

Ethnicities

<http://etn.sagepub.com>

When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda

Helen M Hintjens
Ethnicities 2001; 1; 25

The online version of this article can be found at:
<http://etn.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/1/25>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

Additional services and information for *Ethnicities* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://etn.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://etn.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav>

Copyright © 2001 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Vol 1(1): 25–55 [1468-7968(200104)1:1:25–55:016682]

When identity becomes a knife

Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda

HELEN M. HINTJENS

University of Wales, Swansea

ABSTRACT The term ‘identity’ tends to have positive connotations. This article presents an example of a lethal form of identity politics, where self-expression was not possible for victims or victimizers. At the time, killings in Rwanda in 1994 were presented by (and to) the international media as the outcome of deep-seated ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ hatred, between Tutsi and Hutu Rwandans. However, research on the period, oral testimonies from all sides, video evidence and court cases at the UN Tribunal in Arusha established since the genocide, have all confirmed that this was not the case. It has become clear that the killings were systematic, planned and enforced bureaucratically. The rural and urban Hutu population were persuaded to kill neighbours, friends, family members and strangers, and such killings were planned on a national scale and meticulously monitored. Genocide of the Tutsi was organized by a beleaguered inner core of state functionaries, principally comprising top military officers who came mainly from north-western Rwanda and who refused to implement the terms of the Arusha peace Accords (1991–4). Rwanda’s genocide of Tutsi in 1994 is the most dramatic example of ‘race science’ in action since the Holocaust, with which some parallels are drawn in this article. In both cases, the genocide option was arrived at during a time of economic and political crisis, and a mix of terror and bribery was used to gain popular compliance. To make the genocide thinkable, myths of origin were reinvented and differential forms of citizenship enforced. Identity politics became a means of legitimizing collective violence and scapegoating, and a knife in the back of the civilian population as a whole, victims and victimizers alike.

KEYWORDS Africa ● colonialism ● crisis ● ethnicity ● propaganda ● race

INTRODUCTION

The abominable excesses of the capitalist era of the past three thousand years (predatory imperialism, defraudation of the working man, racial subjugation etc.) were possible only because the human structure of the untold masses who had endured all this had become totally dependent upon authority, incapable of freedom and extremely accessible to mysticism. (Reich, 1970: xxvi–xxvii)

Rwandan history is dangerous. (Gourevitch, 1998: 48)

All the attention on the genocide in Rwanda has not necessarily brought us closer to realizing that what happened there can happen elsewhere too. In using these opening quotations, I wish to link the lethal manipulation of identities in Rwanda to the human condition. Rwanda should certainly not be 'written out of the rest of humanity' (Newbury, 1998: 88) because what happened there in 1994 was beyond previous human experience. This was the fastest, most thoroughly ruthless programme of 'racial' killing yet implemented in the world. Like the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide is now part of the history of humanity, and deserves attention for that reason alone.

It is now virtually irrefutable that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 was state-sponsored genocide; a pre-planned, officially commanded killing of an identified 'enemy within'. In Rwanda's case the enemy was defined in 'racial' terms as the Hamitic race of Tutsi. All Tutsi were in turn equated with the military enemy, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which had first invaded from Uganda in 1990. Popularly however, the killings and deaths of 1994 and 1995 are still being attributed to 'inter-tribal' conflict or 'ethnic violence'. Since many Rwandans and Burundians themselves understand such killings as the outcome of rivalries between 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' people, dating back centuries, in one sense, who are we as outsiders to disagree? Many studies are based on a similar point of view. One recent analysis comparing Rwanda's genocide, the Jewish Holocaust and 'ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia, for example, concluded that: 'Regardless of their complex origins, these events demonstrate the capacity of ethnicity and race to arouse the emotions, sometimes to the point of homicidal fury' (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 52).

Fury and hatred may be significant factors in war and violence, and even in genocide; but my concern here is to discover how such hatred is cultivated, how it is directed at a particular human target, and how such organized hatred finds expression in genocide. In Rwanda only some forms of hatred were deliberately nurtured; inter-Hutu rivalries were actively suppressed. Hatred was only legitimate when directed towards a specific target, identified by the state. I therefore start from the basis that ethnic identities in Rwanda do have a tangible influence on conflict, because such identities have been deliberately manipulated from above until it now appears as if

they are based on primordial ties of kinship or 'race'. But explaining genocide through ethnicity is rather like explaining the movement of the stars through astrology; in both cases, appearances are highly deceptive.

Presumably it is now accepted that distinct 'races' do not exist among humanity. In many situations of conflict, entire groups of people nonetheless act as if they have no common humanity with other whole groups of people. It is this human capacity to extend and limit compassion that gives racial ideology its fatal power, making identity into a knife that severs social relations and disembowels entire countries. Why did ethnic identity labels become lethal in Rwanda in 1994 and cause the society to divide against itself? How can we understand the process by which previously fluctuating social identities hardened into lethal barriers that prevented any compassion for those redefined as 'alien': the Tutsi of Rwanda? Various factors are considered in detail in this article, including the role of colonial ideologies and administrative practices, the economic and political crisis of the early 1990s, and the use of national foundation myths based on 'race' and gender by an increasingly totalitarian state. External manipulation by major western powers under conditions of severe socioeconomic and political stress also contributed to the ideology of genocide.

PRE-COLONIAL RWANDAN SOCIETY

A few scholars suggest that in Rwanda pre-colonial ethnic identities were already forming before contact with European ideas of racial difference and indirect rule (Lemarchand, 1999; Newbury, 1988). Under the late 19th-century *Mwami* (king) Rwabugiri, the Rwandan kingdom was expanding into neighbouring areas. Tutsi and Hutu class stratification was based largely on social status and was not clearcut, as both Hutu and Tutsi kingdoms existed outside the borders of Rwanda (Gasana et al., 1999: 145). Lemarchand reports that until the early 20th century, an individual could be both Hutu in relation to his patrons and Tutsi in relation to his own clients (Lemarchand, 1996: 9–14). Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were used as status terms rather than ethnic terms, in other words, and were considered inseparable elements of a single social structure. Though most of the hard work fell on the Hutu, there were also many common duties, including military service. Protests against the Tutsi monarchy arose in newly conquered areas, so that early on in the 20th century, 'The chiefs and royal courts were forced to seek armed help from the Germans to stop the rebellions' (Gasana et al., 1999: 146). Such rebellions continued into the 1920s, and contradict the almost legendary image of Rwandans' extreme obedience to authority (see Maquet, 1961). I explore this idea in a later section of the article.

It is often tempting to compare Rwanda with neighbouring Burundi, but

this exercise is fraught with traps and difficulties (Hintjens, 1999: 276–80). Since independence, each country has evolved in complex tandem with the other as inter-communal conflicts in Burundi increase the number of refugees in Rwanda and vice versa. To compare the two countries in the pre-colonial and colonial eras is even more problematic, therefore this article considers Rwanda largely on its own terms, while making occasional reference to Burundi where it is helpful to do so. The structure of pre-colonial feudal society in Rwanda was in some ways less complicated than in neighbouring Burundi. Power in Rwanda was unified and centralized around the person of the king and his court. The king's rule was considered sacred, and dated back in oral history to the 13th century (Codere, 1973). The distribution of the king's wealth, in the form of land and cattle, structured all social relations; the extent of the territory that the army controlled defined the limits of his power. The kingdom was drawn together through patron–client ties, clan and locality allegiances, military service, compulsory labour and common religious and cultural practices. There were 18 separate clans in Rwanda, which all included Tutsi, Hutu and Twa (Reyntjens, 1996: 242).

I would argue, along with a number of other observers, that such strong, cross-cutting allegiances served to prevent the crystallization of anything akin to 'ethnic' identities in Rwanda during the pre-colonial era (Gourevitch, 1998: 47; Goyvaerts, 1999; Newbury, 1998; Prunier, 1995: 55). Another factor that made for some social fluidity was the possibility for certain Hutu to do well and become Tutsi, as well as vice versa. Military expansion and defence involved all Rwandans, not just Tutsi (although Tutsi occupied the most skilled military positions). 'Hutu, Tutsi [and Twa] together fought neighbouring kingdoms. In all likelihood they must have done so as *Banyarwanda* [i.e. people of Rwanda] and not as Hutu *and* Tutsi *and* Twa' (Goyvaerts, 1999: 4; emphasis in original). It is likely, then, that the sense of social solidarity among Rwandans was greater prior to the arrival of Europeans than afterwards. One exception is interesting to note; the north-west of Rwanda was not originally part of the kingdom at all, and was only incorporated forcibly in the 1920s, after the defeat of the anti-colonial and anti-*Mwami* movement known as the Nyabingi cult (Newbury, 1998: 76). Perhaps significantly, the Hutu elites from this region were later to lead the 'Hutu Power' movement that led Rwanda to genocide in 1994.

