Gualtiero Piccinini

University of Missouri | Mizzou

Bringing together recent case studies and insights into current developments, this collection introduces philosophers to a range of experimental methods from neuroscience. Chapters provide a comprehensive survey of the discipline, covering neuroimaging such as EEG and MRI, causal interventions, for instance brain stimulation or psychopharmacology,...

The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history going back to the idea that thought is a kind of computation. Its modern incarnation relies on analogies with contemporary computing technology and the use of computational models. It comes in many versions, some more plausible than others. This Element...

We argue that some organisms are altruistically motivated and such altruistic motivation is adaptive. We lay out the helper’s decision problem—determining whether to help another organism. We point out that there are more ways of solving this problem than most people recognize. Specifically, we distinguish two kinds of altruistic motivations, depen...

I introduce three themes: egalitarian ontology, explanatory integration, and neural computation-cum-representation. I argue that all levels of composition and realization are ontologically on a par (no level is more fundamental than the others). In addition, I argue that all levels and their relations must be studied and integrated within multileve...

I argue that good metaphysics and good metascience go hand in hand and go on to clarify my egalitarian ontology of levels, defend the aspect view of realization, insist that computation must be medium independent and neurocognitive processes are largely computational even though some medium-dependent phenomena affect neural computation, and sketch...

Flat physicalism and egalitarian physicalism differ primarily in the following ways: (1) flat physicalism posits a fundamental level whereas egalitarian physicalism does not, (2) flat physicalism claims to be a type-identity reductionism whereas egalitarian physicalism claims to reject type-identity reductionism, (3) flat physicalism maintains that...

Situated approaches to cognition maintain that cognition is embodied, embedded, enactive, and affective (and extended, but that is not relevant here). Situated approaches are often pitched as alternatives to computational and representational approaches, according to which cognition is computation over representations. I argue that, far from being...

I argue that wholes are neither identical to nor (completely) distinct from their parts. Instead, wholes are invariants under some transformations in their parts. Similarly, higher-level properties are neither identical to nor (completely) distinct from their lower-level realizers. Instead, higher-level properties are aspects of their realizers tha...

We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstractio...

It’s fashionable to maintain that in the near future we can become immortal by uploading our minds to artificial computers. Mind uploading requires three assumptions: (1) that we can construct realistic computational simulations of human brains; (2) that realistic computational simulations of human brains would have conscious minds like those posse...

Corrected version

This chapter distinguishes between two types of representation, natural and nonnatural. It argues that nonnatural representation is necessary to explain intentionality. It also argues that traditional accounts of the semantic content of mental representations are insufficient to explain nonnatural representation and, therefore, intentionality. To r...

This book provides the foundations for a neurocomputational explanation of cognition based on contemporary cognitive neuroscience. An ontologically egalitarian account of composition and realization, according to which all levels are equally real, is defended. Multiple realizability and mechanisms are explicated in light of this ontologically egali...

We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a porti...

We employ some of the machinery developed in previous work to investigate the inferential and memory functions of quantum-like neural networks. We set up a logical apparatus to implement this in the form of a Gentzen sequent calculus which codifies some of the combinatory rules for the state spaces of the neuronal networks introduced earlier. We di...

We argue that some organisms are altruistically motivated and such altruistic motivation is adaptive. We lay out the helper’s decision problem—determining whether to help another organism. We point out that there are more ways of solving this problem than most people recognize. Specifically, we distinguish two kinds of altruistic motivations, depen...

In earlier work, we laid out the foundation for explaining the quantum-like behavior of neural systems in the basic kinematic case of clusters of neuron-like units. Here we extend this approach to networks and begin developing a dynamical theory for them. Our approach provides a novel mathematical foundation for neural dynamics and computation whic...

We argue that there are two different kinds of altruistic motivation: classical psychological altruism, which generates ultimate desires to help other organisms at least partly for those organisms’ sake, and nonclassical psychological altruism, which generates ultimate desires to help other organisms for the sake of the organism providing the help....

We situate the debate on intentionality within the rise of cognitive neuroscience and argue that cognitive neuroscience can explain intentionality. We discuss the explanatory significance of ascribing intentionality to representations. At first, we focus on views that attempt to render such ascriptions naturalistic by construing them in a deflation...

The historical debate on representation in cognitive science and neuroscience construes representations as theoretical posits and discusses the degree to which we have reason to posit them. We reject the premise of that debate. We argue that experimental neuroscientists routinely observe and manipulate neural representations in their laboratory. Th...

