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TYPE: Article CC:CCG
JOURNAL TITLE: Intellectual history review
USER JOURNAL TITLE: Intellectual History Review
WTU CATALOG TITLE: Intellectual history review (Online);Intellectual history review [electronic resource].
ARTICLE TITLE: "The Strange Case of the Missing Title Page: An Investigation in Spinozistic Bibliography"
ARTICLE AUTHOR: Jacob Adler
VOLUME: 23
ISSUE: 2
MONTH:
YEAR: 2013
PAGES: 259-262
ISSN: 1749-6985
OCLC #: 123562997
CROSS REFERENCE ID: [TN:776108][ODYSSEY:206.107.44.64/ILL]
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Publisher: Routledge

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Intellectual History Review

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rihr20>

The Strange Case of the Missing Title Page: An Investigation in Spinozistic Bibliography

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Published online: 17 May 2013.

To cite this article: Jacob Adler (2013) The Strange Case of the Missing Title Page: An Investigation in Spinozistic Bibliography , Intellectual History Review, 23:2, 259-262, DOI: [10.1080/17496977.2013.795760](https://doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2013.795760)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2013.795760>

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

THE STRANGE CASE OF THE MISSING TITLE PAGE: AN INVESTIGATION IN SPINOZISTIC BIBLIOGRAPHY

Spinoza scholars have long wondered about the identity of the Hebrew¹ mathematics book – the *Rabbinsch Mathematisch Boeck* – listed as Quarto 31 in the posthumous inventory of Spinoza’s library.² The fact that one cannot conclusively determine the identity of the book makes speculation all the more attractive. The leading candidates are two: Joseph Solomon Delmedigo’s *Sefer ’Elim* (‘The Book of Elim’)³ and Meir Aldabi’s *Shevile ’Emunah* (‘Paths of Faith’).⁴ I will argue in this paper that *’Elim* is in fact the more plausible candidate.

Sefer ’Elim seems *a priori* the more attractive candidate for various reasons. For one thing, the *Rabbinsch Mathematisch Boeck* appears in the list immediately after Delmedigo’s other book, *Ta’alumat Hokhmah* (‘Secrets of Wisdom’).⁵ For another, there are passages in Spinoza’s works that appear to show familiarity with *’Elim*.⁶ *Shevile ’Emunah*, on the other hand, devotes little space to mathematics. Part of it is indeed concerned with astronomy and illustrated with astronomical illustrations, but these hardly seem sufficient to make a non-Hebrew reader call it a mathematics book. *Sefer ’Elim*, by contrast, has in fact received such a designation. A copy held by the University of California, Los Angeles, library received the binder’s title, *Tractatus Varii Mathematici*.⁷

Indeed, the selection of *Shevile ’Emunah* hangs by a very slender thread. It has been proposed mainly on the strength of its inclusion in Jan te Winkel’s catalog of the Spinozahuis library.⁸ It was included in that catalog because a copy of *Shevile ’Emunah* had been donated to the Spinozahuis by Baroness Rosenthal.⁹ As to why Baroness Rosenthal chose to donate this particular

¹ *Rabbinsch* clearly refers to the language of the book, and does not imply any connection with the rabbinate or rabbis. See folios no. 19 and no. 24, where the abbreviation *rabb.* indicates that the book in question is in (post-Biblical) Hebrew. For Biblical Hebrew, the inventory-taker uses the abbreviation *Ebr.* The difference is easily detected in that Biblical Hebrew is printed with vowels and cantillation signs, both of which are absent in Rabbinic texts.

² The inventory can be found in J. Freudenthal, *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s* (Leipzig, 1899), 160–4 and in J. van Sluis and T. Musschenga, *De Boeken van Spinoza* (Groningen: Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2009).

³ Amsterdam: Menasseh Ben Israel, 1629; second edition, Odessa: M.E. Belinson, 1864.

⁴ Riva di Trento, 1550; various subsequent editions, including Amsterdam: Daniel de Fonseca, 1627.

⁵ Basel: Samuel Ashkenazi, 1629–1631.

