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Anti-Immigrant Party Support and Media Visibility: A Cross-Party, Over-Time Perspective

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ABSTRACT *Explanations of the performance of Western European anti-immigrant parties feature prominently in the literature on electoral behaviour and the mass media have been introduced as an important explanatory variable in these analyses. In this article we advance our understanding of the relationship between mass media news reporting and anti-immigrant party support in three ways. First, we go beyond extant research to consider the visibility of anti-immigrant parties and party leaders in the news, rather than anti-immigration issues more generally. Second, in addition to analysing media effects on a party's popularity we also consider the reverse relationship, the effects of a party's popularity on media coverage of the party. Finally, we analyse the relationships from a cross-party perspective, using time-series analysis for six parties in three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany) over the past two decades. Our results show strongest support for the effects of party and particularly leader visibility in the news on anti-immigrant party success, rather than the reverse relationship.*

Introduction

Explanations of the rise of anti-immigrant parties in Europe are prominent in contemporary research on electoral behaviour (e.g. Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Golder, 2003a; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Smith, 2010; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2000, 2005). Such explanations consider both the individual level – relating to why certain individuals vote for or become involved in anti-immigrant parties (e.g. Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Linden & Klandermans, 2007; Van der Brug et al., 2000) – and the party or country level (e.g. Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2003b; Smith, 2010; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Regarding this macro perspective, the focus of extant research is on socio-economic conditions that supposedly increase support for this type of parties, such as

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immigration levels or economic conditions (e.g. Golder, 2003b; Jackman & Volpert, 1996) and on political environments in which these parties may flourish (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006).

Although generally considered a central link between parties and citizens, the mass media have been largely ignored in the study of anti-immigrant parties (see Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 484). More recent studies have started to consider media coverage as an explanation for the rise and fall of anti-immigrant parties (see for example Ellinas, 2010; Mazzoleni et al., 2003). Indeed, there are good reasons to expect media effects on the support for these parties, and the existing studies confirm the presence of such influences. The notion of *issue-voting* asserts that greater media attention to issues that are “owned” (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996) by anti-immigrant parties may increase their level of public support (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Walgrave & De Swert, 2004).¹ Others have argued that the visibility of anti-immigrant parties in the media may also contribute to their success or failure (Rydgren, 2005; see also Koopmans & Muis, 2009).

While these studies of the effects of media coverage on anti-immigrant party support provide a useful starting point and, at a minimum, outline the importance of taking mass media coverage into account, we argue that there are at least three elements missing in current research on this topic. First, relevant studies focus on a single case, and therefore lack a comparative perspective that may render results more generalizable across different electoral contexts. Second, they fail to empirically investigate the effects of a very basic element of political news coverage – the attention given to a party and its figureheads. Third, whereas prior studies address the question of how media coverage influences support for anti-immigrant parties, the possibility of a reciprocal causal relationship – parties’ popularity also having an impact on their visibility in the media – hitherto has not been empirically addressed. This study fills these voids. More specifically, we ask whether and to what degree news coverage of anti-immigrant parties *and* of their leaders affects their electoral viability, or whether it is their standing in the polls that influences party- and leadership news visibility, or finally, whether a reciprocal relationship is present. We do so by looking at media attention and electoral support for six anti-immigrant parties in three West European countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, over the past two decades. The study applies time series analyses to macro-level data to capture the various dynamics between media coverage and public support.

Theory

Party Visibility and Party Support

News coverage of political issues and actors is a central element in the political communication research that deals with the effects of media coverage on political attitudes and behaviour (Norris, 2000; Weaver & Paletz, 1996). The main argument is that the mass media provide the most important link between parties and politicians and the electorate, and it has repeatedly been shown that news coverage can affect

electoral behaviour (e.g. Beck et al., 2002; Dalton et al., 1998). The focus in this study is on the effects of the *visibility of political actors* in the news. Debates of political actors about issues and policies within the media arena are of vital importance for the functioning of modern democracies (e.g. Delli-Carpini, 2004). To be able to partake in the political process in an informed manner, the public needs to be informed about the issues and policy options that political parties offer. As a result, media coverage of political issues and actors are of central importance in the mediation of politics. This should be particularly the case for anti-immigrant parties, which often operate on the fringes of their party systems. Such parties are not able to draw on a traditional voter base and therefore have to rely to an even greater extent on mass mediated publicity to attract voters (see also Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000: 432).

For individual politicians, media attention is a *conditio sine qua non* for electoral success (Vliegthart & Van Aelst, 2010). A politician who is not seen or heard in the mediated public debate will have a hard time generating support for himself and his party to the potential voters. Election campaigns can be characterized, therefore, as battles for media coverage to attract voters' attention. As Hopmann et al. (2010) show in the context of the 2007 Danish national election, visibility is indeed the most important media content characteristic when it comes to explaining the electoral success of parties. The more visible a party is, the more people say that they will vote for it. The authors argue that this effect occurs because people are more aware of the presence of a party or politician and so will start to consider them as a more viable alternative to vote for. Several German (Semetko & Schönbach, 1994) and Dutch (Oegema & Kleinnijenhuis, 2000) campaign studies have also demonstrated that visibility is an important predictor of party preferences.

Whereas for the larger mainstream or government parties an extensive level of media attention is generally guaranteed this is likely to be different for anti-immigrant parties. First, these are often fringe parties with low levels of support – a situation that does not necessarily generate considerable media attention. Second, such parties tend to challenge existing norms and values (Mudde, 2007), which may cause a conscious neglect on the part of (liberal) journalists – taking the form of a conscious or unconscious “*cordon sanitaire in the media*” (e.g. De Swert, 2002; Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). Such limitations in terms of media access are sometimes overcome by the issuing of controversial statements and thereby the stirring up of heated debate. Parties and in particular party leaders that successfully spark such controversy may then receive a disproportionate level of media attention relative to their size. No matter whether anti-immigrant parties are largely ignored by the news media or whether they succeed in gaining extraordinary amounts of attention, their visibility in the news remains a vital prerequisite for their electoral success, independent of its seeming (positive or negative) disproportionality. Drawing on a populist style of rhetoric they tend to claim to speak for the masses and so reaching them via the mass media is crucially important. In line with this, Rydgren (2005) argues that the media attention given to these parties and their elites contributes to their success or failure. He claims that the considerable extent to which Danish media have covered

the Danish People's Party has contributed to its success, whereas the Swedish media have helped in marginalizing the Swedish Democrats by drawing a *cordon sanitaire* around them. Confirming this assumption with empirical evidence, Koopmans and Muis (2009) find that the visibility of Dutch right-wing politician Fortuyn contributed to more favourable standings in the polls during the turbulent 2002 parliamentary election campaign. In sum, news media are an important arena for anti-immigrant parties to present themselves to the public and communicate their (populist) policies and campaign strategies. Accordingly, we expect that more extensive news coverage of an anti-immigrant party leads to a better standing in the polls.

H1. The more media attention an anti-immigrant party receives, the more electoral support it will obtain.

While most research on political parties and mass media focuses on potential influences of media content on public opinion, a theoretical rationale that supposes the causal arrow between media visibility and electoral support points into both directions can also be justified. Confirming Bennett's indexing hypothesis (1990), several studies have demonstrated that the political power of an actor is the most important predictor for the amount of attention this actor will receive in the news (e.g. Sellers & Schaffner, 2007; Tresch, 2009). Thus, one would expect that media coverage to a considerable extent mirrors the composition of parliaments and even the parties' standing in the polls, which are nowadays widely used by journalists in their coverage of politics as a yardstick for the parties' newsworthiness (Brettschneider, 1997; Sonck & Loosveldt, 2008). Those parties that do well among the electorate are the ones that are relevant and newsworthy and hence likely to be covered in mass media. Political parties that do not receive considerable public support, by contrast, are less newsworthy as they are not considered a major actor in the political playing field. Vliegenthart and Van Aelst (2010), for example, find that for most Dutch political parties, an increase in the polls is also followed by an increase in attention in national newspapers – and that is especially true for the anti-immigrant party PVV. Koopmans and Muis (2009) also show this to be the case for Pim Fortuyn. Their analysis reported that Fortuyn's standing in the polls in one week had a positive – though small – influence on the number of claims he was able to make in the media in the next week. In sum, we can assume news visibility of anti-immigrant parties and actors to be affected by the parties' standing in the polls. In combination with H1, we thus expect a reciprocal relationship between news visibility and poll results.

H2. The more electoral support an anti-immigrant party obtains, the more media attention the party will receive.

Leader Visibility and Party Support

Political communication research has shown that mediated politics is now highly personalized, and tends to focus on just a few important figureheads (e.g. Mazzoleni

& Schulz, 1999; Rahat & Sheaffer, 2007). Party leaders or main candidates are more visible than any other type of politician during election campaigns (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007). At the same time, leaders' performance and characteristics are argued to be of great significance for voters when they are making up their minds about which party to vote for (Adam & Maier, 2010). In the words of Mazzoleni (2000: 328): "voters have orphaned and look for new political parents", who they supposedly find in charismatic politicians.

