

## A Networked Space of Meaning? Spatial Politics as Geostrategies of European Integration

James Wesley Scott

To cite this article: James Wesley Scott (2002) A Networked Space of Meaning? Spatial Politics as Geostrategies of European Integration, *Space and Polity*, 6:2, 147-167, DOI: [10.1080/1356257022000003608](https://doi.org/10.1080/1356257022000003608)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356257022000003608>



Published online: 25 Aug 2010.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 233



View related articles [↗](#)



Citing articles: 25 View citing articles [↗](#)

## A Networked Space of Meaning? Spatial Politics as Geostrategies of European Integration

JAMES WESLEY SCOTT

*[Paper first received, September 2001; in final form, April 2002]*

**Abstract.** The European Union is an example of regionalisation characterised not only by economic integration, but also by a ‘spatial politics’ aimed at instilling a sense of European identity and citizenship. Spatial politics are discussed here in terms of governance, regional policies and the production of geographical knowledge that reinforce the notion of a diverse but interdependent European space and, hence, political community. The paper examines recent planning concepts and regional development initiatives and their socio-political qualities and, in particular, their contested nature. Critical questions are raised, for example, regarding European spatial planning, its openness to different spatial development options and its apparent domination by ‘core’ Europe. The author suggests that European spatial politics can potentially contribute to a more cohesive political community, but that this is contingent upon the translation of symbolism into concrete incentives and opportunity structures that promote wider Europeanisation. This also requires forceful institutions, integrating symbolism and clear and effective forms of governance that allow regional diversity to find appropriate political expression.

The European Union—as the only true organised regional space in the world—plays a fundamental role in the building up of the new political architecture and needs to be strengthened further. Indeed Europe, through its integration process, has been able to act not only as an element of balance in (the) international relations, but also as an inducing factor leading to the strengthening of other regional blocs (António Guterres, Prime Minister of Portugal, speech delivered in Berlin, 7 May 2001, p. 8).

James Wesley Scott is in the Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, Freie Universität Berlin, Malteserstr. 74–100, Haus K12249 Berlin, Germany. Fax: 30 838 70 757. E-mail: jscott@geog.fu-berlin.de. This paper is based on research conducted with the generous support of the German–American Academic Council. The research project, which involved North American and European comparisons of transnational regionalism, was carried out in co-operation with Matthew Sparke of the University of Washington. The author would also like to express his thanks to Pertti Joenniemi and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

Of all the large regional groupings in the contemporary world, it is Europe where the search for a link between meaning and power is the most urgent and the most explicit. If Europe is to influence an ever-rougher world game, to preserve its high standard of living and quality of life, and to reduce the socially devastating effects of increased world competition, it has to combine its forces and reduce its fragmentation (Laidi, 1998, p. 67).

## **Introduction**

This paper is motivated by an attempt to comprehend the European integration process as an element of the social-spatial transformation of national polities and economies. Furthermore, the arguments presented here combine geopolitical perspectives on governance with a concern for current academic and political debates on reconceptualisations of spatial scale. The evolution of the European Union arguably represents an alternative geopolitical process that de-emphasises state-centred power politics and hegemony and privileges multipolarity and interdependence (Parker, 1998). The European Union, as a macroregional formation within the world system, is also an exercise in rescaling and reconfiguring political processes. Brenner (1999) suggests that globalisation and post-Fordist capitalism are resulting in 'reterritorialisations' of governance upwards towards international organisations, downwards to cities and regions, and horizontally across nations, regions and communities. The construction of the European Union combines all three of these transformations, re-embedding social-spatial relationships through the creation (as project and process) of a macroregional, European scale.

This approach to (macro)regionalisation draws inspiration from critical readings of geopolitics that shift focus from the 'objective' domination of space by world powers to a preoccupation with the socio-political construction of geopolitical orders. As this paper demonstrates, constructionist views open the field to new interpretations of how space, territory, identity and governance are being renegotiated (or reterritorialised) within the international system. At the same time, the (critical) geopolitical perspective developed here also interprets the political significance of macroregions in terms of the competitive management of the forces of economic and political globalisation (Hocking, 1996). This approach has also found followers among IR scholars, many of them from Nordic countries, who have pursued issues of region-building, identity-construction and security (Joenniemi, 1999; Neumann, 1999).

The emergence of a politically meaningful European scale must be accompanied by the definition of a specific macroregional identity that sets it apart from other geoeconomic spaces, most importantly from the North American Free Trade Area.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the creation of a wider European perspective for regional development, spatial planning and other governance issues is much more than a mere technical matter—it requires a flexible construction of political and territorial identities as these must co-exist in constant tension with national/local interpretations of Europe. The 'spatial politics' of European integration will be dealt with here at two interconnected levels. At one level, we are dealing with values and ideals that support the regional embedding of political processes and responsive, democratic governance. The second level involves a geo-conceptual remaking of Europe as a diverse but networked space of states, regions and

localities. Spatial planning and regional policy have acquired a central role in this project of European construction; it is here where issues of governance, territory and development are most actively renegotiated. It is also the role of spatial planning to provide ideational foundations for a networked Europe through symbolic representations of European space and its future development perspectives. Indeed, one of the principal assumptions underlying recent European planning paradigms is that symbolism guides collective action by creating a sense of common understanding and providing a 'language' that promotes consensus-building.

This paper is a sympathetic treatment of spatial politics and symbolism as employed in the context of European integration. However, there can be no denial that, despite more or less explicit attempts at a Europeanisation of society and space, integration—and therefore spatial politics—remains a contested project. Both the definition of Europe as a 'region' and of 'Europeanness' as an element of identity-formation are subject to very different interpretations, often influenced by national and local experience (Paasi, 2001). Furthermore, regional disparities as well as cultural and political heterogeneity are certain to increase with the enlargement process. Goals of economic efficiency, often informed by neo-liberal ideology, clash with principles of solidarity and spatially balanced economic development. Consequently, one of the principal challenges facing the construction of a European space of meaning will be to reconcile interregional competition with comprehensive strategies of sustainable economic growth.

These issues will be dealt with in a critical treatment of European spatial politics. Discussion will be divided into four parts. First, the paper will focus on specific institutions, political principles and social values that support the notion of a unique European space. These underlie an emerging notion of governance characterised by a search for appropriate spatial fixes and administrative/political responses to changes in the internal and external environments of the EU. In the second part of the paper, spatial planning and symbolic representations of European space will be discussed in greater detail. This will be done by examining planning concepts and regional development initiatives that have developed within the past decade. The third part follows with observations regarding socio-political aspects of spatial politics, particularly its contested nature. Critical questions are raised, for example, regarding European spatial planning and its responsiveness and openness to different spatial development options. In concluding, it is suggested that European spatial politics can potentially contribute to a more cohesive political community but that this is contingent upon the translation of symbolism into concrete incentives and opportunity structures that promote wider Europeanisation.