⁶ J. d’Ancona, ‘Delmedigo, Menasseh Ben Israel en Spinoza’, *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Genootschap voor de Joodsche Wetenschap in Nederland*, 6 (1940), 105–52; J. Adler, ‘Epistemological Categories in Delmedigo and Spinoza’, *Studia Spinozana*, 15 (1999), 205–27; J. Adler, ‘J.S. Delmedigo as Teacher of Spinoza: The Case of Noncomplex Propositions’, *Studia Spinozana*, 16 (2008), 177–85.

⁷ See OCLC #23176308.

⁸ J. te Winkel, *Catalogus van de Boekerij der Vereeniging ’Het Spinozahuis’* (’s-Gravenhage: Boekhandel vh. Gebr. Belinfante, 1914).

⁹ Sluis and Musschenga, *De Boeken van Spinoza*, 43.

book, there seems to be no record.¹⁰ So the mere presence of the book among the holdings of the Spinozahuis does not constitute a very strong argument for identifying *Shevile 'Emunah* as the *Rabbinsch mathematisch boeck*.

Henri Krop, however, in a recent article, argues against *'Elim* and in favor of *Shevile 'Emunah*. In particular, he raises a very pertinent question: If the book were indeed *'Elim*, why would the inventory-taker¹¹ not simply have read off the title from the Latin title page?¹² The author and title are clearly indicated there: '*Scepher Elim [...] Iosephi del Medico Cretensis*'. This consideration, if not negated, would be fairly dispositive. There have been various suggestions: I myself have elsewhere suggested that the title pages may have simply fallen away from old age: at the time of the inventory, the book was forty-eight years old, and well-used books not uncommonly lose their title pages.¹³ Patrizia Pozzi raises an interesting possibility: the title pages may have been removed because of the censorship to which the book was subjected.¹⁴ Now, Pozzi's proposal seems strange at first: although *'Elim* was censored, it did at length appear with the approval of the leadership of the Amsterdam Portuguese-Jewish community and bore the approbations (*'haskamot*') of four respectable Venetian rabbis.¹⁵ Would that not obviate the need for removing a title page? Surprisingly, perhaps, the answer is no. There are much more recent cases in which a book appearing with respectable approbations has been subjected to such treatment. The monumental Hebrew-language Talmud edited by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz – despite approbations from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein and the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson¹⁶ – was banned from some yeshivas and allowed in others only with the title page removed.¹⁷ So such things are known to happen.

Yet if such were the case with *Sefer 'Elim*, we would expect to find some such copies in libraries now; and there do not seem to be any. The library online union catalog OCLC signals such items as 'imperfect', and no copies of *'Elim* in OCLC are flagged as 'imperfect'.

There is, however, another possible explanation, noted by neither Krop nor Pozzi. There *are* extant copies of *Sefer 'Elim* lacking the Latin title page. A copy auctioned by the auction house Virtual Judaica (their lot #25458), lacks both the Latin title page and the approbations.¹⁸ The initial pages of that copy are shown below in figs. 1 and 2. As can be seen, the reverse title page, followed in most copies by the Latin title page, is in this copy followed directly by the first page of text.

¹⁰ J. van Sluis, personal communication.

¹¹ The inventory-taker is identified by Adri Offenberg as Jan Riewertsz, Spinoza's publisher: see A.K. Offenberg, 'Spinoza's Library. The Story of a Reconstruction', *Quaerendo*, 3 (1973), 309–10.

¹² H. Krop, 'Spinoza's Library: The Mathematical and Scientific Works', *Intellectual History Review*, 23 (2013), 27–8.

¹³ J. Adler, 'Joseph Solomon Delmedigo: Student of Galileo, Teacher of Spinoza', *Intellectual History Review*, 23 (2013), 145.

¹⁴ P. Pozzi, 'Un libro misterioso nella biblioteca di Spinoza', *Rivista di storia della filosofia*, 53 (1998), 694–5.

¹⁵ The history of *Sefer 'Elim* and the difficulties involved its publications are related in D'Ancona, 'Delmedigo, Menasseh Ben Israel en Spinoza'.

