CHAPTER 6

EMOTION AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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1. Introduction

It is timely, given the explosion of interest in emotion over the past 20-plus years, to briefly reflect on the history of research on political emotion. In the 1980s an earlier handbook, Margaret Hermann's *Political Psychology* (1986), did not have a chapter on emotion, nor did Greenstein and Lerner's still earlier *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics* (1971). That emotion was largely ignored in the 1970s and 1980s should be, on reflection, a bit of surprise. For from the very outset of Western thought, reason and emotion were understood as the two fundamental qualities of human nature(Aristotle, 1954; Aristotle, 1983; Plato, 1974). Indeed it was the purpose of that inquiry to learn how to reconcile the presumed agonistic relationship between these two core faculties (Nussbaum, 1986).[1]

The period of inattention to emotion reflected, we believe, two presumptions. First, that emotion was mysterious or elusive and, hence, not amenable to scientific inquiry. And, second, that emotion would prove to be a declining force as the growth of and reliance on scientific knowledge, joined with expansive public education, would enable reason to take up the central role in politics (Marcus, 2002).[2] Beginning in the 1980s emotion began its move to center stage in both psychology and political science. Since then, the number of published articles with the words "affect" or "emotion" in the title has grown exponentially (Brader, Marcus, & Miller, 2011). Reflecting the growth of research, two recent textbooks on political psychology have chapters devoted to emotion and politics (Cottam, 2004; Houghton, 2009).

We first offer an overview and critical reflections on the dominant theoretical approaches to emotion and politics. Second, we consider the antecedents and functions that have been posited to distinguish a number of common emotional states. Third, we

examine the rapidly accumulating evidence that emotions shape attention, decision-making, attitudes, and action in the realm of politics. Finally, we conclude with some reflections on important and promising paths forward in the study of emotion and political psychology.

2. Major Theoretical Perspectives

Two broad approaches are evident in the long history of interest in emotion. We can term them the "outside in" and "inside out" approach. The "outside in" approach began with the earliest efforts of humans to understand ourselves. It has been with us ever since. The "inside out" approach is far more recent, enabled by advances in technology.

Scholars adopting an "outside in" approach infer the constitution and causes of emotions from verbal reports of experiences and observations of behavior (Darwin, 1998; Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005; Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1980; Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Tomkins, 2008; Zajonc, 1980). Much as has been the case with many other longstanding psychological concepts—intelligence, motive, memory, and attitudes, "outside in" scholars infer from a reasoned examination of human behavior that the brain is engaged with emotion.[3] From what scholars see "outside," they infer what's going on "inside." They observe manifestations of emotion in facial expression, in gesture, tone, or as reported verbally by subjects. They must deduce its latent qualities from what they, and we, can observe, though that does not preclude speculation, as for example Descartes "locating" the source of emotion in the pineal gland (Descartes, 1989). Practitioners of the "outside in" approach do not directly study the brain's role in generating emotions and therefore, setting aside occasional speculations, tend not to offer precise accounts of how emotion is produced by the brain.

The "inside out" approach—facilitated by technological advances that permit better observation and measurement of brain activities—involves direct investigation of neural processes that engage affect (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Damasio, 1994; Gray, 1987; LeDoux, 1995; Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 2005). This focus on neural processes generated new insights. First, for most neuroscientists, the subjective experience of affect is of only peripheral interest. As Cacioppo and colleagues (Cacioppo, Berntson, Norris, & Gollan, 2011, p. 34) note:

> There is an understandable appeal to settling for feelings as the appropriate data to model in the area of affect. It is these feelings that some theorists seek to describe, understand, and explain. The structure and processes underlying mental contents are not readily apparent, however, and most cognitive processes occur unconsciously with only selected outcomes reaching awareness.

Neuroscientists instead shifted attention to the role of neural processes that subserve emotion. This in turn led to finding that these same processes also subserve various adaptive processes, such as attention and decision-making. Second, neuroscientists argue that affect is inherently appraisal and that a separate and subsequent stage of "cognitive"

interpretation is not an essential ingredient to making affect meaningful (Cacioppo & Decety, 2009; Marcus, 2012). We return to this point below, as the concepts *affect*, *cognition*, and *appraisal*, as scientific terms, have become increasingly problematic.

2.1. Primary Theoretical Approaches

There are three primary theoretical approaches to emotion in broad use today, though there are many specific variants within each. Evolving initially from the "outside in" tradition, there are approach-avoidance theories and appraisal theories. Theories of affect as neural process exemplify the "inside out" perspective. We review each in turn.

2.1.1. Approach-Avoidance Theories

Here affect functions to solve the problem of approach and avoidance. Affect is often understood as a simple valence assessment of circumstances (or stimuli) as either punishing or rewarding. Affect is thus critical to identifying stimuli as either rewarding, hence justifying approach, or punishing, thus warranting avoidance. This notion undergirds modern attitude theories, where liking-disliking constitutes the critical affective dimension of attitudes (Eagley & Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It also underlies Damasio's (Damasio, 1994) conception of "somatic markers" as automatic preconscious signals that facilitate decision-making by sorting good from bad in our environment on the basis of past associations. Similarly, political psychologists adopting a "hot cognition" approach in the study of motivated reasoning see affect as the decisive initial assessment of reward and punishment (Lodge & Taber, 2013).

On one hand, scholars have long found this a convenient and useful way to simplify affective experience: Does she like or dislike that policy? Are voters in a good or bad mood? Is his partisan identity based more on attraction to one party or repulsion from the other? Much research on both explicit and implicit attitudes (toward racial groups, political parties, political candidates, etc.) continues to focus on a simple positive-negative dimension of affect (see Taber & Young, chapter 17, this volume). On the other hand, after some 30 years of analysis in innumerable studies, it is clear that affective subjective experience is not well described by only a single valence dimension (Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Marcus, 2003). Scholars from diverse approaches have found it increasingly useful to make finer differentiations among emotions. Once reliance on a single approach-avoidance conception of emotion, and measures that reproduce that conception (e.g., feeling thermometers), is relaxed so as to accommodate what is now known about the complex and multifaceted character of (preconscious and postawareness) appraisals—see figure 6.2 and attendant discussion below—a richer array of insights is likely to follow.

