

The Domestic and Global Origins of Transnational Advocacy
Explaining Lobbying Presence during WTO Ministerial Conferences

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Forthcoming in *Comparative Political Studies*

Abstract. This article explains varying levels of transnational advocacy initiated by domestic organized interests. Theoretically, we integrate the constraining and enabling impact of the domestic context with factors related to global opportunity structures. We test our hypotheses with an original dataset consisting of all national organized interests that attended the Ministerial Conferences of the WTO in the period 1995-2011. Instead of viewing transnational advocacy as a reaction to a lack of domestic political attention and an attempt to compensate for domestic deprivation, our analyses actually show the opposite. Organized interests that originate from democracies and mostly wealthy countries, and that enjoy robust access to domestic resources, are much more responsive to shifts in the global policy agenda. More generally, our analysis of the factors that drive transnational advocacy show that it is not fruitful to juxtapose domestic and global explanations.

Introduction

Transnational advocacy by domestic organized interests¹ that mobilize beyond national borders is becoming an increasingly significant phenomenon in today's globalized world (Cerny 1995; della Porta, et al. 1999; Smith and Weist 2005). Two perspectives to explain transnational advocacy can be identified in the literature. First, one perspective focuses on the political opportunities that the global political arena provides for organized interests, and the consequences of these opportunities. This global opportunities perspective states that, because of the growing number of international access opportunities, the inequalities between countries' degrees of integration in international governmental and non-governmental organizations should decline and a more balanced pattern of transnational societal mobilization should emerge (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Boli and Thomas 1997; Beckfield 2003; Meyer 1980; Meyer et al. 1997). Second, other scholars emphasize factors located at the domestic level, in particular resource based variables and domestic regime type. For instance, some analysts demonstrated that resources situated at the domestic level are positively associated with more domestic organized interests engaging in transnational advocacy (Dalton, et al. 2003; Lee 2010; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Tarrow 2005). Other scholars showed that democratic openness generates a favorable impact on the amount of non-governmental activity at the international level (Beckfield 2003; Lee 2010; Smith and Wiest 2005; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004).

Since both perspectives have been shown to be so eminently plausible, we undertake to analyze the impact of the domestic and global factors in one single model. We do so in order to disentangle which of these factors is *more* important, or under what *conditions* the one or the other has a more stringent effect on the emergence of transnational advocacy. For instance, is it wealth or democratic openness that drives transnational advocacy? And does democracy have the same effect on mobilization in wealthy and developing or in less prosperous countries? Our main goal is to identify the relative importance of the most important factors associated with variation in transnational advocacy. Yet, we not only aim to further specify existing explanations, we also add some explanatory factors that have been relatively ignored in the literature. These include domestic and global policy attention, or salience, related to specific issue areas, and the type of domestic interest intermediation system.

¹ We use the term 'organized interests' to refer to various types of entities that engage in collective action to advocate a political cause. This broad set includes business associations and labor unions which focus on specific economic interests, on the one hand, and social movement organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that defend more general causes (Salisbury 1983; Beyers et al. 2008).

To test our hypotheses, we analyze the entire interest group community mobilized at one specific global political venue, namely, the WTO Ministerial Conferences (MCs hereafter). More concretely, we investigate lobbying patterns of 1,406 domestic interest groups originating from 138 countries that attended the WTO MCs over a substantial period of time (1995-2011). Analyzing transnational advocacy patterns at MCs has several advantages. First, our large-N study assures that we analyze a global venue where a large variety of societal and economic interests can potentially mobilize. This allows us to *generalize* our findings across countries, issue areas, and types of actors and test our hypotheses with an integrated conceptual framework. This is a strong advantage as many studies are still limited to one particular type of organized interest, being either social movements or business actors (Smith and Weist 2005; Tarrow 2005), one issue area (Dalton et al. 2003; Poloni-Staudinger and Ortals 2014; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002), or a subset of countries (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Second, many large-N-studies of transnational advocacy limit themselves to investigating the frequency with which transnational advocacy organizations are established, relying on registries such as the one published by the *Union of International Associations* (Beckfield 2003; Lee 2010; Smith and Weist 2005). As a consequence, these studies do not explicitly assess varying degrees of actual *political activity*, as we do, like lobbying presence at international diplomatic conferences (but see Ron et al. 2005; Piewitt 2010) and thus are limited in assessing bias in transnational advocacy.

Our analyses demonstrate that the mere presence of domestic organized interests at international policy venues is shaped in the first place by whether a political regime is democratic. Yet, within the overall set of democratic countries, the *level* of democracy is much less and decreasingly important, and overall wealth as well as the access to vital resources become key explanatory factors. The importance of access to resources does not mean that political institutions are irrelevant for democratic countries; on the contrary, our evidence shows that for wealthy countries the nature of the domestic interest intermediation system significantly affects presence at MCs. Furthermore, we find no support for the thesis that organized interests that face some domestic deprivation – for instance lack of political attention and support, or a shortage of resources – appeal more to the international level. Instead, our results demonstrate the opposite, namely that in particular organized interests originating from wealthy countries enjoying considerable access to domestic resources are responsive to shifts in the global policy agenda.

Theoretical perspectives on transnational advocacy

A substantial transnational advocacy literature emphasizes the strategic opportunities for individual organized interests created by international political venues (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Beckfield 2003; Meyer 1980). One of the main theoretical perspectives in this field, the *world polity approach*, posits that growing intergovernmental connections and increasing transnational mobilization by non-state interests shape the global political arena. They thereby offer an additional opportunity for domestic interests to engage in advocacy and to contribute to transnational policymaking. One eminent elaboration of this line of thought is the boomerang framework developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), which builds on Schattschneider's (1960) conception of shifting venues in which 'the losers of any conflict have an interest in shifting venues to bring new allies and activate friendly audiences' to the level of international politics (Tarrow 2005, 145-6). The main idea is that the international setting provides opportunities to domestic organized interests to engage in transnational mobilization, to build transnational advocacy networks, and to seek support from foreign governments and/or international organizations in order to put pressure on the national government. The framework presumes that organized interest advocates facing some domestic deprivation – such as a shortage of political attention, a lack of access to resources or domestic political institutions – shift issues to and seek policy attention at a higher level of government. As such, international opportunities generally enhance the ability of domestic organized interests to provoke boomerang effects and compensate potential losses in domestic political arenas. Empirically, several studies confirm that more open IOs indeed increase organized interest mobilization. A good example is provided by Jackie Smith's work (2005/2006; Smith and Weist 2005), which demonstrates that the growth of the transnational social movement population is positively associated with the growing number of conferences organized by the UN and other international organizations (see also Boli and Thomas 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wotipka and Tsutui 2008).