¹⁶ *Talmud Bavli*, edited by A. Steinsaltz (Jerusalem: Ha-Makhon ha-Yisre'eli le-Firsumim Talmudiyim, 1967–2010); approbations at <http://www.korenpub.com/EN/tal-haskamot.htm>, <http://www.korenpub.com/EN/tal-haskamot2.htm> (accessed 14 March 2013).

¹⁷ Personal communication, Rabbi D. Landes, Director, Pardes Institute, Jerusalem.

¹⁸ See the auction listing at <http://web.archive.org/web/20130211183856/http://www.virtualjudaica.com/VJScripts/PublicViewVJAuctionItem.asp?ScriptAction=View&ID=25458> (accessed 11 March 2013). The auction listing refers to the Latin title page as an 'introduction'.




Fig. 1. Title page, *Sefer 'Elim*, Virtual Judaica auction lot #25458. Photo courtesy www.virtualjudaica.com.

Another copy lacking the Latin title page can be found in the Chaim Elozor Reich z"l Renaissance Hebraica Collection.¹⁹ How did such copies come to exist? There are two possibilities. First, in seventeenth-century Amsterdam, books were often sold in the form of loose sheets, which the purchaser would take to the bookbinder and have bound to taste.²⁰ A Hebrew-reading purchaser might see no need for a Latin title page and could have asked the bookbinder to omit it. Alternatively, after it was determined that the book would be published only in mutilated form, Menasseh Ben Israel himself may have removed the Latin title page from later printings, since it referred to sections of the book that were not permitted to appear, and hence might even be thought to constitute a sort of false advertisement.

So it seems likely that Spinoza's copy of *Sefer 'Elim* was one of those that lack the Latin title page, a situation which precluded the inventory-taker from simply recording the Latin title and author. But one question remains. The inventory-taker, we know, was able to transcribe Hebrew letters, as he did for Octavos 1, 2 and 3.²¹ Why did he not simply record the Hebrew title of *Sefer 'Elim*? But one might more reasonably ask the question the other way around: Given that he could write Hebrew, why did he record the Hebrew titles of only

¹⁹ <http://web.archive.org/web/20130201055211/http://hebrewbooks.org/45020> (accessed 11 March 2013).

²⁰ N. Orenstein, *Hendrick Hondius and the Business of Prints in Seventeenth-Century Holland* (Rotterdam: Sound & Vision Interactive, 1996), 111.

²¹ See the facsimile in Van Sluis and Musschenga, *De Boeken van Spinoza*, 9.



Fig. 2. Reverse title page followed by first text page, *Sefer 'Elim*, Virtual Judaica auction lot #25458. Photo courtesy www.virtualjudaica.com.

three out of the fairly numerous Hebrew books? Well, clearly, the inventory-taker was not a fluent reader or writer of Hebrew. Recording Hebrew titles would have required him to spend time and effort pondering the title page to assure himself that he had recorded the right information. In one case, in fact, he did not. Octavo 1 is recorded simply as *חידושים* (*Hidushim*, 'Novellae') a designation so vague as to give essentially no idea of the identity of the book.²²

In any case, the inventory-taker designated several Hebrew items merely by descriptions, rather than by title or author. Thus Quarto 1 is designated as 'a Hebrew Bible with commentary' and Quarto 32 as 'an explication of the Five Books of Moses.' No doubt these books had title pages, but the inventory-taker had recourse to description, rather than transcription of title and author.

We conclude, then, that though a positive identification of the *Rabbinsch mathematisch boeck* is as yet impossible, Delmedigo's *Sefer 'Elim* seems the most likely possibility.

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2013.795760>

²² An approximate equivalent would be if a non-English-speaking inventory-taker were to come across a novel, with the words, 'A Novel', on the title page, and write it down in the inventory simply as *Novel*.