THE COLONIAL IMPACT

In the Great Lakes region, European colonizers found nothing resembling the loosely organized 'tribal' structure of many East African societies. The nearest equivalent to Rwanda was the Baganda kingdom of central Uganda,

which similarly inspired considerable awe and speculation on the part of the first white conquerors. White explorers, military men and missionaries, were lyrical in their admiration of the tall, athletic and noble 'pastoralists' whom they found scattered throughout East Africa. The great height of the Rwandan monarchy distinguished them from all ordinary Rwandans, whether Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. Europeans were obsessed with height at this time, since 'most anthropologists equated small stature with racial inferiority' (Mosse, 1978: 15). Those defined as Hutu and Twa, according to the race theories of the day, were lower down the evolutionary ladder than the Tutsi. Early white explorers even speculated that the pastoralists in East Africa were not really African at all, but were descended from a 'Hamitic' race that in Rwanda ruled over a 'Bantu' African majority. It was suggested that perhaps the Tutsi originated in Ethiopia or Egypt (Prunier, 1995: 10–11).

Popular representations of the categories Tutsi, Hutu and Twa are still shrouded in a fog of colonial misrepresentation and ignorance. In terms of linguistics and archaeological evidence, however, there is no basis for the received wisdom which says that Tutsi were Nilotic invaders and Hutu Bantu farmers indigenous to the Great Lakes Region. Goyvaerts even suggests that, given the primacy of pastoralism in the Rwandan value system, Hutu may have been later immigrants. In addition, since 'there is not a single Nilotic trace to be discerned in present-day Kinyarwanda [the shared language of Rwandans] we cannot even have recourse to lexicostatistic dating' of the arrival of Hutu and Tutsi in the region, if indeed they were ever separate and distinct peoples in the first place (Goyvaerts, 1999: 6–7; see also Gasana et al., 1999). Also, most uncomfortably for 'heightist' theories of racial superiority, the aristocracy in Rwanda loomed over most Europeans, complicating the whole question of who was inferior and superior.

Under the Belgian mandate and trusteeship, which started after World War I, relations of clientship between Hutu and Tutsi lost any voluntary quality they might previously have had; clients were no longer able to escape to another patron if they were dissatisfied with their existing one. Belgian colonial rule also introduced a cash-crop economy into Rwanda, which displaced the barter and gift economy of traditional feudal society. This brought living standards of Hutu and Tutsi more closely into line, whilst political discrimination against Hutu was sharpened, and Hutu were almost completely excluded from public office and all positions of influence. Whilst consolidating Tutsi aristocratic hegemony, the German and especially the Belgian colonizers undermined the material basis for the kingdom, in the shape of relations of reciprocity, duty, protection, military service and dealing with disputes. Forced labour was increasingly geared towards colonial infrastructure projects, including roads, buildings, terracing and cash-crop production. Monarchic rule thus gradually came to be identified with a system of sharp repression and economic exploitation; the Tutsi themselves

rather than the Belgians appeared to be the agents of colonization. Hutu and Twa were completely excluded from office under the system of indirect rule, and the 'vast interlocking network of relationships in whose interstices Hutu found protection and rose to power' had started to disappear (Linden, 1977: 187; see also Prunier, 1995: 45–6).

A number of administrative reforms introduced by the Belgians in the 1930s started to twist the knife of a new form of identity politics into Rwandan society. Identity cards were introduced in 1933, which bore the 'racial' origin of the individual, traced through the father's line. Each Rwandan was thereby defined as definitively one or other of the three recognized social categories: Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. This was a significant first step in 'slicing up' Rwandan society into vertical, parallel tranches of humanity. The offices of land, cattle and military chiefs were collapsed into one position, and this was explicitly confined to Tutsi (Destexhe, 1995: viii, 31; Van der Meer, 1996: 253–5). After the 1930s, an individual however wealthy, could not become a Tutsi if he was Hutu or Twa; nor could a Tutsi, however poor or unsuccessful, become socially Hutu (Prunier, 1995: 45–6). Traditional religious beliefs were driven underground as the population gradually converted to Catholicism (Linden, 1977). As a quasi-mystical substitute for pre-colonial myths of origin, new theories of racial origins were propagated in schools, seminaries and in official documents.

A commercialized cash crop economy flourished in the 1940s and 1950s. By the time the *ubuhake*, the contract relationship which bound client to patron, was abolished in 1954, the monarchy's real economic and political power was already in sharp decline. By the time of independence in 1962, the Hutu majority in Rwanda was both resentful and frustrated by the total domination of the Tutsi and Belgians in all spheres of their lives:

deprived of all political power and materially exploited by both the whites and the Tutsi [the Hutu] were told by everyone that they were inferiors who deserved their fate and also came to believe it. As a consequence, they began to hate *all* Tutsi, even those who were just as poor as they. (Prunier, 1995: 35–6; emphasis in original)

The majority of those killed in the 1994 genocide were the 'small rural Tutsi from the hills . . . in no way different from their Hutu neighbours' (1995: 249). As early as 1959, the evidence suggested that on average Tutsi Rwandans were no better off than Rwandan Hutu (1995: 55). Unfortunately, this did nothing to counter racial stereotypes propagated by the Belgian colonizers. Notions of racial inferiority and superiority were adopted by Rwandans themselves (i.e. internalized) and made it very difficult to construct a shared anti-colonial form of nationalist identity (Harroy, 1984: 28–9; Hintjens, 1999). As Yurick (1995: 214) suggests: 'Colonization can be thought of not only as the control of some area "external" to the

“homeland” but as the process of *internalizing* the alienating code of the overarching nation-state.’

During the Belgian colonial era, ‘with every schoolchild reared in the doctrine of racial superiority and inferiority, the idea of a collective national entity was steadily laid to waste’ (Gourevitch, 1998: 57–8). How the Belgians managed to rewrite Rwandans’ social identities whilst avoiding the knife-edge of anti-colonialism themselves is explored in the next section.

REINVENTING IDENTITIES

Just as Jews were highly integrated into German society before the Nazis came to power, so were Tutsi close to Hutu in many respects. Unlike the Jews, the Tutsi had no residual language of their own, no distinctive cultural practices of their own, and no separate religious beliefs; all these were shared among Rwandans in general (Gourevitch, 1998: 47). Average physical differences between Hutu and Tutsi were much less than the comparison between ordinary Hutu and the Tutsi monarchy would suggest (Hintjens, 1999; see also Harroy, 1984: 28–9). At independence, ordinary Hutu and Tutsi were swept into an emerging conflict between the Belgian colonial power and their erstwhile allies, the Tutsi aristocracy and the Tutsi intermediary class of indirect rule. What is interesting is how the Belgians managed to escape any responsibility for the colonial exploitation of the Hutu majority of Rwanda.

By the 1950s, Belgian officials and Catholic European clergy had started to fear the anti-colonial radicalism of part of the Tutsi elite. The Hutu underdogs were now gradually transformed into the ‘authentic’ inhabitants of Rwanda, as well as the vast majority of the population. In the ideology of the time, the ‘Bantu’ Hutu appeared more genuinely African, and perhaps more entitled to inherit the post-colonial state structures, than the ‘immigrant’ Tutsi who had supposedly moved into the country from the North. Pan-African and Pan-Bantuist philosophies started to have an influence among a class of educated Hutu, who were now favoured as inheritors of the colonial state machinery.

From the 1950s onwards, the ideology of Bantu origins of the Hutu has been powerfully articulated with notions of ‘the people’. *Le peuple majoritaire* became the usual way to refer to the Hutu at around the time of independence, and referred not only to a numerical majority, but also to the supposed common ancestry of everyone defined as Hutu. Having been considered among the ‘wretched of the earth’, the dominated underclass of Rwandan society, Hutu elites started to reconceptualize ‘their’ people as a racial-cum-ethnic group. As in many other situations, when ‘(p)resented with the choice between being an underclass or an ethnic minority, many

groups opt for the latter' (Eriksen, 1993: 125). Such a transition from horizontal to vertical identities had started to take place with the colonial ideology of race, and now found tangible expression in the abolition of *ubuhake* (1954), the overthrow of the monarchy (1959) and the first killings of Tutsi Rwandans during the Revolution that occurred prior to independence (1959–62). At this time, class and 'race' identity fused into a single, exclusionary paradigm of Rwandan nationality and citizenship (Codere, 1973: 353). The totalitarian overtones of this ideology were already apparent, and were to find expression in sharp control of the Rwandan population, and eventually in state-organized genocide (Mann, 1999: 38–9).

As Tutsi came to be redefined in negative terms, as 'feudal colonizers' and alien to the region, the Belgians were apparently invisible. Their own responsibility for the colonial regime of indirect rule was obscured by the attack on the Tutsi and the monarchical institutions. Belgians themselves apparently felt safe from attack (Lemarchand, 1970: 179) and were able to continue playing an important role after independence. Uvin (1997) refers to the *abazungu*, or white tribe, as the 'fourth tribe' of Rwanda. They were also the only tribe able to escape the genocide in 1994 almost without harm.