### **Macroregionalisation and the Construction of Political Spaces of Meaning**

The characteristic territorial feature of the European Union is its cultural variety, concentrated in a small area. This distinguishes it from other large economic zones of the world, such as the USA, Japan and MERCOSUR. This variety—potentially one of the most significant development factors for the EU—must be retained in the face of European integration (European Commission, 1999, p. 7).

As Peter Taylor has argued, the 20th century saw both the apogee of modern

nation-states and, at the same time, the emergence of “geographical global scale” (Taylor, 1993, p. 1). In scrutinising these two general phenomena, political geography has, since the 1950s, developed considerable sophistication. It has long outgrown ‘objective’ functional approaches and incorporated complex social theory and political economy in its analyses of the state and the international system. Consequently, at the beginning of the 21st century, contradictions between territorial control (as embodied by state power) and interdependent economic and political space on a global scale lie at the centre of political geography’s agenda (Hirsch, 1995; Zincone and Agnew, 2000). These contradictions are reflected in the gradual shifting and/or relocation of spatial scales within which policy is both formulated and carried out. The transnational activities of non-central governments such as cities and regions, as well as NGOs and other organisations, fuel speculation as to the dimensions of this shift in territorial scales of governance (Anderson, 1995; Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999).

Macroregionalisation, or the creation of politically coherent and cohesive blocs within the world system, is one of the more outstanding indicators of change in the social-spatial organisation of international relations. Along with the EU, a series of other regional organisations and/or regimes have emerged in recent decades, such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), MERCOSUR and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) that are increasingly involved in the transnational regulation of economic and political life (Higgott, 1998; Pizarro, 1999; Mansfield and Milner, 1997). The reasons for the emergence of these regional formations appear, at least at first glance, straightforward and can be understood in general terms as institutional change in the international system both as a response to global forces and as a result of new demands caused by change in national political environments (Hurrell, 1995; Katzenstein, 1997).

Notions of ‘geoeconomics’ (coined by Luttwak, 1990) and ‘geogovernance’ (Sum, 1999), express, for example, a post-Cold War preoccupation with ‘nodality’ and ‘positionality’ within the world system (Sparke, 2002). For the sake of this particular discussion, the geopolitics of macroregionalisation involves an intentional project of reconfiguring geographical scale in order to find institutional arrangements that will meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities presented by globalisation. The EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, APEC and other regional ‘clubs’ are manifestations of geogovernance that allow for a co-ordination of national policies with a view to orchestrating and regulating globalisation processes (Cable, 1999).

Despite their proliferation and ‘objective’ strategic nature, macroregionalisation processes are extremely context-sensitive and vary with the ideas and values held by the respective communities of private- and public-sector actors (Higgott, 1998). To understand their geopolitical significance in more profound terms, they therefore cannot be merely subsumed within the logic of neoliberal post-Fordism, no matter how powerful this might be as a unifying analytical paradigm. Zaki Laidi (1998) argues that, as a result of the anticlimactic end to Cold War order and the disappearance of a world structured around identifiable East–West and North–South oppositions, the international system is presently characterised by a loss of orientation and symbolic representations of the future. A major geopolitical challenge, both for states and continents, is thus to rediscover purpose and geoeconomic identity; that is, to define “spaces of meaning” within a disoriented post-Cold-War world. Macroregionalisation, to the extent

that it signifies the emergence of politically operational spaces of meaning, must then entail processes of institutionalisation and identity-formation (Neumann, 1999, pp. 20–37).

Laidi (1998) holds that the development of a European space of meaning based on a tolerance of diversity and humanist ideals, might serve to stabilise the current global dis-order of conflict and polarisation. Indeed, this is precisely the role that many EU élites envisage for the Union (see, European Commission, 2001a). Hence the drive for a more perfect Union that is cohesive politically, institutionally, economically and culturally (European Commission, 1997). However, the task of the EU in this regard appears daunting. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the EU will ever supplant nation-states as an identity-structuring institution. As Michael Keating (1998, p. 27) points out, the nature of Europe's 'new political order' remains unclear and hotly debated and will evolve out of processes of multilevel experimentation and interstate compromise.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, in order to enhance its significance as a political community, the EU must promote formal and informal means of integration, respect local and regional sensibilities and, ultimately, secure the broad and long-term support of the EU citizenry. The challenge of sharing elements of national sovereignty within a much larger political community therefore involves not only reconciling different national and sub-national perspectives on social and economic development but maintaining legitimacy through franchising and incorporating local communities. Similarly, new regional forms of political integration must strike a balance between perceived imperatives of globalisation and more immediate local concerns. Consequently, the EU is taking great pains to develop a vision of European development that will re-establish its sense of purpose. However, the construction of European meaning is a contested project. According to Brigid Laffan (1996), Thomas Risse (2001) and others, there exist at least three basic trajectories of Europeanisation: a shift of political focus in treating member-populations as European citizens rather than as mere economic subjects; a politics of identity and symbols; and, the creation of non-economic cross-national networks.

Critical geopolitics investigates the production and application of geographical knowledge in constructing international political relations (Dalby and Ó'Tuathail, 1996). It eschews realist acceptance of 'objective' geopolitical orders, such as those defined by the hegemony of certain states or groups of states, and instead demonstrates how the subjective use of power (in military, economic and/or discursive forms) creates an illusion of clear objective reality. In so doing, critical geopolitics directs attention to the messy, multilevel of international relations, opening up spaces for many different and nuanced interpretations of geopolitical orders and international politics. Perhaps most importantly for this discussion, and as the work of Dodds and Sidaway (1994), Ó'Tuathail (1998) and others documents, critical geopolitics highlights the socio-political and cultural construction of geopolitical order (or disorder, as the case might be) emphasising, as does Laidi (1998), that symbolism and meaning are never far from 'real' politics.

Scandinavian regionalists such as Carlsnaes (1986), Hettne (1994), Joenieni (1999) and others have long emphasised the symbolic and ideational character of international relations. Symbols and metaphors serve to define the purpose and identity necessary for defining roles and relationships. In the case of regional co-operation, they serve to bound political community by providing a set of

commonly understood and accepted ideas. In order to have meaning for a specific group, symbols and metaphors must at least seem to be grounded in common historical experiences. However, they are not immutable; they are, rather, in a state of flux, particularly in times of rapid change. As Erik Ringmar has argued, 'formative moments' provide opportunities for change in symbolic orders by contesting older orders. Furthermore, such moments

are characteristically periods of symbolic hyper-inflation—times when new emblems, flags, dress codes, songs, fetes and rituals are continuously invented (Ringmar, 1996, p. 85).

To Ringmar's list of symbols we could add: historical events recast in modern contexts, symbols derived from landscapes and, most definitely, maps. The European Union has seized the opportunity to frame the geopolitical shifts that have taken place since 1989 and the mammoth project of enlargement as a formative moment for the creation of its own unifying symbolism. In addition to the symbolic devices mentioned above, the EU has produced an ideational 'hyper-inflation' as well. It has proclaimed human rights, good governance, social equity goals, economic and market-oriented goals, sustainability, environmental security, the protection of cultural landscapes and cultural heritage, etc., defining elements of 'Europeanness'.