A second perspective focuses on domestic factors affecting the amount of transnational advocacy. Several scholars have emphasized the immediate context in which domestic organized interests are embedded (Dalton, et al. 2003; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Lee 2010; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Smith and Weist 2005; Tarrow 2005). One of the most dominant theoretical perspectives in this regard builds on resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and claims that organized interests with a strong domestic support basis and considerable access to resources, are more inclined to expand their lobby attempts to the international level. From such a perspective, organizational resources are considered to be a

key explanatory factor for transnational advocacy (McCarthy and Zald 1987; Ron et al. 2005; Smith and Weist 2005). Others pointed at the importance of democracy for transnational advocacy by arguing that organized interests from more democratic countries are more often engaged in transnational advocacy (for instance Beckfield 2003; Lee 2011). Various studies, especially on EU-level interest representation, show that domestic access and resources are mutually reinforcing, rendering resourceful organized interests embedded in a supportive domestic context more capable of becoming politically active at the EU-level. EU-studies have indeed observed a persistent overrepresentation of nationally-rooted (predominantly business) organizations from core member-states, to the point of suggesting that domestic opportunities better explain transnational mobilization than factors emphasizing the strategic benefits of supranational political opportunities (Beyers 2002; Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Bennett 1999; Dür and Mateo 2012; Eising 2007).

Despite the fact that some authors try to combine domestic and global factors (for instance Bob 2001/2005; Tarrow 2005), few studies rely on research designs with systematic controls that identify *which* domestic factor(s) is (are) more important than others. For instance, whereas the impact of economic prosperity and level of democracy have both been identified as key, the net-effect of these factors remains largely unclear. In order to clarify their relative importance and possible interaction effects, we test the relative importance of various explanatory factors and the conditions under which they affect the emergence and extensiveness of transnational advocacy.

Yet, next to integrating domestic and international factors into one model, we also analyze the impact of two additional explanatory factors, the policy attention for specific issue areas and the type of domestic interest intermediation system. We thus incorporate insights developed in the population ecology literature on organized interest mobilization (Gray and Lowery 1996/2000). This literature has been developed primarily in domestic political settings and emphasizes two major factors, which also resonate in the transnational advocacy literature, to explain how interest group communities develop. These factors are the resources organized interests can rely on (i.e. the *supply side* of lobbying) on the one hand, and the varying political-administrative context or government activity (i.e. the *demand side* of lobbying) on the other hand. The supply side of lobbying has received notable attention in the literature on transnational advocacy, for instance in the writings of Dalton et al. (2003), Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002), and Tarrow (2005). The demand side can consist of different political-administrative institutions (such as interest intermediation system) and actual policy attention, which captures the idea that organizations mobilize most whenever

policymakers engage in policymaking activities concerning specific policy issues (Leech et al. 2005). In our view, the more specific factors that drive transnational advocacy can be situated both under the heading of supply and demand factors apparent in population-ecology analyses of organized interest mobilization. One of the benefits of relying on this overarching approach is that it allows us to combine several factors that are prevalent in the broader literature on transnational advocacy into a general framework to explain the development of transnational interest group communities.

Research hypotheses

We start with the supply side or resource availability. In order to lobby effectively, organized interests need to monitor political processes, network with policymakers and other advocates, gather evidence, possibly rally their constituents, and often have to maintain these activities over long periods of time. That is, organized interests' capacity to remain active globally is crucially influenced by their capability to obtain resources from their direct environment, in particular but not exclusively, from their potential supportive constituency (Gray and Lowery 1996; Lowery and Gray 2004; Nownes and Lipinski 2005; Nownes 2010). Somewhat distinct from many resource-driven explanations (see Dalton et al. 2003; Tarrow 2005), our ecological approach adopts a different level of analysis when it comes to resources. Instead of employing an organizational level of analysis by focusing on the actual resources of specific organizations, we focus on the resources that are accessible in the immediate environment in which organized interests operate. The potential membership of an interest organization, the extent to which financial support is available, or patronage by political entrepreneurs, have indeed been shown to be crucial to explain the number of organized interests that actually mobilize (Lowery et al. 2005; Hanegraaff 2015). We therefore expect transnational mobilization of domestic organized interests to co-vary with the overall resource base that is potentially accessible to domestic organized interests. The more resources available from the direct environment, the more organized interests will be capable of engaging in transnational advocacy. Overall wealth in a country is a first, yet rather crude measure of resource availability and needs further specification. Resource availability might be of a different nature for specific issue areas. Development NGOs for instance may only profit from wealth if a wealthy population cares for development cooperation and accepts and/or convinces policymakers to support development NGOs (for instance through grants and subsidies). Likewise, if a country harbors no substantial agricultural sector, its overall economic prosperity will not enable the mobilization of agricultural interests. Therefore, we

propose two distinct hypotheses. One that taps the overall wealth in a country and one that taps the specific resource availability related to particular issue areas:

Hypothesis 1a: The more resources available at the domestic level, the more domestic organized interests mobilize at the global level.

Hypothesis 1b: The more policy-specific resources are available, the more domestic organized interests having a stake in that policy field mobilize at the global level.

The demand side of lobbying refers to political-administrative institutions as well as actual policymaking activity or policy attention for specific issue areas. The effect of domestic institutions on the number of domestic organized interests and transnational advocacy has been reported in numerous studies dealing with transnational social movements (Beckfield 2003; Lee 2010; Smith and Weist 2005). Yet, this raises the question whether it is wealth, whether it is a matter of either the level of democracy or wealth, or whether it is a specific combination of wealth *and* the level of democracy that drives transnational advocacy. Moreover, what are the conditions under which democracy and/or wealth have a decisive impact on transnational advocacy? Not many studies compare a large set of domestic institutions, and/or control for economic prosperity, to explain varying patterns of transnational advocacy. A notable exception is the study by Rohrschneider and Dalton, who control for the level of democracy, but do not find a relationship between democracy and overall social movement activity on environmental issues (2002, 528). Nonetheless, other studies on participation in transnational social movement organizations have observed that countries with higher levels of democracy tend to be far more strongly connected to transnational activism (Lee 2010; Smith and Weist 2005). A high degree of political openness to a diverse range of organized interests, which generally characterizes democratic political systems, leads us to hypothesize that organized interests originating from democratic states engage more in transnational advocacy.

