

Cooperation and Conflict

<http://cac.sagepub.com>

Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17'


Georgios Karyotis

Cooperation and Conflict 2007; 42; 271

DOI: 10.1177/0010836707079932

The online version of this article can be found at:
<http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/42/3/271>

Published by:

 SAGE Publications

<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:

Nordic International Studies Association

Additional services and information for *Cooperation and Conflict* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://cac.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations (this article cites 12 articles hosted on the SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
<http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/42/3/271>

Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17'

GEORGIOS KARYOTIS

ABSTRACT

After 27 years of stalemate and inability to make any progress in dealing with domestic terrorism, in 2002 the Greek police finally arrested members of the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17', the most lethal terrorist group ever to operate in Greece. The arrest of the terrorists raised several questions that have not yet been satisfactorily answered. Why did Greece take so long before a decisive strike against domestic, left-wing terrorism was recorded? What were the factors that led to the arrest of the terrorists? In answering these questions it is necessary to analyse not just the operational changes in the Greek counter-terrorist strategy that began to materialize at the turn of the millennium, but also the deep-rooted conceptual changes that led to the inclusion of terrorism in the Greek security agenda for the first time. I utilize and extend the theory of 'securitization' as developed by the Copenhagen school, and argue that the state's failure to curtail terrorist activity in Greece resulted from the erroneous belief that terrorism was not a direct threat to Greek security. In turn, the belated securitization of terrorism was the key to the arrest of the terrorists that held Greece hostage for almost three decades.

Keywords: Copenhagen school; Greece; securitization; security; terrorism

Introduction

The phenomenon of terrorism in Greece has its roots in the resistance to the military junta, which ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. In the aftermath of that period, two terrorist organizations first made their appearance: the 'Revolutionary People's Struggle' (ELA) in 1974 and the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17' (17N) in 1975. Since then, approximately 250 groups have claimed responsibility for terrorist acts, but 17N has been the most influential, lethal and radical group of all, and the main source of violence and terror in Greece.

In 27 years of domestic terrorism, no members of any terrorist group were arrested by the Greek police, leading the US State Department (1990, 2000) to characterize 17N as the 'most dangerous active terrorist organization in



Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol. 42(3): 271–293. © NISA 2007 www.ps.au.dk/NISA
SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore
www.sagepublications.com
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836707079932

Europe', and Greece as 'one of the weakest links in Europe's effort against terrorism'. In June 2002, however, a failed bombing attack at the port of Piraeus led Greek police to their first arrest of a 17N member, and this marked the beginning of the end for the group. Within a month, the myth of 17N had dissolved. Two of its hideouts were found containing weapons, files, banners, missiles and bombs, and 19 suspected members of the group were arrested. In February 2003, members of the second major terrorist group, ELA, were also arrested by the police, and Greece finally appeared to be closing a dark chapter of its post-dictatorship history.

My aim in this article is to analyse the reasons for the belated arrest of 17N. I argue that the state's failure to curtail terrorist activity in Greece resulted from the erroneous belief that terrorism was not a direct threat to Greek security. While most European countries had been dealing with terrorism as an important security issue since the mid-1970s, thus adopting strict anti-terrorist laws and increasing cooperation at the European level, terrorism was not perceived as a serious threat, or as a political priority, for the Greek state until the end of the 1990s. As a result, Greece was the only European Union (EU) country in which left-wing terrorist activity remained a serious problem for the authorities.

In exploring the shift towards security in Greek policies on terrorism, I utilize the theory of 'securitization' as developed by the 'Copenhagen School of Security Studies' (CS). Despite its prominence in the literature on security studies, the specific dynamics of securitization remain poorly understood. Adopting a constructivist security approach, I analyse the process through which terrorism was upgraded on the Greek security agenda, as well as the reasons for that move and the consequences. In doing so, I explore political discourses on terrorism as presented in parliamentary discussions and public statements and complement these with personal interviews of members of the Greek political elite.¹ I also examine the state's official response through legislative and policing measures adopted since domestic terrorism first made its presence felt in Greece.

Securitization and the Copenhagen School

Building on, and significantly contributing to, current debates on the concept of security, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde and colleagues developed a coherent and comprehensive framework for the study of security. This framework is analysed in the most important book-length publication of the CS: *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, published in 1998. It is a security framework that is based on two interesting compromises, one conceptual and one methodological, which take into account and aim to overcome the weaknesses of both traditional and new approaches to security.

First, in regard to the polarized debate between traditionalists, who favour a narrow definition of security (e.g. Walt, 1991), and wideners, who call for a more inclusive redefinition of the concept (e.g. Ullman, 1983; Booth, 1991), the CS suggests a middle position. On the one hand, Buzan and colleagues adopt the traditional view that security should be understood as the survival

of a referent object in the face of existential threats. On the other hand, in contrast to the traditionalists, they do not want to restrict the discussion of security to military issues nor to the state as the only referent object. To the military sector, they add political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors, recognizing the growing importance of non-military issues. In doing so, they seek to widen and deepen the concept of security without destroying the intellectual coherence of security studies.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the security framework of the CS is developed from a methodological compromise between Buzan's neo-realist positivism and Wæver's constructivist post-positivism. In his early work, Buzan (1991) adopted the view that security threats were out there, to be observed, measured and analysed. He discussed security on three levels — the sub-state, the state and the international system — but considered the state as the ultimate provider of security and essentially its referent object for all levels. Wæver (1995), on the other hand, rejected the assumption that threats objectively exist and developed a theory to analyse how issues were constructed as existential threats. The two authors explain the resulting compromise between their different metatheoretical positions in their collaborative work:

Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions. (Buzan et al., 1998: 35)

The end result is a framework that has security as socially constructed, while attempting to implement an objectivist mode-of-analysis that privileges the role of the state as the primary, but not exclusive, referent of security. As with traditional security studies, and in contrast to some of the new security approaches (for instance, 'human security' and critical security studies), the CS scholars 'reject reductionism (giving priority to the individual as the ultimate referent object of security) as an unsound approach to international security' (p. 207). They consider the individual as 'relatively marginal' to understanding international security, which in their view is about 'the relations between collective units and how those are reflected upward into the system' (p. 208).

However, unlike traditional studies, the CS argues that an issue only becomes a security issue when it is presented as such. Thus, they understand security as a 'self-referential' practice, because it is in this practice that an issue becomes a security issue. In that way, they move away from the discussion of what security is, which is essentially a normative question, and instead focus on what security does. They define security as 'the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics' (Buzan et al., 1998: 23), a process they refer to as 'securitization'.

