351-374.
42
- 43 Ding, W., & Choi, E. 2011. Divergent paths to commercial science: A comparison of scientists’
44 founding and advising activities. *Research Policy*, 40(1): 69-80.
45
- 46 Ding, W., Murray, F., & Stuart, T. 2006. Gender differences in patenting in the academic life
47 sciences. *Science*, 313: 665-667.
48
- 49 Dolinsky, A. L., Caputo, R. K., Pasumarty, K., & Quazi, H. 1993. The effects of education on
50 business ownership: A longitudinal study of women. *Entrepreneurship Theory and
51 Practice*, 18(1): 43-53.
52
- 53 Du Rietz, A., & Henrekson, M. 2000. Testing the female underperformance hypothesis. *Small
54 Business Economics*, 14(1): 1-10.
55
- 56 Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. 2002. Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders.
57 *Psychological Review*, 109(3): 573-598.
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Eddleston, K. A., Lang, J. J., Mitteness, C., & Balachandra, L. 2016. Do you see what I See?
4 Signaling effects of gender and firm characteristics on financing entrepreneurial ventures.
5 *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 8: 489-514.
6
- 7 Etzkowitz, H., Kemelgor, C., & Uzzi, B. 2000. *Athena Unbound: The Advancement of Women in*
8 *Science and Technology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
9
- 10 Ensley, M. D., & Hmieleski, K. M. 2005. A comparative study of new venture top management team
11 composition, dynamics and performance between university-based and independent start-
12 ups. *Research Policy*, 34: 1091-1105.
13
- 14 European Commission. 2008. *Evaluation on Policy of Women Innovators and Entrepreneurship.*
15 *European Commission: DG Enterprise and Industry*. ec.europa.eu/enterprise/dgs.eval.htm.
16 Accessed August 25, 2015.
17
- 18 European Commission. 2014. *Statistical data on Women entrepreneurs in Europe. European*
19 *Commission: DG Enterprise and Industry*. ec.europa.eu/growth/content/study-statistical-
20 data-women-entrepreneurs-europe-0_en. Accessed December 9, 2017.
21
- 22 European Commission. 2016. *She Figures 2015.*
23 ec.europa.eu/research/swafs/pdf/pub_gender_equality/she_figures_2015-final.pdf. Accessed
24 December 9, 2017.
25
- 26 Fabowale, L., Orser, B., & Riding, A. 1995. Gender, structural factors, and credit terms between
27 Canadian small businesses and financial institutions. *Entrepreneurship Theory and*
28 *Practice*, 19(4): 41-66.
29
- 30 Fairlie, R. W., & Robb, A. M. 2009. Gender differences in business performance: Evidence from the
31 Characteristics of Business Owners survey. *Small Business Economics*, 33: 375-395.
32
- 33 Fortune, A., & Mitchell, W. 2012. Unpacking firm exit at the firm and industry levels: The
34 adaptation and selection of firm capabilities. *Strategic Management Journal*, 33: 794-819.
35
- 36 Fotaki, M. 2013. No woman is like a man (in academia): The masculine symbolic order and the
37 unwanted female body. *Organization Studies*, 34(9): 1251-1275.
38
- 39 Fouad, N. A., Fitzpatrick, M. E., & Liu, J. P. 2011. Persistence of women in engineering careers: A
40 qualitative study of current and former female engineers. *Journal of Women and Minorities*
41 *in Science and Engineering*, 17: 69-96.
42
- 43 Fuentes-Fuentes, M. M., Cooper, S. Y., & Bojica, A. N. 2012. Academic women's entrepreneurship
44 in Spain and Scotland: A multilevel institutional approach. In K.D. Hughes & J.E. Jennings
45 (Eds.), *Global Women's Entrepreneurship Research: Diverse Settings, Questions and*
46 *Approaches* (pp. 56-74). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
47
- 48 Gimeno, J., Folta, T. B., Cooper, A. C., & Woo, C. Y. 1997. Survival of the fittest? Entrepreneurial
49 human capital and the persistence of underperforming firms. *Administrative Science*
50 *Quarterly*, 42(4): 750-783.
51
- 52 Gimmon, E., & Levie, J. 2010. Founder's human capital, external investment, and the survival of new
53 high technology ventures. *Research Policy*, 39(9): 1214-1226.