We conceive of democracy as a component of the demand side of lobbying as we presume that democratic policymakers show more openness to organized interests, for instance because they may partially depend on information about societal preferences for their re-election. Yet, although democracies generally have a more active civil society, it is not realistic to presume that collective action in such regimes is without costs. On the contrary, one could argue that at the highest levels of democracy collective action might be more exhausting in terms of resources compared to intermediate levels of democracy. In highly democratic polities there might be more competition among a larger set of organized interests

and individual citizens may use alternative channels, next to organized interests, to voice their concerns (see also Bernauer et al. 2013). On the other hand, in countries where relatively little resources are available to organized interests, higher levels of democracy may elicit considerable activity by organized interests as they face less competition. In short, we hypothesize that the level of democracy will not necessarily have an effect on its own (a marginal effect), but that the availability of resources conditions the effect of democracy (and vice versa).

Finally, in addition to the level of democracy, we expect another institutional factor to affect aggregate patterns of transnational advocacy, namely differences in domestic interest intermediation systems. An important distinction conceptualizing the role of organized interests in domestic politics has traditionally been whether countries are more pluralist or more corporatist (Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Czada et al. 1998; Eising 2007; Siaroff 1999; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). In corporatist countries, the relationship between organized interests and policymakers is strongly regulated and based on frequent negotiations among a small set of umbrella associations that represent encompassing constituencies. In pluralist systems, organized interests are far more self-reliant and a broader set of actors is engaged in lobbying, creating more competition among those. Therefore, we hypothesize that organized interests operating in pluralist countries are more likely to become active at the global level, as organized interests from these countries are more used to seeking political attention by themselves (Eising 2007). In contrast, organized interests from more corporatist countries often rely on umbrella associations to lobby on their behalf, and we expect this to be the case at the international level as well.

These considerations lead to the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: The more democratic a country, the more domestic organized interests from this country mobilize at the global level.

Hypothesis 2b: The impact of democracy on transnational advocacy is stronger for countries where organized interests have little resources available than for countries with a resource rich environment.

Hypothesis 2c: The more pluralist the system of interest intermediation of a country, the more organized interests from this country mobilize at the global level.

A second set of explanatory factors associated with the demand side concerns the degree of policy attention policymakers pay to particular issues, which signals policymaking activity. As we have discussed above, it is widely documented how a lack (or abundance) of

domestic policy attention drives organized interests to become active transnationally. We therefore test for the extent to which the global policy agenda stimulates organized interests to become active at an international political venue. Generally, we expect higher levels of policy attention for specific issue areas at international political venues such as the WTO to be associated with higher levels of transnational advocacy. One important question in this regard is whether transnational policy attention has a different impact on mobilization patterns than domestic policy attention. A political system with multiple layers of governance, such as the world trade regime, creates additional opportunities for political advocacy. Policy competences and related policymaking activities vary from one governance level to another, which may turn domestic preferences into inputs for transnational policymaking, or may cause international policymaking to demarcate the boundaries within which states can add, implement or transpose rules to their domestic context (Mossberger 1999; Shipan and Volden 2006). When some organized interests lack political support or attention at the domestic level, those stakeholders may seek to rely on global political opportunity structures and shift their political activities to that level, which is what one would expect according to some influential accounts of transnational advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Therefore, we test for domestic and global policy attention, which leads to the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: The more political attention at the global level for a particular policy field, the more domestic organized interests with a stake in this field mobilize at the global level.

Hypothesis 3b: The more domestic attention for a particular policy field, the more domestic organized interests with a stake in this field mobilize at the global level.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Research design, dataset and operationalization

To test these hypotheses, we analyze lobby presence at the WTO Ministerial Conferences. In order to do so, we mapped all domestic organized interests that attended at least one of MCs between 1995 and 2011, an interest group community that consists of 1410 unique organizations.² The applied data collection strategy is in line with recent large-scale

² As our theoretical and empirical focus is on whether national interest organizations mobilize at the global level, we do not include the 558 *global* interest organizations that attended MCs. These are organizations for which we could not unequivocally establish the geographical origin and location of their main activities. Our explanatory framework precludes the inclusion of these actors in a comparable and meaningful fashion. Although the role of

studies on organized interests, namely the systematic mapping of all organized interests lobbying at a particular policy venue (Halpin and Jordan 2011). It combines the construction of a dataset of all organized interests that attended MCs between 1995 and 2011 with a detailed web-based coding of each organization. This coding includes comprehensive information on the type of organizations interested in WTO negotiations, the region or the countries they come from, and their respective areas of interest. Table 1 provides an overview of dependent, independent, and control variables as well as their indicators and the data sources we rely on.

Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. We first present a general country-level model of transnational advocacy by organized interests coming from 138 WTO member-states. The only countries we exclude are those with less than one million inhabitants because of insufficient data for these countries. The dependent variable in this analysis is the number of organized interests per country present at each of the eight MCs that took place since 1995. As a result, the country-level model includes 1104 density measures, i.e. the number of organized interests present at each MC for a total of 138 countries. This allows us to test hypotheses H1a, H2a/b and H3a.

In a second step, we test hypotheses H1b, H2c and H3b. For these hypotheses, we focus on a smaller set of OECD-countries, as testing them requires fine-grained data of contextual constraints and opportunities. Such data are not available for all countries and therefore we resort to OECD countries. Yet, given the skewed nature of representation at MCs towards wealthy countries, these more focused analyses still cover 75 percent of all organized interests that attended the trade conferences. Due to the specific nature of the independent variables, especially the resource and constituency variables, we test separate models for different organized interest types. More specifically, we distinguish between business actors (in the policy fields of agriculture or manufacturing), NGOs (in the policy fields of environment or development), and labor unions. The inclusion of environmental NGOs is interesting as almost twenty percent of the NGOs that attend WTO MCs focus on environmental problems (Hanegraaff et al. 2011). In principle, one would not expect such a substantial number of environmental NGOs at international diplomatic conferences that concern trade. One possible explanation we can test for is whether transnational advocacy is driven by how global policy attention related to specific issue areas or varying levels of

global organizations in transnational lobbying is relevant, it should be noted that global interest organizations are a distinct minority at MCs (Hanegraaff et al. 2011; Hanegraaff 2015).

