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One for All: Social Power Increases Self-Anchoring of Traits, Attitudes, and Emotions

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Abstract
We argue that powerful people tend to engage in social projection. Specifically, they *self-anchor*: They use the self as a reference point when judging others' internal states. In Study 1, which used a reaction-time paradigm, powerful people used their own traits as a reference when assessing the traits of group members, classifying group descriptors more quickly if they had previously reported that those terms described themselves. Study 2, which used a classic false-consensus paradigm, showed that powerful people believed that their group-related attitudes were shared by group members. Study 3 showed that more-powerful people relied more on their own state affect when judging other people's ambiguous emotional expressions. These results support our argument that power fosters self-anchoring, because powerful individuals are often called on to act as the representative face of their groups, and the association between power and representation prompts the heuristic use of the self to infer group properties.

Keywords
social perception, social cognition, social structure

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> L'état, c'est moi.
>
> —attributed to Louis XIV

Groups are often reduced to a single human representative, most typically a powerful member who is uniquely authorized to speak for and direct the group—a company is represented by its CEO, a nation by its president. This phenomenon reflects a literal personification: Qualities of the group are embodied in one person who stands for the collective (van Knippenberg, 2011). If leaders personify their groups, then doing so likely alters their sense of the relationship between self and group: They may interpret their own thoughts and feelings as those of the group. Because the association of power with representation is so pervasive, we suggest that power increases the use of the self as a heuristic for judging others' internal states—that is, power increases *self-anchoring*.

Self-Anchoring

Individuals tend to project their own traits, attitudes, and values onto their groups—a phenomenon called *social projection* (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Projection can involve assimilation (seeing similarity between the self and others) or contrast (seeing differences between the self and others). Evidence for projection has come from questionnaire studies in which respondents rated the traits or attitudes of themselves and of group members (e.g., Coats et al., 2000) and from reaction-time measures showing that people identify traits shared by themselves and their groups more quickly (Coats et al., 2000; Otten & Epstude, 2006).

In the research reported here, we focused on self-anchoring—using one's own characteristics as the basis for judging others' characteristics. Self-anchoring differs from other forms of social projection in that it involves the use of the self as a reference point for estimating group qualities. (In contrast, *self-stereotyping* involves

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using the group as a reference point from which to derive qualities of the self; Otten & Epstude, 2006).

Power is defined as asymmetric control over resources and outcomes desired by others (cf. Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck, 2010). Powerful individuals may self-anchor because high-power roles demand that they personify their groups: Their own states may provide heuristic information about the larger group. Power holders' self-anchoring may also be due to aspects of the power mind-set (Fast & Chen, 2009), a psychological state that carries a heightened sense of control and a greater feeling of entitlement to judge (cf. Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992). The confidence that results from this mind-set, coupled with power holders' greater reliance on their own dispositions (Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012) and insensitivity to social-comparison information (power lowers both assimilation and contrast responses to information about other people's traits; Johnson & Lammers, 2012), may foster self-anchoring: Simply feeling powerful may prompt individuals to rely on the self as the most suitable source of information about others. In short, when power holders try to assess group members' traits, emotions, or attitudes, they will likely use their own traits, emotions, or attitudes to predict group qualities (Otten & Epstude, 2006; Robbins & Krueger, 2005).

We tested our argument in three studies. First, we replicated a foundational study of self-anchoring to determine whether powerful respondents, compared with powerless respondents, showed more self-anchoring when judging their in-group's characteristics on a reaction-time task. To assess self-anchoring in Study 2, we used a classic false-consensus paradigm in which powerful and powerless participants rated their own attitudes and then estimated those of their group. In Study 3, we primed participants with a power mind-set, measured their state affect, and then asked them to judge ambiguous photos of emotional facial expressions to examine whether powerful respondents used their own affect as a reference for judging that of others.

Study 1

Method

Overview. In this study, participants made forced-choice ratings indicating whether traits were descriptive of their in-group.[1] We examined traits that participants had previously indicated were neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of the group but characteristic of themselves; faster response times for later group ratings that matched the self-ratings were taken to reflect self-anchoring (i.e., basing judgments about the group on prior self-ratings).

