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## On the Illegitimate Use of Force: The Neo-Jacobins of Europe

Hakkı Taş<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Department of Political Science, Ipek University, Ankara, Turkey  
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## On the Illegitimate Use of Force: The Neo-Jacobins of Europe

~ HAKKI TAŞ ~

**ABSTRACT** While in Western discourse terrorism first referred to the “Reign of Terror” imposed by the Jacobin state in France (1793–94), in recent decades it has become increasingly associated with non-state actors. Studies on the undertheorized concept of “state terrorism” have by and large neglected its role in liberal democratic states. In this essay I attempt to re-establish the link between the state and terror by challenging the Weberian definition of the state as holding “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.” In 1990, the European Parliament called upon each of its member states to dismantle the formations popularly known as “Gladio,” the clandestine organizations stationed in NATO countries during the 1950s to counter potential Soviet invasions. Investigations ranging from Italy’s Operation Gladio in 1990 to the recent Ergenekon Affair in Turkey (2008–13) reveal that many terrorist activities were perpetrated by those intrastate clandestine military networks. The aim of the essay is thus to bring the agentive state back into terrorism studies through an analysis of Gladio operations in Cold War Europe.

Can might make right? In his seminal work *Politics as a Vocation*, Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.” The state is then defined by its means and “considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.”<sup>1</sup> This Weberian dictum on the state as a legitimate apparatus of centralized coercion not only justifies its use of force as almost “self-righteous” but also renders it irrelevant to the academic study of terrorism and violence. Thus the use of force by modern states has remained largely unchallenged with scholars instead focusing on the violence perpetrated by non-state actors such as subnational and “terrorist” groups. Christian Davenport, for instance, states that “researchers have paid far more attention to the evils done against governments... than to the evils done by presidents, the police, military, secret service, national guard, and death squads against those within their territorial jurisdiction.”<sup>2</sup>

Recent studies have challenged this academic orthodoxy and, as Ruth Blakaley argues, claim to “bring the state back” into terrorism studies.<sup>3</sup> State terrorism, two words that are seldom joined, has now gained wider currency in academic debates and refers to “the intentional use or threat of violence by state agents or their proxies against individuals or groups who are victimized for the purpose of intimidating or



frightening a broader audience.”<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, state terrorism differs from other acts of terrorism not only because of who its perpetrators are but also because its direct victims are not necessarily absolute targets but are viewed as instrumental to the achievement of larger political or economic goals.

The present study examines state terrorism in Europe and focuses on the stay-behind networks, popularly known as *Gladio* (Latin for a short, double-edged sword). These clandestine networks were stationed in NATO countries during the Cold War to guard against Soviet invasions. I begin my discussion by tracing the historical links between the state and terror and their implications for the academic study of terrorism. I then analyze allegations of Gladio-linked domestic terrorism following the first public revelations of this military network in Italy in October 1990. As shown in the analysis of two cases probing political violence, Italy’s Operation Gladio and Turkey’s Ergenekon affair, I suggest that state terrorism is a useful conceptual tool for studying why and how modern states employ terrorism for a variety of political ends.

### THE JACOBIN STATE AND TERROR

The most direct route to exploring the link between the state and terror is provided by the Renaissance philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli, who not only justifies but also praises terror for the sake of the state’s survival. According to Machiavelli, there was terror from the beginning of human society: people were willing to obey as long as they were afraid. In order to frighten them back into obedience, as in Leo Strauss’s famous framing of Machiavellian power politics, “the primacy of Love must be replaced by the primacy of Terror if republics are to be established in accordance with nature.”<sup>5</sup> This early account locates the state as the primary agent of terror.