2.1.2. Appraisal Theories

Appraisal theories are among the leading contemporary approaches to make finer distinctions among emotions. As the name implies, their focus is the appraisals, conceived as cognitive interpretations of the significance of a situation for one's goals, that trigger emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Both conscious and preconscious appraisals are

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possible (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Specific theories seek to offer a unique one-to-one mapping between appraisal pattern and emotion, in order to explain why we observe variation in emotional experiences across individuals and situations. To empirically test these relationships, some studies ask subjects to describe situations in which they felt particular emotions (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), while others experimentally manipulate the attributes of scenarios (along posited appraisal dimensions) to test whether those situations generate the predicted emotions (Roseman, 1991).

Each theory conceives of a slightly different inventory of appraisals and emotions. Smith and Ellsworth (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), for example, map six appraisal dimensions (of eight initially considered) on fifteen emotions. The dimensions include pleasantness, certainty, attention, anticipated effort, responsibility, and situational control. The nature of their contributions differed. Pleasantness explained a great deal of variance in emotional experiences, while situational control explained only a small portion; but the latter was particularly essential to discriminating among negative emotions like sadness, anger, fear, and disgust. Other theories conceptualize and label the appraisals differently, though there is clearly overlap. Having focused on five appraisals in earlier work (Roseman, 1991), Roseman et al. (1996) found that seven appraisals work best to predict 17 emotions: unexpectedness, situational state (present/absent), motivational state (reward/punish), probability (certain/uncertain), control potential, problem source, and causal agency (circumstances, others, or self).

In a final example, Lazarus (1991) identifies a “core relational theme” for each emotion, or what that emotion signals about the ongoing relationship between a person and her environment. Six appraisals—three primary, three secondary—evaluate the meaning of a situation and trigger the appropriate emotion. Primary appraisals, which concern “the stakes,” include goal relevance, goal congruency, and type of ego-involvement. Secondary appraisals, which concern how the situation will be resolved, include blame/credit, coping potential, and future expectations. A situation must be perceived as “goal relevant” for any emotion to be triggered.

Several studies draw on appraisal theories to isolate the causes and explain the emergence of distinct emotions with political consequences (Brader, Groenendyk, & Valentino, 2010; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassess, 2007; Just, Crigler, & Belt, 2007; Steenbergen & Ellis, 2006; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). However, to date, most of this research tends not to advance an entire appraisal account, but rather adopts isolated propositions related to a subset of specific emotions and appraisals as needed for the study in question (but cf. Roseman, Abelson, & Ewing, 1986).

2.1.3. Neural Process Theories

Beginning in the 1980s neuroscientists advanced accounts of the neural processes that generated affective response (Adolphs & Spezio, 2006; Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Gray, 1987; Gray, 1990; LeDoux, 1993; LeDoux, 2000; Rolls, 1999). Although researchers have identified multiple neural systems that generate distinct emotions (Panksepp, 1998), early

work placed a heavy emphasis on two dimensions of affective appraisal, one most often labeled "positive" (a dimension that arrayed affect from moribund to enthusiastic), the second labeled "negative" (a dimension that ranged from calm to anxious and fearful). Each of these invoked neural processes that in turn influenced downstream cognitive and behavioral processes. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers from multiple perspectives found it increasingly useful to take notice of a third dimension, anger (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Panksepp, 1998).[4] This dimension is held to produce affects that range from calm to heightened aversion (e.g., rage, bitterness, anger, contempt, disgust, and so on).

The most prevalent theoretical formulation in political psychology, the theory of affective intelligence, evolved similarly from an initial focus on two dimensions, an anxiety dimension and an enthusiasm dimension (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, 1988) to adopting the current three-dimensional view (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2002). The virtue of this formulation is that it makes an explicit case for the adequacy of the now widely adopted three-dimensional structural account of affective appraisals. Enthusiasm generates hypotheses about when people become engaged in politics in various ways and their reliance on extant identifications and convictions (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). Anxiety generates hypotheses about attention, learning, and reliance on contemporary considerations (Brader, 2006; MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). Aversion/anger generates hypotheses about the role of normative violations, and defensive and aggressive actions to protect extant identifications and convictions (Huddy et al., 2007; MacKuen et al., 2010).

2.2. Critical Considerations

Before turning to research on causes and consequences of emotion, we need to review a few of the concepts that scholars have used to describe emotion. Theoretical perspectives have appeared at different times, applying somewhat different presumptions, often unstated, about terms that, while appearing to be scientific, are just as often vernacular in meaning. This raises the risk of overly plastic meanings inasmuch as lay ideas are often plural in their meanings. Three frequently used terms recur in various accounts of emotion. Moreover, these conceptual terms are central to describing the phenomenon and imputing the mechanisms that control and give rise to the appearance of this or that emotion. The core terms requiring some excavation are *discrete*, *appraisal*, and *cognition*, with the latter two terms often paired, as in "cognitive appraisal." These terms have come to be used in various ways that often lead to confusion.