Territoriality, symbolism and politics come together very concretely in the question of governance. Indeed, one of the principal assumptions underlying recent European planning paradigms is that symbolism is needed to guide collective action by creating a sense of common understanding and providing a 'language' that promotes consensus-building. Within this context, the support of multilevel transnational co-operation in regional policy, spatial planning and other areas in Europe can be understood in terms of a metastrategy in which access to resources within a competitive, multilayered and globalised economy is becoming evermore important (Hocking, 1996). The discussion will focus on these points, whereby European construction will be interpreted in terms of policies aimed at endowing the EU with a set of principles and new spatial symbolism. It will be argued that this also involves a creation of new European geographies in order encourage a reconceptualisation of political space and, as a result, new regional development strategies.

### **Governance, 'New Political Architecture' and the Europeanisation of National Political Space**

Principles and values that distinguish the EU as a political community must be made operational in order to have meaningful regionalising impact. It is in *governance* where political values find their clearest territorial expression. Principles of subsidiarity and partnership increasingly guide the evolution of EU policy, particularly since Maastricht. The most direct consequences of these principles in terms of 'spaces and polities' is a search for the most appropriate and responsive territorial arrangement for different aspects of public policy. As the political construction of Europe has progressed, so the complexity and sophistication of its formal institutions and the scope of its political and economic networks have grown (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). However, as criticism of EU bureaucracy has increased and state–society paradigms that decry statist regulation take hold, 'flexible' (and therefore contractually nego-

tiable) forms of governance are seen as a source of strength (Anderson, 1995; Sbragia, 2000).

Since the mid 1980s, a gradual Europeanisation of domestic policies has taken place, allowing the European Commission more direct access to sub-regional levels and, by the same token, allowing sub-national actors a greater say in European policy implementation. In terms of political principles, this development of multilevel governance is based on specific notions of 'subsidiarity' and partnership, officially introduced as elements of policy by the 1988 reform of EU structural policy and since enshrined by the Maastricht Treaty and in the 1993 and 1999 reforms to structural policy. These principles involve not only a process of vertical co-ordination between various levels of government, but also contain an inclusive element that mandates the participation of non-state actors, NGOs and social partners in the policy-making process. Partnership implies a challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the nation-state by establishing direct links between sub-national and supranational levels in the definition of interests, strategies and objectives. Interestingly, European planning policy has espoused a 'networked' approach to governance that promulgates a move away from what is perceived to be 'command and control' regulation to more proactive and project-oriented approaches to urban and regional development. This paradigm is echoed in planning documents such as the European Spatial Development Perspective ESDP (European Commission, 1999) and TERRA in which it is stated that

the plan is now understood as a 'project of a city or region', a democratic expression of what the territory should be and a frame of reference for collective action (European Commission, 2000, p. 9).

Governance within the EU is thus designed to break down traditional hierarchical relationships between citizen and state, seen as an impediment to the development of a European political community. These changes in relationships between regions, states and the supranational level of the EU have been captured through the notion of 'multilevel governance'. The implication here is that the European integration process is facilitating a gradual shift of policy-making procedure from a nation-state oriented system to a more complex network of actors operating at different administrative levels within evolving supranational political structures (Marks, 1997; Börzel, 2001). However, EU attempts to define the parameters of future forms of governance go beyond this. Romano Prodi (2001) has emphasised the need to bring Europe closer to the citizen and the role that governance plays in realising this aim. At the same time, the EU is expected to act decisively and 'visibly', both within Europe and internationally, as if it were a *de facto* state (EU Commission, 2001a). With *European Governance: A White Paper*, released in July 2001, the EU has begun an open discussion on the reform and improvement of its political processes. The primary aim here is to develop a more systematic multilevel dialogue and greater flexibility in the implementation of EU legislation. Also included in the White Paper are considerations of global governance

the Union should seek to apply the principles of good governance to its global responsibilities. It should aim to boost the effectiveness and enforcement powers of international institutions (EU Commission, 2001a, p. 5).



## **Regional Scale and European Political Identity**

Attempts to create new and flexible territorial contexts for governance within the supranational framework of the EU are an element of European integration that cuts across member-state jurisdictions and EU policy areas. Within this process, the emphasis of regional scale is judged to be of central importance as it spatially integrates notions of economic dynamism, administrative efficiency, community empowerment, civil society and responsive governance (European Commission, 2001a).

Regional scale also helps to define the uniqueness of European governance and in establishing direct relations between the EU and the local level. Within the nation-states of the EU, parallel processes of regionalisation have taken place in which sub-units of the state have been accorded a larger role in defining their futures and influencing European policy. Whilst often based upon historical and cultural traditions, this more local form of regionalism has also been promoted by state policy as a means of rationalising administration and managing internal conflict (Benz *et al.*, 1999). This process is supported institutionally by the Committee of the Regions, an advisory assembly to the European Parliament and Commission but it is also developing as loose co-operative networks, often, but not always, with financial support from the EU. Furthermore, regionalisation is a large-scale project designed, among other things, to empower local communities, to create new strategic alliances between cities and regions and to facilitate the diffusion of social, political and economic innovation (Lindström *et al.*, 1996). If we consider the strategic interests of the EU outlined above, especially the promotion of greater economic and political interdependence as a pre-condition for political stability in Europe, we can also identify a powerful rationale for a more prominent regional role in policy-making (European Commission, 1999).

Regional development is a policy area that lies at the heart of shifting spatial scales of governance within the EU context. Nation-states, including such 'established' democracies as Belgium, Spain, Italy and the UK, must continuously balance national unity and regional interests or suffer the consequences. The sources of these regional tensions are multifarious and the 'modern' response to these challenges has, to a great extent, been characterised by attempts to eliminate socioeconomic disparities and to improve the material basis for development of the regions—a fundamental rationale for regional policy (Higgins and Savoie, 1997). The EU has taken up this aspect of public policy and has developed it into a central area of its governance functions.

A major innovation introduced by European integration has been to transcend a strictly national focus in regional policy, which predominated well into the 1980s, and conceptualise regional development on a continental scale. Numerous programmes and initiatives have been launched with the express goal of creating new spatial perspectives for co-operation between cities and regions in various areas of economic development and regional policy. INTERREG, now in its third phase (2000–06), has supported numerous transboundary and transnational co-operation projects since 1989. Financed out of the EU's structural funds, the present initiative has earmarked over 4.8 billion euros to this end, making it the community's largest structural initiative. With co-financing from national and local sources, the total amount available within the INTERREG framework will exceed well over 6 billion euros. In addition, programmes targeted for

central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most prominently PHARE and TACIS, provide supplemental funds for cross-border projects on the EU's external boundaries.

