Giovanni Alberto Tabacco

This chapter examines the impact of different antitrust regimes on deterring cartel behaviour. It presents the results of a laboratory experiment that sheds light on how competing regulatory frameworks may affect managers' incentives to collude and, in turn, managers' labour markets.

This article combines the industrial organization literature on market structure with the sociological literature on trust and social capital to gain an improved and richer understanding on the key determinants of market concentration. After reviewing theory and empirics about relationship between market size and market concentration, we provide a...

With the help of more than 700 reviewers, we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hardware and software requirements were not an obstacle for rev...

With the help of more than 700 reviewers we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hard-and software requirements were not an obstacle for reviewer...

We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers' labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shareholder...

The persistence of problems such as endemic poverty, rising inequalities, climate change and biodiversity loss demands us to find solutions which are embedded in a highly complex web of interacting social, technological, and ecological processes. Service design (SD), an approach to directly involve citizens in the development and improvement of ser...

We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers' labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a simple theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shar...

We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers' labor contracts, when firm shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a simple theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of...

In this paper we provide a detailed description of the methodological steps involved in conducting a Service Design study in combination with Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs). It complements the conceptual and epistemological argument developed for this methodological combination in Osborne et al. (2021, World Development, in review WD-19535). Se...

We explore the consequences to contract design if firm shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities under different legal regimes. We show that in fine-only legal regimes, optimal contracts must have a fixed wage. In contrast , in fine-plus-prosecution legal regimes optimal contracts must be high-powered, involving...

This thesis studies degree of competitiveness in the airline industry inferred by investigation of market structure. Chapter 2 documents empirical evidence that endogenous sunk costs investments in advertising and in expanding route network play a crucial role in determining equilibrium market structure and, that the industry is a natural oligopoly...

Draft research paper

We explore the consequences to contract design if firm shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities under different legal regimes. We show that in fine-only legal regimes, optimal contracts must have a fixed wage. In contrast , in fine-plus-prosecution legal regimes optimal contracts must be high-powered, involving...

We explore the consequences to contract design if firm shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities under different legal regimes. We show that in fine-only legal regimes, optimal contracts must have a fixed wage. In contrast , optimal contracts in fine-plus-prosecution legal regimes must involve a variable componen...

Most of the industrial organization literature on airlines has neglected the competitive forces which have generated industrial market structure. This chapter, in contrast to previous work, shows the underlying competitive process in the airline industry inferred from the investigation of market structure. The empirical analysis is theoretically gr...

This chapter deduces the nature of competition from an empirical analysis of firm numbers and market share asymmetry. Using a data set consisting of a cross-section sample of city pair markets, we extend the literature on market structure. In contrast to previous literature on empirical models of market structure and entry, here we study the determ...

I attempt to assess collusion in terms of market-sharing agreements among airlines. To pursue this goal, I develop a sequential entry model estimating firm-specific entry functions, for a cross-section sample of 661 airline city pair markets. Entry decisions depend upon market characteristics and market structure (rival’s presence). In line with ea...

Most of the industrial organization literature on airlines has neglected competitive forces which have generated industrial market structure. This chapter, in contrast to previous work, shows the underlying competitive process in the airline industry inferred by investigation of market structure. The empirical analysis is theoretically grounded on...

I attempt to assess collusion in terms of market sharing agreements among airlines. To pursue this goal, I develop a sequential entry model estimating firm-specific entry functions, for a cross-section sample of 661 airline city pair markets. Entry decisions depend upon market characteristics and market structure (rival's presence). In line with ea...

The subject of this book comprises original research about a detailed empirical investigation of market structure of airline city pair markets and competition between airline firms. The core of this research monograph consists of three essay-style empirical chapters. After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 proposes empirical evidence that the ind...

Competition (measured by inverse of mark-ups) has been shown in the recent empirical literature to exert variable effects (positive/negative, and inverted-U) on firm-level innovation (measured by citation-weighted patents). Extant research estimate the ‘average’ relationship between competition and innovation based on the conditional mean function...

This paper evaluates whether the effect of multimarket contact (MMC) on price is dependent on the level of market concentration. We exploit substantial across-market heterogeneity in both multimarket contact and market concentration, present in the US airline industry. We find that effect of MMC on price on markets with HHI<0.3 (corresponding to re...

This article analyzes both determinants of market structure and the intensity of price competition in the European Union (EU) banking industry. For this purpose, the first part of the article applies John Sutton's framework for empirically measuring the relationship between market size and market concentration. Next, the analysis turns to assessing...

This paper proposes a new empirical framework to measure banking competition. The method developed delivers a robust monotonic relationship between the measure and toughness of price competition. Furthermore, the proposed competition measure can be readily applied to other industries.