Any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from 'non-politicized' (outside public debate and decision) through 'politicized' (inclusion of an issue in public policy and debate) to 'securitized'. The distinction between these ideal types essentially has to do with the levels of attention

governments pay to an issue, and, as attention rises, issues may change their meaning (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Kingdon (1995) refers to these times when there is an abrupt shift in how a problem is perceived as 'windows of opportunity' for policy innovation. In turn, changes in perceptions will also influence later policy processes, such as setting relevant goals, identifying appropriate policy responses and giving priority to an issue on the agenda (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).

An issue is securitized when it is perceived and framed as an existential threat, which underlines its importance and urgency in dealing with it. In such conditions of securitization, the existential nature of the threat gives an actor the 'right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game', and to sacrifice other values in the pursuit of security (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). This means that although both are part of politics, securitization can 'be seen as a more extreme version of politicization' (p. 23).

According to the CS, an issue becomes securitized when the term 'security' is mentioned in conjunction with that issue. Wæver (1995: 55) argues that security is not 'a reality prior to language'; it does not exist before it is uttered and can thus be regarded as what in language theory is known as a speech act. 'It is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)' (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). The central question that needs to be addressed, then, is '[w]ho can "do" or "speak" security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects' (p. 27).

Securitizing actors are actors who present issues as existential threats to referent objects. Their authority and social power usually derives from their position, which means that although in principle nobody is excluded from becoming a securitizing actor, the field of security is biased in favour of political elites and 'security professionals'. Securitizing actors are different from functional actors, who significantly influence the securitization of an issue by popularizing the security discourse (p. 36). The media are examples of such an actor, and play an important role in any securitization.

According to the CS, presenting something as an existential threat does not itself automatically create securitization. This is what they call a securitization move. An issue is successfully securitized 'only if and when the audience accepts it as such' (p. 25). Uttering security must have a legitimate standing and be accepted by the broader polity for a securitization move to be completed. Consequently, the audience is as important as the securitization actors are. The proof that a securitization move is complete is that 'by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures he or she would otherwise be bound by' and has persuaded the audience to tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed (p. 26).

How should one go about researching the process of securitization? The CS argues that '[t]he obvious method is discourse analysis, since ... [t]he defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse' (p. 176). Security is understood as an inter-subjective and socially constructed practice. Thus, the emphasis is on the security discourse

that helps actors make sense of and construct the world. Yet, while discourse analysis is useful in identifying speech acts and the rhetoric of danger, it is not by itself adequate for us fully to understand the process of securitization.

The first limitation of the CS approach derives from its reliance on a single mechanism, speech acts, to explain how an issue is securitized. Although in their collaborative work Buzan et al. differentiate from Wæver's earlier view and acknowledge that it is not only the uttering of the word 'security' that is crucial to the specific nature of the speech act, but also the broader rhetorical performance of which it is a part,² they do not develop this aspect of securitization in their analysis, thus reducing the designation of an existential threat to a purely verbal act or linguistic rhetoric. However, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 107) point out

... any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities.

The importance of non-linguistic elements of securitization is demonstrated by Michael Williams (2003), who argues convincingly that images can also play an important role in securitizing an issue. Similarly, Lene Hansen (2000) argues that the focus on the verbal act of speech cannot adequately analyse security situations characterized by imposed silence, especially in gender relations. Finally, Didier Bigo (2000, 2002) has shown that discourses of danger in societal security issues can also be developed through the implementation of specific security practices, such as bureaucratic procedures (exclusion versus inclusion), profiling of groups (e.g. migrants) and particular security technologies (e.g. visa, identity control and registration). In this article I adopt Laclau and Mouffe's definition of discourse, departing from the CS framework that restricts securitization to a purely linguistic process. The study of the process of securitization of terrorism in Greece thus includes an analysis of parliamentary debates, as one of the main forums where political elites seek to legitimize their policies, as well as visual representations and security practices. Although the latter are not disconnected from political rhetoric and securitizing speech acts, they have in their own right the ability to influence how the audience perceives an issue.

The second limitation which the CS acknowledges is that by using discourse analysis 'we will not find underlying motives, hidden agenda, or such. There might be confidential sources that could reveal intentions and tactics ... [and thus, discourse analysis] is a poor strategy for finding real motives' (Buzan et al., 1998: 176). Perhaps surprisingly for a constructivist approach, which reflects the ideational turn in security studies, the CS pays little attention to norms that influence the securitizing actor's decision to present an issue as an existential threat, although these might be different from what is presented and discussed in the public debate in order to legitimize a securitizing move. To overcome this limitation, I relied on elite-interviewing in this research in order to come to an understanding of the motives behind the securitization of terrorism in Greece.

A further clarification is required regarding the definitions of politicization and securitization. While securitization clearly signifies heightened anxiety and attention to a perceived existential threat, politicization is too broad a term to describe the importance of an issue in public policy and debate. The term 'latent politicization' is thus introduced to indicate the process when an issue has become part of public debate and policy, which nevertheless is not yet developed and remains peripheral to political discourse and deliberation. Latent politicization is distinguished here from politicization, which indicates not only that an issue is put at the heart of politics but also that an actor manipulates it for political ends.

Using the framework of the CS, the history of domestic terrorism in Greece is analysed in three periods that reflect the changes in the way terrorism was perceived and subsequently dealt with (see Figure 1). Before 1974, terrorism in Greece was non-existent and *non-politicized*. During the first period (1974–89), when Greek leftist terrorist groups first emerged, the political elites failed to recognize the roots, the level and the significance of the terrorist threat (latent politicization). The second period (1989–99) was characterized by intense political debate on terrorism and witnessed the first unsuccessful attempt to securitize the issue (politicization). Finally, the third period (1999 onwards) sealed the securitization of terrorism, which arguably was the catalyst for the arrest on 17 November.




FIGURE 1
Spectrum of Securitization for Greek Terrorism

Latent Politicization of Terrorism (1975–89)

During the Greek military junta (1967–74), a number of resistance groups were formed aimed at overthrowing the colonels' regime. These groups contributed to the collapse of the military regime and the restoration of democracy in the summer of 1974, after which most of them were disbanded. However, a small minority of their most extreme members favoured continuation of the struggle, and one of them, Alexandros Giotopoulos, founded the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17' in 1975.³ The name 'November 17' was chosen after the student uprising in Greece on 17 November 1973 protesting against the military regime. From that time, Giotopoulos was the ideological leader and instructor of 17N, and also the writer of its manifestos, until his arrest in the summer of 2002.

The first act of 17N came on 23 December 1975, when Richard Welch, the United States CIA station chief in Athens, was shot and killed by three

unmasked men outside his home. The group had chosen such a high-profile target for its first act in order to attract international publicity and to establish credibility as a revolutionary organization. In a proclamation sent to both the Greek and French press, 17N claimed responsibility for the attack, holding the USA responsible for 'decades of innumerable humiliations, calamities and crimes' inflicted upon the Greek people. However, the proclamation was not published in any newspaper, as the Greek authorities dismissed the possibility that an unknown domestic group could act with such precision and efficiency.