The Rwandan 'Revolution', which lasted from 1959 until independence in 1962, marked the first time in Rwandan history that civilian Tutsi were killed. Before this time there had certainly been considerable violence, for instance in the process of criminal justice and in patron–client relations. But until 1959, it is worth noting that 'there had never been systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis – anywhere' (Gourevitch, 1998: 59; see also Lemarchand, 1970 for a full account of this period). The use of violence was of course widespread in the Belgian colonial system, with the Tutsi overlords being told 'You whip the Hutu or we will whip you' (Gourevitch, 1998: 57), but this violence had never before taken the form of organized killings of one part of Rwandan society by another.

Subsequent Rwandan regimes have exploited the psychological dimensions of inter-group jealousies and rivalry between Hutu and Tutsi. Until the early 1990s, President Habyarimana's regime, which came to power in 1972, was less disposed to exploit such tensions than the first Republic of President Gregoire Kayibanda. According to the psychological perspective: 'Tutsi and Hutu have killed each other more in order to upbraid a certain vision they have of themselves, and of their place in the world, than because of material interests' (Prunier, 1995: 40). This account cannot explain why such psychological visions would be more easily directed towards killing at times of economic and political crisis.

Any explanation of the genocide in Rwanda would certainly have to take into account the dynamics of inter-group perceptions as filtered through the 'mirror image' of events in Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi. When 200,000–300,000 Burundian Hutu were massacred in 1972, it provoked a

change of regime in Rwanda. Further killings of Burundian Hutu in 1980, 1988 and 1993 led to the impression that violence between Hutu and Tutsi was unavoidable. Democratic reforms were brought to an end in Burundi in October 1993, when the first elected president, also a Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, was brutally killed by the army just six months after being elected.

By independence, the cracks in the 'premise of inequality' which had underpinned pre-colonial and early colonial Rwandan society and maintained some social fluidity and order, had already become chasms (Mason, 1970: 18–21). After independence, exiled Tutsi fighters continued to cross Rwandan borders at night, calling themselves *inyenzi*, or cockroaches, to emphasize their stealth. While Tutsi were killed, Belgian military and civilian personnel stood by or even assisted with weapons and training. From its beginnings, therefore, the independent Rwandan state was constructed on a reversal of the monarchical and colonial social hierarchy. Yet it operated very much like both the monarchy and the colonial state which it replaced, exhibiting a strong degree of centralization, and a ready made internal enemy against which to erect its defences. Since independence, refugee movements between Rwanda and Burundi have encouraged further polarization of Tutsi and Hutu identities. Regime crises and economic conditions help explain how social tensions can be transformed into open violence.

GENOCIDE AND CRISIS

The end of the Cold War and continuing debt problems and structural adjustment measures have resulted in the marginalization of sub-Saharan Africa within the global economy (Adedeji, 1999; Allen, 1995). Prior to the mid-1980s, Rwanda's government had managed to avoid debt and donor conditionality almost totally. Until then, 'the economy [was] on the whole . . . well managed. The money was stable and levels of inflation, foreign debt and corruption were all low' (Waller, 1996: 9). In addition, 70 per cent of the population had access to clean drinking water, there was a good road network. Local clinics and schools operated in all the main towns (1996: 34).

When receipts from the sale of coffee were cut by two thirds in one year (from 14 billion Rwanda francs in 1986 to 5 billion Rwanda francs in 1987), debts started to pile up, and Rwanda's trade deficit mounted (Chossudovsky, 1997; Prunier, 1995: 123). This situation was not of the government's making, and President Habyarimana's regime could be considered neither corrupt nor incompetent up to this point. Economic crisis nonetheless opened the door to economic conditionality by international agencies, and by the 1990s the international donor community started to demand democratic reforms as well as economic liberalization. President Habyarimana's overall strategy was to seek social consensus in Rwanda and be pragmatic

in terms of economic policies. He also claimed to defend the 'little man', the agricultural-herders, against 'parasitic' traders, intellectuals and other elites (Newbury, 1992: 193–219; Uvin, 1999; Van der Meeren, 1996: 257). To prevent Tutsi from becoming dominant once more, ethnic quotas of 9 per cent for Tutsi and 90 per cent for Hutu had been applied in the civil service and in education since independence. The army was virtually entirely Hutu. During the 1970s to 1980s, Tutsi Rwandans could operate relatively freely in private business and the professions, and this strategy of social consensus (within quotas) paid off until economic crisis reared its head and brought an abrupt end to social peace.

It was in 1990 that the Rwandan government was first obliged to yield to World Bank/IMF pressure and implement a structural adjustment package. The national currency was devalued by two-thirds in one year (Waller, 1996: 33). By 1993, agricultural production was in severe difficulty and food production had declined. Only beer production increased, and most of this was destined for the growing Rwandan army and militias. As food imports grew and the currency was devalued, a trade gap emerged (Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU], 1994: 25; Reyntjens, 1992: 701). Famine appeared, mainly in the south, and real incomes, already slashed in the late 1980s, were further eroded. Mortality levels increased with a dramatic resurgence in malaria and other preventable diseases. Clinics had no drugs to treat the sick (*Le Monde*, 6 April 1994).

In 1990 the first RPF invasion from Uganda coincided with the first economic austerity package imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. After the RPF military attack, security considerations started to take precedence over developmental expenditure and any concern for genuinely democratizing political life was abandoned in favour of defending the regime in power, and protecting the army. The armed forces expanded from 7000 troops in 1989 to over 30,000 by 1994. Assistance for food imports, which was provided to the government in 1992, was reportedly diverted into arms purchases (Chossudovsky, 1997: 118; Lemarchand, 1994: 600). French military assistance expanded and arms purchases absorbed more and more of the shrinking national budget.

According to an EIU report of early 1994, the economic situation was worsened by the government's failure to install full democratic government in line with the Arusha Accords agreed between 1991 and 1994 with the international and African community (see Jones, 1999). The EIU stated that, 'while there is a political stalemate, Rwanda cannot access the \$30m due to it under the Structural Adjustment Programme, due to expire on April 23' (EIU, 1994: 24). According to Michel Chossudovsky, in their insistence on imposing economic and political conditionality all at once, international development agencies showed little 'sensitivity or concern . . . about the likely effects of economic shock therapy for a country on the brink of civil war' (1997: 119). Sovereignty increasingly lay with the IMF and

World Bank, but the Rwandan government blamed the country's problems on the RPF and on Rwandan Tutsi and 'moderate' Hutu, all redefined as RPF collaborators.

From the very start of democratic reforms in the early 1990s, political problems started to arise for the *akazu* (a powerful clique of northern Hutu, centred on the powerful male relatives of Habyarimana's wife). Political party divisions reflected a north/south divide in the country, and did not coalesce along 'ethnic' or 'racial' lines. Southerners generally resented the stranglehold of northern Hutu elites over all the major state institutions. Within the north, Hutu from Gisenyi and Bushiru were favoured over those from Ruhengeri (see Figure 1) in the allocation of public office. A shrinking economic pie exacerbated competition for employment, especially



Figure 1 Map of Rwanda showing main towns

Source: Hintjens (1999), reproduced by kind permission of the *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37(2): 260.

within the army. In this context, the *akazu* came to be openly identified with corruption, clan-based politics and discrimination (Gourevitch, 1998: 93–4; Prunier, 1995: 123; Van der Meer, 1996: 258). By the early 1990s, the real fear was that the rest of the country might well unite in order to finally oust the ‘Gisenyi boys’ from power.

As soon as the Rwandan press and media were allowed free expression, there was open criticism of government policies, the growing corruption, and of the widespread indiscipline in the army (Newbury, 1992: 213–15). Many opposition politicians and their supporters complained that the *clan de Madame* completely dominated public life. This was all the more resented as fewer and fewer Rwandans benefited from the state’s patronage networks. Resources were increasingly concentrated within a highly militarized and fanatically loyal sector of the population, including the army, members of parties loyal to the President and the growing number of informal ‘Hutu Power’ militias.

In January 1992, a huge public demonstration in Kigali called for the removal of President Habyarimana from office, and for the immediate implementation of the Arusha Accords. Such a demonstration was most unusual in Rwandan history, marking the emergence of new forms of political identity being formed in the cauldron of democratic politics. The regime blamed such anti-government actions on foreign agitation, refusing to see the signs of support for democratic reform. In 1993, the extremist pro-Hutu power party, the CDR (*Coalition pour la Défense de la République*) was excluded from power-sharing arrangements under the Arusha Accords, placing the Habyarimana government in a minority position (Jones, 1999: 139). Counter-demonstrations were organized by the regime and the CDR, to protest against the imposition of political reform under the Arusha Accords. Increasingly, the regime was out of touch with public opinion in Rwanda.

The final betrayal, for the *akazu*, was the arrangement under the Arusha Accords for power sharing in the army itself, which it was proposed would be split 50–50 between the RPF and the FAR (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*), the Rwandan army, overwhelmingly a Hutu institution (Prunier, 1995: 159–64). In the face of this proposed reform, senior army officers created an association known as AMASUSU, to protect themselves (Reyntjens, 1995: 58). Supported by the French military, the army oversaw the rapid militarization of Rwandan society in the early 1990s, establishing civil defence militias throughout the country. These operated as covert, trained death squads that moved into action from the start of the genocide.