domestic policy attention affect the number of domestic interest groups attending the MCs. The dependent variable in these more focused analyses is the number of organized interests that have their primary policy interest in one particular issue area. Our analysis thus includes 164 density measures, i.e. the number of organized interests from 21 OECD countries present at each MC.³

Our models use four distinct indicators of domestic *resource availability*. First, for hypothesis 1a, we take overall levels of wealth to be a valid and reliable proxy for the availability of domestic resources. Population ecology models of US state interest group communities presume that wealth is an appropriate measure for potential constituents (Gray and Lowery 1988; Gray and Lowery 2000; Lowery and Gray 2004); in our analysis we conceive wealth as an appropriate measure for potential access to resources more generally, including the constituency an organized interest could potentially rely on. More specifically, we apply the World Bank's classification of countries in four income groups, based on the GDP per capita in the year before the MC took place (Smith and Weist 2005). In order to test hypothesis 1b, we operationalize domestic resources per different type of organized interests. For economic interests, we include the market share in world trade because the number of exporting and importing firms within a particular field represent a fair approximation of the amount of resources available to organized interests representing these firms. We use the total amount (in millions US dollars, logged) of public and private aid per country as an indicator of the potential resources NGOs could access. An indicator combining public and private aid is preferable as there is much variation in the distribution of public and private aid between countries, while both serve as potential resources for development and environmental NGOs. For labour unions we include the absolute number of members (in millions).

Hypotheses 2a, b and c are about the effect of the domestic institutions within which organized interests operate. For hypothesis 2a and b on the effect of level of democracy, we rely on the index developed by the Polity IV project, more precisely a lagged measure (one year before the MC) of the level of democracy and civil liberties. This index ranges from -10 to 10, whereby a high value refers to a full-democracy and a low value to an authoritarian regime. As we control for the interaction between level of democracy and wealth, we rescale

³ These are the 21 OECD-countries for which all data was available: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. Other countries were either too small (e.g. Luxembourg) or we missed data on an independent variable (i.e. Siaroff's Corporatism Index or Comparative Agenda Project).

this index on a scale ranging from 0 to 20. For the second analysis (H2c), we use Siaroff's index (1999), which operationalizes the degree to which domestic interest representation regimes differ across OECD countries on a scale of corporatism ranging from 1 to 5 (1 referring to the most pluralist system and 5 to the most corporatist system).

The third set of hypotheses focuses on the policy attention for specific issue areas. We operationalize global policy attention as the WTO policy agenda of the respective MCs (hypothesis 3a). We measure this by counting and coding the articles dedicated to a specific MC three months prior to the start of each MC in World Trade Online, a widely read and specialized online news service.⁴ World Trade Online provides extensive coverage of policy fields that will be discussed at the forthcoming MCs, allowing us to code each article related to a specific issue area in which particular organized interests have a key interest. For each field discussed at an MC, we thus have an indicator of the number of times this field was mentioned prior to the MCs in the World Trade Online coverage. To test hypothesis 3b on domestic government attention, we use the Comparative Party Manifesto Dataset. The indicators we included are: 1) support for productivity increase including trade (for business groups); 2) support for international cooperation and development aid (for development NGOs); 3) support for environmental policies (for environmental NGOs); and 4) support for trade unions (for interest groups representing trade issues). The party manifesto dataset contains counts based on the number of lines dedicated towards these issue areas in party manifestos prior to each election. To link policy attention of individual parties for policy attention of governments at each MC, we include the weighted average attention for policy issues (based on voting percentage) of the entire governing coalition or in the case of majority systems of, the governing party. Given its rather skewed distribution we log-transform this variable. In other words, we have an estimate of the attention public policymakers pay to the issue areas we analyse for each MC and each country.

We add six *control variables*, which tap potentially explanatory factors not contained in our explanatory framework. In addition to policy attention, what possibly matters is the likelihood of policy change, something that Gray and Lowery have termed *interest certainty* (2000, 74). Potential policy change is an opportunity rather than a liability for organized interests, as it constitutes an incentive to engage in political action for the maintenance of the status quo or in favor of policy change. We should thus expect policy fields – whether at the

⁴ In total we coded 544 articles: Singapore 1996 (97), Geneva 1998 (45), Seattle 1999 (123), Doha 2001 (92), Cancun 2003 (125), Hong Kong 2005 (107), Geneva 2009 (18), and Geneva 2011 (34).

national or the global level – where the likelihood of policy change is high, to attract higher levels of transnational advocacy. We control for this by adding to our models the volatility in the average tariff-levels of a country and overall volatility in the level of peak tariffs for the period 1995-2011 (based on World Bank data, missing values added, where possible, from WTO data). We measure volatility as the variance of yearly average tariffs and peak tariffs between 1995 and 2011. We do so by considering each percentage point increase or decrease in a (peak) tariff per year for the whole period. This means that when (peak) tariffs change considerably, the value on volatility will be high, implying high interest uncertainty, whereas when (peak) tariffs hardly change the value on volatility will be low, implying high policy certainty.⁵ Next, we constructed an index measuring trade dependence, the proportion of export and imports in the overall GDP of a country, as high trade dependence might also ratchet up transnational mobilization. In addition, we control for the level of protectionism in the form of average tariffs and peak tariff for each country, as this might stimulate transnational mobilization in favor of the status quo. Finally, based on the GeoDist database we calculated the distance (in thousand km) between the national capital and the location where the MC takes place (Mayer and Zignago 2011). We expect a long distance to imply higher costs to attend a given MC and thus lower levels of transnational mobilization.

Analyses: explaining transnational mobilization

The dependent variable in all models (Table 2 and 4) is a count measure characterized by a large number of zero's and a variance that is substantially larger than the mean. For instance, when considering the overall models (Table 2), 78 percent of the cases have zero's resulting in a mean of 2.31 and a variance of 123.65. In order to model this over-dispersion, we estimate the parameters with a negative binomial model (NB-model). As we have repeated measures for each country, we cannot assume that the residuals are independent and follow a normal distribution. Therefore, we use clustered standard errors in order to evaluate the significance of our tests. Moreover, given the excessive amount of zero's, we carried out a Vuong-test, which examines whether a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) approach with separate logit-parameters modelling the zero's entails a better model fit. The ZINB-model controls for both over-dispersion and the excessive amount of zero's by introducing a splitting process, which models both zero outcomes (non-attendance) as well as the counts (attendance rates). In other words, it estimates the probability that a country has no organized interest

⁵ Note that this proxy does not capture volatility in services regulation.

representatives at any of the MCs (i.e. a logit-model), versus variation in organized interest mobilization (i.e. a zero-truncated NB-model).

