Jamie B Luguri

Jamie B Luguri
Yale University | YU

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14
Publications
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189
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Publications

Publications (14)
Article
Full-text available
In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs were linked to stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign blame. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n=308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralizati...
Article
Full-text available
In 14 studies, we tested whether political conservatives' stronger free will beliefs were linked to stronger and broader tendencies to moralize and, thus, a greater motivation to assign blame. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of 5 studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization mea...
Article
The present research links a nonsocial, contextual influence (construal level) to the tendency to endorse genetic attributions for individual and social group differences. Studies 1 to 3 show that people thinking in an abstract (vs. concrete) mind-set score higher on a measure of genetic attributions for individual and racial group differences. Stu...
Article
Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). S...
Article
Full-text available
Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). S...
Preprint
In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs aredriven by stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign responsibility. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for m...
Article
Construal level theory posits that that when people are thinking abstractly (vs. concretely) they rely more on their core and consistent attitudes and values. However, past research has been mixed on whether abstract thinking causes liberals and conservatives to become more or less polarized. In the current research, we examine how identity salienc...
Article
Full-text available
Prior research has demonstrated the valence-framing effect, in which leading people to frame a preference negatively (e.g., 'I oppose Romney') yields stronger attitudes than does leading people to frame that same preference positively (e.g., 'I support Obama'). Three studies tested whether or not depth of processing (as operationalized by manipulat...
Article
Full-text available
Myrdal (1944) described the "American dilemma" as the conflict between abstract national values ("liberty and justice for all") and more concrete, everyday prejudices. We leveraged construal-level theory to empirically test Myrdal's proposition that construal level (abstract vs. concrete) can influence prejudice. We measured individual differences...

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