RETHINKING THE UNCONSCIOUS

Since the publication of *Thinking the Unconscious* (2010),²³ something that we already suspected when we began planning the book has been confirmed: namely, that to publish a book on the unconscious means addressing a variety of academic audiences with often entirely different expectations. In our introduction to the volume we maintained, contra the position of Henri F. Ellenberger in his *Discovery of the Unconscious*,²⁴ that one cannot assume that *the* unconscious is a pre-existing phenomenon that was ‘discovered’, and that theories of the unconscious set out to elucidate by way of description. It is equally likely, we argue, that theories of the unconscious invent the ‘objects’ that they go on to describe: this, indeed, is what our title *Thinking the Unconscious* means (3). It also of course means that different theories of the unconscious – elaborated by writers with differing philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, academic or even religious orientations and agendas – will create different ‘objects’, which will in turn require different descriptions. In short: the intellectual tradition to which one belongs will shape what one takes ‘the unconscious’ to be and what a book on this subject should do.

The reception of our book has in fact proven this to be the case. To date it has received nine reviews, which have appeared in journals devoted to intellectual history and the philosophy of science, to sociology, to German studies and to psychoanalysis.²⁵ We have been delighted with the range and depth of these reviews, which have – at least up until the most recent case, that of Wouter J. Hanegraaff in this journal – been generally positive and appreciative but also critical in constructive ways. Of particular interest have been the various subjects that reviewers have seen our book as *failing* to consider. Brett A. Fulkerson Smith, writing in *HOPOS*, expected a paper on Johann Gottlieb Fichte (168–9); Ulrich Plass’s review in the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* saw our book as neglecting ‘the oedipal tensions and ruptures that constitute all tradition’ and wanted more emphasis on Freud and his influences, but agreed with our ‘reluctance to treat the Freudian unconscious as an end-point or fulfilment of the concept’ (1083–4, 1081); while Matt ffytche, writing in *History of the Human Sciences*, wondered why a book devoted to German thought could not also cover English and French approaches to the subject (135). We welcome many of these criticisms as pointing to material that a much longer collection – perhaps a three-volume study that like assembled by Michael B. Buchholz and Günter Gödde – could cover.²⁶ But the subject of our book was explicitly the ‘conceptual history’ of the unconscious in nineteenth-century German thought (2), and its conceptual focus meant that its primary subject would always be German philosophy.

The book has, at least up until now, been reviewed on this basis, being seen as ‘deeply informed and uniformly stimulating’ (Cooksey, 301); as covering ‘very well the complexity of the topic,’

²³ *Thinking the Unconscious: Nineteenth-Century German Thought*, edited by A. Nicholls and M. Liebscher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁴ H.F. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1970).

²⁵ The reviews, listed alphabetically by author name, are as follows: T.L. Cooksey, *The Goethe Yearbook*, 19 (2012), 301–2; M. ffytche, *History of the Human Sciences*, 24:3 (2011), 133–7; B.A. Fulkerson-Smith, *Hopos*, 2:1 (2012), 166–9; R. Gronda, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas*, 1:1 (2012), 16–21; W.J. Hanegraaff, *Intellectual History Review*, 22:4 (2012), 537–42; H.L. Kaye, *Society*, 49 (2012), 188–93; A. Mathäs, *German Studies Review*, 35:2 (2012), 403–5; D. Midgley, *Modern Language Review*, 107:2 (2012), 647–8; U. Plass, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 59:5 (2011), 1079–85.

²⁶ *Das Unbewusste*, edited by M.B. Buchholz and G. Gödde, 3 vols (Gießen: Psychosozial Verlag, 2005–6).

while also avoiding ‘the temptation to enclose the “unconscious” in any too hastily asserted narrative about beginnings and end-points’ (ffytche, 135, 134); as ‘an excellent guide to the myriad discourses on the unconscious that took place in nineteenth-century German thought’ (Fulkerson-Smith, 169); as organizing ‘in a simple and ordered way a great amount of material without betraying its richness’ (Gronda, 20); as possessing a ‘high degree of coherence’ and as ‘benefiting from the inclusion of differing, even deviating viewpoints’ (Mathäs, 404); as a ‘dependable guide to particular historical examples of thinking about the unconscious’ (Midgley, 648); and as deserving praise for ‘introducing readers to once influential but now lesser known thinkers’ (Plass, 1080).