Participants. Fifty U.S. university students participated in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to a high-power or low-power role (25 participants per condition).

Materials and procedure. We asked participants to think of a group in which they were a leader or a member. Participants first described the group and their role in it and then described a specific incident illustrating their high or low power in the group.

Next, participants completed a questionnaire for which they rated the degree to which 90 traits were descriptive of themselves and of their group; responses were made using scales from 1, *not at all*, to 7, *extremely* (Otten & Epstude, 2006; see Coats et al., 2000; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996). Finally, participants indicated the degree to which the same traits applied solely to their in-group, this time responding to dichotomous items (i.e., questions asking whether a given trait was or was not characteristic of the group) using a computer; participants responded to items by pressing the "j" key, labeled "yes," if the trait described group members and the "f" key, labeled "no," if it did not. Responses were recorded using DirectRT software (Empirisoft, New York, NY).

Dependent measures. Our manipulation check contained three items asking participants how much power, control, and authority, respectively, they felt they had in their in-group. Responses were made using 7-point scales from 1, *not at all*, to 7, *very much*. Scores for the three items were averaged to create a composite measure of felt power ($\alpha = .92$).

We coded the traits from the initial self-ratings and group ratings as uncharacteristic if they received a rating from 1 to 3, characteristic if they received a rating from 5 to 7, and neutral if they received a rating of 4. Neutral ratings indicated ambiguity in or uncertainty about the degree of trait descriptiveness. Imagine that a participant reported that *lazy* was self-descriptive but gave his group a rating of 4 on *lazy*. Subsequently, in the computer task, the participant quickly selected "yes" when asked whether *lazy* described the group. This would suggest that the participant relied on self-perceptions to generate a judgment when he or she lacked an existing group representation for that trait. We analyzed only those dichotomous-response trials involving traits given a rating of 4 for the group but a rating above or below 4 for the self—that is, traits for which respondents had no clear group representation. Subsequent computer ratings of the group, if consistent with self-ratings, indicate self-anchoring.

Response times (RTs) for the dichotomous computer task served as the primary dependent variable, with trait as the unit of analysis. We excluded RTs that were more

than 2 standard deviations above or below the mean; remaining latencies were log-transformed (Fazio, 1991). For ease of interpretation, untransformed means are reported.

Results

High-power participants felt more powerful (M = 5.61) than did low-power participants (M = 3.93), $t(48) = 5.34$, $p < .001$. We first tested frequency of self-anchoring by calculating the number of trials on which traits originally rated as neutral for the group and as characteristic of the self were later rated as characteristic of the group. There were more such trials for high-power participants (N = 333) than for low-power participants (N = 294), $t(809) = -2.00$, $p = .046$.

We then constructed a general linear model with log-transformed RTs predicted by self-descriptiveness (characteristic, uncharacteristic; derived from the initial scale ratings), group descriptiveness (characteristic, uncharacteristic; derived from the dichotomous computer task), trait valence (positive, negative), power (high, low), and all interactions. We predicted a three-way interaction of self-descriptiveness, group-descriptiveness, and power: High-power participants should be faster to rate the group descriptiveness of a trait, especially when the rating matches their earlier self-rating for the same trait.

Indeed, this interaction was significant, $F(1, 516) = 11.56$, $p < .001$ (see Fig. 1). High-power participants' RTs were faster when they made trait-descriptiveness judgments concerning their in-group that were consistent with their prior trait-descriptiveness judgment concerning themselves, $F(1, 516) = 13.10$, $p < .001$. For low-power participants, there was no such effect, $F(1, 516) = 2.28$, n.s.

Though unpredicted, this interaction was further moderated by trait valence, $F(1, 516) = 4.58$, $p = .03$, which indicated that the high-power participants' self-anchoring occurred primarily for negative traits (see Fig. 2). Further, a significant main effect of power suggested that high-power participants responded faster, overall, when rating whether traits were descriptive of their in-group than did low-power participants, $F(1, 516) = 5.20$, $p = .02$,[2] a result consistent with past research showing that more powerful individuals process information more efficiently and feel more comfortable judging others (cf. Leyens et al., 1992).