In the media, the *akazu* pursued a sly and intimidating campaign of suppression of dissent and free expression. Mutual criticism among Hutu was ‘letting the side down’, as Rwandan Hutu were encouraged to believe that all the country’s problems and all their personal woes were the fault of the RPF and their Tutsi allies. Propaganda tactics were often sophisticated and subtle (see below). Opposition journalists were silenced or bought over. Inter-Hutu

disagreements were buried and it was drummed into every Rwandan Hutu that whatever the differences of class, region, status or political opinion, Hutus shared something more 'profound' (i.e. something 'racial') which united them. This common origin also opposed all Hutu quite 'naturally' to all Tutsi, who were of a different 'race' (Chrétien, 1995: 38–55, 258–60).

The increasingly totalitarian nature of Rwandan politics became apparent through the 1990s, and perhaps reflected the underlying pressures of economic recession and political reform imposed from outside. More generally, it can be noted that

the deepening of Africa's economic crisis tends to encourage a sort of cultural fundamentalism, comparable to other religious fundamentalisms, as an escape for rural populations, constituting an obstacle to genuine democratisation. (Randrianja, 1996: 39)

In Rwanda it was not so much the rural populations as the urban unemployed youth, led by the northern-dominated political and military elite, which became ardently fundamentalist in outlook. The threats posed by economic recession and war, 'transformed politics into a drama based on shared emotions', particularly the emotion of ethnic hatred (Mosse, 1978: 191). What emerged was a form of 'race' fundamentalism, which reduced all other conflicts to a single struggle between the Hutu and Tutsi, with a 'final war' between the two being presented to Rwandans, and to the foreign media as somehow historically inevitable. Genocide was thinly disguised as the biological struggle of competing races (Article 19, 1996). In all this, there were strong parallels with Nazi Germany's totalitarian ideology. Similarly, the *akazu* did not heed the critical choices, refused to reform or compromise, and proposed only one deadly way out of the crisis: 'racial purification' through elimination of the Tutsi. Ordinary Rwandans (Hutu and Tutsi and Twa) wanted work, food, peace and security of land tenure. They gained none of these, and indeed lost what little most of them had, as the genocide proceeded, and crops withered, seeds lay unplanted, animals were slaughtered, and the country was laid to waste (Nteziliyo, 1995: 319–38; Tardif-Douglin, 1996: 268). Hutus' willingness to take part *en masse* in the genocide had little to do with material calculations; it had to do with a ruthlessly efficient system of terror and propaganda, and the misuse of Rwanda's dangerous history to mystify the sources of social conflict in contemporary Rwandan society.

OBEDIENCE AND PROPAGANDA

It has been suggested that genocide in Rwanda was assisted by the tendency of most ordinary Rwandans to do what they are told (Newbury, 1998).

Widespread popular compliance was achieved through a variety of means and ensured that killing Tutsi became a civic duty of all Hutu, rather than an exceptional or spontaneous act of cruelty. Threat and coercion was involved, but brute force was only one element of the power to gain consent. Perhaps even more importantly, the power to gain obedience 'largely consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story of their reality' (Gourevitch, 1998: 181). For 'Hutu Power' ideology, all Tutsi were potential or actual traitors, and all Hutu should feel threatened by Tutsi, even babies in the womb. Genocide was implemented in a very efficient manner in Rwanda, and social conformism played a part; on the other hand the official genocide policy from the start of the 1990s to 1994 was also a struggle against externally imposed, and domestically desired peace. To organize the genocide: 'required a dogged uphill effort for Habyarimana's extremist entourage to prevent Rwanda slipping toward moderation' (Gourevitch, 1998: 95).

Mass compliance with totalitarian ideologies was a question much studied in the late 20th century. Such ideologies associate power with some greater collective entity, usually the nation, the people, or the 'race', and followers often display a strong desire for identification with this greater collectivity, to the point of ignoring their own self-interest. This urge to 'fuse oneself with somebody or something outside oneself' can be particularly overpowering during times of crisis (Fromm, 1960: 122), when the 'submersion of one's psychological self in some greater mass "self"' (Yurick, 1995: 205) becomes a way of feeling in control. Some regard this identification with a larger entity or body as the basis for political authoritarianism during times of trouble and chaos (see Kristeva, 1993: 2-3). As Arendt (1967: 352) puts it: '(t)otalitarian propaganda can outrageously insult common sense only when common sense has lost its validity'.

The appeal of exclusionist and chauvinist political ideologies can be traced back to repressed sexual impulses, and to what Fromm (1960) calls the 'fear of freedom'. From Rwanda to the Balkans and from Armenia to Cambodia, self-styled representatives of the dominant 'people' claim that 'the victim minority at home is linked with powerful foreign influences, whether another state or some kind of "international conspiracy"' (Mann, 1999: 41). In the case of Rwanda, once the Tutsi had been labelled as aliens, they lost their right to be protected as citizens. The creation of such lethal and divisive ethnic (in this case 'racial') political identities is not an unavoidable outcome of historical inevitability (O'Callaghan, 1995: 40).

In the case of Rwanda, as in Germany in the 1930s and Bosnia of the 1990s, those who sought to consolidate their power did so by attributing the hardships of the people to an identifiable (and accessible) scapegoat: a group to serve as target. With that in mind, it becomes possible to mobilize people on such a scale that the group redefines its own morality, For genocide, if 'everyone' from one

group is involved, then killing others becomes not only acceptable but necessary. (Newbury, 1998: 77)

Particular conditions account for the emergence of totalitarian commands, such as genocide, and a predisposition to believe in the fantastical, or what Reich calls ‘a mystical upbringing’ can become ‘the foundation of fascism when a social catastrophe sets the masses in motion’ (Reich, 1970: 131; see also Adorno, 1974: 238–44). Famine, war and disease all had this effect in Rwanda, at once fragmenting the Rwandan population by undermining their sense of social solidarity, and creating out of them a ‘mass mentality’ that could be manipulated by the regime in power. Under totalitarian conditions, such as those which pertained in Rwanda in the run-up to genocide ‘the individual – always an annoyance to totality – ceases to exist’ (Gourevitch, 1998: 95). For many individual Rwandans the consequences were fatal.

Gourevitch (1998: 96) argues that at some level the killing of Rwandan Tutsi had been normalized by 1994. I am not so sure, since many Tutsi were not expecting to be killed. Certainly a number of euphemistic expressions were commonly used to refer to such killings, including agricultural metaphors and references to collective community development work. Killing Tutsi became the ‘big job’, *akazi gakomeye*, or ‘tree felling’. Special collective work, known as *umuganda*, was another euphemism used for genocide, and Gerard Prunier reports that ‘chopping up men was “bush clearing” and slaughtering women and children was “pulling out the roots of the bad weeds”’ (Prunier, 1995: 138, 142). These expressions drew on a known type of language, in use since at least 1959 with the first political killings of Tutsi in Rwanda. Coded orders served both to disguise the horror of what was being demanded, and to remind those being addressed that this killing was a civic duty which they had to obey, just like any other communal ‘work’ they might be required to take part in (Lemarchand, 1996: 125–6). This use of the language of community development for lethal ends is an interesting issue, dealt with elsewhere (Hintjens, 2000; Uvin, 1999).

In normal times in Rwanda, civic discipline was inculcated through weekly *umuganda* sessions, involving long hours of ‘animation’, with dance, praise for the regime and its leaders, and a great deal of collective chanting of slogans. These ‘community development’ rituals were repeated in macabre mode during the genocide to prepare people for the ‘job of killing’ (Article 19, 1996: 33; Gourevitch, 1998: 94–5; Prunier, 1995: 137–8). Propaganda leaflets were distributed; disinformation was routine, with the prospect of mass slaughter of Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated RPF being constantly invoked. Those who killed Tutsi were promised material rewards, from bottles of beer to the property of the dead. Where all else failed, the threat to kill friends or relatives usually brought about compliance with official orders (African Rights, 1996).

A strict requirement to obey orders had long been applied in development

activities at the level of each Rwandan district, right down to local 'cells' of 10 households. This logic was now applied with the same painstaking efficiency to achieve a different objective: the elimination of all Tutsi and part-Tutsi (Uvin, 1999). Collective works such as terracing, wood felling, tree planting, road mending and construction work were abandoned, as the state urged ordinary citizens to perform this special work of killing. Soon the Hutu FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises) and the popular militias were so busy killing unarmed civilians that they were quite easily overrun by RPF forces in July 1994.

Although compliance was overwhelming, there was also disobedience during the genocide. Examples have been documented by Prunier (1995) and Gourevitch (1998) and by Rwandan survivors themselves (see also, Mukagasana, 1999). There were those who refused to kill fellow Rwandans, and those who protected them at great risk to themselves, and in a situation where everyone was being disciplined to conform. Rape, killing and torture were required of militia and army members, so that no one could later claim not to have taken part.

Whilst manipulating its own population and terrorizing them with images



Figure 2 Cartoon reproduced on cover of Chrétien (1995)

Well-fed person on the left: 'There are not enough dead. Tell them to go faster.' Thinks: Let them try and accuse me of theft and killings.