The group struck again a year later, assassinating Evangelos Mallios, a police captain during the military junta. Mallios had been dishonourably discharged from the police force because he had allegedly tortured prisoners during the dictatorship; he was thus presented as a legitimate target. This time the 17N proclamation was published in both the French and the Greek press on 25 December 1976. The feeling that a new movement had been born was originally welcomed among leftist circles in Athens. The assassination of Pandelis Petrou, another former security officer during the military junta, on 16 January 1980, established 17N as a 'revolutionary' group, with what was seen by many as a fair cause which attracted many sympathizers. By targeting the wicked (junta torturers) and the imperialists (Americans) and taking care never to kill innocent bystanders, the group had managed to 'cultivate a Robin Hood image' (Smith, 1999a).

At a time when most European states were securitizing terrorism and increasing their efforts in dealing with the terrorist threat at both national and European level, the response of the Greek state during this first phase of domestic terrorism was lethargic, inadequate and unplanned. The lack of any coherent strategy in the state's response to terrorism can be attributed to three factors: first, the lack of political consensus on how to define the issue; second, the unwillingness to restrict civil liberties in order to deter the threat; and third, the clear misconceptions over the nature of domestic terrorism.

First, one of the biggest problems was a lack of consensus between the two major political parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the New Democracy party, on how to define terrorism. The first attempt to deal with the emerging terrorist threat came in 1978, when the New Democracy government introduced an anti-terrorist bill for the first time, called the 'Bill to Combat Terrorism and Protect Democratic Polity' (Law 774/1978). However, the anti-terrorist bill brought about widespread criticism. During the parliamentary debate, all opposition parties characterized it as the first step towards a despotic, undemocratic and tyrannical rule of law. For instance, Andreas Papandreou, the socialist leader of PASOK, argued that Law 774/1978 was 'morally, politically and legally unacceptable'.⁴ He concluded that the bill was 'clearly not about terrorists but aimed instead at putting in place the ideological and political conditions to terrorise the Greek population'.⁵ As a result, soon after PASOK came to power in 1981, the law was repealed and not replaced.

The second reason terrorism remained low on the political agenda during this first phase was that policy-makers were unwilling to implement strict anti-terrorism measures that would curtail civil liberties. Issue definition of a problem is 'influenced by value judgements' (Hogwood and

Gunn, 1984: 109), and preserving civil libertarian values in a nation that had suffered the junta's unwarranted use of police brutality was ranked higher than any calls for stricter internal security control. For that reason, although Law 774/1978 was based on Italian and German anti-terrorism legislation, it did not increase police powers in the areas of search, seizure and detaining of suspects. The role of the Greek police compared to that of the police in other European countries was thus significantly weakened. As a result of the limitations in their power, the police forces and the intelligence services failed to make any substantial progress in identifying the terrorists, missing many opportunities to take advantage of important leads along the way (Kassimeris, 2001).

Third, there were general misconceptions over the origin and seriousness of the threat. In regard to the origin of 17N, conspiracy theories persisted for many years that the group comprised foreigners who wanted to undermine Greece's transition to democracy, worsen its relations with the US and Turkey and isolate Greece politically.⁶ According to other speculation, Welch's murder had been the result of internal CIA disagreements related to the succession of the CIA director in the US or to an open CIA-FBI warfare.⁷

As to the seriousness of the terrorist threat, the Greek authorities downplayed its importance throughout this first phase. In 1982 the Greek National Intelligence Agency concluded that '17N is likely to be a "phantom organisation" that possibly does not exist, but is simply a loosely organised group of isolated anarchists that share a common belief in armed struggle' (Papachelas and Telloğlu, 2002: 122). Up until the mid-1980s, terrorism had been perceived as an ephemeral phenomenon, attributed to a group of extreme left militants, which had auto-dissolved and would not bother Greece again. To this perception contributed the fact that 17N remained silent for three years, from 1980 to 1983. Thus, in 1983 the PASOK government's Law Minister, George Mangakis, stated 'terrorism in Greece is non-existent'.⁸

Contrary to what the authorities had expected, however, 17N re-emerged, killing US Navy Captain George Tsantes and his driver in November 1983 and wounding US Army Sgt. Robert Judd five months later. Thereafter, 17N continued with sporadic waves of targeted violence, gradually expanding both its operations and its targets. From simple assassinations requiring minimal logistical planning, the group started employing increasingly sophisticated tactics, such as car bombings, rocket attacks and IRA-style improvised mortar bombings. Additionally, 17N diversified its targets by targeting what it called the 'lumpen local capitalist class' that was exploiting the working class and deserved 'punishment by the proletariat'. The group carried out several robberies to fund its operations, and included new assassination targets, such as Greek businessmen, newspaper publishers and judges.

The gradual intensification of terrorist activity in Greece did not alarm the Greek political elites. Policy-makers continued to downplay terrorism as a threat to public order, even as terrorists acted with virtual impunity. They considered these terrorist incidents as isolated occurrences of violence that were in no way central to Greek political and social life and in no

way comparable to the terrorist problems of Italy, Germany or Spain. Law Minister Mangakis noted in his speech to Parliament:

What we have in this country is not terrorism but isolated episodes of terrorism like the ones experienced by all nations, even the most peaceful, non-violent ones, such as Austria and Switzerland. For it is nowadays no longer possible for a country not to have endured some form of political violence.⁹

Such observations signify that the politicization of terrorism during 1974–89 was latent, and terrorism remained a peripheral issue on the political agenda. Even the introduction of the anti-terrorism bill in 1978 had primarily to do with the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the rising number of terrorist incidents in neighbouring Italy, rather than with a real concern over domestic terrorist activity.¹⁰ Instead, during that period, public debate and policy focused more on other issues and values, such as the promotion of social rights and freedoms and the reconstruction of the economy, which did not allow terrorism to attract any significant amount of attention or resources.

Politicization of Terrorism (1989–99)

A ‘window of opportunity’ opened to raise terrorism in the Greek policy agenda after the assassination of Pavlos Bakoyannis in September 1989. Bakoyannis was the chief parliamentary spokesperson of New Democracy and the son-in-law of its leader, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who succeeded Papandreou as Prime Minister in 1990. His landmark killing marked the end of an attitude of tolerance in both the political establishment and the public. First, it changed how the public viewed 17N. Until his assassination, there was a feeling among sectors of the public that the targets of 17N were ‘legitimate’.¹¹ The Bakoyannis killing marked the end of an atypical acquiescence and consent of the public to the acts of 17N.