In Study 1, we used an established paradigm to show that powerful individuals self-anchor: High-power participants more quickly and frequently classified traits as descriptive or not descriptive of their groups if they had previously rated those traits' descriptiveness in a consistent manner for themselves. In this study, we assessed trait endorsement and asked participants to think of an existing, real in-group. This paradigm also provides certainty that participants used the self to anchor judgments about the group. However, the power manipulation—using participants' existing high- or low-power group memberships—risked evoking groups with overly similar members and hence violating the spirit of random assignment. To counter this possibility, we assigned participants to high- and low-power roles in (fictitious) novel groups in Study 2.



Fig. 1. Results from Study 1: mean reaction times for participants' judgments about traits' descriptiveness of their in-group as a function of participants' prior ratings of the degree to which traits described themselves. Results are shown separately for high-power and low-power participants.



Fig. 2. Results from Study 1: mean reaction times for participants' judgments about traits' descriptiveness of their in-group as a function of participants' prior ratings of the degree to which traits described themselves. Results are shown separately for positively valenced and negatively valenced traits and for high-power and low-power participants.

Study 2

In Study 2, we assessed participants' explicit self-anchoring using the *false-consensus* paradigm (Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). False consensus occurs when an individual intuits an unknown property (here, attitudes) of an in-group by using data about the self to anchor estimates of the group's standing (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). We argue that more powerful individuals should show more false consensus. Consistent with this notion, Flynn and Wiltermuth (2010) showed that individuals with high *betweenness centrality* in social networks (i.e., power from occupying a brokerage position) showed greater false consensus when judging their networks' moral attitudes. However,

their study showed no effects of other network indices of power, which raises the question of whether power, in general, fosters false consensus. In Study 2, we used a broader power manipulation and measured attitudes about self-other relationships rather than moral attitudes.

Method

Overview. Participants were told that they would be playing a competitive group game and were randomly assigned to a *manager* (high-power) or *team member* (low-power) role. Participants rated themselves and their fellow group members on measures of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. The correlation between self-ratings and the ratings of group members constituted our measure of false consensus (Clement & Krueger, 2002; Robbins & Krueger, 2005).

Participants. One hundred fifty-three U.S. university students participated in this study. Of these, 78 were randomly assigned the high-power role and 75 were assigned the low-power role.

Materials and procedure. Materials were presented online using Qualtrics software (Provo, UT). For our power manipulation (Overbeck & Park, 2006), we assigned participants to a specific role (manager or team member) in what they were told would be a four-person team, ostensibly on the basis of results from an earlier prescreening questionnaire. In fact, roles were randomly assigned. Participants were told that their team members were in the room and would soon be identified: First, participants would perform several preparatory tasks while communicating with their teammates online, and then, participants would meet with their team to play a group game in which they competed against other teams. Participants wrote a paragraph introducing themselves to the group and then rated themselves on the attitude measures.

Next, each participant received three teammates' introductions. These had been written by participants in a pilot study; the selected introductions were nondiagnostic with respect to our measures (see the appendix). To heighten the power manipulation and bolster the cover story, we had participants in the manager role divide 25 tokens—which were said to provide advantages during the group game—among four group members (including themselves). Immediately afterward, a power-manipulation check was administered, and participants completed the same measures of attitude as before, this time reporting their estimates of their team members' attitudes. They were dismissed without playing the group game.

Dependent measures. We used the same manipulation check used in Study 1. Questionnaires were used to assess participants' orientation and their perception of others' orientation on the Singelis (1995) measure of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. On the individualist-collectivist dimension, individuals can range from emphasizing autonomy to emphasizing interdependence, and on the vertical-horizontal dimension, individuals can range from emphasizing hierarchy to emphasizing equality.

Following Clement and Krueger (2002), we estimated false consensus by calculating correlations between participants' self-ratings on each subscale and their ratings of group members. A significant correlation would indicate an individual's assumption that others see the world the way he or she does—that is, self-anchoring. Following Hayes (1998), we pooled the subscales' significance values to test the overall self-anchoring effect using a Z' measure, a procedure equivalent to using a within-study meta-analysis of correlations.

Results and discussion

Manipulation check. Analysis of felt-power scores showed that our power manipulation was successful (high-power participants: $M = 5.35$; low-power participants: $M = 3.85$), $F(1, 151) = 65.67$, $p < .001$.