Using terror to establish a new political regime was also the basic stratagem of the Jacobins during the French Revolution. In Western public discourse, the term “terror” first appeared during the *Regime de la Terreur* (The Reign of Terror) (1793–94), when the young Jacobin government deterred and executed the counter-revolutionaries who were deemed enemies of both the republic and the people. Terror was the basic means to ensure the fall of the *ancien régime* and the triumph of the revolution. Jean-Paul Marat, an important Jacobin figure in the early days of the Terror, championed this “salutary terror” as an indispensable phase for the new regime since so many “enemies of the revolution” would not comply with them “unless pushed by fear of popular vengeance... and [then] kept on it by terror.”<sup>6</sup> Beyond giving terror a solely functional value, the Jacobin leader and ideologue Maximilien de Robespierre thought it inseparable from virtue: “If the aim of popular government in peacetime is virtue, then the aim of popular government in a time of revolution is virtue and terror at one and the same time: virtue without terror is disastrous, terror without virtue is impotent.”<sup>7</sup> His blind faith in the revolution would ultimately inspire an ideology of terror.

Assuring the survival of the new republic was a central contributing factor to the Reign of Terror. The Committee of Public Safety, a twelve-man group founded in April 1793 and later reorganized by the Jacobins, administered massive violence and systematic repression. When Robespierre was elected to the Committee in July 1793, he dominated the group and was determined to sweep away any and all political

opposition. During this period, the state of emergency intensified with the adoption of a policy of terror on 30 August 1793. The revolutionary tribunals would go on to send over 16,000 people to the guillotine while some 40,000 others were killed without trial or died in prison. Ironically, the Reign of Terror concluded less than a year later, on 28 July 1794, when Robespierre himself was declared an enemy of the Republic and guillotined as a victim of the very regime he had designed.<sup>8</sup>

The term *terrorism* soon lost its original affirmative usage as political violence carried out by a state against its own citizens. Over time, it gained a derogatory connotation, with the state firmly located as the object of terrorism, not its subject. As a result, terrorism is now defined as a “non-state threat.”<sup>9</sup> The U.S. State Department also defines terrorism as carried out by “subnational groups or clandestine agents,” and rules out the very notion of state terrorism.<sup>10</sup>

When listing the myths perpetuated by current terrorism studies, Michael Stohl notes as the first myth the academic tendency of locating terrorism as “the activity of nongovernmental actors.”<sup>11</sup> This cannot be explained by either neglect or ignorance; rather, it is the conscious decision on the part of many scholars and officials who believe in the moral legitimacy of state violence and in effect deny that states are capable of employing terrorism.<sup>12</sup> For instance, according to Colin Wight, state terrorism is a contradictory term by definition because the state monopolizes the legitimate use of force in the Weberian sense, while terrorism, in contrast, is a form of illegitimate violence.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, Walter Laqueur emphasizes the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence and argues that there would otherwise be no difference between the activities of terrorists and states, and that such an argumentation is itself a terrorist discourse.<sup>14</sup>

The state enters into conventional terrorism studies only when it considers “state-sponsored terrorism,” which appears as a “cost-effective way of waging war covertly” by illiberal states.<sup>15</sup> During the Cold War, the United States named countries such as Bulgaria, East Germany, and Libya as Soviet-controlled sponsors of terrorism.<sup>16</sup> In recent years, however, this proxy terrorism has been associated more with Middle Eastern countries while Western democracies appear only as victims of terrorism sponsored by the “axis of evil,” as George W. Bush, former president of the United States, framed it in his 2002 State of the Union speech: “States like these [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq] and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”<sup>17</sup>

The term “state-sponsored” terrorism ignores a state’s use of terrorism against its own citizens and renders terror solely a foreign policy tool. In addition, it has only been applied to some underdeveloped countries. Within such an understanding, the primary focus of terrorism studies rarely extends beyond the “the US State Department annual list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ or the typical cases of authoritarian dictatorships.”<sup>18</sup> As such, little research has been conducted on state terrorism by modern liberal democracies in the West.