54
- 55 Glass, J. L., Sassler, S., Levitte, Y., & Michelmores, K. M. 2013. What's so special about STEM? A
56 comparison of women's retention in STEM and professional occupations. *Social Forces*,
57 92(2): 723-756.
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Godwin, L. N., Stevens, C. E., & Brenner, N. L. 2006. Forced to play by the rules? Theorizing how
4 mixed-sex founding teams benefit women entrepreneurs in male-dominated contexts.
5 *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 30: 623-642.
6
- 7 Goel, R. K., Göktepe-Hultén, D., & Ram, R. 2015. Academics' entrepreneurship propensities and
8 gender differences. *Journal of Technology Transfer*, 40(1): 161-177.
9
- 10 Greene, P., Brush, C., Hart, M., & Saporito, P. 2001. Exploration of the venture capital industry: Is
11 gender an issue? *Venture Capital*, 3(1): 63-83.
12
- 13 Guarino, C. M. & Borden, V. 2017. Faculty service loads and gender: Are women taking care of the
14 academic family? *Research in Higher Education*, 58(6): 672-694.
15
- 16 Gupta, V. K., Turban, D., Wasti, S. A., & Sikdar, A. 2009. The role of gender stereotypes in
17 perceptions of entrepreneurs and intentions. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 33(2):
18 397-417.
- 19 Haeussler, C., & Colyvas, J. A., 2011. Breaking the ivory tower: Academic entrepreneurship in the
20 life sciences in UK and Germany. *Research Policy*, 40: 41-54.
21
- 22 Haltiwanger, J. Hathaway, I., & Miranda, J. 2014. *Declining Business Dynamism in the U.S. High*
23 *Technology Sector*. Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Foundation.
24
- 25 Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. 1988. The ecology of organizational mortality: American labor unions,
26 1836-1985. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94(1): 25-52.
27
- 28 Hart, J. 2016. Dissecting a gendered organization: Implications for career trajectories for mid-career
29 faculty women in STEM. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 87(5): 605-634.
30
- 31 Hathaway, I. 2013. Tech Starts: *High Technology Business Formation and Job Creation in the*
32 *United States*. Kansas City, MO: Kauffmann Foundation.
33
- 34 Hisrich, R. D., & Jankowicz, A. D. 1990. Intuition in venture capital decisions: an exploratory study
35 using a new technique. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 5(1): 49-62.
36
- 37 Hoogendoorn, S., Oosterbeek, H., & Van Praag, M. 2013. The impact of gender diversity on the
38 performance of business teams: Evidence from a field experiment. *Management Science*,
39 59(7): 1514-1528.
40
- 41 Hsu, D. H. 1997. Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture capital
42 funding. *Research Policy*, 36: 723-741.
43
- 44 Hsu, D. H., Roberts, E. B., & Eesley, C. E. 2007. Entrepreneurs from technology-based universities:
45 Evidence from MIT. *Research Policy*, 36: 768-788.
46
- 47 Hughes, K. D., & Jennings, J. E. 2012. *Global Women's Entrepreneurship Research: Diverse*
48 *Settings, Questions and Approaches*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
49
- 50 Jennings, J. E., & Brush, C. G. 2013. Research on women entrepreneurs: Challenges to (and from)
51 the broader entrepreneurship literature? *Academy of Management Annals*, 7: 663-715.
52
- 53 Joshi, A., Neely, B., Emrich, C., Griffiths, D., & George, G. 2015. Gender research in AMJ: An
54 overview of five decades of empirical research and calls to action thematic issue on gender in
55 management research. *Academy of Management Journal*, 58(5): 1459-1475.
56
- 57 Justo, R., DeTienne, D. R., & Sieger, P. 2015. Failure or voluntary exit? Reassessing the female
58 underperformance hypothesis. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 30: 775-792.
59
60

- 1
2
3 Kalnins, A., & Williams, M. 2014. When do female-owned businesses out-survive male-owned
4 businesses? A disaggregated approach by industry and geography. *Journal of Business*
5 *Venturing*, 29: 822-835.
6
- 7 Kalleberg, A. L., & Leicht, K. T. 1991. Gender and organization performance: Determinants of small
8 business survival and success. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34: 136–161.
9
- 10 Kanze, D., Huang, L., Conley, M. A., & Higgins, E. T. 2018. We ask men to win & women not to
11 lose: Closing the gender gap in startup funding. *Academy of Management Journal*, 61(2):
12 586–614.