Second, the assassination brought terrorism to the heart of the political debate because Bakoyannis was the first politician to be targeted by 17N, but also because his murder came at a very unstable political period for Greece, i.e. after successive weak coalition governments. These contributed to an increase in polarization of the party-political debates and to the politicization of terrorism. In particular, New Democracy accused PASOK of being somehow linked to 17N.¹² This allegation was based on the suspicion that because PASOK was the political transformation of the resistance group Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), 17N and PASOK could have been drawn from the same group of people. According to a senior politician, the general belief in the New Democracy camp was that even if PASOK was not behind 17N, there was ‘some kind of suppression, hushing-up, non-disclosure and covering up of information, or a least an emotional bond with some people that PASOK might have suspected to be related to terrorism’ (Interview, 15 December 2002). Subsequently, the politicization of terrorism did not translate to a constructive political debate on how to

deal with the terrorist threat, but instead to competition between the two major parties trying to capitalize on the issue by making short-term political gains.¹³

Meanwhile, the inability of Greece to make any progress in cracking down on domestic terrorism was increasingly threatening Greek–American relations. Repeatedly, the US government issued travel advice to American citizens to avoid Greece because of its terrorist record. In addition, the National Commission on Terrorism (2000) issued a recommendation that the US should impose economic sanctions on Greece until it showed some resolve in cracking down on terrorists. The US government ruled out sanctions, but instead increased its pressure on Greece to deal with the terrorist threat, offering help in identifying the terrorists and in proposing a number of changes to existing Greek legislation. The US also adopted and further fuelled the theories that connected PASOK with 17N, arguing that PASOK was directly or indirectly linked to the terrorists. For instance, an unnamed US official was quoted in 1999 as saying:

[I]t is logical to assume that people didn't want to look under every rock because of what they might find.... If they arrest the leader, for example, and he turns out to be a former best friend of a PASOK leader, that would be embarrassing. (Smith, 1999b)

Similarly, the former CIA Director James Woolsey argued:

[The US government has] strong reasons to believe that high-ranking members of the Greek government know how to go after this organisation, if they wanted to, but they refuse to act. I won't say anything more, but they know who they are.... They are protecting the terrorists.¹⁴

Such views determined the strategy of the American intelligence services who were involved in the search for 17N. However, according to a former Foreign Minister, Theodore Pangalos, despite its good intentions, 'the involvement of the US government in the fight against terrorism in Greece did not help, but was harmful, because it directed the investigations on PASOK' (Interview, 2 January 2003). The American pressure did contribute to the politicization of terrorism in Greece, however, because it fired up the political debate and forced the authorities to rethink the nature and implications of the terrorist threat.

The First Unsuccessful Securitization Move

As discussed earlier, significantly increased political attention signals the possibility of serious shifts in the framing of an issue and in policy outcomes. In the aftermath of the Bakoyannis murder, the New Democracy government made the first attempt to shift terrorism from normal politics to the security realm. In line with the CS approach, this securitization move entailed the discursive construction of terrorism as an existential threat, as well as the

adoption of stricter legal and policing measures. A new anti-terrorism bill entitled 'Bill for the Protection of Society against Organised Crime' (Law 1916/1990) was adopted in 1990, and this included much stricter provisions on terrorism compared to the previous Law 774/1978, which was abolished by PASOK eight years earlier. It significantly increased police powers in the areas of intelligence gathering and detaining suspects without specific charges; it offered protection to judges and their families; it increased the reward offered for police informers; and it prohibited the press from publishing proclamations from the terrorist groups. This was the first time that such draconian measures had been taken in Greece, and these demonstrated a willingness on the part of the government to upgrade terrorism in its priorities.

Parliamentary discussion once again focused on whether the need to fight terrorism justified limitations on civil liberties. According to the government, there could be no freedom when the security of individuals was compromised by terrorists. Vice President of the Government, Athanasios Kanellopoulos, argued that the question over which social good was more important, freedom or security, was 'a pseudo-dilemma ... In the face of the security threat [that terrorism poses], the freedom of society as a whole will come before the freedom of the individual'.¹⁵ Ioannis Kounenos added that: 'Personal freedom, in a state that is overtaken by fear created by the terrorists, is not freedom. There can be no social or economic stability ... unless every single citizen of this state feels secure about his or her life.'¹⁶

Not only did the government present terrorism as an existential threat to the state and society, it also tried to legitimize the new stricter measures adopted, with reference to the policies of other European countries. Eletherios Papanikolaou referred to the experiences of Italy with the Red Brigades, Germany with the RAF, France with the Action Directe, and cited the adoption of strict laws as the main reason these states succeeded in dismantling the terrorists. Other members of the governing party referred to recommendations of the European Community and the United Nations, as well as to the intensification of European cooperation on terrorism in the TREVI working groups, in order to legitimize the need for stricter anti-terrorism provisions in Greece.

On the other hand, the opposition parties rejected the need for the new bill. Their opposition to the proposed Law was structured around two main arguments: first, that the problem with domestic terrorist groups in Greece was significantly different from that of terrorist groups in other European countries, and, second, that it by no means justified limitations to civil liberties. For instance, Ioannis Skoularikis, speaker of PASOK, stated:

[Greece] does not have a serious problem with terrorism ... but with a few sporadic, spectacular terrorist acts ... There is no future for terrorism in Greece because all Greeks are against it ... The aim of the proposed legislation is to create a climate of fear in order to restrict the rights of the Greek people and subdue any free spirit.¹⁷

Apart from the opposition parties, large sections of Greek society were also hostile to the new legislation. Public opinion treated the increase in

police powers with suspicion and concern over potential infringements and restrictions on civil liberties. However, the clause that provoked the most intense public reaction had to do with the banning of the terrorist communiqués from being published in the Greek press.¹⁸ Until then, terrorist groups in Greece had enjoyed the easiest means of communication with the Greek people (Bakoyannis, 1995; Kassimeris, 1995). Publication of the terrorists' communiqués in the Greek press allowed 17N to have access to the public and advertise their ideas freely. Law 1916/90 was an attempt to put an end to that, but instead turned the media against the government, because they considered this provision as a violation of freedom of speech. Several newspaper editors refused to comply with the legislation and continued to publish 17N communiqués, leading to their arrest and imprisonment. The widespread political opposition, as well as the social reactions to the first serious attempt to upgrade terrorism in the Greek security agenda, indicated that the audience was not ready to accept the government's securitization move and was not willing to accept restrictions on civil liberties. As a result, when PASOK returned to power in 1993, the bill was abolished and not replaced by other legislation.

