Gerald Roger Uhlich

Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Berlin (KdöR)

This paper reports a strategy study on a twenty-period supergame of a numerically specified asymmetric Cournot duopoly. The subjects were twenty-three participants of a student seminar. Three rounds of game playing were followed by three rounds of strategy programming with computer tournaments. The final strategies show a typical approach to the st...

The Negotiation Agreement Area (NAA) is a descriptive area theory for two-person bargaining games in characteristic function form. Laboratory experiments show that the NAA is significantly more successful in prediction than other theories. The experiments conducted in this study as well as previous experiments (Horowitz 1977) indicate that subjects...

This book deals with two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form and presents two new descriptive theories, the Negotiation Agreement Area (NAA) and the Proportional Division Payoff Bounds (PDPB). The evaluation of data for two-person games leads to a new descriptive theory called Negotiation Agreement Area which combines...

The aim of this book was an extensive examination of experimental three-person characteristic function bargaining. We can summarize our study as follows: 1) We had to develop two sets of computer programs for the experimentation of two-and three-person characteristic function bargaining games. Moreover, a program for the evaluation of the data was...

There are many theories of two-person bargaining games, but most of them do not seem to have much relevance for the explanation of laboratory experiments. This may be due to the fact, that most of the theories are normative rather than descriptive. Thousands of plays of different three-person games in characteristic function form have been evaluate...

Our particular interest is in cooperative n-person games in characteristic function form with sidepayments. Before turning to the theories of coalition formation, we need to define the n-person games these theories address.

Many theories for three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form have been developed, but most of them do not seem to have much relevance for the explanation of laboratory experiments, because most of the theories are normative rather than descriptive.

The theory of equal division payoff bounds in its modified form (SELTEN 1985) has proved to be more successful in the prediction of 3-person characteristic function experiments than various versions of the bargaining set. In this paper the question is raised whether the hypotheses “order of strength” (applied to zero-normalizations) and “exhaustivi...

Bibliogr. s. 162 - 165

Evidence shows that real-effort investments can affect bilateral bargaining outcomes. This paper investigates whether similar investments can inhibit equilibrium convergence of experimental markets. In one treatment, sellers’ relative effort affects the allocation of production costs, but a random productivity shock ensures that the allocation is n...