This relationship is particularly important for anti-immigrant parties, which are usually characterized by a strong hierarchy and a charismatic party leader. An anti-immigrant party leader's capacities are often seen as crucial to the party's electoral success or failure (Bos & Van der Brug, 2010; Eatwell, 2003). Such claims are hard to investigate and lack any clear-cut empirical support (Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007). It is reasonable to suppose, however, that an anti-immigrant leader's performance affects his or her party's electoral fortunes. Indeed, some parties were built around a single politician – as was the case with the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, and Geert Wilders' Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands as well as the German Schill-Partei. Bos and Van der Brug (2010) have found that a leader's public image – in terms of how legitimate and effective he or she is considered to be – is an important predictor of the support for an anti-immigrant party. If this holds true then one would expect the party leader's media visibility to have an effect on preferences for his or her party independent from the effect of media visibility of his or her party more generally (as discussed above). Given the centrality of charismatic leadership in anti-immigrant parties we argue that it is important to examine the impact of party leader visibility separately from the impact of party visibility. Yet, both effects are theoretically expected to be positive.

H3. The more media attention an anti-immigrant party's leader receives, the more electoral support the party will obtain.

Successful charismatic leadership is also newsworthy. Thus, just as with party visibility, we expect an opposite effect, i.e. that journalists will devote more attention to an anti-immigrant party's leader as the party's standing in the polls rises. Thus, again we expect a reversal of the relationship between a party's leader visibility and its standing in the polls expressed in H3.

H4. The more electoral support an anti-immigrant party obtains, the more media attention its leader will receive.

Whereas the expectations given above are formulated in a general manner, we have reason to believe that the extent of reversed causal direction varies systematically between different parties. The responses of the mass media and societal actors more generally to the presence of anti-immigrant parties vary considerably across parties. Some parties are systematically excluded from political cooperation by some, or all, of the other parties (Van Spanje & Van der Brug, 2007, 2009), while

other anti-immigrant parties are treated more equally. For example, the two major Dutch parties invited the PVV to formally support their minority government, whereas in neighbouring Belgium all mainstream parties signed an agreement to not politically cooperate with the Vlaams Blok (Maddens & Fiers, 1998). Not surprisingly, levels of media attention to the parties follow a similar pattern. Some parties studied here are deliberately ignored on a permanent basis by some, or all, of the mainstream media, whereas other parties are not. The Dutch PVV, for instance, receives much greater media attention and there is little evidence that it would face a mass media boycott (Vliegenthart & Van Aelst, 2010). By contrast, several newspapers in Sweden have expressed their disgust for the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats and boycotted them in their daily coverage of party politics (Rydgren, 2005; Widfeldt, 2008). The Vlaams Blok in Flanders is another example of a party that receives far less media attention than parties of comparable size and influence (De Swert, 2002; Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). It is also argued that German journalists systematically exclude the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland (NPD) and Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) from their news reports on ideological grounds, even when they obtain noteworthy regional election results (Schellenberg, 2005: 41). The NPD, for example, is despised by many journalists given its association with neo-Nazism (e.g. Smoydzin, 1968; Staud, 2006). In such cases, the media will not devote much attention to the party unless political circumstances dictate to do so – for instance, in case of a favourable election result for the isolated party.

Thus, parties that are marginalized in the media cannot be completely ignored. They will make headlines after electoral victories as these are occasions when journalists cannot avoid mentioning these parties without compromising their role as information providers (e.g. Schaafraad et al., 2008; Schellenberg, 2005). Apart from such events, however, these ostracized parties are not expected to receive much media attention. Good ratings in opinion polls, for example, should not result in as much media attention as for other parties, and the media coverage given to them will tend to be less positive.² Thus, the relationship between electoral performance and media coverage is expected to be primarily unidirectional for outcast anti-immigrant parties, running from media visibility to party support.³

H5. For ostracized anti-immigrant parties, the effect of media attention on electoral performance is stronger than the effect of electoral performance on media attention.

Case Selection

The analyses presented here go beyond the work in prior studies by addressing the question of news influences in three national contexts, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The case selection is largely guided by data availability. To provide a reliable test for our hypotheses, we need both party support as well as media content data that are available for a period that spans multiple years. The selected countries are similar in terms of their media systems – all belong to the

democratic-corporatist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), with strong emphasis on press freedom, low levels of commercialization compared to countries such as the United States and high levels of newspaper readership. Also in terms of party and electoral systems they are quite similar, all having a multi-party system and a form of proportional representation. Perhaps the most notable difference concerns the threshold for entering the national parliament in each of the three countries (Gallagher et al., 2006). Belgium and the Netherlands have low effective thresholds, whereas Germany has a 5% clause (e.g. Carter, 2005). More generally all three countries are neighbouring advanced industrialized countries and long-standing EU members. Furthermore, each has experienced mass immigration from non-Western countries since the 1960s.

A total of six different parties from these three countries are taken into account in this analysis. The parties are very much alike in that they are all staunchly opposed to mass immigration into Western Europe and have a strong hierarchical structure (e.g. Carter, 2005). In addition, they use similar slogans in their election campaigns. In terms of attitude of civil society, other political parties and the mass media to their existence, they all share an outcast status, with one significant exception the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid – which does not experience such ostracism (Schellenberg, 2005: 42; Van Spanje, 2010; Van Spanje & Van der Brug 2007, 2009). The Vlaams Blok is probably the most extreme example of this, with an elaborate *cordon sanitaire* having been established around it, not only in the political arena, but also to some extent in the media (De Swert, 2002; Walgrave & De Swert, 2004).

In the following discussion, we digress briefly to describe the parties under study in this article. In Belgium, the Vlaams Blok, called Vlaams Belang since 2004, was founded in 1978 and about six years later took up its current fiercely anti-immigrant stance (Carter, 2005: 32). It has increased its vote share in each consecutive federal election until 2003 but has retained its major party status in the party system, holding 19 out of 124 seats in the Flemish parliament. While not the official leader, Filip Dewinter has been the party's main figurehead since 1992. As discussed above, this party is considered as a prototypical pariah or outcast party, given its explicit and extensive neglect by Belgian mass media (De Swert, 2002; Walgrave & De Swert, 2004).

In the Netherlands, the rise of populist anti-immigration parties has continued apace. Before the rise of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) which is not included in this study,⁴ several small anti-immigration parties existed in the country. Most prominent were the Centrum Democraten (CD), founded by Hans Janmaat in 1984, who also was its only leader. The party was represented in national parliament from 1989 to 1998 but has lost significance, particularly since the death of its leader in 2002. With emergence of the LPF new impetus was given to anti-immigration politics, although that party never recovered from the assassination of its leader and less than six years after Fortuyn's death, the LPF was dissolved. In 2004, MP Geert Wilders separated from the Liberal party VVD and formed a new party that took up the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric. This party, first called Groep Wilders, and since 2006 the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), won 6% of the vote in the 2006 elections to the Dutch national

parliament, and more than 15% in the following elections in 2010. In terms of media coverage the CD received a similar (albeit less explicit) ostracism from journalists as the Vlaams Belang (Schafraad et al., 2008). However, the amount of media attention given to Dutch anti-immigrant parties that have emerged in the past decade (Vliegthart & Van Aelst, 2010) has been growing considerably and is now higher than the amount of media attention the CD received in the 1980s and 1990s.

For historical reasons anti-immigrant parties in Germany are a sensitive topic in public debate and often stigmatized by their Nazi association in the media (Schafraad et al., 2008). The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland (NPD) is the oldest of those studied here, having been founded in 1964. Although it has never crossed the threshold for parliamentary representation on the federal level, the party has entered a number of Länder parliaments over time and enjoyed its biggest successes in the 1960s. At the federal election of 2005, the party has seen a resurgence in its electoral fortunes and gained its biggest vote share since 1969. The party is currently led by Holger Apfel, and was led by Udo Voigt from 1996 until 2011. The Deutsche Volkunion (DVU) is the second of our German parties included in this analysis and was founded in 1987 by Gerhard Frey who led the party until 2009. The DVU enjoyed success in several Länder elections in the 1990s, most notably gaining 12.3% of the vote in Sachsen-Anhalt. The final German party under study is Die Republikaner (REP) which was founded in 1983 and experienced its electoral breakthrough in the European elections of 1989. Like the DVU its electoral heydays were largely in the first half of the 1990s. Franz Schönhuber was the party's leader from 1985 until 1994, after which the current leader, Rolf Schlierer, took over. Overall, these three German parties are characterized as right-wing extremist, carrying a strong anti-foreigner message. None of the three parties have enjoyed very favourable media coverage (Schellenberg, 2005).

The variation between these parties in their outcast status allows for an assessment of our fifth hypothesis about the stronger effects of popular support on media attention (than vice versa) for parties excluded from the mainstream. While the PVV has never been ostracized, the other five parties are all classified as ostracized in the literature (Van Spanje, 2010; Van Spanje & Van der Brug, 2007, 2009). This literature considers a party "ostracized" if it is systematically excluded from any political cooperation by its largest mainstream competitor, which was the case for VB, CD and the three German parties.