Overall, during this second phase, terrorism in Greece became an important issue in the political arena. The politicization of terrorism resulted in more attention being devoted to it, but this did not bring the government any closer to identifying the terrorists, partly because of the narrow focus on the links between PASOK and 17N.¹⁹ Most importantly, during this phase the first securitization move was attempted by the New Democracy government, which involved securitizing speech acts and stricter internal security and legislative measures. However, the securitization move was not successful because the political parties, the media and public opinion could not agree on the existential nature of the terrorist threat. Greek sensitivities as regards civil liberties continued to stand in the way of stricter internal security laws; they put limitations on the role of the police and resulted in ten more years being wasted.²⁰

Securitization of Greek Terrorism post-1999

A significant change of mood became apparent in the political elites in 1999. The Greek government demonstrated a new determination and an unprecedented sense of urgency in dealing with the terrorist threat, which was reflected in the political discourse on terrorism. For the first time, all political parties came to realize the importance of terrorism as a security threat that had to be dealt with immediately and effectively. As a result, after 1999 a process of securitization of terrorism got under way, leading to a gradual reappraisal and re-evaluation of all policies and measures against terrorism.

Speech acts were central to constructing the security discourse. In the public debate, terrorism was presented as a threat to Greek society and national interests. The devastating impact of domestic terrorism on the economy and tourism, as well as on the country's relations with the EU and

the US, were some of the issues highlighted. For instance, in 1999 Michalis Chrysohoidis, the Public Order Minister, said (quoted in Smith, 1999a):

We realise that this has become a huge problem, more serious than perhaps anything else we are currently dealing with ... I don't think it's too much to say that these terrorist attacks are literally murdering Greece to the point that counter-terrorism has become the *government's top priority* (emphasis added).

The worst fears of the government were realized on 8 June 2000, when Brigadier Stephen Saunders, a British defence attaché in Greece, was assassinated. 17N claimed responsibility for the attack, arguing that they chose the senior British officer not just because the United Kingdom had taken a leading part in the bombardments of Iraq and Yugoslavia, but also because its policy 'even surpassed the Americans in provocation, cynicism and aggression'.

The timing of the terrorist attack, while the Greek government was trying to persuade the international community of its commitment and ability to eradicate terrorism in Greece, shocked the political establishment. As Chrysohoidis pointed out: 'I believe that apart from the loss of the unlucky victim, this action primarily harms the interests of the country' (BBC News, 2000). At the same time, it brought to an end the conspiracy theories that connected PASOK with 17N. It took place while PASOK was in power and was extremely harmful to Greek interests and PASOK itself. This time the reaction from the major parties was one of solidarity and conviction to find the terrorists, leaving behind the short-term political calculations that had characterized the previous phase.

Because of this new sense of urgency to eradicate terrorism, a new anti-terrorism bill was adopted in June 2001. This time it was PASOK that brought the bill to Parliament, which was a significant break from the party's past, considering that it had previously abolished the two laws of 1978 and 1990. The new bill was much stricter than the previous two, yet both major parties supported it, revealing a political consensus that was missing from previous attempts to upgrade terrorism in the security agenda. The bill gave the police greater powers when arresting suspects and also permitted the use of DNA testing to aid in investigations. Collection of personal data, including telephone conversations and videotaping of suspects, was also included in the legislation, along with the legal framework for Greece's first-ever 'witness protection programme' and provisions for granting amnesty to members of terrorist groups who turned state's evidence.

In the parliamentary discussions for the adoption of the law, terrorism was presented as an existential threat by both government and opposition parties. Dora Bakoyanni, widow of Pavlos Bakoyannis and speaker of New Democracy, stated that it was common sense that:

... terrorism has harmed Greek society in its whole; it does not only affect the victims of the attacks but compromises the highest value of all, which is

human life. It is common sense that terrorism has been very costly to Greece on a social and national level ... We should let everyone know that the Greek politicians will not accept half-measures but will react to the terrorist threat, although that reaction has already been long overdue.²¹

The minority parties on the left insisted that the bill endangered civil liberties because it legalized the surveillance of citizens and ensured that secret service agents would not be prosecuted for their actions. This was rejected by the majority of the political elites. As Law Minister, Michael Stathopoulos emphatically noted, '*any* restrictions to human rights and freedoms ... are justified in a democratic society, if they are necessary in order to safeguard internal security and public order and to prevent crime' (emphasis added).²²

The Role of Images

The importance of non-linguistic elements in the construction of the security discourse, discussed earlier in the article, can be seen in the government's communication policy with the public. For the first time, after 1999 the government took initiatives that aimed at sensitizing public opinion on the serious issue of terrorism. These initiatives were based on textual and visual messages designed to remind the public of the consequences, and implications, of terrorist acts.

For example, in a text headed 'One Minute of Silence', and broadcast by all radio and television stations in July 2000, terrorism was depicted as a threat to modern Greece. The text read:

Terrorism constitutes an insult for the Greeks because of the contempt it displays toward the sanctity of human life, and because it seeks to undermine the social cohesion and political stability. It is a threat for today's Greece. It is totally alien to Greece's philosophy and logic. It is alien to all of our traditions. The battle against terrorism is a priority. A priority not only for the state but also for the Greek people. It is a commitment undertaken by the government and the society's objective is to continue the effort aimed at uprooting terrorism; *in every possible way*. We owe it to the victims of the terrorists. We owe it to Democracy and its human values. We owe it to Greece. [Emphasis added]

In addition, the government encouraged the formation of an informal group comprising the relatives of the victims of 17N, who until then had remained out of the public eye. The group was formed in December 2001 in order to create a social alliance against terrorism.²³ In particular, the image of Saunders' widow after the attack was one moment that will remain in the mind of anyone who saw it, and it had a political impact. Soon after, images from the terrorist attacks of September 11 further increased public sensitivity to terrorism, as well as public awareness concerning the seriousness and significance of the terrorist threat.

Collectively, securitizing speech acts, as primary and non-verbal messages (e.g. images), as secondary means contributed to the construction of a

coherent discourse clearly intended to shift terrorism from normal politics to the security sphere. What was different compared to the first securitization move, however, was that Greek society was ready to accept restrictions on its liberties for the sake of eradicating the terrorist threat. As a result, terrorism became securitized, which justified the adoption of exceptional measures that were previously rejected.

Operational Measures

The securitization of terrorism was the catalyst for dramatic changes at the operational level. First, the Greek authorities sought to establish closer cooperation with French, British, US and other intelligence services in a position to offer information and technical support. In the past, no Public Order Minister would have retained his seat if he openly praised Greek cooperation with other countries' intelligence services, especially American services.²⁴ For political and psychological reasons that go back to the dictatorship, such policies were extremely unpopular, even within the security and police forces. The securitization of terrorism changed this. Greece signed new bilateral cooperation agreements on terrorism with many countries, including an agreement with the US in September 2000 and with Turkey in 2001. In addition, the 300-strong anti-terrorist squad established in 1984 was reorganized, with counter-terrorism experts visiting Britain and America for retraining in surveillance techniques and bombing analysis. With these measures, Greece hoped to dispel an inherited mentality of exaggerated mistrust. Furthermore, by cooperating with other countries, Greece wanted to share responsibility for the investigations. As one police colonel pointed out, 'failure of the Greek authorities to capture 17N would also be a failure of our allies helping in the search' (Interview, 5 January 2003).