- 13 Krefting, L. A. 2003. Intertwined discourses of merit and gender: Evidence from academic
14 employment in the USA. *Gender, Work & Organization*, 10(2): 260-278.
15
- 16 Konrad, A. M., Kramer, V. W., & Erkut, S. 2008. The impact of three or more women on corporate
17 boards. *Organizational Dynamics*, 37: 145–164.
18
- 19 Langowitz, N., & Minniti, M. 2007. The entrepreneurial propensity of women. *Entrepreneurship*
20 *Theory and Practice*, 31(3): 341-364.
21
- 22 Leung, M. & Fast, N. 2017. Role categorization, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and startup intentions:
23 how working at a “startup” versus “corporation” shapes perceived learning and subsequent
24 career ambitions. Working Paper.
- 25 Link, A. N., & Strong, D. R. 2016. Gender and entrepreneurship: An annotated bibliography.
26 *Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship*, 12(4–5): 288-441.
27
- 28 Lowe, R., & Brambilia, C. G. 2007. Faculty Entrepreneurs and Research Productivity. *Journal of*
29 *Technology Transfer*, 32: 173–94.
30
- 31 Lukomnik, J. 2017. Board refreshment trends at S&P 1500 Firms. *Harvard Law School Forum on*
32 *Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation*,
33 corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/board-refreshment-trends-at-sp-1500-firms. Accessed
34 January 19, 2018.
35
- 36 Malmstrom, M., Johansson, J., & Wincent, J. 2017. Gender stereotypes and venture support
37 decisions: How governmental venture capitalists socially construct entrepreneurs’ potential.
38 *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 37(1): 1-28.
39
- 40 Manolova, T. S., Brush, C. G., & Edelman, L.F. 2008. What do women entrepreneurs want?
41 *Strategic Change*, 17(3/4):69–82.
- 42 Marlow, S., & Patton, D. 2005. All credit to men? Entrepreneurship, finance, and gender.
43 *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 29(6): 717–735.
44
- 45 Marlow, S., & McAdams, M. 2012. Analyzing the influence of gender upon high technology
46 venturing within the context of business incubation. *Entrepreneurship Theory and*
47 *Practice*, 36(4): 655-676.
48
- 49 Martin, L., Wright, L., Beaven, Z., & Matlay, H. 2015. An unusual job for a woman? Female
50 entrepreneurs in scientific, engineering and technology sectors. *International Journal of*
51 *Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research*, 21(4): 539-556.
52
- 53 Matusik, S. F., George, J. M., & Heeley, M. B. 2008. Values and judgment under uncertainty:
54 evidence from venture capitalist assessments of founders. *Strategic Entrepreneurship*
55 *Journal*, 2(2): 95-115.
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 McGraw, E. 1998. Comparative study of Francophone male and female entrepreneurs outside
4 Quebec. *Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship*, 15(2): 69–87.
5
- 6 McQuaid, J., Smith-Doerr, L., & Monti, D.J. 2010. Expanding entrepreneurship: female and foreign-
7 born founders of New England biotechnology firms. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(7):
8 1045-1063.
9
- 10 Meng., Y. 2016. Collaboration patterns and patenting: Exploring gender distinctions. *Research*
11 *Policy*, 45(1): 56-67.
12
- 13 Minniti, M., & Nardone, C. 2007. Being in someone else’s shoes: The role of gender in nascent
14 entrepreneurship. *Small Business Economics*, 28: 223-238.
- 15 Morelix, A., Fairlie, R., & Tareque, I. 2017. *2017 Kauffman Index of Startup Activity*. Ewing
16 Marion Kauffman Foundation. Available at www.kauffman.org/kauffman-index. Accessed
17 November 22, 2017.
18
- 19 Mundy, L. 2017. Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women? *The Atlantic*.
20 [www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awful-to-](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awful-to-women/517788)
21 [women/517788](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awful-to-women/517788). Accessed December 1, 2017.
22
- 23 Murray, F., & Graham, L. 2007. Buying science and selling science: Gender differences in the
24 market for commercial science. *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 16: 657–689.
25
- 26 National Nanotechnology Coordination Office. 2007. *Nanotechnology: Big Things from a Tiny*
27 *World*. www.nano.gov/html/res/pdf/Nanotechnology_BigThingsfromaTinyWorld.pdf.
