Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
University of Malaga | UMA · Department of Economic Theory and History

PhD in Economics

About

57
Publications
7,705
Reads
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575
Citations
Citations since 2016
39 Research Items
480 Citations
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2016201720182019202020212022020406080
Introduction
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara currently works at the Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada. Ismael does research in Behavioural Economics, Experimental Economics and Game Theory. His current projects include the study of 'Fairness in games', 'Unethical behavior' and 'Bank runs as coordination problems'
Additional affiliations
September 2018 - present
University of Granada
Position
  • Professor (Associate)
September 2013 - August 2018
Middlesex University, UK
Position
  • Professor (Associate)

Publications

Publications (57)
Article
We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which r...
Article
Full-text available
We introduce non-enforceable property rights over a bargaining surplus in a dictator game with production, where the agent’s effort is differentially rewarded and subsequently determines the size of the surplus. Using experimental data, we elicit individual preferences over the egalitarian, accountability and libertarian principles and provide evid...
Article
We develop a principal-agent model in which the principal has access to hard and soft information about the agent�s level of effort. We model the soft signal as being informative about the agent�s level of effort but manipulable by the agent at a cost. We show that the presence of influence activities increases the cost of implementing the efficien...
Article
Coordinated punishment occurs when punishment decisions are complements; i.e., this punishment device requires a specific number of punishers to be effective; otherwise, no damage will be inflicted on the target. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared with uncoordinated punishment, where punishment d...
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We study how lines form in front of banks. In our model, depositors choose first the level of effort to arrive early at the bank and then whether or not to withdraw their deposit. We argue that the informational environment (i.e., the possibility of observing the action of others) affects the emergence of bank runs and should, therefore, influence...
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Trust is a central source of well-being in a society. When individuals feel that they can trust others, cooperative interactions become more likely, making a group of individuals able to enjoy better outcomes than the sum of individual stand-alone efforts would achieve. Opportunistic and dishonest behavior hinders trust by generating negative feedb...
Preprint
We study behavior in a trust game where first-movers initially have a higher endowment than second-movers but the occurrence of a positive random shock can eliminate this inequality by increasing the endowment of the second-mover before the decision of the first-mover. We find that second-movers return less (i.e., they are less trustworthy) when th...
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Full-text available
Link: https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/grawpaper/20_2f05.htm Suggested citation: Ernesto Mesa-Vazquez, Ismael Rodr ´ ´ıguez-Lara, and Amparo Urbano (2020). Standard vs random dictator games: The effect of role uncertainty on generosity. ThE Papers, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of Universidad de Granada. 20/05. Abstract: "...
Article
Raw data of Working Paper "Standard vs random dictator games. The effect of role uncertainty on generosity". Data and codebook: https://x-science.org/xscience/#!Detail/10.23663/x2654 Citation (formatted-apa): Ernesto Mesa-Vazquez, Ismael Rodríguez-Lara, and Amparo Urbano (2020). Standard vs random dictator games: The effect of role uncertainty on...
Preprint
Full-text available
Testing causal relationships expressed by mathematical models on facts about human behaviour across history is challenging. A prominent example is the Neolithic agricultural revolution [1]. Many theoretical models of the adoption of agriculture has been put forward [2] but none has been tested. The only exception is [3], that uses a computational a...
Preprint
We investigate experimentally the effect of a negative endowment shock in a trust game to assess whether different causes of inequality have different effects on trust and trustworthiness. In our trust game there may be inequality in favor of the second mover and this may (or may not) be the result of a negative random shock (i.e., the outcome of a...
Article
Full-text available
Testing causal relationships expressed by mathematical models on facts about human behaviour across history is challenging. A prominent example is the Neolithic agricultural revolution [1]. Many theoretical models of the adoption of agriculture has been put forward [2] but none has been tested. The only exception is [3], that uses a computational a...
Article
Full-text available
We investigate experimentally the effect of a negative endowment shock in a trust game to assess whether different causes of inequality have different effects on trust and trustworthiness. In our trust game there may be inequality in favor of the second mover and this may (or may not) be the result of a negative random shock (i.e., the outcome of a...
Article
Recent work highlights that cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma (PD) is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing the right thing, rather than social preferences for equity or efficiency. To our knowledge, nothing is known on whether moral preferences affect cooperation in the Stag-Hunt Game (SHG). Cooperation in the SHG fundamenta...
Article
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze how response time in a laboratory experiment on bank runs affects withdrawal decisions. Design/methodology/approach In the authors’ setup, the bank has no fundamental problems, depositors decide sequentially whether to keep the money in the bank or to withdraw, and they may observe previous decisions...
Preprint
Full-text available
Recent work highlights that cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma (PD) is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing the right thing, rather than social preferences for equity or efficiency. By contrast, little is known on what motivates cooperation in the Stag-Hunt Game (SHG). Cooperation in the SHG fundamentally differs from coopera...
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Full-text available
We induce conformity in a binary-decision voting game in which one of the options require certain support (majority, supermajority or unanimity) to be the adopted decision. We consider heterogenous types of voters in that each of them prefer a different outcome in the voting game. We demonstrate theoretically that truthful voting is the unique equi...
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We report experimental evidence on second-movers’ behavior in the investment game (also known as the trust game) when there exists endowment heterogeneity. Using a within-subject analysis, we investigate whether or not second-movers exhibit some taste for inequality aversion by returning a larger (smaller) share of the available funds to first-move...
Data
Supporting information. (DOCX)
Article
We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the res...