The concept of state terrorism, though underdeveloped theoretically and lacking adequate academic interest and empirical data, can nevertheless counterbalance the aforementioned anti-state and Western bias. While Noam Chomsky pioneered studies on state terrorism, the recently created “Critical Terrorism Studies” movement has intensified research on the subject.<sup>19</sup> In this approach, states may be considered to be applying methods of terror against their own populations in the form of genocide,

ethnic cleansing, torture, disappearances, illegal detention, and the suppression of political opposition. With such forms in mind, state terrorism in recent decades has clearly been much more destructive than non-state terrorism in terms of lives lost and the number of people affected. For instance, state terrorism in Guatemala alone resulted in higher losses—with 45,000 disappearances and 200,000 killed over the course of its thirty-six year civil conflict—than in all non-state terrorism worldwide during the same time period.<sup>20</sup> Studies on Cold War totalitarianisms, Latin American death squads, and the apartheid regime in South Africa further illuminate this argument. As Hannah Arendt stated, massive terror is the “essence” of a totalitarian system, which aims to maintain total domination over its society.<sup>21</sup> However, terror is not only the preserve of totalitarian systems; rather, such forms of violence have been available to all states, including liberal democratic ones, especially when faced with security threats, whether real or imagined.

As far as the Cold War period is concerned, the general view has been that whereas Eastern Europe suffered under brutal totalitarian orders and dictatorships, Western European countries were transparent democracies where checks and balances and constitutionalism reigned supreme. However, the Gladio scandal in Italy in 1990 challenged this understanding and revealed that Western European democracies employed some “dirty” methods of their own.

#### OPENING PANDORA’S BOX: OPERATION GLADIO

In 1990, the eruption of the “Gladio” affair in Italy revealed the decades-long existence of a stay-behind military network in Western Europe. The scandal broke out only after the judicial investigation into a 1972 car-bombing incident revealed that the source of the explosives was a secret weapon depot kept for this network. Upon Judge Felice Casson’s discovery of documents on Gladio in the military’s secret service archives in Rome, the then Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti acknowledged the long existence of *Operazione Gladio* (Operation Gladio) before the Chamber of Deputies on 24 October 1990. In his disclosure, Andreotti also admitted the presence of large stockpiles of weapons and explosives and that more than 600 operatives were on the Gladio payroll. More importantly, he emphasized that Italy was not the only country where secret stay-behind armies were stationed. Dubbed as Gladio in Italy, these secret armies were intended to provide “behind the lines” resistance in the event of a Soviet invasion. After forty years of secrecy,<sup>22</sup> the unmasking of these networks coincided perfectly with the end of the Cold War and their activities were brought to the attention of governments, parliaments, and the media.

On 22 November 1990, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on Operation Gladio, which called upon all member states to investigate and dismantle all paramilitary networks. The Resolution noted that these clandestine organizations “were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime as evidenced by various judicial inquiries” and “may have interfered illegally in the internal political affairs of Member States or may still do so.” While condemning the forty-year existence of these networks within European countries, the Resolution also asks how they survived the bureaucratic controls and operated without accountability to parliamentary authority.

This also meant that “frequently those holding the highest government and constitutional posts are kept in the dark as to these matters.” The EP also called upon the judiciaries of member states to investigate and reveal the full composition of the paramilitary organizations, requesting the establishment of parliamentary committees of inquiry, if necessary.<sup>23</sup>

Without a thorough analysis of the Cold War context, however, it is difficult to truly comprehend the Gladio affair and its ramifications. In the aftermath of World War II, the power vacuum in Europe paved the way for the growing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union over the control of the political and territorial reorganization of the Continent. Under this bipolar order of the Cold War, the American government’s main policy was one of containment due to the perceived threat of Soviet expansion to homeland security. To accomplish this, the United States mobilized substantial domestic resources and assumed the leadership of the anti-Soviet allies of the West, given that the European powers alone could not counter Soviet power. The alliance and its American leadership were formalized in April 1949 with the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which “dominated Western Europe’s hard security arrangements throughout the Cold War and became the principal vehicle of American influence in Europe.”<sup>24</sup> By NATO’s all-for-one clause, the United States iterated its commitment to European security to counter the threat of communist expansion.