Individualism and collectivism. The Singelis (1995) measure differentiates perceptions of the self in relation to the group in terms of both autonomy (independent vs. collective orientations) and equality (vertical vs. horizontal dimensions). All four subscales showed significant false consensus across participants, rs = .17–.29, ps ≤ .03. We predicted that this pattern would be driven by the responses of high-power participants, not low-power participants.

As predicted, high-power participants showed significant consensus between their own vertical-individualism attitudes and their estimation of group vertical individualism, $r(78) = .47$, $p < .001$, whereas low-power participants did not, $r(75) = .12$, $p = .29$. The horizontal-individualism subscale also showed false consensus by high-power participants, $r(78) = .45$, $p < .001$, but not low-power participants, $r(78) = .10$, $p = .40$. High-power participants' false consensus on the vertical-collectivism subscale was significant, $r(78) = .22$, $p = .05$, but low-power participants' was not, $r(75) = .14$, $p = .23$. Finally, high-power participants perceived significant false consensus on horizontal collectivism, $r(78) = .28$, $p = .01$, and low-power participants did not, $r(75) = .05$, $p = .65$ (see Fig. 3).

We conducted a within-study meta-analysis by pooling the p-to-Z transformations for all subscales, using Hayes's (1998) Z' measure. Results confirmed that the false-consensus effect was significant for high-power participants, $Z' = 5.17$, $p < .001$, but not for low-power



Fig. 3. Results from Study 2: correlations between self-ratings and group ratings (false consensus) on measures of horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism (Singelis, 1995) as a function of participant group.

participants, $Z' = 0.54$, $p = .29$. Most important, a t test showed this difference to be significant, $t(3) = 4.34$, $p = .01$.

The results from Study 2 indicated that powerful individuals systematically use the self as an anchor to estimate group attitudes, whereas low-power individuals do not. These findings extend those of Study 1 to show that high-power individuals self-anchor not only when making implicit judgments but also when making explicit judgments about the attitudes of themselves and their groups. The findings also extend the domain of judgment from traits to attitudes, and confirm that the relationship generalizes across different manipulations of power and different self-anchoring outcomes. Finally, the results extend Flynn and Wiltermuth's (2010) findings, given that they came from a study using a more general power manipulation and measure of attitude.

Study 3: Emotion

Having found evidence of self-anchoring on both implicit trait judgments and explicit attitude judgments and in both established and novel groups, we sought in Study 3 to test whether power is sufficient to produce self-anchoring even without a particular reference group. That is, does self-anchoring result from merely feeling powerful? Consider *action orientation*—power holders' tendency to show action, rather than passivity, in responding to environmental contingencies (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Magee, 2009). Power should foster action orientation because power is associated with getting things done (Overbeck, 2010; Russell, 1938) and because, over time, powerful people repeatedly experience both latitude to act and successful action, which reinforce the power-action link. However, the cited research has shown that action orientation can be elicited not only among long-term power holders but even among non–power holders over the short term by activating the concept of power. We suggest that, likewise, the pervasive association of power with representation may have made self-anchoring a fundamental consequence of activating the power construct.

To test this idea—and thereby test the generality of the self-anchoring effect—in Study 3, we manipulated power using a standard experience-priming manipulation. Further, we extended the set of self-anchoring

domains to include affect. We expected that powerful participants would use their own affect as a basis for estimating others' affect. Finally, to confirm the directionality of effects, we included a power-neutral control condition.

Method

After reporting their own state affect, participants viewed photographs of eyes and identified the emotion that each conveyed. We expected participants' judgment errors to be congruent with their affect. Such a finding would indicate that when participants could not accurately judge a depicted emotion, they self-anchored by relying on the heuristic cue of their internal state.

Participants. Ninety respondents recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk service participated in return for $1 (8 respondents took less than 9 s total to complete the study and were excluded, leaving 82 participants). Participants were randomly assigned to high-power (n = 27), low-power (n = 21), and neutral (n = 34) conditions.