*Man with beard (Hassan Ngeze, editor later of *Kangura*, the fake *Kanguka*), presumably shouting instructions to kill faster.*

Person in the background asks: 'But what are we fighting for? Could it be that they are manipulating us?'

Source: *Kanguka*, an opposition magazine (1992, no. 58). The magazine was closed down and reopened as *Kangura*, a Hutu Power magazine.

of RPF demons hell-bent on killing all Hutu, the Rwandan state also gained compliance, for some time, from the international media and international public opinion. The story given was that the killings of April–July 1994 were the result of the killing of the President, and arose from the intense anger of Hutu against Tutsi Rwandans. Very few scholars continue to argue this point of view, though there are a few (see, for example, Campbell, 1997). From well before the genocide, however, many Rwandans themselves were quite aware of being manipulated, as Figure 2 suggests.

In Rwanda, it is traditionally said that certain powerful truths should not be openly shared with strangers (Gourevitch, 1998: 23, 259–60). Knowledge that is not meant for outsiders is known as *amalenga* (Reyntjens, 1995: 7). As in other conflict situations, so too in Rwanda: ‘to those who have no right to know one could adapt one’s speech by using language that they would misunderstand through ignorance’ (Zagorin, 1990: 251). Presenting false information for outsiders (including naïve academics, journalists and diplomats) could be justified as necessary in a situation where the state wanted to get away with mass murder.

In Rwanda the architects of genocide used propaganda techniques familiar to any student of the Holocaust. One strategy was to: ‘(v)erbally attack the victims, deny – even in the face of the clearest evidence – that any physical violence is taking place, or has taken place’ (Prunier, 1995: 241). The state’s propaganda machinery in Rwanda was highly sophisticated, ensuring that ‘underdevelopment was no obstacle to genocide’ (Gourevitch, 1998: 96). As the *akazu*, the FAR and *interahamwe* militia leaders continued to misinform naïve western reporters and aid workers, what they relied on were western stereotypes of ‘tribal conflict’ as endemic to Africa in particular. The mythical ‘Hutu Power’ version of Rwandan history was thus given some publicity and credibility through reports of ‘centuries of ethnic strife’ and suchlike.

MYTHS OF ORIGIN: RACE AND GENDER

All states and regimes elaborate myths of origin to legitimize their dominance over society. As Sarah Benton notes, ‘(a) story of the origin of a nation is always of its moment . . . it always reveals the character of the nation, explains a conflict, proposes its destiny, justifies a current action’ (Benton, 1998: 27). Myths of origin based on ‘ascribed’ identity markers such as ‘race’, origin, colour or common blood descent are commonly distinguished from those based on more subjective forms of identification, such as feelings of belonging, language skills or sense of nationalism. The myth of identity that came to be so lethally dominant in Rwanda dated from the late colonial era.

Whether considering traditions (cultural beliefs, rituals, ceremonies, ways of doing things) or collective memories of shared pasts, as nations, tribes, peoples or clans, a degree of scepticism is appropriate. Many such claims turn out to be recent, modern inventions or reinventions; the products of conflicts of material interests or struggles. (Allen, 1998: 49)

We have already mentioned that some scholars claim that ethnic identities in the Great Lakes region, and in Rwanda specifically, date back to before European colonial rule. Yet it seems that

those who hold the view that ethnicity already existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, always adhere to a version of Rwandan history . . . according to which, at some time in the past, Hutu (of Bantu origin) were conquered by Tutsi (of Nilotic stock). (Goyvaerts, 1999: 6)

This is what we might call the 'essentialist' view of Rwandan history, whose dangerous implications have been traced elsewhere (see, for example, Gasana et al., 1999: 142; Mamdani, 1996). As the Bahima–Bantu distinction has become pervasive, this supposedly 'racial' conflict has passed into popular consciousness as far afield as Nairobi, Kinshasa, Kampala and Harare.

The Rwandan reconstruction of national identity through a selective use of history thus centred on the notion of lost racial purity. As the gatekeepers of reproduction, women's sexuality was also seen as central to this equation, and their bodies were regarded as the property of the 'Bantu race'. The sexuality of Hutu men was also policed, though not as closely as that of women. Prohibition of 'mixed' sexual relations between Hutu and Tutsi was a key item in *The Ten Commandments of the Hutu*, a propaganda hate document of the 'Hutu Power' faction dating from the early 1990s (Hintjens, 1999: 265).

Present lines of ethnic conflict in Rwandan society have been manufactured with existing elements of antagonisms and historical accounts of the past. Ethnic conflict is certainly not something inherent in Rwandan society. As in the Balkans and the Central Asian Republics, social identities in the Great Lakes region can be constructed in such a way as to split up those who once lived relatively comfortably as neighbours or even family. Once they are demobilized, 'ethnic' identities, however close to one's heart, cease to have much relevance politically (Rutinwa, 1996). Where deliberate policies result in streams of refugees, on the other hand, the state can separate out people who come to be defined as different. It does need to be stated quite clearly that different 'peoples', however defined, can live together comfortably and need not be spatially segregated in order to do so. Tanzania since independence has been living proof of this in the East Africa region. In principle, it would be no more impossible for Rwandans to live together without violence than for Ugandans, South

Africans or Scots to do the same (Newbury, 1998: 88). The ability of all human beings to see each other as part of a totality, rather than as individuals each with their own rights, is common to all societies. And as Storr remarks: 'When men divide the world into good and evil, into sheep and goats, what happens to the goats is usually horrible' (1991: 138).

If the word 'origins' means anything at all, the question of Rwandans' origins has been complicated by centuries of inter-mixing, a common culture and language and a shared history that dates back several centuries. This may be a somewhat frustrating conclusion for those who like their facts neat and tidy, or are attached to romantic notions of ancient origins and roots. However, if 'all sets are fuzzy' (Yurick, 1995: 211; also O'Callaghan, 1995), then the desire to impose tidy distinctions on social reality – whether by scholars, colonial administrators or post-colonial leaders – can do much damage. As Mahmood Mamdani noted when he first studied the Rwandan case, there are many areas of history where the only realistic position to adopt is one of uncertainty and to admit that we do not know for sure (Mamdani, 1996). This position of radical scepticism may be the only realistic one. We do not know for sure what are the origins of Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. We do know that since independence, and during colonial rule, identity politics in Rwanda involved little or no element of choice of ethnic groupings; instead identity has been a knife in the hands of power-holders. Identities can be manipulated to sever social connections and forms of solidarity, whether within families and neighbourhoods or within institutions such as schools, hospitals, churches and work places. Cutting the complex social and family ties between Hutu and Tutsi was seen as a necessary prelude to genocide.

Sexual competition has been a constant undercurrent in attempts to justify genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda. A school of pseudo-historical studies was founded on the notion that autonomous Hutu kingdoms had lived in a state of grace before the imposition of Tutsi rule (Nahimana, 1993). This pre-Tutsi Garden of Eden was located in north-western Rwanda. The downfall of the Hutu had been their desire for things Tutsi, including the 'Hutu desire to own cattle', and their desire to marry Tutsi women (Louis, 1963: 110; also Lemarchand, 1996: 6). In *The Ten Commandments*, Tutsi men were accused of using their wives and sisters to seduce innocent Hutu men and steal their souls. In preparation for genocide it became the duty of every Rwandan Hutu woman to rescue her husband, brothers and sons from the clutches of these Hamitic Eves. In cartoons, the RPF were depicted as wild beasts, snakes, cannibals, rapists, capable of the worst atrocities. In a manner reminiscent of Nazi imagery of Jews, Tutsi were likened to animals and demons (Chrétien, 1995; Cohn, 1980: 212; Oplinger, 1990: 223). 'To have a frightening figure of wickedness, devil, demon or witch helps to focus motivation' (Thomson, 1999: 65). Mythical images were also borrowed from Christianity and Rwandan tradition to show the Hutu as innocent suffering victims of the Tutsis' inhuman cruelties.

In Rwanda, as elsewhere, 'racial hostility is nourished particularly by myths about sexual attacks, interbreeding, women of one race being stolen by men from another' (Balibar, 1991: 76). Such myths served as a cover for mass rapes during the genocide. By exploiting men's fears of sexual inadequacy, weak leaders sought to justify harsh in-group gender inequalities and even harsher treatment of the threatening 'out group'. During the pre-colonial era it was relatively common for Tutsi overlords to 'use' the daughters and wives of their clients for sexual services. Intermarriage was rare, though it became more common after independence. However, most intermarriage occurs in southern Rwanda, and is generally between Hutu men and Tutsi women rather than vice versa (Prunier, 1995: 36).

Women can be regarded as 'the gate-keeping elements for the boundaries of the national collectivity' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989: 106), and the hardening of community identity boundaries usually tightens control over women's mobility. In the Rwanda genocide, intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi was redefined as a crime for either sex, and could result in death. In crossing over 'race' boundaries, Hutu women and men became more vulnerable to attack. Rwandan women suffered additional vulnerabilities as refugees, victims of genocide and survivors. On the other hand, women also took an active part in the genocide, and worked alongside the largely male militias to kill Tutsi. In highly polarized contexts like that of Rwanda in 1994, 'identity-based politics divides women from one another and disallows any "mixing" of identities' (Charles and Hintjens, 1998: 7).