For the general country-level analysis with 138 countries, we have a significant Vuong-test ($z=3.20$; $p<.001$). This rejects the null-hypothesis that the logit- and count-model in a ZINB-model are similar to the outcome of a NB-model and justifies a splitting procedure. As we have no separate hypotheses regarding either non-attendance or increased attendance, we test the same explanatory variables in both the logit-model as well as the NB-models. For instance, we expect wealth and level of democracy to influence both non-attendance as well as increased attendance at MCs, and therefore we make no decision upfront to exclude explanatory variables from one of the models. As the hypothesized interaction effect explicitly concerns attendance rates, we include this effect only for the NIB-model. Finally, to make both the logit- and NB-model more conveniently comparable, we changed the signs of the coefficients in the logit-model so that they reflect the probability to be in the group of *attendants*, in contrast to the probability to be in the group of non-attendants as the model originally estimates. This allows for a clearer comparison with the estimates for variation in organized interest attendance rates at MCs (i.e. the NB-model).

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Table 2 presents two models – one with and one without the hypothesized interaction effect – with 138 countries for eight MCs. The first general finding is that a *wealthy* context is important for explaining variation in organized interest attendance at MCs (see NB-model without and with interaction effect). In the categories of low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income, we observe a significant difference compared to mobilization by organized interests stemming from high income countries. However, there is hardly any effect of wealth on non-attendance of organized interests originating from a certain country (see logit-model). This means that wealth is not a strong common feature among the countries that have no organized interests attending MCs. When we look at the countries without any organized interests attendees (i.e. logit model), 29 are upper-middle or higher income countries, whereas only 18 are lower-middle or lowest income countries. In contrast, when we look at varying densities among the 20 countries with the highest participation rates (i.e. NB-model), no less than 18 of these countries are higher-middle or high income countries, whereas only 2 are lower-income countries (i.e. the Philippines and India). Combined, this indicates that we can partially confirm hypothesis 1a, which states that wealth is a significant

predictor of transnational mobilization. Yet, it only partially explains differences between participation and non-participation.

Second, based on a model without an interaction effect we would conclude that countries with a more *democratic* political system have a higher chance to see any domestic organized interests lobbying at MCs (logit-model), but this does not result in more organized interest attendance per country (NB-model). The outcome in the NB-model outcome seems to confirm Rohrschneider and Dalton's observation of no correlation between level of democracy and transnational advocacy in the environmental field and consequently would seem to refute our expectations about democracy. However, based on a model with an interaction effect, we cannot conclude that the level of democracy is irrelevant for the density of transnational advocacy. Indeed, the inclusion of the interaction effect results in a significant improvement of the predictive capacity of our model ($2*(-LL--LL)=27.188$, $\Delta df=3$, $p<.0001$) and a significant parameter for the interaction term as well as for the entire interaction effect (χ^2 interaction effect=17.62; $df=3$; $p<0.001$). Following Brambor et al. (2006), we interpret the main effect as a conditional effect, focus our interpretation of the results on the interaction term, and rely on a visual representation in order to clarify the effect (see also Braumoeller 2004). Since the conditional parameter should be interpreted as a conditional effect, the attendance rates at the lowest level of polity (recoded Polity index=0), for low and lower middle income countries are a mere 0.4 percent and 0.5 percent of the attendance of high incomes countries.

Although the attendance rates of the lower income countries are low, the interaction effect demonstrates clearly that an increasing level of democratic openness significantly improves attendance rates, more precisely with 17 percent for each unit improvement on the Polity index. Yet, given the generally low attendance rates for these countries, this effect of level of democracy sets in at rather high levels of the Polity index. As hypothesized, the effect of level of democracy on attendance rates is most outspoken at lower levels of economic development (i.e. low income and low-middle income) where each unit increase in democracy leads to higher expected attendants rates; for high-middle income countries we observe no difference at all in expected attendance rates per democratic level; for high income countries we see only an effect at low levels of democracy. Figure 1 presents this interaction effect visually by plotting predicted counts and the 95% confidence intervals. The attendance rates are much lower for the lower income countries, but once these countries pass a threshold of 10 on the recoded Polity index the attendance rates grow at a fast rate. We have no such effect for the high-middle income countries, where attendance rates are stable. For the highest-

income countries, the effect of level of democracy is also positive, but in contrast to poorer countries, the flattening of the trend line at the end shows that there is almost no further increase in expected attendance at very high levels of democratic openness (17-20).

Moreover, the logit model shows that democracy is also crucial for initial mobilization at MCs, i.e. the differences between zeros and non-zeros. In fact, to explain the excess of zeros, democracy is the *only* significant predictor (see left logit model in Table 2). This effect becomes more clear if we dig deeper into the data. In fact, autocracies (score of lower than 5 on Polity IV index) have hardly any interest groups representatives at WTO MCs (i.e. 90 percent scores a zero), and this is irrespective of their economic development (e.g. the Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, have hardly any representation, but belong to the highest income group). Likewise, most anocracies (between 5 and 15 on the Polity IV index) show rather limited levels of attendance at the MCs (75 percent scores a zero). Finally, for democratic countries (higher than 15 on Polity IV index) only 41 percent shows no attendance at all.

To illustrate how the level of democracy conditionally affects transnational advocacy, we highlight India and China, two countries that showed substantial economic growth during the past two decades. If we would rely *only* on prosperity, we would expect a substantial increase in trade lobbying from both countries throughout the period under investigation. Importantly however, we observe such a growth only for democratic India, but not for autocratic China. More specifically, at the first MCs (Singapore 1996 and Geneva 1998), India had two organizations attending the conferences while China had one. During the last three MCs however (Hong Kong 2005, Geneva 2009 and 2011), this number grew for India to respectively 22, 26 and 15 organizations, while for China the number of attendees hardly increased, with a mere three Chinese organizations participating at those last MCs.

All this clearly illustrates the importance of democratic openness to overcome the *initial* obstacles for interest group representation at MCs. Yet, as argued, once this first barrier is passed (e.g. showing higher levels of democratic openness), increased attendance is much less affected by only democratic openness (see NB models).

INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 3 HERE

While economic prosperity and wealth significantly drive transnational advocacy, poor and undemocratic countries, on average and not very surprisingly, add much less quantity to the WTO lobbying community. As we can infer from Figure 1 and 2, the size of the

confidence intervals are substantial for the rich countries, are generally very low for poor and undemocratic countries, but become more sizeable at higher levels of democracy and wealth. This shows that our estimates become less precise for the rich and democratic countries, or that there is still considerable unexplored variation in this set. While the standard deviations of the predicted attendance rates for the authoritarian systems, anocracies and lower-upper middle income countries are all lower than 0.21, the standard deviations for the democratic and high income countries are respectively 0.45 and 1.37, while the confidence intervals are also much broader (see overview Table 3). This suggests that being wealthy or being a democracy may be *necessary*, but not *sufficient* conditions for transnational lobbying and the development of transnational interest group communities. The finding further warrants the more specific models we show in Table 4.

Finally, we also find substantial support for hypothesis 3a on *global policy agendas*. The NB-model clearly shows that organized interest presence is strongly related to the scope of the MC policy agenda, measured by the political attention before a MC takes place. Translating the regression coefficient for the number of articles published in World Trade Online, we can roughly predict that the size of the attendees per countries increases with 1 percent for each additional article published in relation to a particular negotiation topic. Of course these are rough measures, but our more focused analyses below show that, global policy agendas are indeed crucial for transnational advocacy.

As for our control variables we observe some significant effects. First, distance is negatively related to attendance rates, which means that MCs organized more closely to a country's capital attract more attendees (Nordang Uhre 2014). Furthermore, trade dependency shows a small negative effect whereby a lower dependency somewhat surprisingly increases transnational advocacy. Yet, this effect is small, not highly stable and robust. Moreover, tariff volatility generates a substantial and significant positive effect on MC mobilization, while average tariff-levels affects mobilization negatively. These finding could be related to the fact that more wealthy countries generally have lower overall tariffs and less volatile tariff rates. However, they could also point at a domestic agenda effect. Most importantly, if states change their tariffs more regularly and substantially, this could be a trigger for interest groups to become politically active. Our more focused analyses in the next section allow us to test whether domestic political agendas indeed affect transnational advocacy.

To test the hypotheses related to specific issue areas, resource dependencies and the domestic interest intermediation system (H1b, H2c, and H3a/b), our second analysis concentrates on a smaller set of the more wealthy OECD-countries which, on average, show

higher attendance rates. For this reason, for the five models that focus on specific issue areas for 21 OECD countries, we rely on a regular negative binomial model.⁶ This set of countries as well as five issue areas (agriculture, manufacturing, environment, development, and labor) generate the bulk of transnational advocacy at WTO MCs, constituting roughly 75 percent of the organizations identified in the WTO interest group community. We exclude the measures related to trade instruments and democracy because these show no or very limited variation between the OECD countries. All countries have low tariffs and peak-tariffs, and many even have identical levels of trade restrictions, given the large number of countries belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA). In addition, all countries are full democracies scoring around the maximum on the Polity index. Table 4 presents the results.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

We find strong support for our expectations regarding the resources that are available in the immediate environment of an organized interest. First, organized interests embedded in a national context with a higher GDP per capita mobilize in bigger numbers (only for labor organizations the effect is not significant). The effects are also very strong in substantive terms. For every increase (of a thousand dollars) in GDP per capita, attendance rates go up with 2 percent for environmental NGOs (the weakest) effects, and almost 7 percent for agricultural business organizations (the strongest effect). Second, for agriculture and manufacturing businesses, a one percent increase in the share of total world trade has a substantial positive effect on attendance rates of organized interests connected to these areas (17,5 percent for agriculture and 20 percent for manufacturing). The more domestic firms and companies are integrated in the global economy, the more their representatives attend MCs. Third, the public and private money available for NGOs has a very substantial effect on the number of environment and development NGOs that send representatives to MCs. Put differently, the MCs attendance of NGOs is not just driven by the global policy agenda, but is also the result of a considerable domestic resource space. The same goes for labor unions, where we observe that an increase of membership with one standard deviation, increases attendance rates of a union with 87 percent. In short, as hypothesized, transnational advocacy originating in OECD countries is strongly dependent on the availability of resources in the

⁶ We did ran the logit models, yet in all models none of the independent variables was significant. This indicates that for the OECD-countries there is not a distinct process explaining variation in attendance versus non-attendance.

immediate context of an organized interest, a conclusion that holds in varying degrees for different types of organized interests.

In addition, we get systematic support for hypothesis 3a on how global policy attention affects which organized interests are active. For all issues areas, except labor, an increase (decrease) in public saliency during the months before the MC leads to higher (lower) attendance rates, which indicates that transnational advocacy is to a significant extent driven by global policy attention for specific issue areas. The environmental policy field provides a nice example of this. At the first two MCs, the attention for environmental issues and the attendance rates of environmental NGOs was rather marginal. Around 7 percent of the coverage in World Trade Online was dedicated to environmental issues and the attendance rates of environmental organized interests was much below average (Hanegraaff et al. 2011). However, since the Seattle MC (1999) and especially during the start of the Doha development agenda (2001) until the Cancun conference (2003), the attention for environmental issues increased substantially and this corresponds with the increasing attendance of environmental NGOs, with coverage rates reaching around 15-20 percent and attendance rates between 30 and 50 percent. After the Cancun MC, both the attention for environmental issues drastically declines, followed by a decline in attendance rates for environmental NGOs as well. In contrast to this clear global agenda effect, we find no support for our hypothesis on domestic government policy attention (H3b). In all models, the effect of in- or decreased attention for certain issue areas does not trigger any significant change in the number of organized interests attending MCs. In other words, while some scholarship views transnational advocacy as a reaction to a shortage of domestic political attention and an attempt to compensate for domestic deprivation, we find no support for this argument. Rather, our findings suggest the opposite, namely that organized interests originating from wealthy countries and embedded in a resourceful environment are much more likely to respond to shifts in global policy agenda's.

Finally, hypothesis 2c about the effect of the interest intermediation system gets partial confirmation. The for-profit interests of agriculture and manufacturing from pluralist countries mobilize significantly more than those groups from neo-corporatist ones (given the negative sign of the parameter). That is, the agriculture and manufacturing attendance rate decreases with by 61 and 45 percent when countries rank one point higher on Siaroff's 5-point index, i.e. when they are more neo-corporatist. For development NGOs, environment NGOs, and labor unions however, we find no relationship between the number of attendees and the type of interest intermediation system. This finding indicates that in wealthy countries

political-institutional factors are still important to explain patterns of transnational advocacy. Yet, given the fact that we found only a significant effect for business actors, suggests that these factors do not constitute a *critical* condition for all types of mobilization in wealthy countries. This stand in contrast to the effect of domestic resource variables and global policy agendas which were important in *all* issues areas.