2.2.1. What Does It Mean to Say an Emotion Is Discrete or Dimensional?

There are two meanings of the term "discrete" apparent in the literature, one more casual and one more conceptually dense. The first is an assertion that different emotions need to be kept clearly discriminated. As a vernacular term, used in that fashion,

the claim that an emotion is discrete is an appropriate way to make an introductory claim. But even in that usage the term is merely preliminary unless then linked to a recognized taxonomy of emotion states so that the affective state in question is explicitly related to the other specified affect states. This has been done in the case of "basic emotions." Various scholars have enumerated what they take to be the core fundamental affects. Though not all agree on the final array, they typically identify something like 8 to 12 "basic emotions" (Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1989; Roseman, 1984). This second use of the term advances a richer imputation, one that holds that each discrete emotion is a bounded domain that has some homogenous quality both as to its antecedents and its consequences. This second meaning and usage is best grasped by comparison to another frequently used approach to depicting emotion, that of treating affective states as aligned along one or more dimensions.

Consider anxiety from a dimensional point of view. Anxiety, conceived as an affective dimension, is typically regarded as an appraisal of uncertainty. In this dimensional view, affective states of anxiety depict different degrees of uncertainty, hence uniting semantic terms such as *tranquil*, *calm*, *uneasy*, *jittery*, *nervous*, and *fearful* as "marking" different degrees of anxiety, arrayed from less to more. From a discrete perspective, while *jittery* and *fearful* might be seen as describing different intensities of anxiety, the emotions of *tranquility* and *calmness* would more likely be regarded as a different, discrete affective state, one to be contrasted to *anxiety*.

Figure 6.1 provides a further example of the sorts of differences that can distinguish discrete and dimensional approaches. The figure displays four common feeling words—*lethargic*, *withdrawn*, *congenial*, and, *enthusiastic*. Part A shows how these four affective states could be construed when applying a discrete approach. In this case, for illustrative purposes, we "organize" the four emotional states, in the way a cognitive appraisal theorist might, that is, according to the evaluations presumed to give rise to these four

A. Hypothetical Example of Discrete Organization of Selected Emotions

	Regarding	
Valence	Self-regarding	Other-regarding
Positive (approach)	*Enthusiastic*	*Congenial*
Negative (avoidance)	*Lethargic*	*Withdrawn*

B. Hypothetical Example of Dimensional Organization of Selected Emotions



FIGURE 6.1 Sample Taxonomies: Discrete and Dimensional Typologies of Emotion

discrete states. Part B shows how applying a dimensional approach might array them along a single dimension.

If we asked subjects to rate how well each of these affect words describe diverse scenarios, we would likely find that each of these terms is thought to be most applicable to quite different circumstances. Having found that people systematically differentiated these four terms, a scholar could conclude that these are distinct emotions produced by applying a self-regarding versus other-regarding consideration, thereby differentiating *enthusiastic* and *lethargic* from *withdrawn* and *congenial*. And that scholar might also conclude that subjects differentiated appetitive (i.e., positive) outcomes from aversive (i.e., negative) outcomes, thus differentiating *enthusiastic* and *congenial* from *withdrawal* and *lethargic*. These two general abstract considerations when jointly applied generate the four distinct affect states as depicted in Part A of figure 6.1. Thus, data and conception converge.

However, if we asked how *enthusiastic*, *lethargic*, *withdrawn*, or *congenial* they felt in different settings, we might well find that the reported levels each rise and fall in a correlated fashion. Indeed, they might be so highly correlated that they converge to a single dimension. Here again, conception and measurement converge.

In Part A, each of the four affect terms is located in its own cell, emphasizing its unique features, presumably produced by the joint application of two abstract considerations. In Part B of figure 6.1, we see these same affect terms "marking" different levels of a positive affective state, ranging from very low to very high, generated by a single appraisal, that of the likelihood of securing a positive outcome (either in the past, present, or future).

Testing the validity of these two perspectives turns on resolving three issues. First, they clearly differ as to number of antecedent factors that generate the affects (i.e., two or one). Second, they presumably differ in "downstream" consequences (though not all theories produce explicit theoretical claims thereon). Third, is there neurological evidence on the mechanisms by which these (and other) affects are generated? As we shall suggest below, however, these two accounts need not be treated as mutually exclusive.

2.2.2. What Does It Mean to Say That Appraisals Are Central to Emotion?

Affective reactions are expressed in facial display, posture, gesture, vocal timbre, and so forth. Emotions, it is now generally agreed, are generated by neural processes in the brain. The neural processes engaged with emotion are very fast, cycling on the order of five times faster than conscious awareness and producing their appraisals prior to conscious awareness (Rolls, 1999; Rolls, 2005). This requires fundamental rethinking about the relationship between affect and cognition. Affective preconscious appraisals execute faster than and arise before consciousness. But the traditional definition of cognition, a word derived from Latin, to cogitate, to think, has long been perceived as taking place only "inside" the mind where cogitating takes place.

Consciousness—the subjective arena wherein feeling and thinking seem to play out—offers the false sensation of instantaneous and comprehensive access to external affairs. In fact, consciousness is not instantaneous. During the time that it takes the brain to construct consciousness, our brains are active in understanding our circumstances through very fast appraisals of the somatosensory and sensory streams along with integrating those appraisals with our goals so as to enact habituated actions (Marcus, 2012). We subjectively experience events around us as if the events and their mental representation in conscious awareness are concurrent. But this apparent concurrence is itself a fabrication by preconscious neural processes (Libet, 2004; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1979). Given that subjective experience seems to give instant and veridical access to the world, it is not surprising that initial research suggesting that humans react to external events before they are conscious of those events (Zajonc, 1980) was met with considerable skepticism and resistance (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Lazarus, 1982; Lazarus, 1984; Tsal, 1985).[5] Hence, the more potent differentiation between consciousness and affect is not spatial but temporal. And it is well established that people act on these preconscious appraisals (Bechara et al., 1997; Todorov & Ballew, 2007).

Early cognitive theories of affect arose before this new understanding and thus often presumed that thinking of some sort was necessary to interpret affective reactions so as to make them coherent and subjectively meaningful. As a result, researchers risked conflating self-reported interpretations of when and why subjects felt a particular emotion with the temporally prior and "hidden" processes by which affective responses are generated. Put differently, some cognitive appraisal accounts seemed to confuse structural accounts, which posit implicit "rules" by which situational antecedents elicit distinct emotions, with the actual process giving rise to emotions (Clore & Ortony, 2008).