28 Accessed December 13, 2006.
- 29 National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics. 2016. *Survey of Earned*
30 *Doctorates*. Retrieved from www.nsf.gov/statistics. Accessed January 22, 2017.
31
- 32 National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics. 2018. *Women,*
33 *Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: Special Report NSF*
34 *15-311*. Available at www.nsf.gov/statistics/wmpd. Accessed June 30, 2018.
35
- 36 Orser, B. J., Riding, A. L., & Manley, K. 2006. Women entrepreneurs and financial capital.
37 *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 30(5): 643-665.
38
- 39 Orser, B. J., Riding, A. L., & Stanley, J. 2012. Perceived career challenges and response strategies of
40 women in the advanced technology sector. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development*,
41 24(1-2): 73-93.
- 42 Post, C. & Byron, K. 2015. Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-analysis.
43 *Academy of Management Journal*, 58: 1546-1571.
44
- 45 Powell, A., Bagilhole, B., & Dainty, A. 2009. How Women Engineers Do and Undo Gender:
46 Consequences for Gender Equality. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 16: 411–28.
47
- 48 Rhoton, L. A. 2011. Distancing as a gendered barrier: Understanding women scientists’ gender
49 practices. *Gender & Society*, 25(6): 696-716.
50
- 51 Robb, A. M. 2002. Entrepreneurial performance by women and minorities: The case of new firms.
52 *Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship*, 7(4): 383-397.
- 53 Robb, A. M., Coleman, S., & Strangler, D. 2014. *Sources of Economic Hope: Women’s*
54 *Entrepreneurship*. Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Foundation.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Robb, A. M., & Watson, J. 2012. Gender differences in firm performance: Evidence from new
4 ventures in the United States. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 27: 544–558.
- 5
6 Rosa, P., Hamilton, D., & Carter, S. 1996. Gender as a determinant of business performance: insights
7 from a British study. *Small Business Economics*, 8: 463–478.
- 8
9 Rosa, P., & Dawson, A. 2006. Gender and the commercialization of university science: Academic
10 founders of spinout companies. *Entrepreneurship and Regional Development*, 18: 341–366.
- 11
12 Rothaermel, F. T., & Thursby, M. 2007. The nanotech versus the biotech revolution: sources of
13 productivity in incumbent firm research. *Research Policy*, 36(6): 832-49.
- 14
15 Ruef, M., Aldrich, H. E., & Carter, M. E. 2003. The structure of founding teams: Homophily, strong
16 ties, and isolation among U.S. entrepreneurs. *American Sociological Review*, 68: 195-222.
- 17
18 Sapienza, H. J., & Grimm, C. M. 1997. Founder characteristics, start-up process and strategy/
19 structure variables as predictors of shortline railroad performance. *Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice*, 22(1): 5-22.
- 20
21 Schoonhoven, C. B., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Lyman, K. 1990. Speeding products to market: Waiting
22 time to first product introduction in new firms. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 35(1):
23 177-207.
- 24
25 Singh, J. V., Tucker, D. J., & House, R. J. 1986. Organizational legitimacy and the liability of
26 newness. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 31(2): 171-193.
- 27
28 Smalley, R. E. 1999. *Prepared Written Statement and Supplemental Material of R. E. Smalley.*
29 June 22, 1999. www.house.gov/science/smalley_062299.htm Accessed December 13, 2007.
- 30
31 Stephan, P. E., & El-Ganainy, A. 2007. The entrepreneurial puzzle: Explaining the gender gap.
32 *Journal of Technology Transfer*, 32: 475–487.
- 33
34 Stephan, P. E., & Levin, S. G. 1996. Property rights and entrepreneurship in science. *Small Business
Economics Group*, 8(3): 177–188.
- 35
36 Sullivan, D. M. & Meek, W. R. 2012. Gender and entrepreneurship: a review and process model.
37 *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 27(5): 428-458.
- 38
39 Thebaud, S. 2015. Business as Plan B: Institutional foundations of gender inequality in
40 entrepreneurship across 24 industrialized countries. *Administrative Science Quarterly*,
41 60(4): 671-711.
- 42
43 Torchia, M., Calabro, A., & Huse, M. 2011. Women directors on corporate boards: From tokenism to
44 critical mass. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 102: 299-317.
- 45
46 Verheul, I. & Thurik, R. 2001. Start-up capital: Does gender matter? *Small Business Economics*, 16:
47 329–345.