In seeking to strengthen the competitiveness and political responsiveness of the Union, the EU has specifically emphasised the role of regions. Increasingly since 1985, the EU has redesigned its policies to put European regions, rather than nation-states, at the centre of its development agenda. Furthermore, the symbolic importance of 'regional anchoring' is also evident in political documents and statements that support the idea of transboundary co-operation. Ex-EU Commissioner Monika Wulf-Matthies has suggested that a more direct experience with European integration and greater understanding of the importance of promoting integration can only develop out of a sense of "regional-local empowerment".<sup>3</sup> It has also been argued that transnational regionalism contributes to community-building through promoting processes of Deutschian 'social learning' and that political support of co-operative projects addressing specific regional problems will help to create a 'citizen's Europe' (Weynand, 1997).

### **Symbolic Planning and Virtual Regions**

The discussion thus far has been replete with evocative buzzwords that express 'European' political values, social objectives and governance principles. Within the vocabulary of Europeanisation discourses we can encounter such notions as: partnership, sustainability, cohesion, solidarity, competitiveness, diversity, unity, cultural heritage, networking and Euroregions.<sup>4</sup> These concepts serve to make (or so it is intended) the EU palpable and legible at the local level in order that it may develop internal coherence. Furthermore, the rapid development of technological and social innovations—due in great measure to increased global economic competition—has tended to reinforce the credibility of such discursive ideas as a 'Europe of regions' and 'variety in unity' (Jukarainen, 1999).

The political changes that have visited Europe since 1989 have not only given the integration process greater impetus but are responsible for a 'spatial revolution' in the conceptualisation of the European political community. Through territorial policies, social objectives and governance principles promulgated by the EU are being translated into spatial contexts. Notions of European citizenship, spatial development concepts, visionary cartography, regional policy doctrine and new governance paradigms, have been woven together within Europeanising discourses that extol the virtues of co-operation, networking, social capital and general values such as sustainability, solidarity and cohesion. What these spatial concepts imply is, in my opinion, the 'flexible' construction of a networked European society within the context of heterogeneity and a composite supranational polity. European planning and structural policy documents emphasise a need for spatially integrated forms of political co-operation and problem-solving (European Commission, 2001b, 1996). Hence, the construction of (a future enlarged) Europe involves the envisioning of a new strategic space: networked, flexible, competitive, but at the same time co-operative in the solution of common economic, social and environmental problems.

Spatial planning, in particular, is characterised by a search for appropriate spatial fixes and administrative/political responses to changes in the internal and external environments of the Union and its member-states. Attempts at

post-war European spatial planning, spearheaded by German, Dutch and French planning organisations, date from the 1950s. The Council of Europe's Committee of Planning Ministers (CEMAT) has also been active in the area of European regional planning (and encompassing a much larger area than the EU) since 1970. However, European spatial planning as a concerted multi-actor effort has emerged since 1989 and the dramatic political changes on the continent (Williams, 2000). During the 1990s, it not only greatly intensified its activities but also took the markedly discursive and symbolic turn that presently characterises it.

Symbolic planning involves an attempt to construct a European spatial reality through the invention of images and definition of arguments intended to guide action in the area of spatial development (Groth, 2000). Central to symbolic planning in the EU context is a focus on urban systems, urban–rural relationships, access to development opportunity structures and a concern for a diverse natural and cultural heritage. At the same time that they emphasise the importance of sustainability and environmental protection, these planning principles also champion regional competitiveness through ‘clustering’ in terms of localised learning processes, synergy, co-operative governance and regional stewardship negotiated between stakeholders in regional development.

Symbolic planning in the EU context privileges a notion of space that rejects the economic regularities of Christaller's and Lösch's landscapes, oriented as they are towards central points within clearly defined national urban hierarchies. Instead, economic space in the ‘symbolic’ context is both transnationally and regionally interconnected. As a result, strategic planning concepts—such as those that promote ‘polycentric urban regions’—have been advanced as a method with which the better to position urban regions within the greater European economic space and to enhance the interconnectedness of cities and regions (Faludi, 1998; van Houtum and Lagendijk, 2001). The resulting polycentred ‘mosaics’ are difficult to plan for when compartmentalised into national spaces and, hence, a shift away from legalistic and formal modes of land-use planning and towards spatial development *projects* has been espoused. Furthermore, symbolic planning employs a combination of visionary cartography and metaphors in order to convey its message. Development perspectives and scenarios have been ‘mapped out’ in considerable detail and at various spatial levels and include the ‘blue banana’ of core Europe, mesoregional zones of planning co-operation, Euroregions and programme regions. In this way, networks and trans-European urban and regional hierarchies have emerged as central elements in the definition of an integrating European economic and political space. Metaphors are used to enhance conceptions of material spaces within a European context. Among the most evocative of these metaphors are ‘regions’, ‘euroregions’ and ‘networks’.

Symbolic planning for a cohesive European space has culminated in the elaboration of a European Spatial Development Perspective, or ESDP (European Commission, 1999). This process was inaugurated in 1994 at a pan-European meeting of regional planning agencies in Leipzig, Germany. After five years of debate and numerous regional meetings, a framework document was agreed by the European Ministers of Spatial Planning that enshrines sustainable economic development, socioeconomic cohesion, regional equity and polynucleated (and thus balanced) urban development as common objectives. Although not a community-level policy in the sense of agriculture or regional development,

ESDP plays a role as a policy guideline and as a means of conflict-avoidance in industrial, environmental, transport and other spatial development policy areas (Groth, 2000). More importantly perhaps, ESDP is a framework for structural transnational co-operation within the EU (and with neighbouring countries) based on macro and mesoregionalisation processes, multilevel governance partnerships and agenda-setting in spatial development issues. Importantly, ESDP is designed as a strategic element of the networking of Europe physically taking place through the construction of Trans-European Railways and Motorways (EU Commission, 1999, p. 14).

Closely related to symbolic planning are attempts to transnationalise space within the EU, embedding a notion of 'region' and regional competitiveness within a more global European (rather than strictly national) context. Transcending boundaries remains, in fact, a *leitmotif* of European politics, even after 40 years of gradual progress in integrating nation-states. This is evidenced by the INTERREG structural initiative which supports local, regional and mesoregional co-operation across borders.<sup>5</sup> It is also manifested by a proliferation of initiatives aimed at promoting transnational networking, including the generously funded Research, Technological Development and Demonstration (RTD) programmes. In terms of planning and regional development strategy, the transnationalisation of European space is based on flexible processes of region-building. Sergio Boisier (1993) has indicated that communication technology and a heightened awareness of regional vulnerability have encouraged flexible forms of regionalisation at different spatial levels, signalling the emergence of 'virtual' regions. These regions are organised around attempts to co-ordinate regional development or to address other issues of common interest between a variety of localities that are not necessarily geographically contiguous. According to Boisier's notion, virtual regions represent communities of interest established by virtue of contractual agreements and other co-operative arrangements. Through such co-operation, virtual regions aim to dedicate and co-ordinate their resources to the achievement of specific short- and long-term goals in ways more effective than traditional state-centred means.