Recently there has been much interest in the possible quantum-like behavior of the human brain in such functions as cognition, the mental lexicon, memory, etc., producing a vast literature. These studies are both empirical and theoretical, the tenets of the theory in question being mainly, and apparently inevitably, those of quantum physics itself,...

I reduce activities to properties, where properties include causal powers. Activities are manifestations of causal powers. Activities occur when an entity’s causal powers encounter partners for their manifestation. Given this reduction of activities to (manifestations of) properties, entities and properties (and their organization) are all we need...

According to pancomputationalism, all physical systems – atoms, rocks, hurricanes, and toasters – perform computations. Pancomputationalism seems to be increasingly popular among some philosophers and physicists. In this paper, we interpret pancomputationalism in terms of computational descriptions of varying strength—computational interpretations...

We compare the computational power of different classes of computational systems and relate it to whether they contain closed loops. Adding closed loops to the architecture of computational systems increases their computational power. Different computational models are apt for capturing the computational power of different classes of neural systems...

We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstractio...

We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations-even ideally complete ones-typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstractio...

According to the computational theory of cognition (CTC), cognitive capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it’s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTC without argument. But if we presuppose that neural processe...

Cognitive neuroscience raises several foundational issues. A first issue is how to account for our feeling that we are in control of our actions. A second issue is how to account for the relation between the mind and the nervous system. A third issue is how cognitive neuroscience supports its conclusions. A fourth issue is how cognitive neuroscienc...

This book articulates and defends a mechanistic account of concrete, or physical, computation. A physical system is a computing system just in case it is a mechanism one of whose functions is to manipulate vehicles based solely on differences between different portions of the vehicles according to a rule defined over the vehicles. Six desiderata to...

We outline a framework of multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms that incorporates representation and computation. We argue that paradigmatic explanations in cognitive neuroscience fit this framework and thus that cognitive neuroscience constitutes a revolutionary break from traditional cognitive science. Whereas traditional cognitive scientific expl...

Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consci...

I argue that metaphysicians of mind have not done justice to the notion of accessibility between possible worlds. Once accessibility is given its due, physicalism must be reformulated and conceivability arguments must be reevaluated. To reach these conclusions, I explore a novel way of assessing the zombie conceivability argument. I accept that zom...

Ruth Millikan argues that there is no “legitimate phenomenology of experience”: that there is no method—not even a fallible or partially reliable one—for accurately describing our experiences in the first-person. The reason is that there is no method for checking that the ideas we think we have about experience are about anything at all. Like phlog...

Different structures can have the same function. The wings and feet of insects, birds and bats have different structural properties, yet they perform the same functions. Many important concepts and explanations in the special sciences depend on the idea that the same function can be performed by different structures. For instance, in biology, altho...

Functionalism is a popular solution to the mind-body problem. It has a number of versions. We outline some of the major releases of functionalism, listing some of their important features as well as some of the bugs that plagued these releases. We outline how different versions are related. Many have been pessimistic about functionalism's prospects...

We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in...

We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism-neural processes are computations in the g...

The introduction of the concept of computation in cognitive science is discussed in this article. Computationalism is usually introduced as an empirical hypothesis that can be disconfirmed. Processing information is surely an important aspect of cognition so if computation is information processing, then cognition involves computation. Computationa...

We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mecha...

This article defends a modest version of the Physical Church-Turing thesis (CT). Following an established recent trend, I distinguish between what I call Mathematical CT—the thesis supported by the original arguments for CT— and Physical CT. I then distinguish between bold formulations of Physical CT, according to which any physical process—anythin...

Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both - although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use 'comp...

Information and the Veridicality ThesisInformation as a Mongrel ConceptNatural Information Without TruthNonnatural Information: The Case for the Veridicality ThesisNonnatural Information Without TruthAn ObjectionConclusion AcknowledgmentsReferences

We argue that Machery provides no convincing evidence that prototypes and exemplars are typically used in distinct cognitive processes. This partially undermines the fourth tenet of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and thus casts doubts on Machery's way of splitting concepts into different kinds. Although Machery may be right that concepts split into d...

Since the cognitive revolution, it has become commonplace that cognition involves both computation and information processing. Is this one claim or two? Is computation the same as information processing? The two terms are often used interchangeably, but this usage masks important differences. In this paper, we distinguish information processing fro...