In contrast, like other neural process accounts, the most prevalent approach in political science—the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2002)—holds, in its current form, that there are three preconscious appraisals that generate the array of emotions that people experience at the outset of exposure to some stimulus (whether new or old, contemporaneously present, recalled from prior exposure, or part of some imagined future). Of the three, two are ubiquitous, levels of *enthusiasm* ranging from lethargic to enthusiastic, and levels of *anxiety* ranging from calm to anxious. The third, which they label *aversion*, is a situational appraisal manifest only when confronting familiar punishing circumstances.[6]

Preconscious appraisals and postawareness appraisals can both influence subjective affective states. However, disentangling the contributions of pre- and postawareness processes requires some rethinking about the terms cognition and appraisal. Most researchers, regardless of approach, now use *appraisal* to refer to the brain's assessment of some internal or external situation. There remains considerable disagreement over whether to call all appraisals *cognitive* or even what doing so implies (Scherer et al., 2001). The everyday meaning of the word cognition has long been equated with conscious thought or, at least, higher cortical mental functions. In the wake of

long-running and attention-getting debate over the "primacy" of affect and cognition (Lazarus, 1982; Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1980), many psychologists and neuroscientists have adopted an expanded definition of cognition as applying to any sort of information processing in the brain. From this perspective, cognitive appraisals can be understood to encompass anything from preconscious perceptions that arise directly from somatosensory and sensory inputs to extended conscious rumination about the meaning of events.

We argue that this "resolution" does more to obscure than to clarify. A multitude of brain processes, including many long associated with "cognition," occur at a preconscious level. Calling nearly everything the brain does "cognition" seems less than helpful to understanding how a host of distinct and interdependent processes function to regulate behavior.

The field, therefore, would benefit from shifting away from this terminology (and the seemingly intractable debate it invites) to specify more concretely the process by which the brain translates sensory and somatosensory inputs into differentiated emotional reactions, as well as how those emotions translate in turn into behavioral responses. In our view, scholars should focus directly on the temporal dimension, endeavoring to understand how preconscious and postawareness processes each contribute to emotional episodes. Subjective feeling states result from a sequential series of appraisals that have both "upstream" (preconscious) and "downstream" (conscious) aspects.

Such a temporal focus may productively turn attention to understanding better which appraisals, and thus which emotional states (or levels of emotional differentiation), can and do arise at a preconscious stage and which arise only, or mainly, with conscious reflection. For example, it is now widely accepted among both cognitive appraisal theorists and neuroscientists that basic preconscious appraisals of situations as something like desirable/undesirable (i.e., good/bad) set in motion positive/negative affective responses automatically—that is, outside subjective control and often outside of awareness (Clore & Ortony, 2008; Keltner & Lerner, 2010; LeDoux, 1996). In contrast, some evaluations suggested by cognitive appraisal theories may not be apt for preconscious affective appraisals, which are very fast, concerned with deft execution of action plans (including speech), and rely on the tight integration of current expectations with somatosensory input and fast sensory appraisals. Thus, an important and open question for future research is which appraisal dimensions require conscious awareness and which can occur at a pre-conscious stage. Appraisals of novelty/familiarity? Degree of situational control? Self/other causal responsibility? Certain/uncertain outcomes? Scholars have even dubbed certain affects as "self-conscious emotions" (see below), implying a more elaborate process of comparing the performance of the self with social expectations and norms. But does the social comparison underlying such emotions imply conscious awareness? The answer remains unclear.

From this broader understanding, both neural process theories, such as the theory of affective intelligence, and cognitive appraisal theories posit appraisal as an essential



FIGURE 6.2 Affective Experience Over Time

function of conscious and affective processes. This would suggest that earlier efforts to integrate discrete and dimensional accounts in a "hierarchical" structure (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999a; 1999b) might be more usefully reconceived not in spatial terms, higher or lower, but rather in temporally arrayed "layers," with earlier states swiftly being elaborated by downstream appraisals. This suggestion, as shown in figure 6.2, allows for multiple appraisals, some very early with others falling along later in the time course of affective experience.

For example, as illustrated in the figure, initial preconscious appraisals may trigger emotions along a couple of fundamental dimensions, such as anxiety-calm and enthusiasm-lethargy. Subsequent appraisals may shape affective responses into a broader array of specific emotional states, such as anger, fear, sadness, disgust, shame, and joy. Finally, as conscious awareness and interpretation of emotions unfolds further, and emotions become infused with greater cognitive input, individuals may experience still more subtle variations in affect—for example, as angry-like reactions differentiate into anger, frustration, contempt, and resentment (Clore, Ortony, Dienes, & Fujita, 1993)—or the blending of affects into a unique emotional state—such as sadness and joy melding into a feeling of nostalgia as one reflects on happier past times (Holak & Havlena, 1998). In this way, the elaboration shown in figure 6.2 suggests one way to account for the richness of affective experience while also relying on the more parsimonious account of the early stages of preconscious appraisal. Though it should be added that for at least some circumstances, notably those when people confront very familiar stimuli (e.g., people, slogans, groups, circumstances, etc.) rather than an unfolding richness we might find, in some circumstances, the affective space collapsing even to a single valence dimension (Marcus et al., 2000).