The contribution of British intelligence after Saunders was murdered was particularly important. The Scotland Yard team was systematic and expert in developing relevant wiretaps and other technical evidence (Buhayer, 2002). In addition, the involvement of the British was not received in the same suspicious and negative light as was the American involvement of the previous years. According to former Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis, 'the British pointed our search in the right direction because they did not share the preoccupations of the Americans regarding the links between 17N and PASOK' (Interview, 18 December 2002).

Under the leadership of Chrysohoidis, and with the help of both British and American intelligence, a new round of investigations began. A computerized crime management system was introduced, loaded with all information on 17N in order to compare the files and assist in the cross-linking of information gathered during the history of 17N. Based on the computerized analysis, a report comprising several hundred pages produced in June 2001 offered a systematic overview of the activity of the terrorist group.

In January 2002, the police communicated information that it had the names of 17N members but would not give in to pressures to make arrests until all the required evidence had been gathered (Karakousis, 2002). Two

of its members were placed under surveillance and Giotopoulos was identified as the group's leader (Papachelas and Telloğlu, 2002: 218–34). In this climate of persecution, and in an attempt to show that the organization was still invulnerable and active, 17N made the mistake that the police were waiting for in June 2002, with the failed attack at Piraeus. Within 2 months, 19 suspected members of the group had been arrested, including Giotopoulos, the group's leader, and Dimitris Koufodinas, the group's leader of operations (see Kassimeris, 2005). At the trial of the terrorist suspects, which commenced in Athens in March 2003, 15 of the accused were found guilty, while another 4 were acquitted because of lack of evidence. Giotopoulos, the group's leader, received a sentence of 21 life-terms, the heaviest in Greek legal history.²⁵

The arrest of 17N signified the complete demystification of the group. The 'phantom organization' was found to comprise personalities most of whom did not match the ideological profiles or the revolutionary personalities that people were expecting to see.²⁶ In the light of day, the phenomenon of indigenous terrorism in Greece, and 17N in particular, assumed its true dimensions, destroying the myths, fantasies, suspicions and obsessions that had persisted for 27 years.

Reasons for the Securitization of Terrorism

What was remarkable in the securitization of terrorism was that although the terrorist threat had not become any more serious than previously — terrorist incidents were in fact fewer than ever — the political elites were able to come to consensus about how to deal with the issue as an urgent security priority. It is interesting then to explore the reasons for this change, a change that led to the upgrade of terrorism in the security sphere. These can be traced back to changes in Greek security thinking, the impact of European norms and in the momentum gained from international developments and the prospect of hosting the 2004 Olympics.

First, a gradual change in Greek self-perceptions and security thinking took place after Costas Simitis succeeded ailing Papandreu as leader of PASOK and Prime Minister of Greece in 1996. Simitis initiated a range of modernization programmes that aimed to strengthen the European orientation of Greece, which until then had been characterized by introversion, opportunism and internal contradictions (Verney, 1990).²⁷ The focus of the government was on economic reforms that would allow Greece to meet the criteria for entry into the Euro zone, a goal achieved by the end of 1999. At the same time, the new government demonstrated a gradual rethinking of its security priorities and policies.

Ever since domestic terrorism had first made its presence felt in Greece in 1974, the security agenda had been dominated by hostility with neighbouring Turkey, which twice (in 1987 and 1996) brought the two countries to the brink of war over disputes in the Aegean Sea. Foreign policy was shaped with a traditional concept of security in mind, emphasizing the military dimension of politics and supporting unilateral and nationalistic policies. However, Greek–Turkish relations improved dramatically in 1999, following

the earthquakes that hit both countries and the resulting mutual empathy and cooperation at various levels that has come to be known as 'earthquake diplomacy'. With the confrontation with Turkey no longer considered a permanently operating factor in the Greek security environment (Lesser et al., 2001), there was room for other issues, such as terrorism, to be upgraded in the Greek security agenda, issues that had previously been overshadowed by the perceived Turkish threat.

Central to this new security thinking was the gradual Europeanization of Greek security policy (Ioakimidis, 2000; Kavakas, 2000). Research under the auspices of the Rand National Security Research Division found that after 1996 Greece became progressively more modern and more European, and increasingly placed virtually all of the country's external policy challenges within a multicultural, European framework (Lesser et al., 2001). As a result, this created what March and Olsen (1989: 160–2) call a 'logic of appropriateness'. More specifically, norms, values and routines embedded within the European institutions gradually became integrated in Greek political life, influencing definitions of political reality and policy outcomes.

Terrorism had been the highest priority in the European internal security agenda during the 1970s and 1980s, but when the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993 the Union shifted its attention to other internal security threats, such as immigration and organized crime (Benyon, 1996). Thus, as Monica den Boer (2003: 1) noted: 'within Europe, it seemed as if the issue of terrorism had temporarily disappeared from the stage'. Yet, the renewed focus on Justice and Home Affairs after the Tampere European Council in 1999 and the September 11 attacks brought terrorism back to the top of the European agenda. In this context, Greece gradually changed its perceptions and policies on terrorism, at the same time as the EU was re-securitizing terrorism and dedicating more resources to dealing with internal security issues.

Schimmelfennig (2000) argues that it is often a rational choice for countries to behave appropriately. The European institutions' greater strength is vested in their ability to define reality for others, so that they internalize the existing order as beneficial to them. The adoption of European norms as regards terrorism in Greece was partly due to a realization that the only way to promote Greek self-interests would be through the EU. Retired Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos suggested that Greece, by falling into line with the EU counter-terrorist norms and policies was perhaps also expecting some sort of return from the Union in other issues, for instance with regard to Cypriot accession to the EU (Interview, 14 December 2002).

Finally, another main reason that the political elites supported the securitization of terrorism was the prospect of hosting the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004. With the Olympics in mind, both the US and the EU substantially increased the pressures on the Greek government to catch the elusive 17N terrorists. For instance, Wayne Merry (2001), a former US embassy staff member who served in Athens, called for the barring of American athletes from the Athens 2004 Games if the members of the infamous terrorist group were not brought to justice. While in the past American pressures were interpreted as an effort of the US to intervene in

Greek politics, the forthcoming Olympics helped the Greek political elites understand that the international concerns regarding terrorism were fully justified and had to be addressed urgently and effectively.