Building on this classification, H5 assumes that media actors systematically devote less attention to anti-immigrant parties that are systematically ostracized by political actors (and by societal actors more generally). Based on a cursory view of the evidence, we have reason to believe that this is correct (i.e. while not completely ignoring them, the media seemed to give little attention to the parties under study, except for the PVV). In sum, the PVV differs from the other parties in terms of not being ostracized but it neither differs much from the VB in terms of size nor from the VB, CD or REP in terms of being "populist" (Golder, 2003b). If we are to find differences between the PVV and the other parties, we can thus safely attribute these differences to the other parties being ostracized.

Data and Methods

To address the hypotheses specified above we collected data for the six different parties in Belgium (Flanders), the Netherlands and Germany. For measures of the support for the various parties we rely on existing public opinion polls that tap people's vote intention if elections were held at that moment/that week/the coming Sunday.⁵ There are differences in the frequency with which such public opinion polls were held in the three countries as well as in the time-span that they cover. Since our hypotheses are not time-dependent, we do not believe that this will fundamentally influence our results.⁶ While in the Netherlands, in recent years weekly opinion polls have been conducted, in Belgium only quarterly data are available. For Germany we rely on a monthly time-series of vote intention data. Data were obtained from NIRA/La Libre Belgique (Flanders), TNS NIPO, Politieke Barometer/Synovate (Netherlands) and the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen Politbarometer (cumulative file, Germany).⁷ *Anti-immigrant party support* is the percentage of the sample of voters that indicate intending to vote for any of the six parties introduced above.⁸ Due to the institutional federal structure of Belgium, for the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang we selected a sample of the Flemish voters, since most citizens in Wallonia are unable to vote for this Flemish party.

For the media data we rely on a computer-assisted content analysis of newspaper coverage. The selection of newspapers was determined by electronic availability, and we tried to ensure for each country variation in terms of political leaning of the newspapers.⁹ Some newspapers are not digitally available for the whole period and, in those cases, data are weighed on the basis of the scores of the separate newspapers in the period in which all newspapers were available. The two main independent variables, *visibility of anti-immigrant parties* and *visibility of anti-immigrant party leaders*, are measured by a count of articles that contain the name of the party and the political leader, respectively. Disambiguity words are added when names of leaders or abbreviations of parties are also used to denote other persons or organizations. Counts are aggregated to a weekly, monthly or quarterly level depending on the availability of polling data. Several other ways to calculate visibility (e.g. number of referrals instead of number of articles) and weighing procedures (e.g. based on positioning of article in newspaper) were applied, but since the aggregated scores resulting from those different ways of calculating visibility were very highly correlated (generally over 0.9), we opted for this straightforward measure of article count. Table 1 presents the data sources that are used in each of the three countries, the frequency with which polls were held, the research period as well as descriptive statistics for the most important variables.

Parties differ considerably in their mean levels of electoral support, as well as in the media attention they receive – though absolute values here are not easily comparable due to differences in newspaper selection and layouts across countries. Usually the visibility of the party is considerably higher than the visibility of its leader, except for the case of the PVV and Geert Wilders. This is not very surprising, as Wilders is the party's founder, its only member and its all-time leader.

Table 1. Descriptive characteristics

Country	Party	Period	Poll	Newspapers	Datasource	Aggregation	N	Mean party	Mean leader	Mean polls
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	1998–2008	La Libre Belgique	<i>Standaard</i> (front page)	Archive University of Antwerp	quarterly	43	16.00 (1.38)	3.37 (0.54)	19.15 (0.64)
Netherlands	CentrumDemocraten	1990–1998	NIPO	<i>NRC</i> <i>NRC</i>	LexisNexis	monthly	106	19.51 (25.92)	10.57 (15.29)	0.92 (0.68)
	Partij voor de Vrijheid	2004–2008	Synovate	<i>Volkskrant</i> <i>Telegraaf</i> <i>Trouw</i> <i>Sueddeutsche</i> <i>Zeitung</i> <i>Tageszeitung</i> <i>Die Welt</i>	LexisNexis, SZ CD- ROM	weekly	182	(1.33) 57.15	(1.36) 3.17	(0.24) 1.00
Germany	Republikaner	1994–2007	Politbarometer			monthly	168	(2.53) 101.64	(0.37) 7.02	(0.07) 0.34
	NPD	2001–2007				monthly	84	(8.61) 28.12	(0.82) 5.05	(0.04) 0.11
	DVU	1998–2007				monthly	120	(3.69) 28.12	(0.72) 5.05	(0.01) 0.11

Note: standard deviations in parentheses.

Control Variables

In addition to media visibility for parties and their leadership, issue visibility has been argued to affect public support for anti-immigrant parties. The agenda-setting hypothesis assumes a transfer of salience of issues from the media agenda to the public agenda: the more visible an issue is in the media, the more likely people are to consider this an important issue for the country (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). This notion of agenda setting is combined with theories of issue ownership (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996) to explain the relationship between media visibility of issues and support for anti-immigrant parties. The assumption is that if media visibility of issues that are “owned” by anti-immigrant parties – as, most notably the issues of immigration and ethnic integration – increases, people will regard these issues more relevant when deciding who to vote for and therefore turn to anti-immigrant parties. Walgrave and De Swert (2004) find empirical support for this idea based on data concerning the Flemish party Vlaams Blok, and Boomgaarden and Vliegthart (2007) on the basis of data concerning the Centrum-Democraten and Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. We thus include media attention to immigration issues as a control variable in our models. The more extensively national news media covered immigration issues, the higher the proportion of citizens that reported a vote for one of these parties should be. We rely on earlier developed combinations of key words to assess visibility of immigration issues. For the Netherlands until 2002, we use the measure as employed by Boomgaarden and Vliegthart (2007). For Germany, we use the same measure as used in Boomgaarden and Vliegthart (2009).¹⁰ For the Netherlands from 2004 onwards, we use a slightly adjusted version of the Boomgaarden and Vliegthart (2007) search string¹¹ and counted the weekly number of articles on all front pages of the four newspapers included in the sample. For Belgium, we use the same search string and counted the number of articles occurring on the front page and from June 2007 on the first three pages of *de Standaard* in quarterly intervals.

Contextual factors relevant to the wider socio-economic environment, such as levels of unemployment (Golder, 2003a; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001) and immigration (Knigge, 1998), are considered to be important when explaining anti-immigrant party support. While immigration in general has a positive influence – more immigration resulting in more anti-immigrant party support – mixed evidence has been found concerning the effects of unemployment. In the majority of cases, high unemployment levels have appeared to suppress support for parties at the far-right of the political spectrum. The intuition behind this is that in case of high unemployment, voters turn to more mainstream political parties instead of anti-immigrant parties. This is because the former have a better reputation in solving problems that relate to the economy (Boomgaarden & Vliegthart, 2007). We collected data on unemployment and immigration. Again, due to differences in data availability across countries they are not exactly similar across countries, but they essentially tap very similar concepts and can be considered functional equivalents. First, we control for the level of *immigration*. We collected monthly numbers of immigrants for the

Netherlands (source Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), monthly net migration in Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) and yearly numbers of immigrants for Belgium (Nationaal Bureau voor de Statistiek). Second, we use *unemployment* levels. For the Netherlands, we obtained monthly data from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, for Germany we collected the same data from the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. For Belgium, we use quarterly data available from the OECD.

Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) during a given time period a local, regional, national or European *election* took place in which the party under consideration participated. For Germany, due to the frequent occurrence of regional elections, we only included those in which at least one of the three parties obtained more than 2% of the votes. For efficiency and space reasons we do not elaborate on all the results related to the control variables, but we will briefly address the main findings. We refrain from including any organizational characteristics that may matter, such as party resources and organizational capacity. First of all, it is difficult to collect appropriate, regularly measured, indicators for organizational activity that can be included in our models. Second, these characteristics are likely to change little on weekly, monthly or quarterly levels, which means that they cannot account for changes in those time intervals.

Analysis

We conduct separate analyses for all parties. Due to differences in time-span and frequency of polls, pooling the data was not possible. Since media-effects can occur at short time intervals we conduct our main analysis on the lowest level of aggregation possible – i.e. if we have weekly data from opinion polls available, we aggregate data to the weekly level and our unit of observation is the week. When assessing a reciprocal causal relationship in a time series design, a Vector Autoregression (VAR) and tests for Granger causality are standard techniques of analysis (Brandt & Williams, 2007). However, because we include various control variables that we do not have clear expectations about in terms of how far they are affected by the other variables in the model, more restrictions need to be imposed in terms of which variables are specified as exogenous. Thus, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach is appropriate (Soroka, 2002). Similar to a Vector Autoregression, several OLS equations including one or multiple lags of the various endogenous variables are estimated simultaneously, but the number of exogenous variables is restricted – in this case to media visibility and anti-immigrant party support. Additionally, the errors of the various equations are allowed to correlate.