More than just a military alliance and security belt, NATO was also tasked with retaliating against any Soviet threat. This included covert operations against the Soviet state, as exemplified in National Security Council document No. 68 (NSC 68) of 14 April 1950: “Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.” The U.S. strategy to complement its formal overt foreign policy with covert actions was first realized through the establishment of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in 1948 as an autonomous body within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Office was then merged in 1952 with the Office of Special Operations, which had organized the stay-behind forces in the various European states.<sup>25</sup>

The stay-behind military networks were aided with funds, weapons, and training in order to organize paramilitary resistance in case of an unprovoked Soviet invasion of Western Europe. While the possibility of an occupation of this kind had long been debated, the profound fears it aroused appeared real enough for extreme measures to be taken against it. According to Daniele Ganser’s comprehensive study, these secret military structures were established in NATO countries such as Germany, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, as well as in the neutral countries of Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Austria. While Gladio, the name of the Italian branch,<sup>26</sup> came to symbolize the whole structure, the stay-behind armies were named differently in each country: “SDRA 8” in Belgium, “P-26” in Switzerland, “Absalon” in Denmark, and “Counter-Guerilla” in Turkey. They were all coordinated by NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium through two clandestine committees: the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC).<sup>27</sup>

Although the reserve officers and arms caches of the Gladio networks were ready to respond to any offense, the Soviet invasion they were preparing for never actually took place. In fact these organizations are believed to have been involved in domestic terrorism and false flag operations against leftist groups as a way of preventing the communists from gaining political power. These operations, as conceived and executed in France and Italy, were part of a larger systematic order of “psychological warfare” the aim of which was “to reduce the strength and appeal of Communist Parties in France and Italy, with the ultimate objective of outlawing them.” From the American point of view,<sup>28</sup> the Italian government had to “treat Italian Communists as Communists rather than Italians, through legislative and administrative harassment, suppression and control.”<sup>29</sup>

The brutal history of Italy’s First Republic (1947–92) witnessed numerous and unparalleled terrorist attacks between 1969 and 1987, amounting to 14,591 acts of political violence, which according to official figures left 491 dead and 1,181 injured or maimed.<sup>30</sup> This period of terror began with the 1969 bombing of a bank in Milan and reached its height with the 1980 destruction of the Bologna railway station, in which 85 people were killed and over 200 wounded. This was considered one of the worst terrorist attacks in modern European history.

These atrocities were all linked to a policy dubbed “strategia della tensione” (the strategy of tension), in accordance with “the US plan to introduce a state of emergency in Italy in order to exclude the political left from government.”<sup>31</sup> In 2000, a parliamentary report prepared by the Left Democratic Party accused the U.S. intelligence service for inspiring the strategy of tension: “Those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and... linked to the structures of United States intelligence.”<sup>32</sup>

As a distinctive feature of state terrorism, these attacks primarily aimed at creating chaos and tension beyond their direct victims by fomenting fear in the population. The dual effects of political turmoil and the growing fear of terrorists elevated security concerns as the top priority and increased the demand for state protection. With growing security concerns, the frightened public could entrust the right with greater powers in government in support of its radical security measures to deter the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks. Roberto Cavallero, a former Gladio agent, for example, hints at a direct link between Gladio and the terrorist events of 1970s, explaining that they were trained “to prepare groups which, in the event of an advance by left wing forces... would fill the streets, creating a situation of such tension as to require military intervention.”<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, according to judicial and parliamentary investigations, the bombing campaigns in Cold War Italy were not initiated by left-wing extremists, but rather by action squads known as *Nuclei di Difesa della Stato* (Nuclei for Defence of the State). After 1966, the American and Italian intelligence communities also recruited action squads from the fascist movement *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order). The then Italian Chief of Counter-Intelligence General Gianadelio Maletti, for example, argued that it was American intelligence agencies who equipped *Ordine Nuovo* with explosives for the Milan attack, rather than the anarchists, as was initially thought.<sup>34</sup> From this perspective, it appears that the Gladio agents, masquerading as left-wing groups, conducted terrorist activities in order to both limit the potential of democratic processes and stunt

