Giovanni Ponti

• PhD, University College London (1997)
• Professor at University of Alicante

We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design of Gneezy and Potters (1997, GP97) and its replications: time frequency and time horizon. To this aim, we randomize between subjects five different time frequencies: 1 round (“High Frequency” in GP97), 3 rounds (“Low Frequency”), but also 6, 9 and 12 rounds. As...

This paper uses a field experiment to estimate the effects of prices and social norms on the decision to adopt and efficient technology. We find that prices and social norms influence the adoption and decision along different margins: while prices operate on both the extensive and intensive margins, social norms operate mostly through the extensive...

We compare two zero-sum versions of the so called Chinos Game, a traditional parlour game played in many countries. In one version, which we call Preemption Scenario, the first player who guesses right wins the prize. In the alternative version, called the Copycat Scenario, the last player who guesses right wins the prize. While in the Preemption S...

This paper uses a field experiment to estimate behavioral parameters from a structural model of residential adoption of technology. As our model includes both economic and psychological factors, we are able to identify the role of prices, social norms, social pressure, and curiosity on the adoption decision. We find that prices and social norms inf...

The disposition effect (DE) is a common bias by which investors tend to sell winning assets too soon and hold losing assets too long. We complement the existing evidence in three directions. First, we check whether the DE is robust to realistic features such as transaction costs and competitive payment schemes. Second, by using a gender-balanced de...

The fact that men trade more than women in financial markets has been attributed to men's overconfidence. However, evidence supporting this view is only indirect. We directly test this conjecture experimentally, by measuring confidence using monetary incentives before participants trade in a simulated market. We find that men are more confident tha...

Gneezy and Potters (1997) designed an investment game experiment and found that, consistent with Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA), individuals are more willing to take risks when they evaluate the results of their investments less frequently. We formally prove that these findings can be accommodated by a standard CRRA functional, once we assume narrow br...

We test the empirical content of the assumption of preference dependent beliefs using a behavioral model of strategic decision making in which the rankings of individuals over final outcomes in simple games influence their beliefs over the opponent’s behavior. This approach— by analogy with Psychological Game Theory—allows for interdependence betwe...

We report the results of a procurement experiments where subjects compete for procurement contracts to be awarded by means of a scoring auction. Two experimental conditions are considered depending on the relative quality-price weight in the scoring rule. We show that different quality-price weights in the scoring rule dramatically alter the strate...

We study how the ratio between the length of the second and fourth digit (2D:4D) correlates with choices in social and risk preferences elicitation tasks by building a large dataset from five experimental projects with more than 800 subjects. Our results confirm the recent literature that downplays the link between 2D:4D and many domains of economi...

We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a...

This paper surveys some of the mechanisms that have been proposed by the experimental literature to elicit social networks. These mechanisms differ in their incentive structures, as well as the means of reward they employ. We compare these elicitation devices on the basis of the estimated differences in the characteristics of the induced networks,...

Experimental evidence suggests that the frequency with which individuals get feedback information on their investments has an effect on their risk-taking behavior. In particular, when they are given information sufficiently often, they take less risks compared with a situation in which they are informed less frequently. We find that this result sti...

Experimental Instructions. (PDF)

Random-effect tobit regressions. (PDF)

Further Statistical Evidence. (PDF)

We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the responder states an acceptance threshold below which the offer is rejected and both players, proposer and responder, are allowed several attempts to reach an agreement by conceding. Proposers concede by increasing offers and responders concede by decr...

We study how cognitive abilities correlate with behavioral choices by collecting evidence from almost 1200 subjects across eight experimental projects concerning a wide variety of tasks, including some classic risk and social preference elicitation protocols. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has been administered to all our experimental subjects...

In the light of a vast amount of theoretical and experimental research, many economists are already used to the idea that people hold social (that is, interdependent) preferences. This opinion has been influenced by an abundant literature showing how experimental subjects, using classical experimental protocols, act as though they are attempting to...

This paper provides experimental evidence on the relationship between social preferences and cognitive abilities, which we measure using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We elicit social preferences by way of 24 dictatorial situations, in which the Dictator's choice sets include (i) standard Dictator games, where increasing the Dictator's payof...

Excessive working hours—even at night—are becoming increasingly common in our modern 24/7 society. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is particularly vulnerable to the effects of sleep loss and, consequently, the specific behaviors subserved by the functional integrity of the PFC, such as risk-taking and pro-social behavior, may be affected significantly....

Limited attention has been devoted on how (real-life) social networks are elicited and mapped, even less from the viewpoint of mechanism design. This paper surveys the few mechanisms that have been proposed by the experimental literature to this purpose. These mechanisms di er in their incentive structure, as well as in the means of reward they emp...

This paper reports experimental evidence from Dictator Game experiments in which subjects choose repeatedly one out of four options involving a pair of monetary prizes, one for them, one for another anonymously matched participant. In some sessions, there is no uncertainty about the player position (i.e., the identity of the best paid agent, consta...

The scope of the paper is to review the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are in fact complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fu...

We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the...

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A vast body of social and cognitive psychology studies in humans reports evidence that external rewards, typically monetary ones, undermine intrinsic motivation. These findings challenge the standard selfish-rationality assumption at the core of economic reasoning. In the present work we aimed at investigating whether the different modulation of a...

This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents "choose to work" for a principal by selecting one of t...

We report on a two-stage experiment in which (i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and (ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are posit...

We propose (and test experimentally) a model of observational learning in which players have social preferences. To this end, we design an experiment-based on a classic parlor game known as the Chinos Game-in which we vary (by way of an exogenous iid stochastic process) the probability of getting the prize in the event of a correct guess. By this d...

Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2009-05 and as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, pages 249-257.