Colonial myths of racial origin, which emphasize exclusivity and 'purity', have poisoned relations between component parts of Rwanda's population, and have done similar damage in neighbouring Burundi. This is reason enough to challenge such ideas.

IDENTIFYING THE KNIFE: 'RACE SCIENCE'

Most conflicts in Africa are still analysed in terms of a model that sees 'tribal' identity as somehow primordial throughout the continent, whatever the variations in social structure and history. Some more complex academic analyses have emerged in recent years, which challenge any simple notion of 'tribal' identities existing in the Rwandan context (see, for example, Gasana et al., 1999: 141–55).

I cannot see why it is sometimes considered controversial to compare the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda with the Holocaust of Jews in the Second World War. Perhaps it is the dominance of the 'tribal' paradigm to explain conflict in Africa that accounts for resistance to the notion that an African genocide might be comparable to one in Europe. There are some striking parallels between the two experiences of state-sponsored genocide. There are also

many important differences. The use of propaganda and 'race' ideologies can certainly be compared (Article 19, 1996: 48; Mukagasana, 1999) even though Rwanda and Germany have little in common in terms of many other factors, including economic and social development.

Both the Holocaust and the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda were planned in a systematic and calculating way. Leaders controlling the institutions of state were the architects responsible for designing genocide plans, and bear overwhelming responsibility for what happened even where they themselves did not kill. This principle has been accepted by the UN Criminal Tribunal in Arusha (Magnarella, 2000). Direct participation in killing does not indicate greater culpability than planning such killings. Fromm (1973: 404) reminds us that 'Hitler did not get involved. . . . He was never present at a murder or an execution.' The killings were less remote in Rwanda than in Germany, but there too a fatally efficient system involved widespread popular participation in 'massacres by remote control' (Reyntjens, 1995: 32). The planners of genocide had read their history books, and were adept propagandists. Radio broadcasts, for instance, created a climate of fear by repeatedly reporting that the RPF were attacking unarmed civilians and wanted to wipe out the Hutu of Rwanda in a campaign of 'ethnic purification' (Chalk, 1999). Until 6 April 1994 when the genocide began, daily life in the country remained 'shrouded in an illusion of normality' (Friedlander, 1997: 60–1), and most Tutsi, like most Jews in Germany before them, simply could not believe that one day the army or even their Hutu friends and neighbours might come and kill them.

Impoverished as Rwanda was by 1994, the state could not be described as weak; if anything, it was so strong it crushed Rwandan society completely. A 'tradition of strong local and regional governments, with power broken down all the way to clusters of ten families', and the lack of 'bush' or uninhabited land made it possible for the Rwandan military and militias to control the mobility of virtually every citizen, both during peacetime, and during the genocide (Gourevitch, 1998; Gros, 1996: 460; also Mukagasana, 1999). Considerable thought was given to how those planning the killings would cover their tracks. The chosen way was to retreat to outside Rwanda's borders, taking the population with them, and holding them up as a human shield, so as to obtain relief assistance and aid from western humanitarian agencies. The FAR and *interahamwe* militias hoped to make it impossible for the RPF to govern by taking virtually the entire population with them across the border.

No-one would seriously suggest that the Holocaust was caused by centuries of 'racial' conflict between Aryan Germans and Semitic Jews. Yet in Rwanda's case, some continue to argue that racial differences were so deep-rooted that genocide was inevitable. Whenever they are uttered, however, I would agree that such 'old clichés about "tribal hatred" are an insult to the dead' (Keane, 1996: 190). Systematic persecution arises as wider social

and political identities are racialized, and the state gradually withdraws its protection from the intended victims of violence. By 1994 in Rwanda, as in Germany of the 1930s, ordinary people's frustrations with the state of the economy, and with life in general, were redirected towards fairly well-defined targets, and thus deflected from the holders of state power. In Rwanda 'Bantu' took the place of 'Aryan' and 'Hamites' or 'Bahima' the place of 'Semites'. These identities are what proved lethal to all Rwandans, as they had earlier proved lethal to all Germans, Jewish or not.

The genocide decimated Rwanda's Tutsi population, and reduced its public infrastructure to rubble, as 'the whole machinery of government that could not be taken out of the country was systematically and deliberately destroyed' (Republic of Rwanda, 1995: 13). In the face of economic and political crisis, genocide was the totalitarian state's ultimate answer to its own crisis of legitimacy both in Hutu Power Rwanda and Nazi Germany. The Rwandan regime mobilized a form of ethnic-cum-'racial' politics that identified and then sought out and exterminated the minority in the country. But this was not inevitable. If Habyarimana had been able to control the *akazu*, and to negotiate more openly with the RPF, genocide might have been avoided. Instead all moderates and democrats were silenced, and Rwandan political life closed down. Non-ethnic forms of individual and collective self-expression were not tolerated, and the battle lines were kept simple: Hutu versus Tutsi.

What emerges from all of this is that physical 'race science' is still alive and well. 'Race science' was an invention of 18th-century Europe, the reverse side of Enlightenment philosophies that spoke of universal human values and conditions. Ideas of 'racial hierarchy' served to bolster both class and imperial inequalities:

this drive to find differences in the 'races' of mankind grew out of the social climate of the day. A natural stratification of the races mirrored the social stratification of the classes, and in the light of the doctrine of the 'survival of the fittest' justified the exploitation and oppression of both. (Montagu, 1953: xxii)

'Man's Most Dangerous Myth', 'race science', sought to provide empirical justification for a view of human evolution that was fundamentally at odds with the universalistic rationalism of the Enlightenment. Anthropology was always an art rather than a science, and yet pseudo-scientific 'racial' classifications of human beings were very influential (Mosse, 1978: 16–17). In the case of Ruanda-Urundi such ideas were transplanted and soon became encoded in law and administrative procedures. As Pieterse (1992) has shown, racial images and theories were moulded over the centuries to fit in with the needs of the imperial economies and neo-colonial elites. Belgian popular images of African 'races' were as stereotypical and degrading as those of any other colonizing power, with the complication in Ruanda-Urundi of the 'Hamitic myth' (Vints, 1986).

PROSPECTS FOR REINVENTING NATIONAL IDENTITY

In Rwanda, 'race' still lurks behind innocuous-sounding terms like ethnicity. Those who fear losing power can reconstruct such 'race' identity categories and impose them through the means at their disposal (O'Callaghan, 1995: 36; Randrianja, 1996). By the early 1990s, the Rwandan state came to 'embrace [not] the entire *polis*', but only 'that part which members of the hegemonic elite think it should embrace'. This was to have fatal consequences for the excluded Tutsi minority and the moderate political opposition in Rwanda (Gros, 1996: 460).

Both in Rwanda and in neighbouring Burundi, regimes currently in power blame colonial policies and the imperialist designs of western powers for the existence of inter-ethnic conflict in the region. The government of Rwanda has even proposed that 'The government of Belgium through its divisive colonial policies, must be held morally and legally accountable, under international law' for the genocide. The Belgian government might yet find itself asked to pay 'compensation to the victims of the genocide' (Republic of Rwanda, 1995: 32).

It may seem mechanistic to argue that racial ideas brought in during the colonial era somehow 'caused' subsequent killings, and even the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. Like many post-independence states, both Rwanda and Burundi have continued with colonial divide-and-rule policies and have sought to drive a wedge between Tutsi and Hutu in each country. Part of the responsibility for this ideology lies with the former colonizer, Belgium. The means to conduct genocide were also obtained from support from France, Belgium and to a lesser extent the USA and the UK. Certainly western powers did nothing to prevent the genocide. The former colonizers and western powers cannot be blamed for all the present ills of Rwanda, however. Responsibility for the genocide largely falls on the *akazu* and their allies in Rwanda: the Rwandan state was no-one's puppet. On the other hand, those who look for evidence of 'ethnic' or 'racial' conflict in pre-colonial Rwanda seem to want to let Belgium off the hook altogether, and that won't do either.

The post-genocide regime of the RPF was set up in a country emptied of most of its inhabitants; some by genocide, many by forced mass emigration to Zaire and Tanzania under the retreating FAR forces. The subsequent Rwandan regime has adopted a very different approach to identity politics from its predecessors. Rhetorically at least, the RPF government has stressed the need to remove citizenship differences based on 'race' from Rwandans' consciousness. A process of civic reconstruction is proposed, with everyone becoming first and foremost a Rwandan citizen (Goyvaerts, 1999). Citizenship is presented not as an organic quality, but as something that must be built and inculcated through the right education, ideology and

practices. The RPF government now discourages the 'ethnicist ideology', and use of the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in official publications, in schools and the media (Republic of Rwanda, 1995: 10). 'Ethnic' categories have been removed from national identity cards for the first time since 1933, and a process of civic reconstruction is proposed. This model of citizenship resembles the Jacobin statism of Museveni's Uganda, where all ethnic self-identification is officially frowned on. Officially all Rwandans are equal citizens, but 'Only time will tell whether Rwandan politics can be de-ethnicised to a degree that makes democracy meaningful and secure' (Keane, 1996: 118–9). Unfortunately, the global trend, including that in Europe, is towards more rather than less exclusionary forms of nationality and citizenship (Berting, 1995).