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3. Antecedents and Functions of Emotions

This section is divided into brief discussions of emotions or "families of emotions." Our goal is to provide readers with a sense of the most relevant distinctions among emotions, as suggested by the research literature to date, including their antecedents and functions. These categories do not reflect any particular theory, but instead identify for readers distinctions that have proven useful for social and political psychologists across a variety of studies and perspectives. Indeed, as noted earlier, one theory might argue for tying multiple categories to a single affective dimension, while another theory might insist on splitting a single category apart into even finer distinctions. This is also not an exhaustive list. Some emotions—surprise, jealousy, regret, sympathy, to name a few—have received little or no attention from political psychologists to date.[7]

3.1. Enthusiasm, Hope, Pride, and Joy

This set of emotions illustrates well the tension between vernacular labels that attempt to assign meaning to our experiences and scientific categories that mark distinct psychological processes. They are central examples of what are often called positive or "feel-good" emotions, and they are indeed associated with pleasurable feelings and an approach orientation. There are some ready differences in the way people use these terms in everyday life. Joy and happiness often refer most directly to feelings of pleasure and may describe even more broadly a positive mood or general satisfaction with life (Fredrickson, 2003). Enthusiasm suggests a more specific state of excitement and expectation for what's happening and what's ahead. Hope implies a prospective orientation, yearning for better things. Pride, in contrast, is a more retrospective feeling of pleasure and confidence due to one's success.

Thus, one might be tempted to treat these as distinct categories and yet, for all the differentiation in meaning attached to the labels, it has been difficult to differentiate these emotions observationally (based on self-reports and the like) and especially by their consequences.[8] They appear very similar in terms of neural, physiological, expressive, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Several scholars have argued that these feelings emerge from one emotional system—variously given labels such as the behavioral approach system (Gray, 1987), the seeking system (Panksepp, 1998), or the disposition system (Marcus et al., 2000)—that functions to regulate and adapt behavior toward the pursuit of rewards. People experience the emotional state associated with feelings of enthusiasm, joy, and so on, when the system receives positive feedback about that pursuit, namely when rewards appear within reach, are getting closer, or have been attained. This emotion generates the physical and mental resources for maintaining and focusing

interest and engagement with the pursuit of those rewards in question, motivating the expenditure of further effort to reach the goal. In the service of such goal-seeking, this system also facilitates the learning of routines (habits of mind and body) and regulates their execution.

Political psychologists have shown that enthusiasm—typically measured as a scale that combines self-reported feelings from this set of emotions (e.g., "hopeful," "proud," "enthusiastic," "happy")—increases interest in political processes, motivates political action, and strengthens reliance on prior convictions in making political choices (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). What triggers enthusiasm in the political domain? In general, political psychologists have devoted less effort to uncovering the antecedents of politically consequential emotions than the effects. But experimental research has highlighted a few sources of political enthusiasm. These can be substantive in origin, such as reassuring news stories about the enactment of desired policies (MacKuen et al., 2010), the positive economic impact of social trends (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008), or the lead one's party has in the polls (Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008). Enthusiasm can also be triggered in somewhat more superficial (yet equally consequential) ways, such as by the smile of a charismatic politician (Sullivan & Masters, 1988b) or the use of uplifting music and feel-good imagery in campaign advertising (Brader, 2006).[9]

There is much more to learn about this set of emotions. Despite the difficulties mentioned earlier, there has been some effort to differentiate further among so-called "positive" emotions. For example, some associate pride with an expressive impulse (Lazarus, 1991) and argue, therefore, it may particularly motivate people to put their views and accomplishments on display through public discussion or the wearing and posting of political messages (Corrigan & Brader, 2011). Research on "self-conscious emotions" also differentiates pride by highlighting its relationship to feelings of shame and guilt (see below). Scholars also have suggested other potential consequences of enthusiasm, joy, or other "positive" emotions that remain relatively little explored in the political realm. Evidence in social psychology suggests these emotions can stimulate creative, playful thinking that leads to new solutions (Fredrickson, 2003) and assist recovery from stressful states, from "laughing off" a scare to coping with aversive events such as disaster or terrorist attacks. Similarly, the past decade has seen increased interest in investigating the impact of political humor, but we are not aware of any such studies to date that treat audience reactions to successful attempts at political humor explicitly as an emotion (i.e., *amusement*) and pursue its effects accordingly.

3.2. Sadness and Disappointment

If the preceding set of emotions is associated with the successful pursuit and acquisition of rewards, sadness and disappointment are clearly related to the reverse: failure and loss. Not surprisingly, therefore, dimensional accounts such as the theory of affective

intelligence posit these emotions as products of negative feedback from the same emotional system that generates enthusiasm. Vernacular usage can imply subtle distinctions in meaning for how feelings are labeled in this category: one is sad, not disappointed, at the loss of a loved one. But this may simply reflect differences in intensity; a person who failed to achieve a goal she had been pursuing might describe herself as disappointed, sad, or depressed, as the importance of the goal and the magnitude of the failure increase. Is there an emotional difference between the loss of something valued and the failure to obtain rewards? Evidence on the behavioral consequences does yet not fully support such a distinction. Sadness and disappointment motivate withdrawal and more effortful processing of information, encouraging individuals to accept the loss, reflect on their situation, and change goals and plans accordingly (Bonanno, Goorin, & Coifman, 2008).

Although these emotions are ubiquitous and explicitly part of prominent theories, their political antecedents and implications are little studied. So much of politics seems to be about stirring up passions, the heavy emphasis on high-arousal emotions such as enthusiasm, fear, and anger, is perhaps understandable. However, sadness and disappointment are hardly irrelevant to the political domain. How does sadness affect the behavior of citizens experiencing a sense of collective and, at times, personal loss following events such as deadly terrorist attacks, a devastating natural disaster, or the death of a beloved leader? Or what about the consequences of disappointment felt at the failure of one's "side" in an election, a war, or international competition? By and large, the answers await further study.