We refrain from estimating models that include both party *and* leader visibility. This is because, as Table 2 demonstrates, the scores are highly correlated in all cases – ranging from 0.66 to 0.92. Thus, the simultaneous inclusion of these variables would lead to multicollinearity problems, which would render the estimations of the effects of interest less precise and might lead to Type-II errors. To compare

Table 2. Contemporaneous correlations

Country	Party	Leader-Party	Party-Polls	Leader-Polls
BE	Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang	0.805	0.544	0.654
NL	CentrumDemocraten	0.919	0.339	0.380
	Partij voor de Vrijheid	0.782	0.717	0.541
GER	Republikaner	0.708	0.119	0.232
	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	0.664	0.343	0.319
	Deutsche Volkunion	0.891	0.549	0.542

possible differences in causes and effects of leaders and parties, we decided to run each model twice, once with party visibility, and once with leader visibility.

This means that we estimate for all parties the following equations:¹²

$$\begin{aligned} \text{polls}_t = & \alpha^{\text{polls}} + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{polls}} \text{polls}_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{medias}} \text{media}_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{immi}} \text{immi}_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{unemp}} \text{unemp}_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{immedia}} \text{immedia}_{t-i} + \beta^{\text{elections}} \text{elections}_t + \varepsilon_t^{\text{polls}} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{media}_t = & \alpha^{\text{media}} + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{polls}} \text{polls}_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{medias}} \text{media}_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{immi}} \text{immi}_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{unemp}} \text{unemp}_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta^{\text{immedia}} \text{immedia}_{t-i} + \beta^{\text{elections}} \text{elections}_t + \varepsilon_t^{\text{media}} \end{aligned}$$

where *polls* is the standing in the polls, *media* the visibility of the party in the first analysis and leader in the second analysis, *immi* the immigration level, *unemp* the unemployment level, *immedia* the visibility of the immigration issue and *elections* the dummy variable indicating whether any election was held during that time period. To make results more readily comparable across parties, we standardize all variables prior to the analysis by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This does not fundamentally alter the results and resembles reporting the standardized betas instead of the unstandardized Bs in a regression analysis. We refrain from presenting the full models and, for reasons of clarity, we will only present the results that directly address our hypotheses. We present the sum of the coefficients for all lags of the independent variable that are included in the model, providing an indication of the overall effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

Before running the models, we first check if the assumption of stationarity – i.e. no over-time trends in the mean and variance – holds for each of the series. In those cases where the augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicates that the series is not stationary, we use differenced scores. This is the case for the Dutch CD and PVV opinion polls and media series, as well as for the VB opinion polls series. In these cases, the control variables are also differenced. Non-stationarity of the data may lead to spurious findings when applying regression analysis. The differencing of the data enforces a focus on the *change* of each variable instead of its *level*, which removes problems associated with the violation of the assumption of stationarity of the time series. Since both dependent as well as independent variables are differenced, this transformation does not alter the interpretation of the results.

To establish the appropriate number of lags k , we use comparisons of log likelihood and the Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) and limit the maximum lag length to 1 (quarter), 3 (months) and 13 (weeks). This will prevent contamination of our results by effects that should be considered spurious. Furthermore, agenda-setting research has shown that effects from the media agenda on the public agenda occur with a time lag ranging from a couple of days to a couple of months (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). We present coefficients of the various lags – which should be interpreted with caution because of the strong autocorrelation in the series and resulting multicollinearity in the models – as well as F-tests for Granger causality,¹³ indicating whether the sum of all lags of a certain independent variable equal 0. If they significantly deviate from zero, we conclude that the independent variable Granger-causes the dependent variable. Finally, we check for autocorrelation in the residuals of the analysis using the Ljung-Box Q statistic. In none of the cases, except for the analysis for the CD, do we find any remaining autocorrelation. For the CD, we run an additional set of analyses that demonstrate that adding additional lags leads to slightly worse model fit, but removes any substantial autocorrelation and does not substantially change the main findings.

We conducted several additional diagnostic and confirmatory analyses to support our results. First, to check to what extent results are influenced by the level of aggregation, we repeated the analysis for the CD, Republikaner and DVU using quarterly data. For the PVV and NPD, this is not feasible due to the limited number of observations available. Second, in case both party and leader visibility influence standing in the polls, we conducted an additional OLS regression, including both the number of leader mentionings, as well as the number of unique party mentionings (i.e. the number of party mentionings minus the number of leader mentionings). We chose this strategy since an overwhelming majority of the articles that refer to the leader also mention the party. This analysis provides an answer to the question whether it is mainly party visibility or leader visibility that drives the standing in the polls, while it ensures the absence of multicollinearity.

Results

Figure 1 presents the news visibility of the various parties and their leaders, and the parties' support in the polls. As the graphs show, there is considerable variation in




Figure 1. Party and leader visibility and standing in the polls

Note: from left to right, top to bottom: Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, PVV, CentrumDemocraten, Republikaner, NPD, DVU.

each of the variables, but absolute levels differ. For example, the German DVU never exceeds the levels of marginal support, while Dutch PVV reaches a maximum of close to 14%. Visual inspection of the series suggests some degree of correlation, since in many instances peaks in visibility and peaks in the polls coincide, or appear shortly after each other. This is in line with the correlations presented in Table 2.

Table 3. Relationships between visibility and standing in the polls

Party	Lags	Party-> polls	Polls-> party	Leader-> polls	Polls-> leader
Vlaams Belang/Vlaams Blok	1	0.075***	ns	ns	ns
CentrumDemocraten	1/2	ns	ns	ns	0.659**
Partij voor de Vrijheid	2	0.178***	ns	0.169*	ns
Republikaner	2	0.188*	0.134 +	ns	0.095 +
NPD	3	0.374 +	0.356*	ns	0.311**
DVU	1	0.293***	-0.284**	0.386***	-0.195*

Note: results are based on seemingly unrelated regression analyses. Coefficients are the summed effects over all lags of the independent variable included in the model of a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable; the first column summarizes the effect of party visibility on standing in the polls, the second column the effect of standing in the polls on party visibility; the third column the effect of leader visibility on standing in the polls and the fourth column the effect of standing in the polls on leader visibility

***p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10 according to Granger causality tests.

Our first expectation (H1) relates to the potential influence of a party’s news visibility on its electoral support. The first column in Table 3 presents the results. Tables A1 to A12 in the Appendix¹⁴ present the results of the full analyses. In five out of the six cases, we indeed find that party visibility increases electoral support. This occurs in all three countries that are included in our analyses: Belgium (VB), the Netherlands (PVV) and Germany (all parties). For the PVV, for example, a one-point increase in the standardized party visibility score results overall, i.e. spread over two lags, in a 0.075 point increase in the standardized electoral support measure. Only for CD, we do not find a significant relationship. Overall, our results offer considerable support for H1.

Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive effect of electoral support on party visibility. As can be seen from Table 3, this relationship is not supported as strongly as the reverse (specified in H1). We only find significant effects in Germany, with two of the three parties showing an effect in the expected direction. For the DVU, we find an effect that is opposite to what we expected: more electoral support actually results in less media attention for the party. All in all, we find little support for the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that a higher visibility of the party leader would increase electoral support for the party. This hypothesis is confirmed for only two out of six parties (see Table 3). Only in the case of the PVV and the DVU does the visibility of the party leader contribute to the electoral fortunes of his party. For the other parties, the leader is less central, which is also indicated by the party leaders’ limited visibility compared to the parties’ visibility (see Table 2). With regard to the fourth hypothesis we find significant positive effects of party support on leader

Table 4. Effects of leader and party visibility on standing in the polls

	Party unique	Leader
Party		
Partij voor de Vrijheid	0.266 +	0.164*
DVU	ns	0.380***

Note: results are based on OLS analyses. Coefficients are the summed effects over all lags of the independent variable included in the model of a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable

*** $p < 0.001$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$ according to Granger causality tests.

visibility for the Republikaner and the NPD, but also for the CD. Once more, a negative effect for the DVU is found.

In two instances, for the DVU and the PVV, the results indicate that both the party and leader matter when it comes to predicting electoral support. But what happens if they are both included in the same model? Table 4 provides the answer, showing relevant summary statistics for an analysis that includes both the visibility of the party minus the visibility of the leader, as well as the visibility of the leader. Table B1 and B2 in the Appendix¹⁵ present the full models. In both instances, we find the effect of leadership visibility to be more significant than the party visibility. Apparently, when both matter, it is the leader's visibility that is the strongest driver of public opinion.

Our final expectation was that for outcast parties, the effect of media attention on electoral performance would be stronger than vice versa (H5). Our results offer mixed support for this hypothesis. For the party facing a *cordon sanitaire* – VB – the effects of media attention on support levels are significant, while the reverse relationship is not significant. The DVU also demonstrates a positive effect of attention on performance and interestingly a negative effect of performance on attention. Finally also for the Republikaner we find that the effects of media coverage on the polls are stronger than vice versa. On the other hand, in the results for the CD and NPD the opposite relationship holds, with polls more strongly affecting leader visibility (CD) or party and leader (NPD) visibility rather than the other way round.