Materials, procedure, and measures. Participants assigned to the high-power condition wrote briefly about an incident in which they had had power over someone else. Participants assigned to the low-power condition wrote about an incident in which someone had had power over them. Participants assigned to the neutral condition described their last trip to the grocery store (Galinsky et al., 2003). Participants completed the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), with instructions to report their current (state) affect.

Participants next completed the Mind in the Eyes Task (MET), which has been used to assess emotion perception among both normal and pathological populations (see Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Participants viewed 36 photos of faces expressing emotions and cropped to show only the eyes. Each image was accompanied by a list of four possible emotions, and participants were asked to pick the best-fitting one. Each item had one correct answer, validated through extensive testing with diverse samples.

Affect. We calculated scores for the Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) subscales of the PANAS separately, averaging across participants' responses to each set of items. We subtracted mean NA ratings (α = .89) from mean PA ratings (α = .90) to create a composite. Higher scores reflected more positive affect.

Emotion perception. We classified all emotions from responses on the MET as positive or negative, with three exceptions (*insisting, tentative,* and *serious* were classified as neutral and excluded from analysis). Positive emotions included *friendly, interested*, and *thoughtful*; negative emotions included *panicked, worried*, and *preoccupied*.

To examine errors, we coded the valence of responses and summed each participant's incorrect positive and negative responses. We divided this value by 36, the total number of questions, to derive the proportion of answers containing positively skewed or negatively skewed errors. These measures thus reflected the proportion of all responses in which participants incorrectly assessed the emotions in the MET photos as positive or negative.

Results

We constructed a general linear model with power represented by two orthogonal contrasts (Contrast 1: high-power condition = 1, low-power condition = −1, neutral condition = 0; Contrast 2: high-power condition = −1, low-power condition = −1, neutral condition = 2) entered simultaneously, affect mean-centered and treated as continuous, and all interactions.

We analyzed positive and negative errors as repeated measures in the model. The predicted three-way interaction of power, affect valence, and error valence, $F(1, 76) = 9.49$, $p = .003$, showed that the degree to which misperceptions reflected participants' preexisting affect differed between high-power and low-power participants (see Fig. 4). For high-power participants, the simple two-way interaction of error valence and affect valence showed that errors tended to match the valence of participants' preexisting state affect, $F(1, 25) = 9.85$, $p < .001$. This was not true for low-power participants, $F(1, 21) = 0.47$, n.s., or participants in the neutral condition, $F(1, 33) = 0.00$, n.s. In particular, high-power participants made a substantially larger proportion of negative errors as their negative affect increased, $F(1, 25) = 9.45$, $p < .001$. Error valence did not differ as a function of these participants' positive affect, $F(1, 25) = 0.00$, n.s. In short, high-power participants who felt more negative at the time of the study were more predisposed to mistakenly see others as feeling negative, too. Indeed, a main effect of error valence showed that a larger proportion of errors, overall, involved negative emotions, $F(1, 76) = 46.65$, $p < .001$.

General Discussion

Across three studies, we demonstrated that power fosters self-anchoring. Study 1, in which we used the reaction-time paradigm developed by Otten and Epstude (2006), showed that high-power, compared with low-power, members of real-world groups used their own traits as references when judging the traits of in-group members.



Fig. 4. Results from Study 3: proportion of all emotion-estimation responses that were incorrect as a function of state affect, shown separately for each condition and for negatively skewed and positively skewed errors. Higher *x*-axis values indicate more positive affect.

Study 2 showed that high-power members of prospective laboratory groups uniquely used their attitudes about individualism and collectivism to estimate the attitudes of new subordinates, a result in line with classic false-consensus findings (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Study 3 showed that when judging ambiguous emotion expressions, individuals primed with high power tended to make errors in line with their own state affect; low-power and neutral-condition participants did not. The three studies used multiple methods and measures to show a convergent pattern of self-anchoring by the powerful.

Studies 1 and 3 showed that power holders' self-anchoring occurred primarily on negative dimensions. Though unpredicted, this pattern suggests that power holders may be more likely to see their weaknesses as being shared with others than their strengths. Perhaps the powerful are especially motivated to excuse or justify their weaknesses but motivated to see themselves as unique on positive dimensions. Thus, they conclude that group members share their negative, but not their positive, traits and feelings. Alternatively, because power is typically associated with heightened positive affect

(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), it is possible that negative traits and feelings were particularly salient for powerful participants, making them more available when the need arose to interpret other people's undefined characteristics. These possibilities should be examined in future research.

