Ingrid Exurville

L'exportation et la mutualisation des industries de fabrication des circuits intégrés impliquent de nombreuses interrogations concernant l'intégrité des circuits fabriqués. On se retrouve alors confronté au problème d'insertion d'une fonctionnalité dissimulée pouvant agir de façon cachée : on parle de Cheval de Troie Matériel (CTM). En raison de la...

A Hardware Trojan is a malicious hardware modification of an integrated circuit. It could be inserted at different design steps but also during the process fabrication of the target. Due to the damages that can be caused, detection of these alterations has become a major concern. In this paper, we propose a new resilient method to detect Hardware T...

Hardware Trojans (HT) inserted in integrated circuits have received special attention of researchers. In this paper, we present firstly a novel HT detection technique based on path delays measurements. A delay model, which considers intra-die process variations, is established for a net. Secondly, we show how to detect HT using ElectroMagnetic (EM)...

In this paper we study the information leakage that may exist, due to electrical coupling, between logically independent blocks of a secure circuit as a new attack path to retrieve secret information. First, an AES-128 has been implemented on a FPGA board. Then, this AES implementation has been secured with a delay-based countermeasure against faul...

This paper describes the results of the practical measurements done to determine the path delay associated with each bit of a hardware AES FPGA implementation using a clock glitch injection tool. We illustrate how the measured path delays can constitute a characteristic fingerprint of an Intellectuel Property (IP) and can be used to detect the inse...