In a final step we address whether the different aggregation levels that are used in the various analyses explain part of the differences between parties. Table 5 reports the results of a quarterly analysis with one lag for four out of the six parties, while Tables C1 to C6 in the Appendix¹⁶ present the full models. For Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, the initial analysis was already on the quarterly level, while the time span of the data available for the PVV and the NPD was too short to conduct an analysis at quarterly intervals. The analyses show that most results from the previous analyses hold, with only one exception: the influence of standing in the polls on leader visibility becomes insignificant for the CD. Apparently, the Dutch media's sensitivity to popular opinion on the far right leadership is quite short-lived and does not extend typically beyond one month. More generally, however, given that

Table 5. Relationships between visibility and standing in the polls (quarterly data)

Party	Party-> polls	Polls-> party	Leader-> polls	Polls-> leader
Vlaams Belang/Vlaams Blok	0.075***	ns	ns	ns
CentrumDemocraten	ns	ns	ns	ns
Republikaner	ns	0.419***	ns	0.267**
DVU	0.592***	-0.280 +	0.708***	-0.452*

Note: coefficients are the effects of a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable; the first column summarizes the effect of party visibility on standing in the polls, the second column the effect of standing in the polls on party visibility; the third column the effect of leader visibility on standing in the polls and the fourth column the effect of standing in the polls on leader visibility

***p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; + p < 0.10 according to Granger causality tests.

we would expect it to be more difficult to find effects at higher levels of aggregation (i.e. over longer time periods), the fact that our findings of significance are confirmed in almost all cases makes us more confident that our findings of significance in Table 3 are not a statistical artefact.¹⁷

Conclusion

This article has investigated the relationships between the media visibility of six anti-immigrant parties and their leaders and public support for these parties in terms of their poll standings. We find that a relationship between media visibility and public support exists in a number of cases and that it is generally positive. More specifically, our analyses confirm that media coverage of these parties affects their level of public support in five of the six parties studied (Hypothesis 1) and for two of the six, the leaders' visibility in the media is also significant for levels of support (Hypothesis 3). For the reversed relationship some support is also found. In particular for the German NPD we showed considerable effects of poll results on party and leader media visibility, whereas the effect was rather weak for the Republikaner. The DVU's media coverage is actually negatively influenced by poll results. This suggests that journalists may be strategically neglecting to report about a party that is growing in electoral significance. It remains puzzling, however, why this is the case for just one of these parties. A more detailed analysis of this specific case is warranted. Overall these findings give very mixed credit to Hypotheses 2 and 4.

For Hypothesis (H5) we find limited support. For the PVV the effects are clearly uni-directional and run from media to polls in line with our expectations. For those parties that receive little attention from journalists we find a mixed picture,

however, with some supporting our expectations in that the effects of media visibility on support are less strong than vice versa, but this is not the case for all of them.

The question of how to explain differences across parties and countries is not straightforward to answer and requires a more in-depth analysis of each case. Interestingly for the two parties that are most successful in electoral terms (the Belgian VB and the Dutch PVV) we find the most clear-cut evidence of media effects. This suggests that size matters and that essentially those that are already successful benefit more from media attention than their more marginal counterparts. Such parties arguably cannot capitalize on their media attention because they face stronger voter doubts about their legitimacy and/or effectiveness (Bos & Van der Brug, 2010).

Beyond testing these causal claims, our results provide evidence that party visibility in the media is generally more relevant to popular support than the visibility of anti-immigrant party leaders. However, if *both* are important, as for the PVV and the DVU, then it is leader visibility that has the strongest effects. Again, case-specific explanations might apply here in terms of the centrality of founder and leader Geert Wilders to the PVV. To some extent, therefore, these results seem to underpin studies on the central importance of charismatic leadership for anti-immigrant parties in obtaining electoral support (Bos & Van der Brug, 2010).

In practical terms, the results more generally demonstrate that when media actors consider the rise of anti-immigrant parties as a negative development and see it as their task to prevent society from allowing these parties to grow, limited media attention and a *cordon sanitaire* might be an effective strategy, but only if it is possible to consistently implement it. As the case of VB shows, effects of visibility – even when this attention remains limited overall – on electoral preferences are considerable, even in a context where the party is largely ignored by the media.

This study is not without shortcomings. First, it only looks at the visibility of parties and politicians without considering for example tone or framing of media coverage of these actors. Other studies, largely from a US context, have demonstrated the importance of the tone of candidate portrayals for voting behaviour (Dalton et al., 1998; Druckman & Parkin 2008). For this macro-level time-series study, however, we had to rely on computer-assisted content analysis that does not allow the analysis of the tone of party or leader portrayals. Although others have demonstrated the superiority of visibility to tone in explaining vote choice (Hopmann et al., 2010), it is possible that tone and labels such as “extremist” or “neo-Nazi” that are typically used to describe these parties in some countries, may be more affective than the tone applied to the reporting of other types of party. An analysis of the interplay between visibility and tone of portrayals of anti-immigrant parties in the media as they affect vote choice would therefore be a welcome addition to the literature that might help to more fully understand some of our findings.

Second, the way differences between parties and leaders are conceptualized might be improved. Future research should separate the party coverage in which the leader is mentioned from the coverage in which the leader is not mentioned and again consider their effects in one analysis to disentangle “party-effects” from “leader-effects”.

Third, the comparison between the PVV, on the one hand, and the five other parties under study, on the other hand, suffers from “many variables, few cases” problems. For example, it may well be that the differences in historical heritage between the parties (rather than ostracism) drive cross-party differences in the interplay of media and electoral behaviour. We acknowledge that our inter-party comparison is problematic for this reason. Future research should take more parties into account; our study presents only a modest step into a largely unexplored research field. Finally, the article did not specifically compare anti-immigrant parties with mainstream parties. While we argued that the media are of crucial importance for anti-immigrant parties and that strong relationships between media and party support might be somewhat more likely for those parties, a study explicitly comparing different types of parties is necessary to sustain this claim. Despite these shortcomings we believe that our article sheds new light on the intriguing mutual relationship between media and anti-immigrant parties.

Notes

1. It should be noted, however, that anti-immigrant parties are not necessarily single-issue parties (Mudde, 1999).
2. Indeed, the positive relationship running from performance to attention may be attenuated further if the mass media were to devote a lot of attention to the party if it does *not* do well in the polls – so as to be able to give it negative attention.
3. It is possible that the electoral support for parties that are largely ignored is more driven by media attention than the electoral support of parties that receive ample attention, as voters may be especially impressed by the scarce attention the party receives. This should have resulted in more evidence for H5 (which we hardly found), as it should have strengthened the effect of media attention on support (whereas the effect of support on media attention would remain the same). We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
4. LPF is not included in this study because the party only existed for a limited period in time, and data from opinion polls conducted in this period are incomplete. See the special issue of *Acta Politica*, 2003, on the party for further details.
5. The formulation differs somewhat across countries, but is consistent per party.
6. Of course, in the latter period of our research period, the Internet has become increasingly important as a news provider. However, the number of people relying on the Internet for their daily news is still limited and, if they do so, it is often on websites of traditional newspapers that might show considerable overlap with the printed version of the paper (de Waal & Schönbach, 2010).
7. For the weekly series for PVV, data are missing, mainly for the summer period. Those weeks are deleted and values for the various independent variables are computed as the mean weekly values for the period between the last poll before the summer and the first one after the summer period. For the monthly German data, in several years data for the month of July are missing. Here, we imputed the mean of the values of June and August.
8. Taking opinion polls as a proxy for the electoral performance of a party in general might have certain disadvantages (e.g. underreporting due to social desirability). However, when researching support for anti-immigrant parties in an over-time perspective with regular points of measurements, it is probably the only option. Furthermore, our main interest is not so much differences in absolute levels of support for different parties, but rather changes and dynamics in support, for which a systematic and stable bias in the data is less of a problem.
9. For Germany we selected the centre-right newspaper *die Welt*, centre-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the left-leaning *Tageszeitung*. For the Netherlands we selected the centre-right *NRC Handelsblad*, centre-

left *Volkskrant*, *Trouw* (a protestant centrist newspaper by origin) and the right-leaning broadsheet *de Telegraaf* (van der Eijk, 2000). For Belgium (Flanders), we selected only the front page of the main quality newspaper *de Standaard*. In June 2007, the newspaper shifted to a tabloid format with only one news article on the front page. Concerning the media content from that moment onwards, we took the first three pages of this newspaper which roughly include a similar number of articles as the front page before June 2007. This media sample is limited, but we think it will provide an adequate picture of the coverage in Belgium. To check to what extent newspapers devote similar attention to an anti-immigrant party and its leader, we made a more detailed analysis of Dutch newspaper coverage for the CD and Janmaat during the period 1995–2002. For this period, we compared the scores of *de Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw* at a quarterly level. This analysis shows large similarity in attention devoted to the party and its leader, as well as in the coverage on page 1 and the complete newspaper. More precisely, the newspapers correlate on average 0.90 for CD and 0.86 for Janmaat. We cannot think of any reason why that would be different for Belgian newspapers. Furthermore, the front-page coverage of Dutch newspaper *de Volkskrant*, which is most similar to Belgian newspaper *de Standaard*, correlated with all coverage 0.75 for the CD and 0.74 for Janmaat.