3.3. Fear and Anxiety

Fear is the most studied emotion, not only within political psychology (e.g., see Stein, chapter 12, this volume), but also in the social sciences writ large. The terms fear and anxiety (along with numerous other cognates: alarm, worry, terror, etc.) typically refer to the same emotion in everyday discourse, conveying at most differing intensities of feeling. Although scholars broadly agree that these are at least very closely related "defensive" emotions, some draw distinctions between the terms. For example, clinical psychologists distinguish between generalized anxiety disorders and specific fears (phobias) that afflict individuals (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Öhman & Soares, 1993; Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves, 1989). Other researchers have pointed to neurological and behavioral differences between an emotional state (fear) associated with clear threats and more purely avoidance reactions, on one hand, and one (anxiety) associated with ambiguous threats and a mix of approach reactions and risk aversion, on the other (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Perkins, Inchley-Mort, Pickering, Corr, & Burgess, 2012). Nonetheless, to date, most political psychologists use these labels interchangeably. On a practical level, research subjects in surveys and experiments seem to use the terms to report the same latent emotional experience, and such self-reports remain the principal method of measuring emotions. It remains to be seen whether political psychologists

can isolate more subtle differences in these emotional responses and trace them in turn to meaningfully distinct political consequences.

The disproportionate scholarly attention focused on fear clearly reflects the centrality and importance of its function in human life. Fear is a product of an emotional system—sometimes named the behavioral inhibition system (Gray, 1987), the surveillance system (Marcus et al., 2000), or simply the fear system (Panksepp, 1998)—that monitors the environment for potential threats and adapts behavior accordingly. It may be activated as an innate response to certain classes of events that portend danger (e.g., unexpected loud noises, large objects quickly approaching) or as a learned response to just about anything that has become associated with danger (LeDoux, 1996). Novelty, or uncertainty, can trigger anxiety, since what is unknown may also be dangerous. Fear interrupts ongoing behavior, while redirecting attention and other cognitive activity toward dealing with the threat. Specifically, it prompts individuals to seek out information related to the threat and to reconsider courses of action to deal with the danger in light of present circumstances. It motivates people to remove the danger, if that is readily doable, or, if not, to remove themselves from the danger. Thus, fear motivates (and prepares the body for) risk-aversive behavior, including actions aimed at prevention and protection, conciliatory acts, hiding, and flight. The impact of fear on memory is more complex, with evidence that it can both enhance the encoding and recall of memories and yet also interfere with encoding and recall.

What arouses fear among citizens? As with enthusiasm, political psychologists have demonstrated that it can be triggered by both substantive and superficial stimuli. Subliminal images of snakes and skulls (Way & Masters, 1996a; Way & Masters, 1996b) and the discordant music and violent images that serve as a backdrop to campaign advertising (Brader, 2006) generate anxiety that spills over to affect the way voters process political information and make decisions. Of course, fear is often activated directly by threats conveyed by the very events, people, and policies at the heart of political life, including, for example, the worried or uncertain expressions of political leaders (Sullivan & Masters, 1988b), campaign news suggesting a preferred candidate is losing (Valentino et al., 2008) or does not have the policy positions or character one hoped (Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010), stereotypic portrayals of threatening out-groups (Brader et al., 2008), news of deadly viral outbreaks (Brader et al., 2010), or images of terrorist attacks (Gadarian, 2010; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009).

3.4. Calmness and Serenity

If feelings of fear arise from threatening conditions, then serenity or calmness is the state that prevails only when threats are absent. Perhaps for this reason, dimensional accounts of emotion, which place fear and calmness as poles on a single axis, give greater recognition to this emotional state. The theory of affective intelligence, for example, posits that calmness is generated when the surveillance system indicates everything is safe and

expected (Marcus et al., 2000). In contrast, discrete emotion accounts rarely include this emotion in their lists. We are aware of no research on the political antecedents and implications of serenity. This is understandable, given that the emotional state implies that "not much is happening," but it nonetheless seems to hold potential significance for politics that has gone unexplored. For example, leaders may wish to restore calm to a public upset about the threat of war, disease, terrorism, or other crisis. Whereas numerous studies in political psychology have investigated how to make citizens more anxious, none yet have investigated how to make them more calm.

3.5. Anger

The status of anger has posed particular difficulties for dimensional models of emotion. Although people clearly *experience* anger as distinct from fear, self-reported feelings of anger often accompany those of fear. and the structural analyses have typically placed anger and fear in very close proximity (Tellegen et al., 1999a; 1999b). This makes considerable sense in light of the fact that many of the same situations that produce fear also produce anger (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Berkowitz, 1988). Nevertheless, anger appears to be an "approach" emotion (Carver, 2004) and, as such, its consequences often seem to have more in common with enthusiasm than fear. In light of this, Carver recasts the dimension underlying the behavioral approach system such that sadness anchors the low end when rewards vanish or are recognized as unobtainable, but anger and frustration emerge along the middle of the dimension when rewards are seen as slipping away but still within reach. Another dimensional account, affective intelligence theory, has also evolved to argue that aversion—defined as a cluster of feelings that includes anger, disgust, contempt, and hatred—is activated by the same system that produces enthusiasm (i.e., the disposition system), specifically when *familiar* disliked or threatening stimuli present themselves (MacKuen et al., 2010).

Whatever the challenges to defining its "place" in the structure of emotions, anger clearly has distinct effects. Indeed, one of the most important contributions of political psychology's growing attention to emotions in recent years has been to explain why threatening or aversive circumstances in politics often produce such divergent reactions. Social scientists have long recognized that "threat" has a strong influence on individuals but previously did not differentiate or reconcile its myriad effects. In contrast to those who are anxious, angry citizens cling tightly to their prior convictions and are less receptive to new considerations or opposing points of view. Anger is a particularly powerful mobilizing force that motivates people to take and support risky, confrontational, and punitive actions.