There are some criticisms of the current RPF government. One complaint is that the regime's constant reference to the genocide is a ploy to disguise its own authoritarian policies. The monopolization of power by anglophone former exiles from Uganda is resented by francophone Rwandans. Assessing the record of the RPF is outside the scope of this article, but there is no doubt that past genocide cannot be an excuse for bad policies at home or abroad; this is also true of Israel more than 50 years after its creation. It is nonetheless significant that the RPF regime in principle opposes all forms of inter-communal violence, something that cannot be said of any previous regime in Rwanda. The aim of the present government is presumably to discourage collective political identities from being defined in the lethal terms of 'race'. In this way, it is hoped that Rwandan society will no longer be divided against itself.

In Rwanda as elsewhere, the ideology of national liberation has been used for totalitarian ends. Self-determination for a heroic people (here the Hutu majority) 'led to a practical denial of individual rights and the enthronement of the principle that might is right' (Gosling, 1991: 59). Nothing more clearly illustrates the need to establish a universalistic basis for citizen-state relations than the experience of state-sponsored genocide. Yet how is this to be done? International law remains at best an ambiguous instrument.

Under international law, genocide is clearly defined as a crime against humanity. Such laws have been the basis for the prosecution of leaders of the genocide at the UN Criminal Tribunal in Arusha (Magnarella, 2000). In other ways international law is surprisingly ambiguous. The Universal Declaration of Human rights, for example, in Article 28, states that: 'Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.' But in Article 29 we are reminded that: 'Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his [sic] personality is possible.' In practice, this can be interpreted as meaning that all citizens have a duty of obedience to the collectivity under which they are living. Each person has

rights, but only as the counterpart of duties they are required to perform towards the collectivity, whether state, community or family (Kymlicka, 1998: 17). What are we to make of this when the civic duties that an individual is required to fulfil include the duty to kill other human beings? Some recent research suggests that the punitive model of international law does not work under such circumstances (Drumbl, 2000).

The rhetoric of patriotic duty and community was exploited to the full in Rwanda in the run-up to genocide and during its implementation. Blatant misuse of state power started within the *akazu*, and continued after Habyarimana's death in the military interim government, which considered itself the sole legal authority in Rwanda during the genocide. From 1990 onwards, civil war was used as an excuse to curtail human rights. The Rwandan government went along with the process of agreeing the terms and conditions of the Arusha Accords, but refused to implement them (Jones, 1999). These Accords were intended to improve respect for human rights and usher in domestic peace by ending the climate of impunity for the army and by democratising political life. To impose democratic reform as a pre-condition for economic aid was guaranteed to create hostility within the regime: an example of how 'the ideology of human rights (can) come close to emptying human rights of its real content' (O'Callaghan, 1995: 41). Reforms proposed by the Arusha Accords, however well meaning, were resisted every step of the way, and were presented by hard-liners as a betrayal of the national interest of Rwanda. When IMF and development funds were withheld unless reforms were acted on, this merely added to the impression that little Rwanda was under siege from hostile external forces, all of them in alliance with the RPF.

CONCLUSION

Postmodern theory emphasizes the relationality of contemporary forms of cultural and political identity, and the eclectic nature of their construction and reconstruction. In Rwanda such identities became more rigidly defined and less complex with modernity; the boundaries of ethnic and 'racial' identity started to harden with German colonial rule, and this tendency was given force through colonial administrative practices introduced by Belgium. Drawing on 19th-century ideas of race, reforms initiated by the colonizers, commercialization and conversion to Catholicism all undermined the flexibility of the social identities of Rwandans. Clientship was redirected to serve purely colonial purposes (Prunier, 1995: 35), and by the 1930s, the social cement of Rwandan society had started to come apart. As massive economic and social changes promoted a new stratum of educated Hutu, Banyarwanda identity gradually started to break into two polarized

Hutu and Tutsi identities (with the Twa minority squeezed out). Thereafter, Hutu and Tutsi were generally conceived as polar opposites rather than parts of a Rwandan whole. One result of this was that colonial myths of origin were not disputed by the nationalist movement prior to independence, and were instead taken on board by the post-colonial regimes of the First and Second Republics.

In times of trouble, 'Nothing unites a divided society so effectively as identifying a common enemy' (Storr, 1991: 126), and genocide in Rwanda was the counterpart of the *akazu's* refusal to contemplate meaningful democratic reforms and power sharing arrangements. As deep divisions started to emerge within the dominant political order in Rwanda, it was decided at some point that the Rwandan state's crisis of legitimacy could be overcome by targeting and vilifying the Tutsi and planning their elimination (Uvin, 1997, 1999).

Accurate interpretations of Rwandan history are notoriously difficult to find. Instead what we find all too often is 'a mixture of fact and fiction designed to offer each community retrospective validation of its own interpretation of the genesis of ethnic conflict' (Lemarchand, 1996: 19). In other words, most historical accounts are loaded in one sense or another (Gasana et al., 1999). What happened in the past is filtered and interpreted in the present according to the purposes and position of the speaker or researcher (Mamdani, 1996; Lemarchand, 1998). Getting at the truth in Rwanda is therefore no easy matter, and the general reluctance of many Rwandans to share information freely with outsiders makes this worse. Gourevitch (1998: 258) reports that the RPF regime, wanting to have done with old habits of secrecy and reserve, has tried to encourage openness and honesty in Rwandan public life. Whether this can be achieved through education, media campaigns and a change in national ethos remains to be seen however.

The international media's susceptibility to propaganda has been a problem remarked on in other contexts, including the former Yugoslavia, where Stjepan Mestrovic commented that naïve, one-sided accounts of the conflict were fabricated and swallowed whole by western journalists who knew no better, and were easily duped. Mestrovic (1996) makes the very interesting observation that postmodern critiques of Enlightenment values may have been partly responsible for the weak moral response to atrocities such as 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia or genocide in Rwanda. Western fatalism concerning 'ethnic conflict' in the Balkans may have provided some indirect encouragement to the Rwandan regime in its determination to hold on to power at all costs.

Given the right conditions, I believe that political identities can be manipulated almost anywhere until they become as lethal as 'race' identities became in Rwanda in 1994. Desperate searching for clear identity boundaries can certainly occur in any part of the world at times of crisis.

Faced with a choice between allegiance to a collectivity based on 'race' or common origin, or following a lonely path of one's own individual conscience, isolated and fearful individuals will generally prefer to be followers. When coercion is added to the equation, disobedience to official orders becomes unlikely. The search for a secure form of identity was not the sole or even the main cause of the genocide of 1994, but without this tendency it would not have been possible to rally so many Hutu Rwandans to the cause of killing their Tutsi neighbours, strangers, family and friends. Genocide requires complicity from most of the dominant population. Once genocide started, killing simply became a civic duty, and a norm rather than an exceptional act of violence.

Amidst all this, a few testimonies have emerged of individuals who chose not to collapse their individual identity into that of the collective self, and were prepared to risk death by refusing the orders to kill. But for most Hutu Rwandans during the genocide, 'even the simplest gesture of common decency could mean death' (Prunier, 1995: 260; also Gourevitch, 1998: 110–44). So ruthlessly efficient was the genocide machinery once it was set in motion that not many Tutsi could be saved, though a few survived by leaving the country, hiding in ceilings and swamps, and being protected by Hutu neighbours and strangers (Mukagasana, 1999). The orders to kill Tutsi were initially resisted by the entire population of Butare, where, 'with the willing support of the population, leaders of both major ethnic groups combined for two weeks to thwart genocide' (Newbury, 1998: 81). Two weeks does not sound like long, but from start to finish the genocide in Rwanda lasted barely 100 days.

Acknowledgements

This article was originally presented to a conference on 'Identities in Action', Gwynnog, 10–12 December 1999, organized by Meic Llewelyn, University of Aberystwyth. Thanks also to two external reviewers for their comments, and to the editors for helping to reduce the length of the final draft.