10. This measure is only available until 2005. The analyses reported in this article however run until 2007 and do not include this variable. However, a replication of the analyses for the period until 2005 with inclusion of the immigration variable yielded similar results.
11. The original search string employed by Boomgaarden and Vliegthart was a very complex one, consisting of elaborate combinations of key words. Later analyses show that a simplified version yielded largely similar results (Vliegthart, 2007). In this case, we use: *discrim* OR (*haat w/5 aanzet*) OR *inburgering** OR (*scholing* OR *cursus** OR *les** OR *onderwijs*) *w/10* (*immi** OR *alloch** OR *asiel** OR *buitenl**) OR *taalcur** OR *taalles** OR *taalonderw** OR *gezinsherenig** OR *schijnhuw** OR *nephuw** OR *uithuw** OR *immig** OR *alloch** OR *multicult** OR (*verpaup** AND (*buurt** OR *wijk**)) OR *moslim** OR *islam** OR *asiel** OR *uitgeproc** OR *verblijfs** OR (*grondwet w/10 artikel 7*) OR *importbruid* OR (*bruid** AND *buitenland*) OR (*inkomenseis w/20 trouw**) OR *pluriform** OR *asielzoeker** OR *vluchteling** OR (*generaal pardon*) OR *pardonregeling*.
12. Note that in some cases original series are replaced by differenced series (see further below).
13. We do not present Granger causality tests for analyses that just include one lag, since results will be similar to the results from the coefficient of this one lag.
14. Available at <<http://dx.doi.org/<fulldoi>>>.
15. Available at <<http://dx.doi.org/<fulldoi>>>.
16. Available at <<http://dx.doi.org/<fulldoi>>>.
17. Our control variables show mixed results. In all instances, not surprisingly, elections increase the visibility of a leader and the party in the media. In those times, political actors are more visible in general and this is no different for anti-immigrant parties than for anti-immigrant leaders. The other control variables do not provide any straightforward results: visibility of the immigration and integration issue affects support for the CD. Additionally, unemployment has a negative effect on support for the same party. The level of migration has only limited effects on support for the various parties included in the analysis.

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Appendix

Table A1. Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang party model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	41	6	0.18	0.40	28.24	0.00
visibility	41	6	0.74	0.64	72.35	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.59	0.14	4.35	0.00		
visibility party						
t-1	0.07	0.03	2.57	0.01		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.07	0.08	-0.90	0.37		
immigration						
t-1	0.03	0.05	0.55	0.58		
immigration news						
t-1	0.04	0.12	0.32	0.75		
elections						
	-0.10	0.08	-1.17	0.24		
constant	-0.01	0.03	-0.34	0.73		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	-0.53	0.10	-5.21	0.00		
polls						
t-1	0.51	0.61	0.84	0.40		
immigration						
t-1	0.19	0.17	1.18	0.24		
unemployment						
t-1	0.40	0.30	1.33	0.19		
immigration news						
t-1	0.73	0.50	1.46	0.14		
elections						
	1.26	0.28	4.57	0.00		
constant	-0.04	0.13	-0.30	0.77		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	18.87 (p-value = 0.53)					
Residuals visibility	17.29 (p-value = 0.63)					

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Table A2. Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang leader model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	41	6	0.19	0.32	19.18	0.00
visibility	41	6	0.79	0.56	51.41	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.58	0.14	4.03	0.00		
visibility party						
t-1	0.01	0.03	0.30	0.76		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.03	0.08	-0.32	0.75		
immigration						
t-1	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.95		
immigration news						
t-1	0.07	0.13	0.58	0.56		
elections						
	0.02	0.08	0.25	0.80		
constant	-0.01	0.03	-0.29	0.77		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	-0.53	0.11	-4.62	0.00		
polls						
t-1	0.49	0.62	0.79	0.43		
immigration						
t-1	0.16	0.18	0.90	0.37		
unemployment						
t-1	0.33	0.33	1.00	0.32		
immigration news						
t-1	0.66	0.54	1.21	0.22		
elections						
	1.06	0.29	3.70	0.00		
constant	-0.04	0.14	-0.27	0.79		

Ljung-Box Q test for white noise
 Residuals polls 17.62 (p-value = 0.61)
 Residuals visibility 21.10 (p-value 0.39)

Table A3. CD party model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	106	6	0.42	0.12	14.55	0.02
visibility	106	6	0.81	0.28	41.11	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	-0.25	0.09	-2.74	0.01		
visibility						
t-1	0.03	0.04	0.68	0.50		
immigration						
t-1	0.04	0.05	0.81	0.42		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.40	0.56	-0.71	0.48		
immigration news						
t-1	0.30	0.16	1.80	0.07		
elections						
	-0.03	0.14	-0.22	0.83		
constant	-0.01	0.04	-0.16	0.88		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	-0.06	0.18	-0.36	0.72		
visibility						
t-1	-0.33	0.09	-3.92	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.10	0.10	-1.01	0.32		
unemployment						
t-1	3.30	1.07	3.07	0.00		
immigration news						
t-1	0.10	0.31	0.31	0.75		
elections						
	0.72	0.26	2.76	0.01		
constant	0.03	0.08	0.36	0.72		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	25.65 (p-value = 0.18)					
Residuals visibility	42.54 (p-value = 0.00)					

Table A4. CD leader model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	105	11	0.41	0.18	23.73	0.01
visibility	105	11	0.74	0.40	69.73	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	-0.28	0.10	-2.99	0.00	9.54	0.01
t-2	-0.15	0.10	-1.53	0.13		
visibility						
t-1	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.95	0.15	0.92
t-2	0.02	0.05	0.37	0.71		
immigration						
t-1	0.03	0.05	0.57	0.57	0.36	0.84
t-2	0.01	0.05	0.26	0.80		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.61	0.57	-1.06	0.29	5.91	0.05
t-2	1.35	0.58	2.33	0.02		
immigration news						
t-1	0.29	0.17	1.71	0.09	2.94	0.23
t-2	0.07	0.17	0.40	0.69		
elections						
constant	-0.04	0.15	-0.25	0.80		
constant	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.93		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.05	0.17	0.29	0.77	12.80	0.00
t-2	0.61	0.17	3.52	0.00		
visibility						
t-1	-0.35	0.09	-3.87	0.00	15.01	0.00
t-2	-0.14	0.09	-1.49	0.14		
immigration						
t-1	-0.06	0.10	-0.60	0.55	0.37	0.83
t-2	-0.02	0.10	-0.20	0.84		
unemployment						
t-1	3.64	1.04	3.51	0.00	12.47	0.02
t-2	-0.96	1.05	-0.92	0.36		
immigration news						
t-1	0.32	0.30	1.06	0.29	2.65	0.27
t-2	0.47	0.32	1.49	0.14		
elections						
constant	0.91	0.27	3.42	0.00		
constant	0.01	0.07	0.20	0.84		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	22.39 (p-value = 0.32)					
Residuals visibility	32.00 (p-value = 0.04)					

Table A5. PVV party model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	179	11	0.28	0.11	21.66	0.03
visibility	179	11	0.61	0.24	57.44	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	-0.06	0.07	-0.83	0.41	2.23	0.33
t-2	-0.09	0.07	-1.26	0.21		
visibility						
t-1	0.07	0.03	2.09	0.04	11.49	0.00
t-2	0.11	0.03	3.25	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	0.04	0.05	0.85	0.40	1.76	0.42
t-2	0.05	0.05	1.03	0.30		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.08	0.25	-0.32	0.75	0.25	0.88
t-2	-0.09	0.25	-0.38	0.70		
immigration news						
t-1	0.04	0.02	1.58	0.11	4.18	0.12
t-2	0.04	0.02	1.80	0.07		
elections						
	0.28	0.22	1.31	0.19		
constant	0.00	0.02	-0.06	0.95		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	-0.24	0.16	-1.49	0.14	2.52	0.28
t-2	0.08	0.16	0.51	0.61		
visibility						
t-1	-0.33	0.08	-4.29	0.00	20.89	0.00
t-2	-0.22	0.07	-3.04	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	0.08	0.12	0.70	0.48	3.89	0.14
t-2	0.21	0.11	1.85	0.06		
unemployment						
t-1	0.55	0.55	1.01	0.31	1.59	0.45
t-2	0.41	0.55	0.75	0.45		
immigration news						
t-1	0.01	0.05	0.15	0.88	0.34	0.84
t-2	-0.02	0.05	-0.47	0.64		
elections						
	1.40	0.48	2.93	0.00		
constant	0.02	0.05	0.53	0.60		