Some limitations of our studies must be acknowledged. Only Study 3 included a control condition. Though we believe that our findings reflect elevated self-anchoring by high-power individuals, more research is needed to eliminate the possibility that low power suppressed self-anchoring instead. Further, power holders' self-anchoring may depend on contextual variables. Future research should examine potential moderators and boundary conditions. For example, we suspect that power based in group consensus, which requires staying attuned to the group, may foster less self-anchoring than power based in the control of resources. Alternatively, in larger groups in which individual characteristics are less easily observable and a perception heuristic is more useful, powerful individuals may self-anchor even more.

These studies extend existing work on how power affects people's construal of themselves and their social world. Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld (2006) showed that power leads to poorer perspective-taking; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Galinsky, and Magee (2008) showed that power holders tend to objectify others; Overbeck and Park (2001, 2006) showed that power holders use social attention in an instrumental way. Our results shed light on these patterns. Powerful people must act—and are viewed—as the representative of their groups. Being imbued with authority to make decisions, control resources, and determine outcomes makes the power holder a uniquely focal group member—both privileged with and encumbered by the expectation that they think and act on the group's behalf. For this reason, powerful people need rapid ways to make decisions. One efficient heuristic is to simply use the self as reference point—to use one's own traits, attitudes, and feelings as guides to action and decision.

Of course, no one likes to think that he or she is a callous, self-centered decision maker—it is more palatable to think that one's views are shared by the group. That is, rather than simply say "I want this, so I will do this," power holders may think "I want this, and it clearly reflects what the rest of the group wants, and *therefore*, I will do it." In the end, the power holder continues to be guided by internal states—failing to take the perspective or consider the true motives of subordinates, but experiencing this process as collective and representative.

Herein lies a key challenge of power: It is necessary for efficiency, coordination, and effectiveness, but the same features that make it efficient create potential for abuse. In this case, powerful people's increased self-anchoring can speed their decision making but leave them both oblivious to the desires of their group and complacent about how well they represent it. Even worse, some self-anchoring power holders—such as Louis XIV—may substitute personal aims for those of the group and expect their followers to sacrifice and suffer for their own ambitions.

Appendix: Team-Member Introductions (Study 3)

Edward

> My name is Edward. I am 18 and a freshman at USC. I am intelligent and motivated in my academics as a business major, as well as involved and interested in many extracurricular activities. I am athletic and enjoy all sports. I also enjoy busy social life and meeting new people. I enjoy working with others.

Jamie

> My name is Jasmine, but people call me Jamie. I care about my family and friends a lot because they make my life worth living for. I enjoy dancing very much and is currently taking Jazz dance class. I am pretty short (5'2"), but like it. Music is a great tool to release stress and relax on a sunny afternoon for me.

Addison

> Hi, I was born and raised in Hawaii. I am bilingual. I am an active member of BAY. I am an accounting major. I spend more of my time in Leavey, than I do in class. I like working with numbers. I respect others for what they are. I don't judge. My parents taught me to be open-minded at a early age. I try to live a fun life.

Author Contributions

J. R. Overbeck developed the research concept. Both authors contributed to the study design. V. Droutman conducted data collection. J. R. Overbeck performed most data analyses, and V. Droutman performed additional follow-up analyses, both under the supervision of J. R. Overbeck and independently; interpretations were collaborative. J. R. Overbeck drafted the manuscript and V. Droutman provided critical revisions. Both authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Notes

1. Study 1 closely replicated Otten and Epstude's (2006) study, which provided distinct evidence for self-anchoring. For the sake of brevity, we refer readers to the original paper for additional details about the study design.

2. Analyses also revealed theoretically uninteresting main effects of self-descriptiveness, $F(1, 516) = 6.05$, $p = .01$, and group descriptiveness, $F(1, 516) = 8.88$, $p < .01$, as well as two-way interactions between group descriptiveness and valence, $F(1, 516) = 4.24$, $p = .04$, and power and valence, $F(1, 516) = 6.20$, $p = .01$.

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