References

- Adedeji, Adebayo (1999) *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*. London, New York and Ijebu-Ode (Nigeria): Zed Books-ACDESS.
- Adorno, Theodor (1974) *Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life*. London: New Left Books.
- African Rights (1996) *Witness to Genocide: Jean-Paul Akayesu* (First Prosecution by the International Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania), Issue 4, September, London.
- Allen, Chris (1995) 'Understanding African Politics', *Review of African Political Economy* 65: 301–20.
- Allen, Sheila (1998) 'Identity: Feminist Perspectives on "Race", Ethnicity and

- Nationalism', in N. Charles and H. Hintjens (eds) *Gender, Ethnicity and Political Ideologies*, pp. 46–64. London: Routledge.
- Allen, Tim and Kate Hudson, eds (1996) 'Introduction', in *War, Ethnicity and the Media*, pp. 1–13. London: South Bank University.
- Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds (1989) *Woman Nation State*. London: Macmillan.
- Arendt, Hannah (1967) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Article 19 (1996) 'Broadcasting Genocide Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990–4', October, London.
- Balibar, Etienne (1991) 'Interview with Etienne Balibar', in M. Silverman (ed.) *Race, Discourse and Power in France*, pp. 71–83. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Benton, Sarah (1998) 'Founding Fathers and Earth Mothers: Women's Place at the Birth of Nations', in N. Charles and H. Hintjens (eds) *Gender, Ethnicity and Political Ideologies*, pp. 27–45. London: Routledge.
- Berting, Jan (1995) 'Patterns of Exclusion: Imaginaries of Class, Nation, Ethnicity and Gender in Europe', in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (eds) *The Decolonization of Immigration: Culture, Knowledge and Power*, pp. 149–65. London: Zed Books.
- Campbell, Aidan (1997) *Western Primitivism: African Ethnicity*. London: Cassell.
- Chalk, Frank (1999) 'Hate Radio in Rwanda', in H. Adelman and A. Suhrke (eds) *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, pp. 93–107. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction.
- Charles, Nickie and Helen Hintjens, eds (1998) 'Gender, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity', in *Gender, Ethnicity and Political Ideologies*, pp. 1–26. London: Routledge.
- Chossudovsky, Michael, ed. (1997) 'Economic Genocide in Rwanda', in *The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of the IMF and World Bank Reforms*. London: Zed/Third World Network.
- Chrétien, Jean Pierre with Reporters sans frontières (1995) *Rwanda: les médias du genocide*. Paris: Karthala.
- Codere, Helen (1973) *The Biography of an African Society: Rwanda 1900–1960 Based on Forty-Eight Rwandan Autobiographies*. Tervuren (Belgium): Musée Royale de l'Afrique Centrale, Sciences Humaines, No. IN-8.
- Cohn, N. (1980) *Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. New York: Scholars Press.
- Cornell, Stephen and Douglas Hartmann (1998) *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Destexhe, Alain (1995) *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. London: Pluto Press.
- Drumbl, Mark A. (2000) 'Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide', *Punishment and Society* 2(3): 287–308.
- Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (1994) 'Rwanda Country Report', 1st Quarter March, EIU Report. London: Economist Publications.
- Eriksen, T.H. (1993) *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.
- Friedlander, Saul (1997) *Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution 1933–39*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Fromm, Eric (1960) *The Fear of Freedom*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Fromm, Eric (1973) *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. London: Jonathan Cape.

- Gasana, Emmanuel, Butera Jean-Bosco, Byanafashe Deo and Alice Kareikezi (1999) 'Rwanda', in A. Adedeji (ed.) *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*, pp. 141–73. London, New York and Ijebu-Ode (Nigeria): Zed Books-ACDESS.
- Gosling, David (1991) 'Obligations of Affluent Nations to the Poor in the Situation of "Radical Inequality"', in W. Twining (ed.) *Issues of Self-Determination*, pp. 49–70. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
- Gourevitch, Philip (1998) *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. London and Basingstoke: Picador.
- Goyvaerts, Didier (1999) 'Ethnicity in Rwanda Revisited', unpublished paper.
- Gros, Jean-Germain (1996) 'Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti', *Third World Quarterly* 17(3): 455–71.
- Harroy, Jean-Paul (1984) *Rwanda*. Brussels: Hayez.
- Hintjens, Helen (1999) 'Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37(2): 241–86.
- Hintjens, Helen (2000) 'Rwanda: When Developmentalism becomes Lethal', paper presented to African Studies Association of the UK Biennial Conference, University of Cambridge, 11–13 September.
- Jones, Bruce (1999) 'The Arusha Peace Process', in H. Adelman and A. Suhrke (eds) *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, pp. 131–56. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Keane, Fergal (1996) *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Kristeva, Julia (1993) *Nations without Nationalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will (1998) 'Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice', text of 6th J.C. Rees Memorial Lecture, Department of Political Theory and Government, University of Wales Swansea.
- Lemarchand, René (1970) *Rwanda and Burundi*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Lemarchand, René (1994) 'Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa in Comparative Perspective', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32(4): 581–604.
- Lemarchand, René (1996[1994]) *Burundi Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. New York and Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Cambridge University Press.
- Lemarchand, René (1998) 'Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?', *African Studies Review* April 41(1): 3–16.
- Lemarchand, René (1999) 'Coming to Terms with the Past: The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda', unpublished paper.
- Linden, Ian (1977) *Church and Revolution in Rwanda*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Louis, William Roger (1963) *Ruanda-Urundi 1884–1919*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Magnarella, Paul. J. (2000) *Justice in Africa: Rwanda's Genocide, Its Courts and the UN Criminal Tribunal*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Mamdani, Mahmood (1996) 'From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda', *New Left Review* 216: 3–36.
- Mann, M. (1999) 'The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing', *New Left Review* 235 (May–June): 18–45.

- Maquet, Jacques J. (1961) *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Mason, Philip (1970) *Patterns of Dominance*. Oxford and London: Oxford University Press/Institute of Race Relations.
- Mestrovic, Stjepan, ed. (1996) 'Introduction' in *Genocide after Emotion: The Post-emotional Balkan War*, pp. 5–30. London: Routledge.
- Montagu, M.F. Ashley (1953) *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Mosse, George L. (1978) *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism*. London: J.M. Dent.
- Mukagasana, Yolande (1999) *N'aie pas peur de savoir Rwanda: une rescapée tutsi raconte*. Paris: Éditions J'ai lu.
- Nahimana, Ferdinand (1993) *Le Rwanda: émergence d'un état*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Newbury, Catherine (1988) *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Newbury, Catherine (1992) 'Rwanda: Recent Debates over Governance and Rural Development', in Michael Bratton and Goran Hyden (eds) *Governance and Politics in Africa*, pp. 193–219. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Newbury, David (1998) 'Understanding Genocide', *African Studies Review* 41(1): 73–97.
- Nteziliyo, Anastase (1995) 'L'Agriculture: une priorité dans la reconstruction nationale', in André Guichaoua (ed.) *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda 1993–94: Analyses, faits et documents*, pp. 319–38. Paris: Université de Lille/Karthala.
- O'Callaghan, M. (1995) 'Continuities in Imagination', in J. Nederveen Pieterse and B. Parekh (eds) *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power*. London: Zed Books.
- Oplinger, J. (1990) *The Politics of Demonology: The European Witch Craze and the Mass Production of Deviance*. London: Associated University Press.
- Pieterse, J. Nederveen (1992) *White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Culture*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Prunier, Gérard (1995) *The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994: History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst.
- Randrianja, Sofolo (1996) 'Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy', in Stephen Ellis (ed.) *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions*, pp. 20–41. London and Portsmouth, NJ: Heinemann/James Currey.
- Reich, Wilhelm (1970) *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*. London: Souvenir Press.
- Republic of Rwanda (1995) *Recommendations of the Conference Held in Kigali from November 1st to 5th, 1995 on 'Genocide, Impunity and Accountability: Dialogue for a National and International Response'*. Office of the President, December, Kigali.
- Reyntjens, Filip (1992) 'Rwanda', *Africa South of the Sahara 1993*, pp. 697–709. London: Europa.
- Reyntjens, Filip (1995) 'Rwanda: Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire', *Institut Africain, Cahiers Africains* (Africa Studies) 16. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Reyntjens, Filip (1996) 'Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9(3) (Sept.): 240–51.
- Rutinwa, Bonaventure (1996) 'Durable Solutions: An Appraisal of the New

- Proposals for Prevention and Solution of the Refugee Crisis in the Great Lakes Region', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9(3) (Sept.): 312–25.
- Storr, Anthony (1991[1972]) *The Roots of Genocide and Human Cruelty*. London: Routledge.
- Tardif-Douglin, David (1996) 'Rehabilitating Household Food Production after War: The Rwandan Experience', in K. Kumar (ed.) *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, pp. 265–85. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Thomson, Oliver (1999) *Easily Led: A History of Propaganda*. Stroud: Sutton Publishing.
- Uvin, Peter (1997) 'Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda', *African Studies Review* 40(2): 91–115.
- Uvin, Peter (1999) 'Development Aid and Structural Violence', *Development* 42(3): 49–56.
- Van der Meeren, Rachel (1996) 'Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960–90', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9(3) (Sept.): 252–67.
- Vints, Luc (1986) *Kongo Made in Belgium*. Leuven: Kritak.
- Waller, David (1996[1993]) *Rwanda: Which Way Now?* Oxfam Country Profile. Oxford: Oxfam Publications.
- Yurick, S. (1995) 'The Emerging Metastate versus the Politics of Ethno-Nationalist Identity', in J. Nederveen Pieterse and B. Parekh (eds) *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power*, pp. 204–24. London: Zed Books.
- Zagorin, Perez (1990) *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution and Conformity in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

HELEN M. HINTJENS is a lecturer in development studies at the School of Social Sciences and International Development, University of Wales Swansea. Address: School of Social Sciences and International Development, CDS-Taliesin, University of Wales Swansea, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP, Wales. [email: h.hintjens@swansea.ac.uk]