But the feedback has not all been positive, and the most serious criticism is one that we regard as absolutely justified. The reviews by ffytche and Gronda correctly pointed out that our philosophical focus neglects what Gronda calls ‘extra-philosophical insights’ (21), and what ffytche refers to as

the whole expansive interest in somnambulism, mesmerism and forms of clairvoyance and prophecy in the 19th century, in all of which ‘unconscious’ knowledge, or contact with the unconscious portions of the soul [...] is paramount. Perhaps this is no longer ‘thinking’ the unconscious, but for many in 19th-century Germany it was the way the unconscious was thought about. (136)

The ‘perhaps’ in ffytche’s criticism is one that we would draw attention to here, since a book that we explicitly frame as a conceptual history of the unconscious must have as its main focus the philosophical discourses concerning this phenomenon. These discourses are philosophical and conceptual, we argue, because they see the unconscious as posing a *philosophical problem* that arises from the shortcomings of the Cartesian model of the subject (3).

If consciousness is to be equated with thought, as Descartes suggested, then how does one understand those elements of thinking that seem to occur during sleep, or which lack clarity and distinctness? The answer was provided by Leibniz’s theory of *petites perceptions*, which referred to those phenomena that are *in* consciousness but which fall below the Cartesian threshold of clarity and distinctness. Such perceptions were later described by eighteenth-century German thinkers such as Wolff, Baumgarten, Platner and Kant as ‘dark’ or ‘obscure’ (*dunkel*), and as pointing to areas of the soul about which philosophy was insufficiently aware. While Kant by and large turned away from this area of investigation, post-Kantian German philosophy from Schelling to Nietzsche saw it as central, suggesting that it might point to connections between the subject on the one hand and nature or the absolute on the other. This, then, was the core philosophical narrative outlined in our introduction (4–18), and as such it *did* exclude extra-philosophical material. Sonu Shamdasani’s Epilogue to our volume (287–96) was thus intended to suggest the other book that we *could* have written if we had considered non-philosophical (and also non-German) discourses on the unconscious during the nineteenth century.

Wouter J. Hanegraaff, who is President of the European Society for the Study of Western Esotericism, is in hearty agreement with the criticisms of ffytche and Gronda. He correctly points out that our book neglects to consider the German traditions of mesmerism and somnambulism, though he is mistaken in his claim that we consider these subjects to be ‘below the dignity of academic philosophizing’ (Hanegraaff, 540); rather, we regarded them as simply being beyond the scope of our volume, the main aim of which was to examine key philosophical contributions on the conceptual history of the unconscious made by nineteenth-century German thinkers. But Hanegraaff’s criticisms do not end there. His more damning claim is that our approach is ‘dominated by Freudian models’, and that many of the papers in our volume project Freudian

notions of the unconscious back onto the nineteenth-century sources (Hanegraaff, 537). The papers by Bishop, Nicholls and Bell are even said to have ‘a strange obsession [...] with making Goethe into a kind of psychoanalyst *avant la lettre*’ and of embarking ‘on an obsessive quest for the Great Precursor to Freud’ (Hanegraaff, 538).

The notion that Freudian psychoanalysis was influenced by Goethe’s writings has been a central subject of investigation in many histories of the unconscious, and receives extensive treatment in Ellenberger’s magisterial contribution.²⁷ It is, moreover, a key aspect of what might be called the ‘creation story’ of psychoanalysis, since Freud attributed his decision to pursue a medical career to his hearing of a public lecture on ‘Die Natur’. This text was mistakenly attributed to Goethe but, as Bishop and Nicholls point out, Goethe nevertheless came to see it as expressing the pantheistic views that he held during the early stages of his career, and Freud took him at his word (26, 38–40, 101). Since Freud can arguably be regarded as the most prominent theorist of the unconscious in the history of Western thought, since his main philosophical and cultural influences come from nineteenth-century Germany, and since he himself attributed some of his most central ideas to his readings of Goethe (much more so than to Schopenhauer or Nietzsche), we felt that a consideration of these issues was unavoidable in a volume such as ours.