Ljung-Box Q test for white noise

Residuals polls 14.41 (p-value = 0.81)

Residuals visibility 20.02 (p-value = 0.46)

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Table A6. PVV leader model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	179	11	0.28	0.10	18.90	0.06
visibility	179	11	0.61	0.29	72.09	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
<hr/>						
polls						
t-1	-0.06	0.07	-0.78	0.44	1.64	0.44
t-2	-0.08	0.07	-1.04	0.30		
visibility						
t-1	0.08	0.03	2.37	0.02	8.87	0.01
t-2	0.09	0.03	2.66	0.01		
immigration						
t-1	-0.05	0.25	-0.22	0.83	1.74	0.41
t-2	-0.10	0.25	-0.39	0.70		
unemployment						
t-1	0.04	0.02	1.56	0.12	0.20	0.91
t-2	0.04	0.02	1.85	0.06		
immigration news						
t-1	0.04	0.05	0.75	0.46	4.30	0.12
t-2	0.06	0.05	1.10	0.27		
elections						
	0.30	0.22	1.37	0.17		
constant	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.96		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
<hr/>						
polls						
t-1	-0.22	0.16	-1.34	0.18	1.91	0.39
t-2	-0.06	0.16	-0.38	0.70		
visibility						
t-1	-0.47	0.08	-6.10	0.00	38.53	0.00
t-2	-0.27	0.07	-3.71	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.07	0.11	-0.60	0.55	2.70	0.26
t-2	0.17	0.11	1.52	0.13		
unemployment						
t-1	0.73	0.55	1.34	0.18	2.78	0.25
t-2	0.54	0.55	0.98	0.33		
immigration news						
t-1	0.01	0.05	0.23	0.82	0.44	0.80
t-2	-0.02	0.05	-0.49	0.62		
elections						
	0.95	0.47	1.99	0.05		
constant						
	0.03	0.05	0.73	0.47		

Ljung-Box Q test for white noise
 Residuals polls 14.29 (p-value = 0.82)
 Residuals visibility 22.28 (p-value = 0.33)

Table A7. Republikaner party model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	166	9	0.86	0.23	50.16	0.00
visibility	166	9	0.76	0.40	111.20	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.22	0.08	2.95	0.00	27.32	0.00
t-2	0.23	0.08	3.08	0.00		
visibility						
t-1	0.21	0.08	2.61	0.01	7.70	0.02
t-2	-0.02	0.08	-0.24	0.81		
immigration						
t-1	-0.14	0.10	-1.47	0.14	3.45	0.18
t-2	0.17	0.10	1.72	0.09		
unemployment						
t-1	0.32	0.20	1.64	0.10	3.74	0.15
t-2	-0.20	0.19	-1.05	0.29		
elections						
constant	0.02	0.22	0.11	0.91		
visibility	-0.04	0.07	-0.54	0.59		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.14	0.07	2.03	0.04	4.61	0.10
t-2	0.00	0.07	-0.01	0.99		
visibility						
t-1	0.31	0.07	4.50	0.00	40.73	0.00
t-2	0.16	0.07	2.21	0.03		
immigration						
t-1	0.05	0.08	0.61	0.54	2.83	0.24
t-2	-0.14	0.09	-1.66	0.10		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.05	0.17	-0.31	0.76	3.50	0.18
t-2	-0.08	0.16	-0.51	0.61		
elections						
constant	1.06	0.20	5.42	0.00		
visibility	-0.09	0.06	-1.36	0.17		

Ljung-Box Q test for white noise

Residuals polls 20.79 (p-value = 0.41)

Residuals visibility 22.93 (p-value = 0.29)

Table A8. Republikaner leader model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	166	9	0.88	0.21	44.21	0.00
press	166	9	0.75	0.39	105.93	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.22	0.08	2.92	0.00	26.92	0.00
t-2	0.24	0.08	3.16	0.00		
visibility						
t-1	0.13	0.08	1.69	0.09	2.92	0.23
t-2	-0.03	0.08	-0.45	0.65		
immigration						
t-1	-0.11	0.10	-1.15	0.25	2.65	0.27
t-2	0.16	0.10	1.58	0.11		
unemployment						
t-1	0.29	0.20	1.44	0.15	2.64	0.27
t-2	-0.19	0.19	-1.00	0.32		
elections						
constant	0.03	0.23	0.14	0.89		
constant	-0.03	0.07	-0.43	0.67		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.15	0.06	2.34	0.02	5.52	0.06
t-2	-0.06	0.07	-0.84	0.40		
visibility						
t-1	0.23	0.07	3.48	0.00	48.15	0.00
t-2	0.27	0.06	4.14	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.05	0.08	-0.56	0.57	1.44	0.49
t-2	-0.05	0.08	-0.63	0.53		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.16	0.17	-0.96	0.34	1.13	0.57
t-2	0.11	0.16	0.68	0.50		
elections						
constant	0.89	0.19	4.59	0.00		
constant	-0.10	0.06	-1.66	0.10		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	25.77 (p-value = 0.17)					
Residuals visibility	45.04 (p-value = 0.01)					

Table A9. NPD party model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	81	13	0.80	0.36	46.33	0.00
visibility	81	13	0.68	0.62	132.48	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.10	0.11	0.92	0.36	3.95	0.27
t-2	0.10	0.11	0.86	0.39		
t-3	-0.18	0.12	-1.54	0.12		
visibility						
t-1	0.26	0.12	2.17	0.03	6.90	0.08
t-2	-0.01	0.11	-0.10	0.92		
t-3	0.13	0.10	1.27	0.21		
immigration						
t-1	-0.43	0.16	-2.76	0.01	14.33	0.00
t-2	0.10	0.17	0.60	0.55		
t-3	-0.50	0.17	-2.98	0.00		
unemployment						
t-1	0.14	0.33	0.44	0.66	5.92	0.12
t-2	-1.01	0.58	-1.73	0.08		
t-3	0.87	0.37	2.33	0.02		
elections	0.23	0.42	0.55	0.58		
constant	-0.09	0.11	-0.77	0.44		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.20	0.09	2.14	0.03	16.84	0.00
t-2	0.33	0.10	3.34	0.00		
t-3	0.10	0.10	0.98	0.33		
visibility						
t-1	0.27	0.10	2.70	0.01	9.27	0.03
t-2	-0.02	0.09	-0.25	0.80		
t-3	0.11	0.09	1.23	0.22		
immigration						
t-1	0.27	0.13	2.01	0.05	7.27	0.06
t-2	-0.32	0.14	-2.26	0.02		
t-3	0.27	0.14	1.91	0.06		
unemployment						
t-1	0.89	0.28	3.20	0.00	15.12	0.00
t-2	-0.70	0.50	-1.41	0.16		
t-3	-0.18	0.32	-0.55	0.58		
elections						
constant	1.39	0.36	3.88	0.00		
constant	0.16	0.10	1.68	0.09		

Ljung-Box Q test for white noise

Residuals polls 15.46 (p-value = 0.75)

Residuals visibility 19.51 (p-value = 0.49)

Table A10. NPD leader model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	81	13	0.82	0.32	38.40	0.00
visibility	81	13	0.79	0.39	52.71	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.13	0.11	1.16	0.25	4.67	0.20
t-2	0.19	0.11	1.66	0.10		
t-3	-0.09	0.12	-0.77	0.44		
visibility						
t-1	0.05	0.12	0.45	0.65	1.43	0.70
t-2	0.08	0.11	0.74	0.46		
t-3	0.04	0.11	0.37	0.71		
immigration						
t-1	-0.35	0.16	-2.16	0.03	11.09	0.01
t-2	0.07	0.18	0.38	0.70		
t-3	-0.50	0.18	-2.79	0.01		
unemployment						
t-1	0.04	0.35	0.13	0.90	8.70	0.03
t-2	-0.68	0.58	-1.18	0.24		
t-3	0.64	0.36	1.77	0.08		
elections	0.13	0.44	0.29	0.77		
constant	0.05	0.10	0.49	0.63		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	0.12	0.11	1.14	0.26	15.03	0.00
t-2	0.36	0.11	3.37	0.00		
t-3	-0.17	0.12	-1.51	0.13		
visibility						
t-1	0.36	0.11	3.16	0.00	11.38	0.01
t-2	-0.01	0.11	-0.12	0.91		
t-3	0.09	0.11	0.81	0.42		
immigration						
t-1	0.19	0.15	1.27	0.21	4.65	0.20
t-2	-0.27	0.17	-1.60	0.11		
t-3	0.20	0.17	1.19	0.23		
unemployment						
t-1	0.44	0.33	1.33	0.18	2.85	0.42
t-2	-0.59	0.55	-1.07	0.29		
t-3	0.16	0.34	0.48	0.63		
elections						
constant	0.37	0.42	0.88	0.38		
constant	0.03	0.09	0.30	0.76		

Ljung-Box Q test for white noise
 Residuals polls 13.09 (p-value = 0.87)
 Residuals visibility 8.32 (p-value = 0.99)