the growth of the Italian Left. Thus terrorist attacks perpetrated or supported by state agents were blamed on so-called leftist subversives, which led to the demonization of the leftist political groups by rendering them internal enemies in the eyes of the public.

Apart from such long-term aims, Gladio terrorism also had immediate goals and specific targets, as exemplified by the Red Brigades' 1978 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, the leader of the Christian Democrats. Just prior to his abduction, Moro had announced his intention to enter the coalition with the Italian Communist Party. Moro's political vision, *Compromesso Storico* (Historic Compromise), had the potential to widen the democratic base for leftist political participation. According to Ola Tunander, in the early 1970s, the Gladio operatives were able to infiltrate the higher echelons of the Red Brigades, a leftist activist movement, and the murder of Aldo Moro was to be a Gladio operation, using ammunition from their own arm caches.<sup>35</sup>

#### FROM OPERATION GLADIO TO THE ERGENEKON AFFAIR

The Gladio affair, so vulnerable to conspiracy theories of all sorts, still merits further academic study. While journalistic accounts scapegoated the stay-behinds as the mothers of all evils during the Cold War, academics have generally kept away from the subject even during the public scandals of the 1990s. According to Italian historian Leopoldo Nuti, "much more documentation is needed than is currently available" in order to clarify the acts of terrorism in Italy's shady history and their links to Operation Gladio, if any.<sup>36</sup> The secrecy surrounding the subject, however, makes it almost impossible for any researcher or public official to obtain archival records.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, since the discovery of the stay-behinds, documentation on the networks has been destroyed. Italian Senator Libero Gualtieri, for instance, head of the parliamentary committee for the Gladio investigation, stated that had the committee been provided with the "full truth," they would have demonstrated that the explosives used in the Gladio terror activities were supplied by the CIA.<sup>38</sup>

Despite the European Parliament's resolution on the stay-behinds only few countries ultimately pursued parliamentary investigations—Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. With the release of Italy's parliamentary report in 2000, the Gladio scandal seemed to have all but dissipated. That would have been the case had it not been for the investigation of the Turkish Ergenekon network, which began a few years earlier in June 1997, following the joint operation of the gendarmerie and security forces in Istanbul who raided an apartment and uncovered hand grenades and explosives belonging to a retired non-commissioned army officer. This discovery, along with the investigations by prosecutor Zekeriya Öz, eventually led to a 2,445-page long indictment with thirty different charges against the suspects of the Ergenekon network. According to observers in Turkey and abroad, this network—nestled in the state hierarchy and composed of retired and active-duty military officers, police, mafiosi, and civilians—was a remnant of the Turkish arm of the Gladio Operation.

As the authorities widened their investigations, the evidence showed that the members of the network had been involved in several assassinations that had "mistakenly" been attributed to leftist, Islamist, or Kurdish separatist activists. According to



the indictment, the victims of these terrorist attacks or false flag operations over the past few decades included secularist journalist Uğur Mumcu, head of a business conglomerate Özdemir Sabancı, secularist academic Necip Hablemitoğlu, Italian priest Andrea Santoro, and three Protestants in Malatya, in addition to those killed by JITEM, the illegal gendarmerie unit that terrorized Kurds in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s. Likewise, the 2006 assault on the Turkish Council of State for its ruling against teachers wearing headscarves was initially labeled an Islamist terror act, but the perpetrator later appeared in connection with some Ergenekon suspects. The most sensational atrocity was the assassination in 2007 of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul by a seventeen-year-old teenager. It turned out that this assassination, seemingly motivated by the anti-Armenian sentiments of a young nationalist, was actually masterminded by a fascist network with connections to senior police and gendarmerie officers.