As we point out in our introduction (23–4), we sought to present two opposing accounts of the Goethe-Freud relation. In an extremely significant two-volume study, Paul Bishop has traced the influence of German Classicism (the aesthetic theories of Goethe and Schiller) upon the analytical psychology of Carl Gustav Jung.²⁸ He is probably the most well known proponent of the idea – also prominently outlined by Ellenberger²⁹ – that many key concepts in psychoanalysis, including that of the unconscious, emerged from the intellectual context of Weimar Classicism. Whether or not one agrees with this narrative, we felt that due to its prevalence in the existing literature, it absolutely deserved a place in our volume. As we also state in our introduction (23), and as Bishop (see 39) and also reviewers of our book note (see, for example, Fulkerson-Smith, 167; Midgley, 648), the chapter by Angus Nicholls specifically questions the claims made by Bishop in his chapter, arguing that the idea that Goethe directly influenced Freud’s notion of the unconscious belongs to the ‘historical mythology’ of psychoanalysis, which he regards as requiring a ‘thoroughgoing critique’ (92). The stated purpose of Nicholls’s chapter is to show that whereas Goethe’s ideas about the unconscious belong to the philosophical contexts of Spinoza’s pantheism, of Kant’s critical philosophy and of Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*, Freud’s intellectual orientation was informed by the materialist positivism of Ernst Brücke, which totally rejected not only the entire idealist tradition in general but also Goethe’s scientific studies in particular (93–4). Nicholls then cites Freud’s ‘Goethe Prize’ address precisely to show how fundamentally Freud misinterpreted Goethe to ‘lend cultural legitimacy to the project of psychoanalysis’ (107), and this, indeed, is how other reviewers have understood his chapter (see, for example, Fulkerson-Smith, 167).

No other reviewer has made the claim, central to Wouter Hanegraaff’s review (see Hanegraaff, 538), that Nicholls’s use of the phrase ‘Goethe’s relation to psychoanalysis’ (92) projects a retrospective teleology from Freud back onto Goethe; rather, when read in its actual context, it quite clearly refers to Freud’s own narrative concerning the alleged Goethean origins of

²⁷ See Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, 204–6, 447, 465–8, 495, 540, 542, 742.

²⁸ P. Bishop, *Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics*, 2 vols (London: Routledge, 2008–9).

²⁹ Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, 204–6, 542.

psychoanalysis, a narrative that Nicholls's entire chapter explicitly rejects. Hanegraaff, in his seeming insistence that Nicholls wants to find Freud everywhere in Goethe, then alleges that this leads to readings of Goethe's texts that are, he thinks, 'spectacular misinterpretations' (Hanegraaff, 538). The only example he mentions is a line from the 'Zueignung' section in *Faust I*, in which Goethe invokes *schwankende Gestalten*, a phrase that Nicholls interprets in the context of Goethe's scientific ideas concerning 'organic forms that are subject to continual transformation' (105–6). This interpretation, Nicholls points out, is based on Goethe's contemporaneous work on morphology (104), and it is supported by the commentaries to be found in the two most recent critical editions of Goethe's works, written by the leading scholars in the field.³⁰ These commentaries are mentioned by Nicholls in the main text of his chapter and are also cited in the notes (104). Either Hanegraaff did not check these authorities before declaring Nicholls to be spectacularly wrong, or he did check them and considered them to be irrelevant for his purposes. Hanegraaff then attributes to Nicholls the idea that Goethe was in search of the 'secrets of nature' (Hanegraaff, 539), when in fact Nicholls clearly says this of Faust (the character), not Goethe (see 106). Moreover, on Nicholls's detailed consideration of the entirely different philosophical contexts of Goethe and Freud, and on Nicholls's critique of Freud's claim about a Goethean origin for his concept of the unconscious (120), Hanegraaff is completely silent.