Conclusion

In this article, we have argued that a profound understanding of transnational advocacy requires an integrated framework that combines contextual conditions situated at the domestic *and* the international level. Our findings show the usefulness of such an approach. The evidence demonstrates that the mere presence of domestic organized interests at international policy venues is shaped first and foremost by the level of democracy. Countries with low levels of democracy send almost no organized interests to WTO MCs. The more countries become democratic, the more access to resources – overall wealth and/or assets attuned to a specific type of interests – starts to generate a considerable effect on the amount of transnational advocacy. This means that a resourceful context that lacks democratic institutions produces, on average, significantly less transnational advocacy compared to a similar context with democratic institutions. Next to analyzing factors formerly identified in the literature, we also tested some additional hypotheses. First, although variation in democratic openness becomes less important the wealthier countries are, domestic political-institutional properties, more precisely the institutional structure of state-society relations, remain relevant. The nature of the domestic interest intermediation system does matter, as countries with pluralist systems send significantly more business interests. In addition, we show that increased policy attention at the global level, both from an aggregate perspective as well as for particular policy fields, profoundly affects mobilization patterns of domestic interest groups. When issues are more prominent on the global agenda, we observe more organized interest activity in all issue areas. A last, yet crucial, finding is that we find no support for the thesis that organized interests that lack domestic policy attention or access to basic resources shift a substantial part of their political attention to the international level. On the contrary, our findings suggest the opposite, namely that organized interests originating from wealthy and democratic countries *and* embedded in a resourceful environment are much more likely to respond to shifts in global policy agenda's.

In this respect, our study confirms that many of the structural conditions shaping domestic organized interest politics also affect the propensity of organized interests to become

active transnationally. That is, resources and political attention are prerequisites for interest organizations to mobilize at an international venue, while the properties of domestic political institutions provide additional constraints and opportunities that shape transnational advocacy. As such, global and transnational lobbying does not differ in a fundamental way from domestic mobilization patterns. Yet, studies of domestic mobilization patterns have hitherto tended to look at resource dependencies and the impact of domestic institutions, while studies of transnational advocacy have often privileged global opportunity structures. Our inclusive and comprehensive approach shows that it is not fruitful to juxtapose both sets of explanatory factors. Quite the opposite, by combining domestic and international explanatory factors in one explanatory framework and testing hypotheses about them through multiple steps, we could add explanatory leverage to existing explanations of transnational lobbying (Poloni-Staudinger and Ortals 2013).

Of course, we need to remain careful and should not over-interpret these findings. While our analysis demonstrates that political attention at the global level is important, care is warranted when making causal claims about policy attention at t_0 determining organized interest activities at t_1 . Organized interests could have been successful in shaping the policy agenda and ensuing policy activity in the first place, and may thus have co-shaped the policy agenda. We have thus conducted our analysis assuming that the policy agenda is shaped by policymakers deciding which issues to put on the agenda, which in turns attracts organized interests who mobilize in response to this growing attention (see Toshkov et al. 2013, 50-3). In this article, we thus conceived of policy attention as an exogenous structural condition arguing that higher levels of attention result in dense interest group communities (Lowery and Gray 1996; Messer et al. 2011). Nonetheless, the risk of endogeneity of policy attention should not be overdrawn. First, it would be unusual to presume that policy attention is mostly or predominantly shaped by organized interests, since considerable part of a policy agenda is generated by other organized interests as well as policymakers from the many other WTO members. Second, our findings do not lose relevance if policy attention would be shaped primarily by the organized interests that attended MCs. On the contrary, one could even argue that our findings confirm the pivotal role played by a selected group of interests from wealthy and democratic countries in shaping global policy agendas.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that we identified key *structural* conditions that shape overall patterns of transnational advocacy. This means that our results do not allow to draw inferences about *tactical* considerations that could inform the decision of some specific organization to shift its lobbying activities to the global level. True, our general conclusion is

that domestic opportunities are crucial for understanding transnational advocacy and that organized interests without domestic policy attention or access to basic resources will not easily shift their attention to the international level. This does not rule out that under specific conditions some organized interests strategically shift to the global level (see Poloni-Staudinger and Orbals 2013). Yet, our results caution against an excessive optimistic view suggesting that global opportunities are a panacea for shortcomings in the representation of societal interests at the national level.

Acknowledgements. The research presented in this article was made possible by the Research Foundation-Flanders (Odysseus Programme, project number G.0908.09) and financial support from the University Research Fund of the University of Antwerp. We also would like to express our gratitude to all our (many) students and research assistants who helped us with coding and processing the data. Finally, we thank our colleagues – in particular Lisa Dellmuth, Andreas Dür, David Lowery, Andreas Nordang-Uhre, Jens Steffek, Jonas Tallberg and Robert Thomson – who gave excellent and constructive comments on various earlier versions of this paper.

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Table 1. Overview of dependent, independent, control variables, research hypotheses, data-sources and descriptive statistics

Variable	Variable description	Data-source	Average	Standard deviation	Minimum-maximum
Dependent variable					
Density	The number of domestic interests groups present at 8 MCs per country (1995-2011)	WTO attendance lists – coded	2.31	11.12	0 – 228
Independent variables					
H1a. Overall resources	1 = Low income countries 2 = Lower middle income countries 3 = Upper middle income countries 4 = High income countries	World Bank Statistics	2.62	1.09	1 – 4
H1b. Access to policy-specific resources	- Economic groups: market share/total world trade - NGOs: amount of development aid in a country (in million US dollars) - logged - Labor union members (in millions)	OECD statistics	2.93	2.72	0.20 – 11.02
H2a. Level of democracy	Scale ranging from -10 (authoritarian regime) to +10 (full-democracy); rescaled to 0-20	Polity Project	10,223	21,855	0 – 214,378
H2b. Wealth * Democracy	Wealth*PolityIV		0.86	0.93	0.28 – 3.68
H2c. Neo-corporatism	Allen Siaroff 5-point continuous scale of 1 (pluralism)–5 (corporatism)	Siaroff 1999	13.33	6.54	0 – 20
H3a. Global policy attention	Number of articles in World Trade Online (total and per policy field)	World Trade Online	2.53	1.37	1 – 5
H3b. Domestic policy attention	Government attention for issue areas (logged): - Economic productivity - Development aid - Environment - Labor	Comparative Manifesto Project	78.00	38.40	18 – 125
			69.19	86.58	0 – 388.44
			82.73	79.29	0 – 563.73
			118.43	80.96	0 – 398.33
			59.11	55.37	0 – 202.94
Control variables					
Distance	Distance between MC location and national capital in 1000 kilometers	GeoDist database	7.77	5.43	0 – 19.81
Trade dependency	The proportion of export and imports in the overall GNP of a country	World Bank	81.86	50.13	0 – 183.07
Trade protection I	- Level of tariffs	WTO and UNCTAD	8.34	6.30	0 – 39.73
Trade protection II	- Percentage peak tariffs		4.05	4.46	0 – 27.99
Uncertainty I	- Tariff volatility	WTO and UNCTAD	8.91	14.40	0 – 83.84
Uncertainty II	- Peak Tariff Volatility		5.48	9.29	0 – 58.45