The Turkish case shows the near impossibility of eliminating these clandestine networks even when their original goals are no longer relevant. As Philip Davies remarks, “Once you have trained and armed anyone they are difficult to disarm and impossible to untrain, and you can never completely control what they do with either in the long run.”<sup>39</sup> So, while stay-behinds were dismantled in various European countries at the end of the Cold War, Turkey had initiated neither a parliamentary investigation nor any legal procedure to face this reality.<sup>40</sup>

In 1952, like the European states had done at the start of the Cold War period, Turkey founded a special unit called the Tactical Mobilization Group, which was later restructured under different names such as the Special Warfare Department and the Special Forces Command. Just like the Italian Gladio employed the fascist Ordine Nuovo in its operations, the Turkish branch’s paramilitary force, called the Counter-Guerrilla, relied on members of the national fascist movement, the Grey Wolves. And just like the Italian branch, this Turkish Counter-Guerrilla is believed to have extended its mission to false flag operations and domestic control.

Now, according to Daniele Ganser “the history of the secret army in Turkey is more violent than that of any other stay-behind in Western Europe.”<sup>41</sup> The first wide-scale example of Counter-Guerrilla operations was the anti-Christian riots in 1955, known as the 6-7 September events. The riots began after the news—later discovered to be false—spread by the Tactical Mobilization Group that the Thessaloniki home of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, was plundered by Greek ultranationalists. In 2001, the then Deputy Director of the Tactical Mobilization Group Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu admitted that he had organized those events.<sup>42</sup>

It was former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit who first acknowledged the existence of the stay-behind networks. This happened only in 1974, when he was approached by the Chief of the General Staff for extra funding for military troops, which turned out to be for the Special Warfare Department. Ecevit later commented that “Up until then I had never heard of any such organization when I was Prime Minister or Minister or party chairman.”<sup>43</sup> He was concerned that the Counter-Guerrilla force was involved in the nation-wide terrorism and destabilization of the 1970s. In a 1977 speech, he blamed “an organization inside the state, but outside the state’s control” for perpetrating the attacks during the Labor Day celebrations in Taksim Square, killing

thirty-six people.<sup>44</sup> This statement was followed twenty days later by the assassination attempt on his life at the airport in Izmir.

In 1978, thirty years before the Ergenekon trial, State Prosecutor Doğan Öz, with Ecevit's encouragement, was the first to initiate legal proceedings against the Gladio-like networks. In his investigation report, Öz concluded that "Military and civilian security services are behind all this work. The Counter-Guerilla forces are subordinate to the Special Warfare Department." Soon after making this statement, Öz was assassinated on 24 March 1978 by Ibrahim Çiftçi, a Grey Wolves member who confessed to the crime. Significantly, each time the civilian courts convicted Çiftçi, the highest military court overturned the sentence.<sup>45</sup>

The end of the Cold War did not spell the end of the Counter-Guerilla forces. In 1992, for instance, the military acknowledged that the unit was being actively used against the armed members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey. In addition, in the 1990s there were several mysterious killings, assassinations, and forced evacuations of villages in the region that were carried out by the Counter-Guerrilla, including several Ergenekon suspects.