What triggers anger? Anger emerges in situations when people are threatened or find obstacles blocking their path to reward (see also Huddy, chapter 23, this volume). The primary function of the set of effects just described is to marshal the cognitive and physical resources necessary to overcome such obstacles or threats. But we have already noted

that anger and fear frequently co-occur. Moreover, fear is also a response to threats, and sadness is also a response when rewards are not obtained. So what *distinctively* triggers anger? Beyond the presence of threats and obstacles, four antecedents receive considerable discussion in the literature: (1) an external cause, especially the intentional actions of some "freely acting" agent who can be blamed (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985); (2) coping potential, or the perception that one has some control over the situation (Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991); (3) perception that the situation is unfair, illegitimate, or undeserved (Averill, 1983; Roseman, 1991); and (4) the familiarity of a threat (Marcus, 2002). Some have argued that many or all of these factors may constitute sufficient rather than necessary conditions for the arousal of anger; no one is essential, but each strengthens the likelihood and experience of an anger response (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004).

By conducting further research to isolate the causes of anger as distinct from other "negative" emotions, political psychologists can shed light on the origins of public outrage and contribute to a greater understanding of anger among psychologists generally (Krosnick & McGraw, 2002). Steenbergen and Ellis (2006), for example, draw on survey data to suggest that anger toward presidential candidates may be rooted in assessments of unfair or morally wrong actions. Other studies have found that intentionality of the wrongdoer increases anger in criminal justice opinions (Petersen, 2010) and, in experimental research, that situational blame and control trigger anger distinctly from fear in response to threatening news (Brader et al., 2010).

3.6. Disgust

Much as it requires some effort to disentangle anger from fear, even more effort is required to pull apart disgust and anger (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). The co-occurrence of self-reported disgust and anger to any specific elicitor is high; numerous studies use "disgusted" as an indicator term in constructing scales for anger (Conover & Feldman, 1986; MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011). The theory of affective intelligence explicitly conceptualizes disgust as a marker for an emotional state called "aversion," which is also indicated by feelings of anger, contempt, and hatred (MacKuen et al., 2010). Despite this close entanglement with anger, however, disgust reactions also clearly arise from a distinctive and very old neural and physiological process that has evolved to avoid and expel contamination (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). When people smell decomposing bodies or urine-saturated alleyways, when they see cockroaches crawling across food or maggot-infested wounds, they automatically wrinkle their nose, curl their upper lip, and even feel nauseous. Disgust motivates individuals to stay away from noxious or impure stimuli and, if necessary, to purge and cleanse themselves of the possible contaminants. Scholars have recently begun to examine more fully the social and political implications of disgust, building on the recognition that disgust reactions in human societies seem to have been extended beyond the realm of physical impurity to the realm of moral impurity (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).

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3.7. Shame, Embarrassment, Guilt, and Pride

The last set of emotions more fully represents a family or class of emotions. Although there has been difficulty and disagreement in distinguishing among some of these feeling terms, no scholars propose that they all constitute a single emotional state or dimension. Many scholars instead consider it useful to categorize these affective states together under the label "self-conscious emotions" (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007). They are triggered by preconscious or conscious appraisals evaluating the self, specifically comparing how well or poorly oneself has performed with respect to a socially prescribed standard or norm (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008). Both the experience and the anticipation of experiencing these emotions can influence behavior, typically motivating people toward greater adherence with social standards.

Ordinary people (and some researchers) use shame and guilt interchangeably, but mounting research suggests two clearly distinct emotional processes are at work (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007): the first, labeled shame, is triggered when negative self-evaluation is leveled at the whole self ("I am a bad person"), while the second, guilt, is triggered when negative self-evaluation is focused on a specific behavior ("I did a bad thing"). The divergent consequences are stark. Shame, by far the more painful experience, causes feelings of powerlessness and worthlessness; motivates a desire to hide, deny, or escape the situation; inhibits empathy; provokes externalization of blame and destructive anger; and is associated with a host of psychological disorders (depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal thoughts, etc.). In contrast, guilt elicits feelings of remorse and regret over actions; causes heavier focus on the consequences of behavior for others; and motivates reparative actions such as confession, apologies, efforts to make amends, and desire to improve future behavior. Embarrassment manifests as a relatively mild feeling (Lewis et al., 2008), triggered by norm violations, social awkwardness, and feeling exposed (i.e., conspicuous); it motivates conciliatory behavior, attempts to win the approval of others in the group, and conformity with social norms (Tangney et al., 2007). Finally, pride is triggered by a positive self-evaluation for meeting standards or other socially valued outcomes and encourages further conformity with standards.

Although these emotions may seem more the province of interpersonal relations than politics, they bear ample relevance for politics. Self-conscious emotions likely facilitate the informal policing and maintenance of group norms (e.g., reciprocity, civility, acquiescence) that enable cooperation and reinforce power structures in communities, formal organizations, social movements, or any peer network. For example, the experience of embarrassment or pride at finding oneself out of or in line, respectively, with the political values of one's group elicits greater adherence and application of those values (Suhay, 2008). Politicians and activists try at times to explicitly "shame" (usually meaning guilt or embarrassment, by the definitions above, and so illustrative of the confusion over terms) citizens or leaders into "doing what is right." During the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King Jr. used these emotional tactics when he pointed to the hypocritical gap between American principles and the realities of racial

inequality, and again when he told white audiences that the "tragedy" of their times lay not in the violent actions of bad people, but rather in the "appalling silence and indifference of the good people." Without directly measuring emotions, recent studies highlight the way get-out-the-vote efforts can motivate greater adherence to civic duty and thereby boost turnout—ostensibly by evoking self-conscious emotions through the actual or threatened publication of names and voting records to neighbors or members of the community (Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2010; Panagopoulos, 2010). As a final example, citizens may experience collective guilt for the harmful actions of group members (past or present), which in turn may motivate support for reparative policies and political action on behalf of such goals (Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2006; Pagano & Huo, 2007).