Virtual regions are an important element in the construction of a European planning space. While ESDP serves as a general framework for pan-European development, other planning processes have emerged that provide mesoregional perspectives within the EU context. Among these are Visions and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea 2010 (VASAB Secretariat, 1997), the programming process involved in managing the EU's INTERREG IIC and IIIB initiatives, and the TERRA planning laboratory. These documents elaborate at length on the notion of flexible regionalisation (although avoiding the term 'virtual' due to its possible negative overtones) and suggest, for example, the possibility of new co-operative regions such as the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic Arc or the Mediterranean region. Visions and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea 2010 (VASAB Secretariat, 1997; Nordregio, 2000) is being promoted as an innovative approach to transnational co-operation in dealing with a complex array of problems ranging from water resources management and urban development to the restructuring of post-socialist economies in crisis. VASAB is an especially poetic document that aims to promote a sense of Baltic regionalism based on interdependence. The four major trajectories of development—urban, regional, infrastructure and institutional—are conceptualised in terms of evocative objects and notions (see Table 1).


**Table 1.** VASAB 2010: spatial metaphors in the service of regional development

I	General goal	Establishing a transnational agenda and framework for regional development
II	The 'Pearls'	An urban network of international importance
III	The 'Strings'	Effective and sustainable links between cities
IV	The 'Patches'	Areas supporting dynamism and quality of life
V	The 'System'	Comprehensive spatial planning as a functional institution

Mesoregional spaces such as the Baltic Sea region have historical claims to a regional identity. Other mesoregions, 'established', for example, within the INTERREG initiative and the smaller European Regional Development Fund provision (Article 10) for pilot projects in interregional co-operation, are much more 'artificial' in nature, programmed around a sense of shared development problems and very general geographical categories (see Figure 1). In this way, the Atlantic Arc, CADSES (Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and South-eastern European Space) and the North-west Metropolitan Area are more or less contiguous spaces defined in terms of core-periphery status and considerations of post-socialist transformation of central and eastern Europe. Through associating rural regions experiencing high unemployment, for example, the Atlantic Arc framework provides an opportunity structure for the exchange of information and experience in economic and social development.

Project-focused and problem-oriented regions are perhaps the most flexible (and tenuous) of European spaces in this context of spatial politics. However, the Europeanisation of space is also evident in very concrete microregional situations. For example, a number of cross-border spatial planning concepts have been drawn up along Germany's external borders (Scott, 2000). These are, on the whole, very general plans based on central places and development corridors; their innovative content lies in the suggestion of a possibility of 'jointly managed' transnational spaces. The German-Polish Spatial Planning Perspective, completed in 1995, is now in the process of re-evaluation.<sup>6</sup> More importantly, however, the practice of establishing Euroregions, local and/or regional government associations devoted to cross-border co-operation, has spread through the EU. Euroregions are an interesting case here; while necessarily referring to specific regional contexts, they are, in the aggregate, a spatial metaphor in the sense that they evoke a sense of transnational community, developed in free association, that contributes to wider European integration. Politically speaking, local-level cross-border regionalisation is seen *in the European context* to provide a more apt spatial fit for the management of political, economic, cultural and environmental matters and has thus developed into a policy area in its own right.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the Euroregion concept has proved a powerful tool with which to transport European values and objectives. The popularity of the concept is evident in its proliferation within the EU, particularly along Germany's borders. More striking, however, is the fact that since 1993 Euroregions have rapidly materialised in central and eastern Europe, in areas characterised by decades of conflict, closure and non-co-operation (Eger, 1998).


In addition to flexible regionalisation, European symbolic planning attaches great importance to the mobility network that will integrate the continent in concrete, physical terms. Figure 2 depicts the Trans-European Railway and Motorway network (TEM-TER), including strategically important high-speed



**Figure 1.** Transnational spaces and virtual regions: INTERREG IIC programme areas. *Key:* 1. North Sea region; 2. North-western metropolitan area; 3. South-western Europe; 4. Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and south-eastern European space (CADSES); 5. Baltic Sea region; 6. Western Mediterranean and Latin Alps; 7. Atlantic area. *Source:* European Commission (1999, p. 45).

rail lines, that will link European centres. Rail and road networks are also to be more carefully integrated and the need for intermodal transport chains and a sustainable solution to transport problems is stressed (European Commission, 1999, p. 30). While the major TEM-TER lines largely bypass more peripheral areas, ESDP stresses the need to integrate secondary transport networks into the modernised, high-speed routes in order to prevent future marginalisation of the peripheries. Access to infrastructure and 'urban-rural' partnerships (European Commission, 1999, pp. 23-27) features prominently as a means to attenuate the polarisation of growth and development in the EU.

Finally, the conceptualisations of spatial development both within the present and future enlarged EU are very closely linked to governance issues. This follows from the logic of ESDP, VASAB and other planning initiatives that seek



**Figure 2.** The 14 priority projects of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TER). *Key:* 1. High-speed train/combined transport, north–south; 2. High-speed train, PBKAL; 3. High-speed train, south; 4. High-speed train, east; 5. Betuwe line; conventional rail/combined transport; 6. High-speed train/combined transport, France–Italy; 7. Greek motorways, Pathe and Via Egnatia; 8. Multimodal link, Portugal–Spain–central Europe; 9. Conventional rail, Cork–Dublin–Belfast–Larne–Stranraer; 10. Malpensa airport, Milano; 11. Oresund fixed rail/road link, Denmark–Sweden; 12. Nordic triangle multimodal corridor; 13. Ireland–United Kingdom–Benelux road link; 14. West coast main line. *Source:* European Commission (1999, p. 15).

to encourage a ‘European’ spatial planning and regional development praxis. At the same time, the European situation is very much characterised by a re-configuration of politics at the regional level around the theme of growth and competitiveness (Keating, 1997). The basic implication of this for planning and

regional development is that vision and strategy developed within a process of open dialogue can, in many cases, provide more appropriate guidance for action than outright regulation. The 'system' (see Table 1) that is envisaged is thus intended to encourage proactive and project-oriented collective action while remaining embedded (through 'vertical and horizontal integration') within more formal avenues of policy definition (European Commission, 1999, p. 36; 2000, p. 9).

### **Symbolic Planning: A Reflection of the Contestedness of 'EU Europe'**

European spatial planning is distinguished by its focus on the production of spatial concepts and avoidance of prescriptive doctrine. The geographical knowledge thus being generated underscores a dichotomous conceptualisation of the European continent; that is, of cores and peripheries, of strengths and weaknesses, of EU and 'non'-EU Europe. The various planning documents discussed in this paper suggest that a more cohesive, competitive and sustainable continent can be achieved through informed governance and by empowered localities. Furthermore, European spatial planning promotes the notion that dense economic networks, a sense of cultural heritage and European identity coupled with innovative drive will provide the foundations for the strategies and governance necessary to overcome the EU's global weaknesses.