The Greek government did not really fear that 17N would strike during the Olympics. This would be beyond both the group's operational abilities and its ideological platform. However, the political elites were aware that the inability to make progress in dealing with domestic terrorism was damaging the international image of Greece. For that reason, 'Greece developed a more coherent anti-terrorist strategy for the first time, which was structured around the Olympics'.²⁸ As Pavlos Tsimas noted, the Olympics provided an extra incentive to the Greek authorities to invest more resources in the pursuit of 17N and to cooperate with foreign intelligence services (Interview, 1 October 2002). The belief was that the arrest of the terrorists would contribute to the image of Greece as a secure country and would thus allow it to maximize the economic and political benefits from hosting the Games.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the global war on terror further substantiated the feeling of urgency to deal with the terrorist problem at home. It also forced Greek elites to rethink the dangers of international terrorism acting in Greece. Although Palestinian terrorist groups had acted in Greece during the 1970s and 1980s (see Kaminaris, 1999), there was a belief that Greece was not affected by international terrorism, because it was not a Western metropolis and had never had tense relations with the Arab world.²⁹ September 11 indicated that this could prove to be an illusion. International terrorist groups in need of publicity would possibly view the Athens Olympics as a legitimate and attractive target, which reinforced the ongoing process of securitizing terrorism.³⁰

The analysis in this section suggests that norm diffusion played a role in the securitization of terrorism in Greece, but its exact impact is difficult to calculate accurately. Would Greece have securitized terrorism without the influence of European norms and external pressures? Possibly not, because for decades previously it had failed to do so. Essentially, though, regardless of the influence of these norms and pressures, domestic actors supported and constructed the security discourse, through speech acts, visual messages and stricter laws. The changes in Greek security policies and thinking, the pressure from the forthcoming Olympics and the increased anxiety with regard to international terrorism induced Greek political elites to make terrorism the highest priority of the country. As shown, some of these developments have their roots in the mid-1990s, but since 1999 they have begun to materialize in a comprehensive change in the political discourse, a public acceptance of stricter policing and legal measures and a general re-evaluation of all policies on terrorism, all of which contributed to the arrest of 17N.

Conclusions

According to David Fromkin (1975: 687), 'the terrorist's success is almost always the result of misunderstandings or misconceptions of the terrorist

strategy'. The analysis in this article reveals that the main reasons the terrorist problem proved to be so resilient in Greece was the failure of the Greek authorities to make a correct diagnosis of the roots, the level and the significance of the terrorist threat. Up until 1999, terrorism had not been perceived as a very serious threat or as a political priority of the Greek state, and as a result there was no coherent counter-terrorist strategy and no systematic and sustained effort to find the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks.

Securitization theory as developed by the CS has been shown to provide a very useful framework through which to explore and understand Greek responses to terrorism. Analysis of the Greek case underlines the importance of perceptions on how issues are dealt with at policy level, which is central to the CS approach and a significant departure from the traditional, realist view that the security agenda is predetermined and closed. In terms of the process of securitization itself, speech acts clearly played a catalytic role in both attempts to securitize terrorism. At the same time, non-verbal images and practices were also influential in the process of securitization and cannot be separated from the securitizing language on which the CS exclusively relies. Finally, this article suggests that identifying the motives behind a securitizing move can contribute to the understanding of the process of securitization and allow for an evaluation of its appropriateness. The Greek experience with indigenous terrorism highlights the potentially positive effects of securitizing an issue, which are not often addressed in the literature. As this article has demonstrated, the securitization of terrorism was the catalyst for the capture of 17N after almost three decades of unpunished terror.

With the arrest of the Revolutionary Organization November 17, Greece seems finally to be closing a dark chapter of its post-dictatorship history. However, this does not mean the total elimination of terrorism in Greece. European experience shows that after a period of time a new generation of terrorists emerge who tend to act in a fragmented and uncontrolled fashion. It is doubtful that another domestic terrorist group will emerge in Greece in the near future with the operational capabilities and scope of 17N, but it is likely that there will be an increase in small intensity terrorist acts such as bombings.³¹ Nowadays, the focus of the Greek authorities should inevitably shift to the growing threat from international terrorism, which requires close cooperation within the EU and the global coalition on terrorism. The challenge for the Greek state is to ensure that democracy will continue to be strengthened in a climate of heightened anxiety.

Notes

1. A set of 20 personal, semi-structured interviews was carried out in Athens, from April 2002 to October 2003, with members of the Greek political elite. I thank them for their insights and the Public Benefit Institute Alexander Onassis for funding this research. I am also grateful to Roland Dannreuther, David Judge and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.

2. The CS notes that 'the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word *security*. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring

emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience' (Buzan et al., 1998: 27).

3. Alexandros Giotopoulos is the son of Dimitris Giotopoulos, a renowned 1930s communist theoretician, and close associate of Leon Trotsky. After his arrest, Giotopoulos denied the accusations and declared that he did not accept the charges, as he did not recognize the system that was making them.

4. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 18 April 1978, p. 2776.

5. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 13 April 1978, p. 2588.

6. For instance, one day after the Welch attack, the first page of the newspaper *Ta Nea* read: 'Great Provocation: Three swarthy men, most likely foreigners, shot dead the CIA chief'.

7. Some had speculated that the CIA was taking in its own laundry. Characteristically, two Greek newspapers had the following front page titles: 'CIA assassinates Richard Welch' and 'Double-agent Welch executed by the CIA' (Kassimeris, 2001: 73). These views were also adopted by some in the US (Kessler, 1994).

8. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 16 May 1983, p. 6429.

9. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 18 May 1983, p. 6452.

10. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 12 April 1978, p. 2483.

11. Personal interview with political commentator and journalist Pavlos Tsimas on 1 October 2002. Although Greek public opinion gradually became more hostile towards 17N and rejected its tactics, even after its arrest 13.1% continued to view its members as ideological revolutionaries (see *To Vima*, 1 September 2002).

12. Similarly, after Bakoyannis's murder, PASOK supporters implied that New Democracy may be behind 17N (Papachelas and Telloglou, 2002: 153–4).

13. For instance, one day after Bakoyannis's assassination, the newspaper *Apogevmatini* carried the front-page title: 'Political Leaders: These are the instigators. PASOK is behind the killers'. On the same day, *Eleftheros Typos* bore the title: 'The PASOK-led 17 November strikes again'.

14. The interview was published in the weekly Greek newspaper *Pontiki* on 8 June 2000.

15. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 12 June 1990, p. 4654.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 4689.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 4669–70.

18. Most terrorism experts suggest that decreasing the terrorists' access to the mass media will lead to the decline of terrorism (see Crenshaw, 1991).

19. For example, when the French Intelligence agencies identified Giotopoulos and two others as suspects in 1991, they were ignored by both the Greek government and the CIA, who had their own list of suspects connected to PASOK (Papachelas and Telloglou, 2002: 161–2).