Table A11. DVU party model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	119	5	0.89	0.20	29.89	0.00
visibility	119	5	0.83	0.49	115.31	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.02	0.10	0.15	0.88		
visibility						
t-1	0.29	0.08	3.49	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.23	0.10	-2.19	0.03		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.08	0.09	-0.90	0.37		
elections	0.72	0.33	2.15	0.03		
constant	-0.09	0.09	-1.05	0.29		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	-0.28	0.09	-3.07	0.00		
visibility						
t-1	0.57	0.08	7.25	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.21	0.10	-2.22	0.03		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.02	0.08	-0.19	0.85		
elections	2.28	0.31	7.33	0.00		
constant	-0.09	0.08	-1.10	0.27		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	10.63 (p-value = 0.96)					
Residuals visibility	16.84 (p-value = 0.66)					

Table A12. DVU leader model

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	119	5	0.87	0.24	38.55	0.00
visibility	119	5	0.82	0.46	100.90	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	-0.02	0.10	-0.26	0.80		
visibility						
t-1	0.39	0.09	4.45	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.16	0.10	-1.59	0.11		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.09	0.08	-1.04	0.30		
elections	0.75	0.32	2.31	0.02		
constant	-0.08	0.08	-0.97	0.33		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	-0.19	0.09	-2.16	0.03		
visibility						
t-1	0.54	0.08	6.60	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.17	0.10	-1.77	0.08		
unemployment						
t-1	0.02	0.08	0.25	0.80		
elections	1.94	0.31	6.35	0.00		
constant	-0.09	0.08	-1.13	0.26		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	9.63 (p-value = 0.97)					
Residuals visibility	16.63 (p-value = 0.68)					

Table B1. Regression model PVV predicting polls

polls	B	SE	z	p-value	Granger test	p-value
polls						
t-1	-0.05	0.08	-0.63	0.53		
t-2	-0.10	0.08	-1.35	0.18		
party visibility						
t-1	0.04	0.11	0.37	0.71	2.46	0.09
t-2	0.22	0.11	2.03	0.04		
leader visibility						
t-1	0.06	0.04	1.75	0.08	4.51	0.01
t-2	0.10	0.03	2.93	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	0.04	0.05	0.68	0.50		
t-2	0.06	0.05	1.17	0.24		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.08	0.26	-0.29	0.77		
t-2	-0.13	0.26	-0.48	0.63		
immigration news						
t-1	0.04	0.03	1.70	0.09		
t-2	0.04	0.02	1.70	0.09		
elections						
	0.26	0.22	1.16	0.25		
constant	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.96		
R-squared	0.12					
N	179					

Table B2. Regression model DVU predicting polls

polls	B	SE	z	p-value
polls				
t-1	-0.02	0.10	-0.18	0.86
party visibility				
t-1	-0.07	0.16	-0.40	0.69
leader visibility				
t-1	0.38	0.09	4.19	0.00
migration				
t-1	-0.15	0.11	-1.41	0.16
unemployment				
t-1	-0.09	0.09	-1.01	0.31
elections	0.75	0.33	2.25	0.03
constant	-0.08	0.09	-0.88	0.38
R-squared	0.25			
N	119			

Table C1. CD party model (quarterly data)

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	34	6	0.11	0.11	4.40	0.62
visibility	34	6	0.72	0.57	45.77	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.06	0.16	0.36	0.72		
visibility						
t-1	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.96		
immigration						
t-1	0.00	0.02	-0.19	0.85		
unemployment						
t-1	0.20	0.14	1.45	0.15		
immigration news						
t-1	0.07	0.08	0.88	0.38		
elections						
	-0.07	0.08	-0.79	0.43		
constant	0.01	0.02	0.27	0.79		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	-0.37	0.13	-2.85	0.00		
polls						
t-1	0.51	1.12	0.46	0.65		
immigration						
t-1	0.00	0.12	-0.01	1.00		
unemployment						
t-1	1.13	0.96	1.17	0.24		
immigration news						
t-1	-0.20	0.52	-0.39	0.70		
elections						
	2.35	0.38	6.12	0.00		
constant	0.02	0.13	0.18	0.86		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	20.36 (p-value = 0.44)					
Residuals visibility	18.44 (p-value = 0.56)					

Table C2. CD leader model (quarterly data)

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	34	6	0.11	0.13	5.72	0.46
visibility	34	6	0.81	0.50	33.82	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.04	0.16	0.27	0.79		
visibility						
t-1	0.03	0.02	1.10	0.27		
immigration						
t-1	0.04	0.08	0.50	0.62		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.01	0.02	-0.51	0.61		
elections						
	-0.12	0.08	-1.57	0.12		
constant	0.01	0.02	0.31	0.76		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	-0.28	0.14	-2.03	0.04		
polls						
t-1	0.86	1.26	0.68	0.50		
immigration						
t-1	-0.37	0.58	-0.64	0.52		
unemployment						
t-1	0.13	0.13	0.98	0.33		
elections						
	2.28	0.44	5.22	0.00		
constant	0.04	0.14	0.28	0.78		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	20.32 (p-value = 0.44)					
Residuals visibility	20.18 (p-value = 0.45)					

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Table C3. Republikaner party model (quarterly data)

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	55	5	0.79	0.22	15.64	0.00
visibility	55	5	0.67	0.52	59.34	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.18	0.13	1.38	0.17		
visibility						
t-1	0.09	0.15	0.60	0.55		
immigration						
t-1	-0.25	0.13	-1.91	0.06		
unemployment						
t-1	0.06	0.12	0.49	0.63		
elections						
constant	0.31	0.26	1.22	0.22		
visibility	-0.14	0.13	-1.08	0.28		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	0.32	0.10	3.09	0.00		
polls						
t-1	0.42	0.10	4.26	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	0.03	0.12	0.25	0.80		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.13	0.11	-1.16	0.25		
elections						
constant	0.44	0.21	2.14	0.03		
visibility	-0.12	0.11	-1.07	0.28		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	34.58 (p-value = 0.02)					
Residuals visibility	12.21 (p-value = 0.91)					

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Table C4. Republikaner leader model (quarterly data)

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	55	5	0.78	0.22	15.62	0.00
visibility	55	5	0.58	0.59	78.68	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.19	0.13	1.48	0.14		
visibility						
t-1	0.08	0.15	0.55	0.59		
immigration						
t-1	-0.24	0.14	-1.76	0.08		
unemployment						
t-1	0.05	0.12	0.44	0.66		
elections						
	0.33	0.25	1.31	0.19		
constant	-0.14	0.13	-1.08	0.28		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	0.50	0.09	5.30	0.00		
polls						
t-1	0.27	0.09	2.97	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.07	0.10	-0.64	0.52		
unemployment						
t-1	0.00	0.10	0.03	0.97		
elections						
	0.12	0.19	0.65	0.52		
constant	-0.08	0.10	-0.80	0.42		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	36.71 (p-value = 0.01)					
Residuals visibility	12.65 (p-value = 0.89)					

Table C5. DVU party model (quarterly data)

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	39	5	0.77	0.39	39.35	0.00
visibility	39	5	0.84	0.48	42.25	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.25	0.13	1.92	0.05		
visibility						
t-1	0.59	0.13	4.59	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	-0.08	0.17	-0.45	0.65		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.05	0.13	-0.35	0.73		
elections						
	-0.10	0.38	-0.26	0.79		
constant	-0.09	0.14	-0.63	0.53		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	0.49	0.14	3.57	0.00		
polls						
t-1	-0.28	0.17	-1.66	0.10		
immigration						
t-1	-0.07	0.19	-0.37	0.71		
unemployment						
t-1	0.13	0.15	0.89	0.37		
elections						
	1.44	0.35	4.17	0.00		
constant	-0.20	0.15	-1.35	0.18		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	19.59 (p-value = 0.48)					
Residuals visibility	5.39 (p-value = 1.00)					

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Table C6. DVU leader model (quarterly data)

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	R-sq	chi2	p-value
polls	39	5	0.72	0.47	56.72	0.00
visibility	39	5	0.82	0.47	42.03	0.00
polls	B	SE	z	p-value		
polls						
t-1	0.31	0.12	2.51	0.01		
visibility						
t-1	0.71	0.12	5.95	0.00		
immigration						
t-1	0.08	0.16	0.50	0.62		
unemployment						
t-1	-0.07	0.12	-0.59	0.55		
elections						
	-0.03	0.33	-0.08	0.94		
constant	-0.07	0.13	-0.56	0.57		
visibility	B	SE	z	p-value		
visibility						
t-1	0.61	0.15	4.05	0.00		
polls						
t-1	-0.45	0.17	-2.62	0.01		
immigration						
t-1	-0.20	0.19	-1.07	0.28		
unemployment						
t-1	0.12	0.15	0.83	0.41		
elections						
	1.12	0.34	3.32	0.00		
constant	-0.18	0.15	-1.21	0.23		
Ljung-Box Q test for white noise						
Residuals polls	24.87 (p-value = 0.21)					
Residuals visibility	5.51 (p-value = 1.00)					