Computationalism – the view that cognition is computation – has been controversial from the start. It faces insufficiency objections and objections from neural realization. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, biological computations are...

As our data will show, negative existential sentences containing socalled empty names evoke the same strong semantic intuitions in ordinary speakers and philosophers alike. (1) (a) Santa Claus does not exist. (b) Superman does not exist. (c) Clark Kent does not exist. Uttering the sentences in (1) seems to say something truth-evaluable , to say so...

Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel...

Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel’s groundbreaking book, Describing Inner Experience: Proponent Meets Skeptic, examines a research method called Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). DES, which was developed by Hurlburt and collaborators, works roughly as follows. An investigator gives a subject a random beeper. During the day, as the subject hears a beep...

According to the Veridicality Thesis, information requires truth. On this view, smoke carries information about there being a fire only if there is a fire, the proposition that the earth has two moons carries information about the earth having two moons only if the earth has two moons, and so on. We reject this Veridicality Thesis. We argue that th...

Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as t...

In his refreshing and thought-provoking book, Edouard Machery (2009) argues that people possess different kinds of concept. This is probably true and important. Before I get to that, I will briefly disagree on two other points.

First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientist...

Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidenc...

I address whether neural networks perform computations in the sense of computability theory and computer science. I explicate and defend the following theses. (1) Many neural networks compute--they perform computations. (2) Some neural networks compute in a classical way. Ordinary digital computers, which are very large networks of logic gates, bel...

This paper offers an account of what it is for a physical system to be a computing mechanism—a system that performs computations. A computing mechanism is a mech-anism whose function is to generate output strings from input strings and (possibly) internal states, in accordance with a general rule that applies to all relevant strings and depends on...

The following three theses are inconsistent: (1) (Paradigmatic) connectionist systems perform computations. (2) Performing computations requires executing programs. (3) Connectionist systems do not execute programs. Many authors embrace (2). This leads them to a dilemma: either connectionist systems execute programs or they don't compute. According...

According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputationalism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of t...

I appeal to Merker's theory to motivate a hypothesis about the ontology of consciousness: Creature consciousness is (at least partially) constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. Rather than elaborating theories of phenomenal consciousness couched solely in terms of state consciousness, as philosophers are fond of doing, a correct approach to pheno...

The Church–Turing Thesis (CTT) is often employed in arguments for computationalism. I scrutinize the most prominent of such arguments in light of recent work on CTT and argue that they are unsound. Although CTT does nothing to support computationalism, it is not irrelevant to it. By eliminating misunderstandings about the relationship between CTT a...

Accordingtosomephilosophers,computationalexplanationisproprietary to psychology—it does not belong in neuroscience. But neuroscientists routinely offer computational explanations of cognitive phenomena. In fact, computational explana- tion was initially imported from computability theory into the science of mind by neuroscientists, who justified th...

A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a sin-gular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: (a) concepts split...

According to the received view of computation, there is no computation without representation. In other words, computational states are individuated, at least in part, by their content. I propose an alternative view of computation, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties, and their functional properti...

Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we...

Almost no one cites Sellars, while reinventing his wheels with gratifying regularity. (Dennett 1987, 349) In philosophy of mind, there is functionalism about mental states and functionalism about mental contents. The former — mental State functionalism — says that mental states are individuated by their functional relations with mental inputs, Out...

Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and compu...

According to some philosophers, there is no fact of the matter whether something is either a computer, or some other computing mechanism, or something that performs no computations at all. On the contrary, I argue that there is a fact of the matter whether something is a calculator or a computer: a computer is a calculator of large capacity, and a...

Abstract. Epistemic divergence occurs when different investigators give different answers to the same question using evidence-collecting methods that are not public. Without following the principle that scientific methods must be public, scientific communities risk epistemic divergence. I explicate the notion of public method and argue that, to avo...

Computationalism says that brains are computing mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that perform computations. At present, there is no consensus on how to formulate computationalism precisely or adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, or between different versions of computationalism. An important reason for the current impasse is...

This paper concerns Alan Turing's ideas about machines, mathematical methods of proof, and intelligence. By the late 1930s, Kurt Gdel and other logicians, including Turing himself, had shown that no finite set of rules could be used to generate all true mathematical statements. Yet according to Turing, there was no upper bound to the number of math...

In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, ...

Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life and science. Many scientists and philosophers consider this practice unjustified, while others have made the untestable assumption that introspection is a truthful method of private observation. I argue that neither scepticism nor faith concerning intr...

Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. ...