Suspicious about the existence of a "deep state" were further confirmed by a road accident, known as the Susurluk Scandal of 3 November 1996, when a car and truck crashed near the small town of Susurluk. The crash killed three of the four passengers in the car, including a high-ranking police chief, a prominent politician, and a (fugitive) assassin working with the Grey Wolves. A small arsenal of weapons was also found in the car's trunk. Though the parliamentary investigation committee found considerable evidence of cooperation between state officials and known criminal figures, no serious arrests were made and the case was closed.<sup>46</sup>

The Ergenekon trial, which, in 2013, handed down hundreds of years of imprisonment for 275 defendants, reinvigorated the debate about the "deep state," a parallel government operating outside the law and redefining state policy. According to the indictments, the Ergenekon network aimed to sow civil unrest and prepare the ground for a military coup so that the Turkish army, guardian of the secular regime, would overthrow the Islamic-leaning *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (the Justice and Development Party, AKP) government. In the military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980, the army had halted Turkish democracy in the name of bringing peace and order to the country. In 1997, it forced the Islamist government to step down as well. As Feroz Ahmad observed, "Many cynics had come to believe that the generals wanted to keep the country living in an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty" to justify their interventions.<sup>47</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Two centuries after the Jacobin Reign of Terror, Gladio-linked terrorism demonstrates how terror can be utilized by states as a means of political suppression and manipulation. Unlike the Jacobins, who attempted to strengthen their power and stabilize the country by suppressing the opposition, the neo-Jacobins of Europe sought to destabilize their countries via terror so that the ensuing chaos would keep the frightened public in need of strong leaders and radical military measures.

Originally founded as a stay-behind network to be activated in the event of a communist invasion, the Gladio forces appear to have directed their efforts against the rising trend of communists inside their country and to have committed false flag terrorist attacks that were later falsely blamed on left-wing groups. In some cases, members of those secret military units directly carried out the terror activities and assassinations, whereas, in other cases, they employed right-wing militias, mafiosi, or other criminal figures. Thus Gladio-linked atrocities—in which many innocent people, from Aldo Moro to Hrant Dink, have lost their lives—are an example of clandestine state terrorism in which agents or proxies of the state covertly perpetrate their criminal acts in order to liquidate the opposition and foment fear in the public at large.

While with the fading of the Soviet threat, the Gladio networks seem to have lost their *raison d'être*, they have nevertheless brought to light the neglected link between the state and terror. Despite the glorification of the war on terror and despite pitting the state and terrorist organizations in opposition, the paramilitary organizations like the Italian Ordine Nuovo or the Turkish Counter-Guerilla force appear to have been founded or supported by the state. This implies, at the very least, the state's acquiescence in the execution of terrorist acts when these are in its national interest. So despite the inadequate coverage of state terrorism and despite the Western bias in limiting the term to authoritarian regimes in the underdeveloped world, the very phenomenon of Gladio-linked events challenges the current research literature on state terrorism in Europe.

As Alex Schmid puts it, the fundamental problem of studying state terrorism is “how to study clandestine actors working from the underground or secret government locations.”<sup>48</sup> Clandestinity and the use of proxy mercenary forces always make denial easy and reliable data hard to come by. Nevertheless, the Ergenekon trials in Turkey, which compared to the Italian and other cases are better documented, may stimulate further research on the disturbing history of stay-behind networks in Europe.