This work presents the design of a mechanism to elicit latent social networks. Subjects are invited to reveal their friends’ names, together with a “strength” (from acquaintance to friend) measuring the valuation of the relationship. According to the mechanism, subjects are rewarded with a fixed price either a) if the strengths of a randomly select...

This paper reports a 3-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the Þrst two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects� social and reciprocity concerns, together with their beliefs. In the last phase, four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete by o ering agents a contract from a Þxed menu. Then, eac...

The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers’ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply rooted in the hosting country; and high educational levels used as an indirect signal o...

Summary The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers' beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country; and high educational levels used as an indirect...

This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these t...

This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, frame effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either i) to achieve or ii) not to lose a non excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not deterioration) only if a certain contribution level is achieved. S...

The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody's hands. Our evidence shows that, d...

This paper presents the first experimental test of a new view on Social Capital. By contrast with the usual interpretations as a term describing trust, social norms, networks and/or social preferences, we define Social Capital as agents' willingness to share economic rents. To investigate on the influence of economic rents on cooperative behavior,...

This paper reports experimental evidence from a series of a simple Dictator Games in which, randomly matched in pair, subjects choose repeatedly one out of four alternatives involving a pair of fixed monetary prizes, one for them and the other for an anonymously matched subject. While in some treatments player position (i.e. the identity of the bes...

This paper explores, theoretically and experimentally, a fixed-price mechanism by which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, equilibrium consists in overstating true demand to alleviate the effects of being rationed. Overstating is more intense the lower the price, with bids reaching thei...

Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effect...

A collection of Ken Binmore's influential papers on bargaining experiments, with the author's newly written commentary addressing the challenges to game theory posed by the behavioral school of economics. This volume brings together all of Ken Binmore's influential experimental papers on bargaining along with newly written commentary in which Binmo...

http://adsabs.harvard.edu//abs/2007AIPC..887..260B COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN NEURAL SYSTEMS: Ninth Granada Lectures. AIP Conference Proceedings, Volume 887, pp. 260-260 (2007). This paper explores the role of social integration on altruistic behavior. To this aim, we develop a two-stage experimental protocol based on the classic Dictator Game. In the...

We experimentally analyze first- and second-price procurement auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative cost advantage by investment prior to the auction. Theory predicts that bidders invest more often prior to second-price auctions than prior to first-price auctions, which is clearly confirmed by our experimental data. Bidding in the auc...

This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these t...

We study the behavior of 12 pairs of undergraduate students while they were involved in a simple coordination game requiring motor interaction. Three experimental conditions were defined according to whether a monetary prize was given to both or only one subject, if the couple was in successfully completing the required assignment. Electromyographi...

This paper proposes an original mechanism to elicit latent social networks. Subjects are invited to reveal their friends’ name and surname, together with a score measuring the strength of relationship. According to the mechanism, subjects are rewarded of a fixed price either a) when they do not name anybody or b) when the scores of a randomly selec...

This paper constructs a two-country (Home and Foreign) general equilibrium model of Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. The scale effects property is removed by introducing two distinct specifications in the knowledge production function: the permanent effect on growth (PEG) specification, which allows policy effects on long-run growth; and...

This paper reports an experimental study on three well known solutions for bankruptcy problems, that is, the constrained equal-awards, the proportional and the constrained equal-losses rule. To do this, we first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium outcome coincides with one of these three rules. Moreover, we also...

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given pay...

. We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best forKing Solomon's Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics. We find that all the mechanisms proposed by the literature fail to implement the first best dynamically and provide an alternative solution.

This paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies continuous-timeevolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environments using as a solution concept one roun...

We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best for King Solomon's Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics, and also with best-reply dynamics. We find that, although the mechanisms proposed by the literature are dynamically implementable with best-reply dyn...

This paper studies the evolutionary properties of the Centipede Game. For this game, the use of backward induction as a model of rational behavior has been consistently challenged by the experimental evidence. Our claim is that backward induction can still accurately predict the players' behavior, provided that they are given time enough to appreci...

We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best forKing Solomon's Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics. We find that all the mechanisms proposed by the literature fail to implement the first best dynamically and provide an alternative solution.

This paper is concerned with the evolutionary stability of social inequality structures. We study the evolution of a population whose members compare their relative wealth to coordinate their actions in a simple tacit bargaining game. We interpret the equilibrium behaviors that players may adopt as a consequence of their relative wealth, as customs...

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King Solomon's Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly ration...

The paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies continuous-time evolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.

Traditional game theoretic analysis proposes backward induction as a model of rational behaviour in games with perfect information. However, counterintuitive results have cast doubt on the predictive power of the theory. For example, in the Centipede Game, experimental evidence shows that subjects' behavior significatively differs from what the the...

This paper studies the evolution of a population whose members use their social class to coor-dinate their actions in a simple tacit bargaining game. In the spirit of Rosenthal and Landau [1979], we interpret the equilibrium behaviours that the players may adopt, as a function of their class, as customs. Players may change their class depending on...

This paper explores the role of social integration on inequity concerns. To this aim, we use a two-phase experimental protocol. In the …rst phase, we elicit a social network of a group of 169 undergraduate students in Economics; in the second phase, each of them has to …rst unilaterally create an unequal distribution of a …xed amount of money betwe...

This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment is designed as a sequence of three treatments. In the last treatment, TR3, four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete by offering the agents a contract from a fixed menu. In this menu, each contract is the optimal solution of a (complete information...

This paper constructs a two-country (Home and Foreign) general equilibrium model of Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. The scale effects property is removed by introducing two distinct specifications in the knowledge production function: the permanent effect on growth (PEG) specification, which allows policy effects on long-run growth; and...