Hanegraaff's failure to provide readers with even a rudimentary account of the arguments of our book before undertaking sweeping critiques of them extends to other contributions in the volume. Andrew Bowie, it is claimed, focuses exclusively on the contemporary philosophical relevance of Schelling's ideas about the unconscious (Hanegraaff, 538), but Hanegraaff says nothing about what these ideas, which are carefully outlined by Bowie in their historical context and in relation to those of other thinkers such as Kant, Fichte and Hegel (see 63–82), actually amounted to. Matthew Bell, who has written a standard work on the history of psychology in Germany,³¹ is also accused of projecting Freud onto Goethe (538–9), even though his entire chapter is devoted to Carl Gustav Carus, whom he sees as being 'the first proper theorist of the unconscious' (156). Hanegraaff has nothing at all to say about Bell's important claim, and he barely even mentions Bell's account of Carus's theory of the unconscious (165–70). Michael Heidelberger, who is probably the leading expert on Gustav Theodor Fechner in the world, is accused by Hanegraaff of trying to make the more mystical components of Fechner's thought look academically acceptable (541). But again, Hanegraaff has nothing to tell readers about Fechner's 'threshold' theory of consciousness, which is the main subject of Heidelberger's lengthy chapter (see in particular 221–32), and which was absolutely central to German psychology in the late nineteenth century. Similarly, Sebastian Gardner has performed the daunting task of summarising and clarifying Eduard von Hartmann's extremely influential *Philosophie*

³⁰ See Albrecht Schöne, who sees the phrase *schwankende Gestalten* in the following context: 'In Goethes naturwissenschaftlich-morphologischem Sprachgebrauch: die in Metamorphosen sich umbildenden organischen Gestalten [...] bei denen freilich nach Goethes eigenen Worten, "nirgend ein Bestehendes, nirgend ein Ruhendes, ein Abgeschlossenes vorkommt."' J.W. Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche*, edited by H. Birus, D. Borchmeyer, K. Eibl, W. Vosskamp et al., 40 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985–2003), vol. 7/2, 152. See also Victor Lange, who suggests that *schwankende Gestalten* can be interpreted 'im Sinne des in G.s naturwissenschaftlichem Denken gelegentlich verwendeten Wortes und Begriffes "schwankend" in der Bedeutung von der "Gestalt", die nicht "abgeschlossen sein kann", sondern "in einer steten Bewegung schwanke,"' in J.W. Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens*, edited by K. Richter, H.G. Göpfert, N. Miller and G. Sauder, 21 vols (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1985–1998), vol. 6.1, 994.

³¹ M. Bell, *The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

des Unbewussten (1869), and of carefully contextualising Hartmann's ideas in relation to those of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Darwin, among others (177–80, 186, 193–4). In response, Hanegraaff quite inexplicably accuses Gardner of making 'not even the slightest attempt at contextualizing von Hartmann and his work' (541), and has virtually nothing to say about the actual content of Gardner's chapter. Most problematically of all, the entire framing narrative of our book, according to which the unconscious was a problem that German philosophy inherited from Descartes through Leibniz (4–18), is not mentioned even once by Hanegraaff in his entire review.

Hanegraaff's review is not, it should be noted, completely negative. He has positive things to say about the chapters written by Martin Liebscher (on Nietzsche), by Günter Götde (on Freud) and he approves of Sonu Shamdasani's Epilogue to our volume. Some of Hanegraaff's criticisms are also helpful; he does, for example, point to problems with existing translations (in particular of Herder and Goethe) that we have used,³² and we thank him for these corrections, while also reminding readers that our book included all German quotes in the original language for precisely this reason. Most perplexing of all, however, is Hanegraaff's allegation that we 'depart from normal academic codes of good conduct' through 'sharply attacking' one of our contributors: Günter Götde (541). We simply do not understand on what basis Hanegraaff makes this claim, and we reject it absolutely. As many other reviewers of our book point out (see Cooksey, 301; Fulkerson-Smith, 166; Gronda, 19–20; Plass, 1081) Götde's important book on 'tradition lines' of the unconscious is absolutely central to the narrative of our introduction,³³ and we praise it as 'the most detailed existing study on nineteenth-century philosophical discourses on the unconscious' (22). Indeed, ffytche also notes that our book 'gives the only English language entry-point into Götde's extensive work on the topic' (135). We also describe Buchholz's and Götde's three-volume work *Das Unbewusste* as 'monumental' (18), and we outline with great care what Götde means by 'tradition lines' of the unconscious (22–4). Our critique of Götde merely argues that such tradition lines should only be applied sceptically and heuristically, and that they do not represent 'independent and hermetic developmental streams,' while also emphasising just how useful they can be when used in this way (24). Furthermore, we even point out that Götde himself demonstrates this reservation, and that his chapter in our volume is written in precisely this heuristic spirit (24). This, therefore, is a respectful critique of a valued colleague whose work we obviously regard as indispensable to our subject.³⁴