This, on the one hand evocative and on the other rather vague, conceptualisation of integral European development accommodates many different interests and voices. ESDP's virtuous triangle of 'society, economy and environment', within which European sustainable development is to evolve, encompasses virtually all spheres of political life (European Commission, 1999, p. 10). However, closer examination reveals the highly contested nature of European spatial politics and of symbolic planning in particular. Indeed, ESDP, VASAB, INTERREG IIC/IIIB, TERRA and other expressions of European spatial politics raise a series of questions regarding interpretations of a European 'space of meaning' and the interests that spatial planning is serving. In the following, I will briefly sketch out several socio-political issues that have emerged with respect to European symbolic planning. These issues relate specifically to ideological tensions, core-periphery conflicts, diverging national perspectives and implementation, as well as the inclusiveness and openness of the planning processes themselves.

Several critics of European spatial planning argue that ideological biases have been imposed on the final version of ESDP with neo-liberal economic values supplanting social equity and sustainability objectives (Richardson and Jensen, 2000). Indeed, the language of ESDP is replete with allusions to competitiveness and the need to strengthen the urban cores of the EU. The assumption behind supporting a 'balanced, polycentric urban system' is that intense economic and social relationships between urban centres, and the sense of regional identity that derives from them, produce essential resources for innovation and strategic governance (van Houtum and Lagendijk, 2001). ESDP also puts a premium on mobility and the development of Trans European Networks (TEN) that will connect dynamic polycentric regions. This clear emphasis on economic dimensions is borne out of a fear of North American domination and tends to strengthen the hand of Atlantic, or 'core' Europe. This central, densely urbanised



core is known by the spatially evocative term 'pentagon', a zone bounded by London–Paris–Milan–Munich and Hamburg.

Criticisms of ESDP, VASAB and CBSS strategies also highlight the imbalances of authority and political power inherent within European spatial planning processes. The accession countries have a markedly weaker hand in deliberations on spatial planning (Richardson and Jensen, 2000). In the case of ESDP, they are not included at all, which is a curious fact given that as soon as 2004 the EU will welcome its first new members from the former 'Soviet bloc'. In the case of VASAB, accession countries and Russia have been invited to participate, but the impetus for the basic spatial concept has been primarily Swedish and overwhelmingly reflects concerns of the Nordic countries that, upon closer reading, appear quite discriminatory against countries of the 'east'. In particular, VASAB articulates a more general Baltic security and economic discourse that appears to support anti-immigration agendas and, at the same time, exploit the lower wage costs and other growth opportunities in the east (Jaakson, 2000).

As a result, there appears to be considerable national jockeying for position and influence on spatial planning issues. Here again, geographical metaphors of core and periphery as well as urban–rural contradictions figure prominently. For example, during preparations of the final ESDP document, maps by Dutch experts indicating distances between cardinal points of the EU were rejected by Spain, Greece and other southern European states as expressive of geopolitical asymmetries within Europe (Faludi, 2000). Indeed, this map, later removed from the final version, defines a core region, clearly marked by a circle, and lines emanating from it in north–south and east–west directions (Faludi, 2000, p. 243). Interestingly, within the context of European spatial planning, southern European countries have tended to stress Europe's cultural heritage and regional identities rather than 'efficiency-oriented' concepts such as polycentric urban regions (Rusca, 1998). ESDP's implicit bias against rural areas has helped to fuel opposition to visions of Europe dominated by a hegemonic pentagon. Neither the 'north' nor the 'south' appears ready to accept the notion that they are at best semi-peripheries with a only handful of important city-regions. This is illustrated by Nordic displeasure with ESDP's focus on mobility and polycentric urban areas, suggesting a minimal role for non-urban areas in shaping the future EU (Böhme, 1998). The Swedish regional planner Kai Böhme (1999) has even suggested that, because of their distinctiveness, Nordic perspectives might require their own regional ESDP.

The further development of ESDP, VASAB and other spatial development strategies raises thorny issues of governance, accountability and implementation. Ideally, the search for an EU-European symbolic order should emphasise openness and responsiveness in order to manage the very different understandings of Europe and multifarious local perspectives on European development (Paasi, 2001). This is also a principal governance goal in order to enhance the accessibility of the European policy-making process. In this regard, however, European spatial planning delivers very mixed signals. ESDP has been faulted for its élitism and, in keeping with the bureaucratic traditions of European administrative practice, a relative lack of inclusiveness (Williams, 2000). With considerable justification, ESDP could be seen as a technocratic exercise and networking of experts rather than a forum for the open discussion of important issues that concern the wider population. However, it must also be mentioned that, during the period leading up to the final draft (1997–99), statements and opinions from

many informed sources in all EU member-states were collected by the steering groups.

VASAB began as a rather exclusive initiative but the active participation of local governments and NGOs, a trademark of Nordic democracy, has made for a considerable public participation element. Undeniably, VASAB is top-down in its orientation but, through dialogue with local governments, NGOs and other actors, VASAB has also acquired multifarious 'bottom-up' perspectives (Jaakson, 2000). The INTERREG IIC process was to an extent more open than ESDP as it invited both state and non-state organisations, including private firms, to compete for project funding. Elites representing business interests and chambers of commerce were, in fact, often involved as 'corporate members' of regional development and employment initiatives. By the same token, however, the Lead Partners of prospective INTERREG projects, more often than not public agencies, restricted access to strategic information to actor groups who, in context and by affiliation, seemed most appropriate as collaborators (Scott, 2001).

Finally, there remain questions regarding the implementation of spatial politics. This is of considerable importance as no real mechanisms for the actual translation of symbolic planning into action have been envisaged, other than good will on the part of respective governments. Vague administrative and financial scenarios for the long-term realisation of European spatial planning goals are at once a strength and a weakness; while consensus is facilitated, the lack of resources and clear division of responsibilities make action difficult. This will necessitate a long process of intergovernmental negotiation in order to formalise the status of spatial planning within Community-level policies and to find appropriate implementation instruments

## **Conclusions**

Spatial politics have been dealt with here in terms of governance and political values and, more concretely, as a process of generating geographical knowledge that support notions of economic interdependence and political community. As this paper has demonstrated, a multifaceted and long-term approach to EU identity formation has emerged that is founded upon institutions, principles and spatial development perspectives. Contradictions of EU integration are both the rationale for and a challenge to the definition of a 'European' space of meaning. Spatial politics thus count because they contribute to managing diversity and heterogeneity. Certainly, there is no single definitive interpretation of European identity and no room for a hegemonic project of identity formation (Paasi, 2001). This requires forceful institutions, integrating symbolism and clear and effective forms of governance that allow regional diversity to find appropriate political expression. The construction of the European Union also requires flexibility as the EU reacts to changes in its internal and external environments.

European spatial politics are not aimed at replacing national perspectives on development. Land-use planning, urban affairs and questions of regional governance and administrative reform, for example, can only be resolved within national contexts. Clearly, the centrality of national experience in interpreting Europe as a project of community-building and identity formation must be taken into account. Furthermore, ideological tensions between equity and efficiency that permeate European political arenas indicate that many development issues will perhaps never be fully subject to direct supranational tutelage.