20. The Greek case is a characteristic example of the vulnerability of liberal democracies to terrorism (see Chalk, 1996).

21. Parliamentary Proceedings, *Greek Parliament*, 6 June 2001, pp. 9149–50.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 9162.

23. The group adopted the name 'Os Edo' (No More) in a clear reference to the Spanish movement against Basque terrorism called 'Basta Ya'. In a public address, the group stated: 'The terrorists turn our silence into an excuse. In this way, they continue their terrorist activity without any substantial hindrance. The truth is that the merciless killers have managed to harm not only us but the country as well.' See *Kathimerini*, 20 December 2001.

24. Personal interview with Former Public Order Minister Stelios Papatthemelis on 25 April 2002. Papatthemelis noted that he faced stiff opposition when he tried to enhance cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies in order to identify the terrorists.

25. Vasilis Trikkas, member of the right-wing party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), expressed a minority opinion that leading members of 17N were still free because the prosecuting authorities were 'unable or unwilling to arrest them' (Interview, 18 December 2002).

26. Apart from Giotopoulos, the rest of 17N seemingly had ordinary lives and jobs. Among the 17N terrorists, there was an electrician, a retired printer, a bee-keeper, a bus driver and a telephone operator.

27. Greece had participated in TREVI and other European working groups on terrorism since 1981, but was not always willing to cooperate with its European partners. For instance, in 1986 the Greek government refused to comply with an EC decision to impose sanctions on Libya, which was suspected of sponsoring terrorist attacks (Lodge, 1988).

28. Personal interview with Yannis Valinakis, Secretary of International Relations of New Democracy, 20 December 2002.

29. Personal interview, 26 April 2002. The interviewee also noted that the Greek authorities were often tolerant towards Middle-Eastern terrorist groups, expecting in return that Greek interests would not be attacked.

30. The security costs for the Athens Olympics came to a record \$1.39 billion, i.e. about the same as the cost of the entire Sydney Olympics in 2000. See *Eleftherotypia*, 10 September 2004.

31. For instance, on 12 January 2007, the left-wing 'Revolutionary Struggle', a spin-off group of 17N that emerged in 2003, launched a missile attack on the US Embassy in Athens without causing any casualties.

References

- Bakoyannis, Dora (1995) 'Terrorism in Greece', *Mediterranean Quarterly* 6: 17–28.
- Baumgartner, Frank R. and Jones, Bryan D. (1993) *Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- BBC News (2000) 'Greek Shock at Killing', 8 June. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/783265.stm>; accessed on 15 October 2002.
- Benyon, John (1996) 'The Politics of Police Co-operation in the European Union', *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 24: 353–79.
- Bigo, Didier (2000) 'Internal and External Securitizations in Europe', in M. Kelstrup and M. C. Williams (eds) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, pp. 142–68. London: Routledge.
- Bigo, Didier (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives* 27: 63–92.
- Booth, Ken, ed. (1991) *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security*. London: Harper Collins Academic.
- Buhayer, Constantine (2002) 'UK's Role in Boosting Greek Counterterrorism Capabilities', *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14.
- Buzan, Barry (1991) *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Chalk, Peter (1996) *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic*. London: Macmillan.
- Crenshaw, Martha (1991) 'How Terrorism Declines', in Clark McCauley (ed.) *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, pp. 69–87. London: Frank Cass.
- Den Boer, Monica (2003) '9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment', *Notre Europe Policy Paper* 6.

- Fromkin, David (1975) 'The Strategy of Terrorism', *Foreign Affairs* 53: 692–3.
- Hansen, Lene (2000) 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29: 285–306.
- Hogwood, Brian W. and Gunn, Lewis A. (1984) *Policy Analysis for the Real World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ioakimidis, Panayotis (2000) 'The Europeanisation of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems', in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds) *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, pp. 359–72. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kaminaris, Spiros (1999) 'Greece and the Middle East', *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal* 3: 36–46.
- Karakousis, Antonis (2002) 'The Hour of Truth is Near for November 17', *Kathimerini*, English edn., 14 January.
- Kassimeris, George (1995) 'Greece: Twenty Years of Political Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7: 74–92.
- Kassimeris, George (2001) *Europe's Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Kassimeris, George (2005) 'Urban Guerrilla or Revolutionary Fantasist? Dimitris Koufodinas and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28: 21–31.
- Kavakas, Dimitrios (2000) 'Greece', in I. Manners and R. Whitman (eds) *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, pp. 144–61. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kessler, Ronald (1994) *Inside the CIA: Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Kingdon, John W. (1995) *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd edn. New York: HarperCollins.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.
- Lesser, Ian O., Larrabee, Stephen F., Zanini, Michele and Vlachos-Dengler, Katia (2001) *Greece's New Geopolitics*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
- Lodge, Juliet (1988) 'The European Community and Terrorism: From Principles to Concerted Action', in Juliet Lodge (ed.) *The Threat of Terrorism*, pp. 229–64. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
- March, James and Olsen, Johan (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Merry, Wayne E. (2001) 'Don't Ignore Greek Terrorism', *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 February. Available at <http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?durable/2001/02/14/text/p11s1.html>; accessed on 17 February 2002.
- National Commission on Terrorism (2000) *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism*. Available at <http://www.gpo.gov/nct/>; accessed on 19 February 2002.
- Papachelas, Alexis and Telloğlu, Tasos (2002) *The 17 November Dossier*. Athens: Estia Publications [in Greek].
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2000) 'International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment', *European Journal of International Relations* 6: 109–39.
- Smith, Helena (1999a) 'Terrorists Hold Greece Hostage', *Guardian*, 27 May.
- Smith, Jeffrey R. (1999b) 'US Presses Greece for Action Against Leftist Terror Group', *Washington Post*, 3 November.
- Ullman, Richard (1983) 'Redefining Security', *International Security* 8: 129–53.
- US Department of State (1990) *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989*. Washington, DC.
- US Department of State (2000) *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*. Washington, DC.

- Verney, Susannah (1990) 'To Be or Not to Be within the European Community: The Party Debate and Democratic Consolidation in Greece', in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.) *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*, pp. 203–23. London and New York: Routledge.
- Wæver, Ole (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*, pp. 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Walt, Stephen M. (1991) 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 211–39.
- Williams, Michael C. (2003) 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 511–31.

GEORGIOS KARYOTIS is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Strathclyde. He holds a PhD from the University of Edinburgh and his main research interests include international security theory, European migration policy, terrorism and South-Eastern Europe politics.

Address: Department of Government, McCance Building, Room 4.43, 16 Richmond Street, Glasgow, G1 1XQ, Scotland, UK.

[email: G.Karyotis@strath.ac.uk]