We wish to thank the editors of the *Intellectual History Review* for giving us the opportunity here to respond to Hanegraaff's review and to reflect upon the broader reception of our book; readers can of course judge its merits and shortcomings for themselves, but we strongly felt

³² See J.G. Herder, *Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode*, in *Selected Early Works*, edited by E.A. Menze and K. Menges, translated by E.A. Menze and M. Palma (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 43–4; J.W. Goethe, 'The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject,' translated by D. Miller, in *Goethe's Collected Works*, edited by V. Lange, E.A. Blackall, C. Hamlin et al., 12 vols (New York: Suhrkamp, 1988), vol. 12, 11–17, cit. Nicholls and Liebscher, *Thinking the Unconscious*, 96, 115.

³³ G. Götde, *Traditionslinien des 'Unbewussten': Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud* (Tübingen: edition diskord, 1999).

³⁴ The editors' respect for Götde's research is evidenced not only by Liebscher's 2002 review of *Traditionslinien des Unbewussten* in *Nietzsche-Studien*, 31 (2002), 423–31, but also by Liebscher's contribution to the important three volume study on *Das Unbewusste* by Götde and Buchholz ('C. G. Jung. Die gedanklichen Werkzeuge des Unbewussten', in *Macht und Dynamik des Unbewussten*, edited by M.B. Buchholz and G. Götde (Berlin: Psychosozial Verlag, 2005), 391–404.)

that Hanegraaff's account did not provide readers with a fair, reasonable or objective impression of its contents, even if some aspects of his critique are helpful and illuminating.

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2013.795762>

ANNOUNCEMENT

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DARIL (www.daril.eu) is an Internet site aiming to provide scholars with a free access to a digital collection of searchable descriptions, digital photo-reproductions and encoded editions of inaugural lectures delivered at Renaissance and Early Modern universities. Historical studies have already revealed the complexity of the pathways through which university philosophical culture has taken part in the development of knowledge from the Late Middle Ages to our times. Nonetheless, until now a full class of documents has been considered only sporadically: the inaugural lectures (also known as *paginae*) of the single university courses given from the Renaissance to the beginning of the eighteenth century. Scholars of university history know that each of the countless inaugural lectures till extant in archives and libraries is an interesting document, revealing the tenets of university culture in a specific place and time; however, few research campaigns have been conducted on these documents. Main obstacles to these enterprises are the large number of extant documents and their dispersion. DARIL aims to facilitate scholars to overcome these difficulties. At present, DARIL's database comprises only 110 documents preserved in a specific archive series in the Archivio Antico of the University of Padua; notwithstanding, DARIL's infrastructure has been created with a more extensive aim: to permit the archive to include and to make freely available metadata, digital photo-reproductions and semi-diplomatic encoded editions of any inaugural lecture produced at any university or college from the beginning of the Renaissance to the years around the end of the eighteenth century. Anyone can submit materials to be stored in the database, whether photo-reproductions and semi-diplomatic encoded editions, simply digital photo-reproductions and semi-diplomatic editions, or simply digital photo-reproductions of *paginae*. Both individual scholars and research teams are invited to take part in the expansion of the database; their work will be explicitly recognized and exhibited in the metadata accompanying each single document. DARIL's interface is available in English and Italian. For more information, one may refer to the sections 'Project' and 'Progetto' of DARIL's Internet site

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