This paper has sought to bring out the contestedness of the EU's spatial politics. Analyses of spatial politics clearly reveal the problematic power relationships and ideological struggles behind the creation of spatial notions of Europe. However, I would also like to warn against reading an implicit linearity or inevitability in the development of European society towards a socially disengaged, neo-liberal future. While there can be no doubt that state–society paradigms of neo-liberal hue have made inroads in both European and national policy debates, they co-exist with alternative paradigms that emphasise solidarity and subsidiarity. The relentlessness of economic discourse and permanent evocation of Castells' (1996) 'network society' appear to overwhelm other models but, as I have attempted to show, all these aspects are closely interconnected. Institutionalisation processes and the development of a European polity will produce a very complex Union, one in which the wholesale imposition of an 'Anglo-Saxon' model of societal development does not seem likely. Instead, a process of institutional innovation, negotiation, political struggle and post-enlargement intergovernmentalism will configure the future EU. In agreement with Entrikin (1999), I interpret spatial politics in the European Union as expressing different, perhaps not always competing, representations of EU political community based on market, civic and cultural models. Each of the models has associated with it a differing spatial logic: the economic space of unfettered interaction within a borderless EU; the space of a democratic *demos* united by political ideals and issues; and, cultural attachments to regions, cities and other specific places. Thus we find a co-existence of different notions of space and place that express the complexity of societal relationships within the EU. Ideational tension will, in the long-term, produce a specific European response to globalisation.

What then might be the contribution of spatial politics and symbolic planning to the creation of a stronger sense of identity and political community within the European Union? Presently, European spatial planning appears to be a selective process, appealing to and affecting specific groups who by necessity and/or conviction are transnational in outlook while only occasionally resonating with other groups. Only when (and if) the opportunity of Europe is widely perceived will ambivalence towards the European project give way to more enthusiastic support of and identification with the EU. Much will thus depend on whether the EU's symbolic politics of space translate into more concrete action and development impulses: Europeanisation is hence an opportunity structure that must grow in importance within the institutional frameworks that inform public policy and governance.

## Notes

1. See Karl Haushofer's tract (1931) on the geopolitics of pan-ideas as an inexorable, historical process of culturally (and ethnically) defined regionalisation. This presents a very different picture of the 'European idea'.
2. On the other hand, the process of European integration, always much more than a mere merging of markets, has resulted in the development of a composite political 'something' at the macroregional/supranational level. It is certainly not a state in the traditional sense, it is not a superstate as feared by the more reactionary Eurosceptics, and many wonder if it is and/or ever will be a superpower (Walker, 2001). At the moment, the beginnings of a constitutional debate are evident that might result in a much more formalised supranational structure.
3. Comments made at the Conference of Transboundary Co-operation in Breisach (Germany) on 18 September 1998.

4. The official title of the second cohesion report (European Commission, 2001b) is telling; proclaiming as it does the Europeanness of values such as 'European unity', 'people's solidarity' and 'diversity'.
5. For information regarding the INTERREG initiative, see the European Commission's website ([www.inforegio.cec.eu.int](http://www.inforegio.cec.eu.int)).
6. For information regarding German-Polish spatial planning, see the website of the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning which provides contact information and relevant links ([http://www.bbr.bund.de/english/dept1/i3/eu\\_enlargement.htm](http://www.bbr.bund.de/english/dept1/i3/eu_enlargement.htm)).
7. See the final declaration of the Seventh European Conference of Border Regions, held 28-30 October 1999 in Timisoara (Romania) and sponsored by the Council of Europe and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (<http://www.coe.fr/cplre/timisoara/edeclfinale.htm>).

## References

- AGNEW, J. (2001) How many Europes? The European Union, eastward enlargement and uneven development, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8, pp. 29-38.
- ANDERSON, J. (1995) The exaggerated death of the nation-state, in: J. ANDERSON C. BROOK and A. COCHRANE (Eds) *A global world? Re-Ordering Political Space*, pp. 65-112. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ANDERSON, J. and O'DOWD, L. (1999) Contested borders: globalization and ethno-national conflict in Ireland, *Regional Studies*, 33, pp. 681-696.
- BENZ, A., FÜRST, D., KILPER, H. and REHFELD, D. (1999) *Regionalisierung: Theorie-Praxis-Perspektiven*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.
- BÖHME, K. (1998) Northern impressions of the ESDP, in: C. BENGIS and K. BÖHME (Eds) *The Progress of European Spatial Planning*, pp. 77-86. Stockholm: Nordregio.
- BÖHME, K. (1999) A northern view on the ESDP, *North*, 9, pp. 1 and 31-34.
- BOISIER, S. (1993) *Postmodernismo territorial y globalización: regiones pivotaes y regiones virtuales*. Documento 93/19, CEPAL/ILPES, Santiago de Chile.
- BÖRZEL, T. A. (2001) Europeanization and territorial institutional change: towards a co-operative regionalism, in: M. G. COWLES, J. CAPORASO and T. RISSE (Eds) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, pp. 137-158. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- BRENNER, N. (1999) Globalization as reterritorialization: the rescaling of urban governance in the European Union, *Urban Studies*, 36, pp. 431-451.
- CABLE, V. (1999) *Globalization and Global Governance*. London: Chatham House.
- CARLSNAES, W. (1986) *Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- CASTELLS, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society: Economy, Society and Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- DALBY, S. and ÓTUATHAIL, G. (1996) The critical geopolitics constellation: problematizing fusions of geographical knowledge and power, *Political Geography*, 15, pp. 451-456.
- DEUTSCH, K. (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- DODDS, K. J. and SIDAWAY, J. (1994) Locating critical geopolitics, *Environment and Planning D*, 12, pp. 515-524.
- EGER, G. (1998) Az eurégió mint az európai integráció sajátos térbeli területe, *Külpolitika*, 4, pp. 76-87.
- ENTRIKIN, J. (1999) Political community, identity, and cosmopolitan place, *International Sociology*, 14, pp. 269-282.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1996) *First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion*. Luxembourg: ECC-EC-EAEC.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1997) *For a Stronger and Wider Union. Agenda 2000, Volume I. Communication of the Commission*. DOC 97/6. European Commission: Strasbourg.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999) *ESDP. European Spatial Development Perspective: Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the Territory of the European Union*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2000) *TERRA: An Experimental Laboratory in Spatial Planning*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2001a) *European Governance. A White Paper*. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities (COM 2001 428, final).

- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2001b) *Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- FALUDI, A. (1998) Polynucleated metropolitan regions in northwest Europe, *European Planning Studies*, 6, pp. 365–377.
- FALUDI, A. (2000) The European Spatial Development Perspective—what next?, *European Planning Studies*, 8, pp. 237–250.
- FOUCHER, M. (1998) *La République européenne: Entre histoires et géographies*. Paris: Belin.
- GROTH, N. B. (2000) Urban systems between policy and geography, *Regional Studies*, 34, pp. 571–580.
- GUTERRES, A. (2001) *The European treaties revisited: what role for Europe in the globalised world?* Speech delivered at the Conference at the Walter Hallstein Institute for European Constitutional Law, Humboldt University, Berlin, May.
- HAUSHOFER, K. (1931) *Die Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen*. Berlin: Zentral Verlag.
- HETTNE, B. (1994) *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security*. Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research.
- HETTNE, B., INOTAI, A. and SUNKEL, O. (Eds) (2000) *Globalism and the New Regionalism*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- HIGGINS, B. J. and SAVOIE, D. J. (1997) *Regional Development Theories and their Application*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- HIGGOTT, R. (1998) The international political economy of regionalism: the Asia–Pacific and Europe compared, in: W. D. COLEMAN and R. D. UNDERHILL (Eds) *Regionalism and Global Economic Integration*, pp. 42–67. London: Routledge.
- HIRSCH, J. (1995) Nation-state, international regulation, and the question of democracy, *Review of International Political Economy*, 2, pp. 267–284.
- HOCKING, B. (1996) Bridging boundaries, creating linkages: non-central governments and multilayered policy environments, *WeltTrends*, 11, pp. 36–51.
- HOUTUM, H. VAN and LAGENDIJK, A. (2001) Contextualising regional identity and imagination in the construction of polycentric urban regions: the cases of the Ruhr area and Basque Country, *Urban Studies*, 38, pp. 747–767.
- HURRELL, A. (1995) Regionalism in theoretical perspective, in: L. FAWCETT and A. HURRELL (Eds) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, pp. 37–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- JAAKSON, R. (2000) Supra-national spatial planning of the Baltic Sea region and competing narratives for tourism, *European Planning Studies*, 8, pp. 565–579.
- JOENNIEMI, P. (1999) *Bridging the Iron Curtain? Co-operation around the Baltic rim*. Working Paper No. 22, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute ([www.copri.dk](http://www.copri.dk)).
- JUKARAINEN, P. (1999) *Baltic Sea region: new images and identities within a new spatial order*. Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Finland (unpublished).
- KATZENSTEIN, P. (1997) United Germany in an integrating Europe, in: P. J. KATZENSTEIN (Ed.) *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, pp. 1–48. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- KEATING, M. (1997) The invention of regions: political restructuring and territorial government in western Europe, *Environment and Planning C*, 15, pp. 383–398.
- KEATING, M. (1998) *New Regionalism in Western Europe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- KOHLER-KOCH, B. and EISING, R. (1999) *Governance in the European Union*. London: Routledge.
- LAFFAN, B. (1996) Ireland: a region without regions—the odd man out, in: L. HOOGE (Ed.) *Cohesion Policy and European Integration*, pp. 320–341. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LAIDI, Z. (1998) *A World without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics*. London: Routledge.
- LINDSTRÖM, B., HEDEGAARD, L. and VEGGELAND, N. (1996) *Regional Policy and Territorial Supremacy. Nordic Region Building and Institutional Change in the Wake of European Integration*. Copenhagen: NordRefo.
- LUTTWAK, E. (1990) From geopolitics to geo-economics: logic of conflict, grammar of commerce, *The National Interest*, 20, pp. 17–23.
- MANSFIELD, E. D. and MILNER, H. V. (1997) The political economy of regionalism: an overview, in: E. D. MANSFIELD and H. V. MILNER (Eds) *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, pp. 1–19. New York: Columbia University Press.
- MARKS, G. (1997) An actor-centred approach to multi-level governance, in: C. JEFFREY (Ed.) *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe?*, pp. 20–40. London: Frank Cass.
- NEUMANN, I. (1999) *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

- NORDREGIO (2000) *Background Study for VASAB 2010 PLUS. The Baltic Sea Region Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow—Main Spatial Trends*. Stockholm: Nordregio.
- Ó TUATHAIL, G. (1998) Thinking critically about geopolitics, in: G. Ó TUATHAIL (Ed.) *The Geopolitics Reader*, pp. 1–12. London: Routledge.
- PAASI, A. (2001) Europe as a social process and discourse, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8, pp. 7–28.
- PARKER, G. (1998) *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future*. London: Pinter.
- PIZARRO, R. (1999) *Comparative analysis of regionalism in Latin America and Asia–Pacific*. Serie Comercio Internacional, No. 6, CEPAL, International Trade and Development Finance Division, Santiago, Chile (www.eclac.cl).
- PRODI, R. (2001) *Solidarity: the foundation on which Europe stands*. Speech delivered at the opening session of the *European Forum on Economic and Social Cohesion*, Brussels, May.
- RICHARDSON, T. and JENSEN, O. B. (2000) Discourses of mobility and polycentric development: a contested view of European spatial planning, *European Planning Studies*, 8, pp. 503–520.
- RINGMAR, E. (1996) *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years' War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- RISSE, T. (2001) A European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of nation-state identities, in: M. G. COWLES, J. CAPORASO and T. RISSE (Eds) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, pp. 198–216. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- RUSCA, R. (1998) The development of a European spatial planning policy, in: C. BENGIS and K. BÖHME (Eds) *The Progress of European Spatial Planning, Vol. 1*, pp. 35–48. Stockholm: Nordregio.
- SBRAGIA, A. (2000) The EU and governance by steering, in: J. PIERRE (Ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy*, pp. 219–240. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SCOTT, J. W. (2000) Transboundary co-operation on Germany's borders: strategic regionalism through multilevel governance, *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 15, pp. 143–167.
- SCOTT, J. W. (2001) *Report on transboundary co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region (INTERREG IIC-BSR: transnational spatial planning)*. Discussion paper produced for the Groupement d'études et de recherches Notre Europe (Contact: Marjorie Jouen, 44 rue Notre-Dame des Victoires, F-75002, Paris).
- SPARKE, M. (2002) Not a state, but more than a state of mind: cascading cascadias and the geo-economics of cross-border regionalism, in: P. PERKMANN and N.-L. SUM (Eds). *Globalization, Regionalization and the Building of Cross-Border Regions*, forthcoming. London: Macmillan.
- SUM, N.-L. (1999) Rethinking globalization: rearticulating the spatial scale and temporal horizons of trans-border spaces, in: K. OLDS, P. F. KELLY, L. KONG ET AL. (Eds) *Globalisation and the Asia–Pacific: Contested Territories*, pp. 129–145. New York: Routledge.
- TAYLOR, P. (1993) *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis*. London: Belhaven Press.
- VASAB SECRETARIAT (1997) *Statements and Documents. Transnational Co-operation for Spatial Development in the Baltic Sea Region, International Conference in Rostock, 12–13 June 1997*. Vasab Secretariat, 24 Długi Targ, PL-80828 Gdansk, Poland.
- WALKER, M. (2001) Europe's existential crisis, *Wilson Quarterly*, 25(1), pp. 30–53.
- WEYNAND, S. (1997) Inter-regional associations and the European integration process, in: C. JEFFERY (Ed.) *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe?*, pp. 166–182. London: Frank Cass.
- WILLIAMS, R. H. (2000) Constructing the European Spatial Development Perspective—for whom?, *European Planning Studies*, 8, pp. 357–365.
- ZINCONE, G. and AGNEW, J. (2000) The second great transformation: the politics of globalisation in the global North, *Space and Polity*, 4, pp. 5–21.