- 48
49 Visintin, F., & Pittino, D. 2014. Founding team composition and early performance of university-
50 based spinoff companies. *Technovation*, 34(1): 31-43.
- 51
52 Wadhwa, V. 2012. The Face of Success, Part 2: Where Are All the Female Tech Geniuses? **Inc.com**,
53 January 18, 2012. www.inc.com/vivek-wadhwa/where-are-all-the-female-tech-geniuses.
- 54
55 Wadhwa, V., Freeman, R., & Rissing, B. 2008. *Education and Technology Entrepreneurship.*
56 Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Foundation.
- 57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Wang, J., & Shapira, P., 2012. Partnering with universities: a good choice for nanotechnology start-
4 up firms? *Small Business Economics*, 38(2): 197-21.
5
6 Ward, K., & Wolf-Wendel, L. 2012. *Academic Motherhood: How Faculty Manage Work and*
7 *Family*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
8
9 Watson, W., Stewart, W. H., & BarNir, A. 2003. The effects of human capital, organizational
10 demography, and interpersonal processes on venture partner perceptions of firm profit and
11 growth. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 18(2): 145-164.
12
13 Wennberg, K., Wiklund, J., DeTienne, D. R., & Cardon, M. S. 2010. Reconceptualizing
14 entrepreneurial exit: Divergent exit routes and their drivers. *Journal of Business Venturing*,
15 25: 361-375.
16
17 Westphal, J. D., & Milton, L. P. 2000. How experience and network ties affect the influence of
18 demographic minorities on corporate boards. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 45: 366–
19 398.
20
21 Whittington, K. B. 2018. A tie is a tie? Gender and network positioning in life science inventor
22 collaboration. *Research Policy*, 47(2): 511-526.
23
24 Whittington, K. B., & Smith-Doerr, L. 2005. Gender and commercial science: Women’s patenting in
25 the life sciences. *Journal of Technology Transfer*, 30(4): 355-370.
26
27 Woolley, J. L. 2010. Technology emergence through entrepreneurship across multiple industries.
28 *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 4(1): 1-21.
29
30 Woolley, J. L. 2017. Origins and outcomes: The roles of spinoff founders and intellectual property in
31 high technology venture outcomes. *Academy of Management Discoveries*, 3(1): 64-90.
32
33 Wu, Z. & Chua, J. H. 2012. Second-order gender effects: The case of U.S. small business borrowing
34 cost. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 36: 443–463.
35
36 Wynarczyk, P., & Renner, C. 2006. The “gender gap” in the scientific labor market: The case of
37 science, engineering and technology-based SMEs in the UK. *Equal Opportunities*
38 *International*, 25(8): 660-673.
39
40 Yamaguchi, K. 1991. *Event History Analysis*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
41
42 Yoder, B. L. 2017. *Engineering by the Numbers*. American Society for Engineering Education.
43 Available from [www.asee.org/papers-and-publications/publications/college-](http://www.asee.org/papers-and-publications/publications/college-profiles/15EngineeringbytheNumbersPart1.pdf)
44 [profiles/15EngineeringbytheNumbersPart1.pdf](http://www.asee.org/papers-and-publications/publications/college-profiles/15EngineeringbytheNumbersPart1.pdf). Accessed June 30, 2018.
45
46 Zaiontz, C. 2017. *Real Statistics Using Excel*. Available from [www.real-statistics.com/students-t-](http://www.real-statistics.com/students-t-distribution/two-sample-t-test-unequal-variances)
47 [distribution/two-sample-t-test-unequal-variances](http://www.real-statistics.com/students-t-distribution/two-sample-t-test-unequal-variances). Accessed April 13, 2017.
48
49 Zarya, V. 2017. Venture capital's funding gender gap is actually getting worse. *Fortune*.
50 fortune.com/2017/03/13/female-founders-venture-capital. Accessed December 11, 2017.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5 Jennifer L. Woolley profile:
6
7

8 Jennifer L. Woolley (jwoolley@scu.edu) is an associate professor of management and
9 entrepreneurship at Santa Clara University. Her research focuses on entrepreneurship, innovation
10 and the emergence of firms, industries, and technologies. She is interested in the relationship
11 between founding teams, intellectual property, public policy, ecosystem infrastructure and firm
12 outcomes.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60