## NOTES

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14. Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Continuum, 2003), 237.
15. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 186.
16. Neil Livingstone and Arnold Terrell, eds., *Fighting Back* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1986), 1–10.
17. "Text of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address," *The Washington Post*, 29 January 2002.
18. Richard Jackson, "Conclusion, Contemporary State Terrorism: Towards a New Research Agenda," in Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting, *Contemporary State Terrorism*, 233.
19. For their manifesto, see Richard Jackson, "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6 (2007): 244–51.
20. Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid, "Theories of Terrorism," in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011), 203.
21. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2d ed. (Cleveland, OH: The World Publishing, 1958), 464.
22. This stay-behind network first caused a public scandal in Germany in 1952, when the German police found out that the CIA was working with a fascist youth group led by former Nazi officers, which blacklisted some people as unreliable in case of a Soviet invasion. Similarly, Olav Riste mentions several disclosures of the Norwegian stay-behind since 1978. Yet these scandals did not result in the revelation of the whole international stay-behind program. See Jonathan Kwitny, "An Internation Story: The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe," *The Nation*, 6 April 1992, 446; Olav Riste, "With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of 'Stay-Behind' in Norway," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30.6 (2007): 1023.
23. European Parliament Resolution on Gladio (1990), Joint resolution replacing B3–2021, 2058, 2068, 2078, and 2087/90; at: [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/European\\_Parliament\\_resolution\\_on\\_Gladio](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/European_Parliament_resolution_on_Gladio).
24. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 25.
25. Charles Cogan, "'Stay-Behind' in France: Much Ado About Nothing?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30.6 (2007): 942–45.
26. The codename "Gladio" for a joint US-Italy organization first appeared in a meeting between American and Italian intelligence officers on October 18, 1956. The agreement, finalized on November 26, 1956, detailed the conduct of stay-behind activities should any portion of Italian territory face a threat of enemy invasion or insurgency. Leopoldo Nuti, "The Italian 'Stay-Behind' Network: The Origins of Operation 'Gladio,'" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30.6 (2007): 966.
27. For an comprehensive overview, see Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
28. The American influence on Cold War Italy was not a new phenomenon. Since the early 1970s, some Italian historians such as Ennio Di Nolfo and Elena Aga Rossi conducted considerable research in American and British archives and elaborated on this connection. Subsequent studies have also pointed to the U.S. covert operations in Italy and saw the influence of the American containment policy in the power of the center-right Christian Democrats and the difficulties faced by the Italian Communist Party in coming to power. When Franco de Felice introduced the concept of "double state" in Italy in his "Doppia lealtà e doppio stato" in 1989, just a year before the revelation of the operation Gladio, he

- followed the same line and pointed to Italian ruling elites' conflicting loyalties toward Italy and the United States. For a comprehensive literature review, see Antonio Varsori, "Cold War History in Italy," *Cold War History* 8.2 (2008): 157–87.
29. Mario Del Pero, "The United States and 'Psychological Warfare' in Italy, 1948–1955," *Journal of American History* 87 (March 2001): 1313.
  30. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 5.
  31. Ola Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State: Approaching the Dual State of the West," in *Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty*, ed. Eric Wilson (London: Pluto, 2009), 58.
  32. Philip Willan, "US 'Supported Anti-left Terror in Italy,'" *The Guardian*, 24 June 2000.
  33. William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II, Part 1* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 106.
  34. Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State," 58.
  35. Tunander, "Democratic State vs. Deep State," 67. There are basically two opposite approaches whether or not Moro's murder was masterminded by obscure forces like Gladio. See Richard Drake's review essay, "The Aldo Moro Murder Case in Retrospect," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8.2 (2006): 114–25.
  36. Nuti, "The Italian 'Stay-Behind' Network," 977.
  37. Cogan, "'Stay-Behind' in France," 937.
  38. Kwitny, "An Internation Story: The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe," 448.
  39. Philip Davies, review of Daniele Ganser, *Nato's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28.6 (2005): 1067.
  40. After the Gladio scandal in Italy, General Doğu Beyazıt, Chief of the Operations Department, and General Kemal Yılmaz, Chief of the Special Forces, issued a press release on 3 December 1990 acknowledging the existence of a similar secret NATO unit directed under the auspices of the Special Warfare Department to organize resistance in the case of a communist occupation. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 241.
  41. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 224.
  42. H. Akın Ünver, "Turkey's 'Deep State' and the Ergenekon Conundrum," *The Middle East Institute Policy Brief* 23 (2009): 7.
  43. Frank Bovenberk and Yücel Yeşilgöz, "The Turkish Mafia and the State," in *Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond*, ed. Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 595.
  44. Barış Altıntaş, "A Beginner's Guide to Ergenekon, Trial of the Century," *Today's Zaman*, 4 January 2009.
  45. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 237.
  46. Bovenberk and Yeşilgöz, "The Turkish Mafia and the State," 585.
  47. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 176.
  48. Alex Schmid, ed., Introduction to *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011), 9.