Table 2b. Predicting overall country level presence (8 WTO MCs)

	Without interaction term				With interaction term polity*wealth			
	Logit model		Negative binomial model		Logit model		Negative binomial model	
	Estimate	Stand. error	Estimate	Stand. error	Estimate	Stand. error	Estimate	Stand. error
Constant	4.307	(2.930)	1.538	(1.179)	4.999†	(2.645)	3.251*	(1.519)
Independent variables								
1a. Wealth Countries								
1 = Low income	-1.896	(6.627)	-2.268**	(0.666)	-5.682	(4.250)	-4.954***	(1.264)
2 = Lower middle income	-2.110	(3.325)	-2.210***	(0.509)	-8.526	(9.540)	-5.371***	(1.291)
3 = Upper middle income	-9.375	(11.924)	-2.070***	(0.396)	-9.608†	(5.451)	-2.825*	(1.127)
4 = High income (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2a. Democracy level (Polity IV)	0.419***	(0.129)	0.052	(0.042)	0.593*	(0.265)	-0.028	(0.066)
3a. Global Policy Attention	0.002	(0.021)	0.010***	(0.002)	0.006	(0.021)	0.011***	(0.001)
H2b. Interaction								
Polity IV*Wealth: low income							0.169*	(0.075)
Polity IV *Wealth: lower middle income							0.184*	(0.075)
Polity IV *Wealth: upper middle income							0.030	(0.071)
Polity IV *Wealth: high income (ref)							-	-
Control variables								
Distance	0.012	(0.195)	-0.043*	(0.018)	-0.048	(0.333)	0.041*	(0.020)
Trade dependency	0.001	(0.011)	-0.008†	(0.004)	0.005	(0.029)	-0.012*	(0.004)
Trade protection I: Tariffs	0.152	(0.129)	-0.071*	(0.030)	0.097	(0.327)	-0.077**	(0.022)
Trade protection II: Peak tariffs	-0.294	(0.481)	-0.028	(0.071)	-0.532	(0.466)	-0.031	(0.057)
Uncertainty I: Tariff volatility	0.002	(0.067)	0.035**	(0.010)	0.118	(0.107)	0.033***	(0.008)
Uncertainty II: Peak tariff volatility	-0.114	(0.115)	-0.015	(0.029)	-0.305	(0.266)	-0.002	(0.033)
Diagnostics								
Ln α	0.868***	(0.158)			0.788***	(0.166)		
A	2.382	(0.376)			2.199	(0.366)		
Log likelihood function	-1370.964				-1357.37			
Wald Chi-square	117.53				151.88			
	(df=11)				(df=14)			
Prob > chi2	.0000				.0000			

Zero-inflated negative binomial regression; signs in logit model are transposed; standard errors are corrected for within-country clustering; n=1104, clusters=138, non-zero observation=348; significance levels: †=<.1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Figure 1. Predicted attendance rates (NIB-model), plus 95% confidence intervals, per level of democracy and four income groups




Table 3. Average predicted counts, standard deviations and confidence intervals (95%) for level of democracy and national income (n=1104; ZINB-model)

	Predicted count	Standard deviation	Confidence interval	
			<i>Lower</i>	<i>Upper</i>
Autocracies (polity <= -6, n=204)	0.24	0.05	0.13	0.34
Anocracies (polity between -5 and 5, n=316)	0.90	0.18	0.53	1.27
Democracies (polity >= 6, n=624)	2.35	0.45	1.46	3.23
Low income countries (n=232)	0.57	0.21	0.14	0.99
Lower middle income countries (n=280)	0.62	0.17	0.27	0.97
Upper middle income countries (n=312)	0.80	0.17	0.46	1.14
High income countries (n=320)	4.77	1.37	2.07	7.47

Table 4. Predicting overall country level presence for different types of organized interests (21 OECD countries)

	Agricultural business	Manufacturing business	Development NGOs	Environmental NGOs	Labor organizations
Constant	-1.904† (1.076)	-3.919** (1.128)	-7.958*** (0.927)	-9.042*** (2.349)	-5.902*** (1.204)
Independent variables					
1a. GDP/capita	0.066*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.016)	0.067*** (0.007)	0.023* (0.010)	0.008 (0.009)
1b. Market share	0.175* (0.080)	0.200*** (0.057)			
1b. Development aid			0.454*** (0.099)	0.675*** (0.174)	
1b. Union members					0.870** (0.155)
2c. Corporatism	-0.614*** (0.130)	-0.456† (0.251)	-0.078 (0.097)	0.185 (0.154)	0.137 (0.172)
3a. Global attention	0.041*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.055*** (0.006)	0.015*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.008)
3b. Domestic attention	0.117 (0.105)	0.026 (.106)	0.141 (0.111)	0.099 (0.190)	-0.061 (0.063)
Control variables					
Distance	-0.076* (0.032)	-0.065** (0.023)	-0.028 (0.025)	0.029 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.030)
Trade dependencies	-0.011* (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)			
Diagnostics					
Ln α	-0.071 (0.329)	-0.176 (0.451)	-0.969 (0.420)	-0.033 (0.479)	-0.071 (0.292)
α	0.931 (0.306)	0.837 (0.378)	0.379 (0.159)	1.034 (0.495)	0.931 (0.272)
LL	-251.418	-206.272	-257.074	-155.927	-236.662
Wald Chi-square	347.43	147.86	322.43	60.24	43.54
Prob > chi2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Negative binomial regression; standard errors are corrected for within-country clustering; n=168, clusters=21; significance levels: †=<.1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001