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We use different incentive schemes to study truth-telling in a die-roll task when people are asked to reveal the number rolled privately. We find no significant evidence of cheating when there are no financial incentives associated with the reports, but do find evidence of such when the reports determine financial gains or losses (in different trea...
Article
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During financial crisis, depositors and investors react quickly to the enviroment, thus financial authorities do often rely on the suspension of convertibility (i.e., freezing deposits) to prevent bank runs episodes. However, it is unclear how response time shapes decisions during bank runs. To cover this gap, we report experimental evidence on the...
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We test for the construct validity of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) by eliciting response times. We find that incorrect answers to the CRT are quicker than correct answers. At the individual level, we classify subjects into impulsive and reflective, depending on whether they choose the incorrect intuitive answer or the correct answer the majo...
Article
We use the die-paradigm to study gender differences in cheating behavior. We find that i) both males and females do not cheat in the absence of financial incentives, ii) both males and females cheat (but not maximally) if reports are associated with financial gains or losses, and iii) males and females do not cheat differentially.
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Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior from others even if they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectatio...
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A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). In this paper, we study its role in mobilization. We assume that social media allow potential participants to observe the individual participation decisions of others, while traditional mass media allow potential participants to see on...
Article
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We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a...
Article
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We provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems with fundamentals and coordination failures among depositors, the two main culprits identified in the literature. Depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so, even when theoretically they should not. Our findings suggest that panic also manifests itse...
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Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological feature likely to be relevant is the formation of expectations, particularly about receiving cooperative or generous behavior from others. Without such expectations, social life will be seriously impeded and, in turn, expectations leading to satisfa...
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We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwis...
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This paper studies the extent to which offers and demands in ultimatum games are consistent with equity theory when there is a joint endowment to be distributed. Using a within-subject design, we also investigate the importance of the bargaining power by comparing the subjects’ behavior in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game, which differ in th...
Chapter
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Thousands of depositors crowd in the door of a bank branch. “Where is our money?” they shout enraged. “We want our money back!” The scene, besides being part of the classic movie “It’s a wonderful life” (Frank Capra, 1946), reflects a reality that many people believed distant but that has re-arisen strongly in recent years. We refer to bank runs.
Article
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We induce conformity in a binary-decision voting game by assuming that agents may derive some utility by voting the same option that others. Theoretically, we show that truthful voting is the unique equilibrium without conformity. Introducing conformity enlarges the set of equilibria, which includes voting profiles in which agents do not necessaril...
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This paper provides experimental evidence on the relationship between social preferences and cognitive abilities, which we measure using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We elicit social preferences by way of 24 dictatorial situations, in which the Dictator's choice sets include (i) standard Dictator games, where increasing the Dictator's payof...
Article
We assess the effect of cognitive abilities on withdrawal decisions in a bank-run game. In our setup, depositors choose sequentially between withdrawing or keeping their funds deposited in a common bank. Depositors may observe previous decisions depending on the information structure. Theoretically, the last depositor in the sequence of decisions h...
Article
We report experimental evidence on gender differences in financial decision-making that involves three depositors choosing whether to keep their money deposited or to withdraw it. We find that one's position in the line, the fact that one is being observed and observed decisions are key determinants in explaining the subjects’ behavior. Our main re...
Article
We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We model depositors’ decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the other depositors’ actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a sufficient condition to prevent bank runs...
Article
Este artículo muestra que las mujeres eligen con mayor frecuencia la asignación justa que les resulta más beneficiosa a su rentabilidad financiera. La evidencia experimental proviene de un juego del dictador con la producción, en el que los sujetos primero resuelven un cuestionario para acumular ganancias, y luego dividen estas ganancias eligiendo...
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We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki (2004), which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of the surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects’ production (libertarian principle). In our model, dictators may a...
Article
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This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipien...
Article
I consider a dictator game with production, in which the e¤ort of the agents is di¤erentially rewarded and determines the size of the surplus. Using experimental data I elicit individual preferences over the egalitarian, accountability and libertarian distribution principles and provide evidence to support the inability of these principles to accou...
Article
We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We model depositors’ decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the other depositors’ actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a sufficient condition to prevent bank runs...
Article
Full-text available
We develop, both theoretically and experimentally, a stereotypical environment that allows for co-ordination breakdown, leading to a bank run. Three depositors are located at the nodes of a network and have to decide whether to keep their funds deposited or to withdraw. One of the depositors has immediate liquidity needs, whereas the other two depo...

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