4. Political Consequences of Emotions

Research on the political consequences of emotions to date has spanned several important substantive domains of politics, including voter decision-making in election campaigns; reactions to war, terrorism, disaster; the effects of mass-mediated messages; the formation of policy preferences; and the evolution of political activism and social movements. We offer a brief and necessarily selective overview of a fast-growing body of evidence demonstrating that emotions shape political outcomes in a multitude of ways. We organize this discussion according to types of effects, ranging from how emotions affect preferences over individual and collective political actions, thus shaping both public opinion and political participation, to how they influence the very processes of attention, information processing, and decision-making. In the concluding section of the chapter, we also highlight some new or neglected areas ripe for further consideration by political psychologists.

4.1. Motivation for Personal and Political Action

In adapting behavior to meet situational needs, emotions prepare the body for and provide an impulse toward certain courses of action, sometimes called *action tendencies* (Frijda, 1986). As a result, they can shape both the private and public actions of citizens. High-arousal emotions, such as fear, enthusiasm, and anger, provide the motivation for citizens to become engaged with and participate in politics generally (Marcus et al., 2000). Of these, the impact of fear seems most variable and the impact of anger seems most reliably potent, but both appear to depend on the resources or efficacy of the individual (Brader, 2006; Rudolph, Gangl, & Stevens, 2000; Valentino et al., 2011; Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009; see also Valentino & Nardis, chapter 18, this volume). Political psychologists should also take note of recent work in political sociology that documents the critical role of emotions in motivating and sustaining collective action

in protests, social movements, and other forms of political activism (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Gould, 2009; Jasper, 1998; 2011; see also Klandermans & Stekelenburg, chapter 24, this volume).

The action tendencies ascribed to fear, anger, enthusiasm, sadness, and other emotions are quite distinct, of course, though such implications remain relatively underexplored in the field. Fear and anger, for example, have divergent effects not only on the assessment of risks, but also actual risk-taking behavior. In the shadow of terrorist attacks, fearful citizens perceive greater risks and are more like to engage in precautionary actions like screening mail and restricting travel, while angry citizens perceive less risk and engage in more risk-acceptant behaviors (Lerner et al., 2003). Similarly, facing a potentially deadly viral outbreak, angry citizens were more likely to write officials demanding investigation and prosecution of those who caused the outbreak, while fearful citizens were more likely to engage in preventative or protective behaviors, such as wearing a mask, increased hand washing, and reading up on the disease (Brader et al., 2010). We should expect similar emotion-specific patterns for explicitly political actions where this is a fit between action tendency and type of behavior; for example, pride ought to promote expressive displays of group loyalty, while anger ought to motivate participation in confrontational protests or other forms of political aggression.

4.2. From Action Tendencies to Political Attitudes

Much of politics involves collective and representational action, with governments, political parties, or other groups acting ostensibly on behalf of others. In many or even most cases, citizens do not act directly to pursue their goals for society, but instead express support for particular policies or outcomes and choose leaders who will pursue them. Thus, action tendencies should manifest as much in preferences for public action (i.e., public opinion) as in individual participatory acts.

Indeed, scholars have found that emotions inform preferences and policy-related attitudes across several policy domains. For example, anger and anxiety have been the focal emotions for studies of public reactions to terrorism, with anxiety leading to more risk-averse or isolationist policy preferences and anger leading to more support for more confrontational policies (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Lambert et al., 2010; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006; Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Across a range of behaviors, anger seems to promote a more confident, aggressive response during crises, while fear causes individuals to pull back or proceed with caution (see also Druckman & McDermott, 2008). Similarly, anxiety and anger seem to make individuals more and less receptive, respectively, to compromise (MacKuen et al., 2010).

We also see emotions affecting opinions and decisions in the domain of morality. While many have held that such decisions ought to rely on explicit principles, the sentimental approach has long held that normative actions are embedded in early habits

of right action sustained by emotional foundations (Frazer, 2010; Hume, 1975; 1984; Smith, 1959). A modern-day sentimentalist is Jonathan Haidt (2001). In his moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt, 2008), Haidt grounds moral judgment in emotions. He argues that five foundations—harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity—elicit the key emotions of disgust and empathy that motivate action intended to sustain the moral codes in question.

This formulation has stimulated and exemplified work on so-called moral emotions (Tangney et al., 2007). That body of work includes studies examining the role of shame, embarrassment, and pride in promoting adherence to group values in democratic life (Suhay, 2008), the role of empathy and guilt in promoting support for humanitarian and reparative actions during war (Pagano & Huo, 2007), and the role of anger and guilt in punishing norm violations (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). A cluster of recent studies considers the role of disgust in moral judgments and behavior. Studies focusing on both traits (i.e., general sensitivity to disgust reactions) and situational reactions find that disgust causes individuals to make harsher moral judgments (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Research in the United States also suggests that disgust reactions push people toward identifying as politically conservative (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). Finally, disgust is associated with morally conservative policy positions, especially on issues linked to perceived impurity, such as abortion and homosexuality (Inbar & Gilovich, 2011; Inbar et al., 2009).

4.3. Information Processing and Decision-Making

It has now become conventional wisdom that humans have two modes of decision-making, the so-called dual-process model. For a review see Evans (2008). The essential claim is that there is a fast system that relies primarily on processes not present in consciousness, and there is a slow system that makes use of deliberative, introspective, and thoughtful processes resident in consciousness. Emotion is increasingly understood to play a principal role in shaping which route, or path, is active and in serving to sustain each. This is important in part because if citizens, and leaders, have two modes of judgment, each activated in different circumstances, then understanding the strengths and liabilities of each shapes what we can expect of citizens and their leaders under circumstances when judgment processes differ. This has normative as well as empirical implications (Marcus, 2013). Such process-focused research examines how affective appraisals shape attention and judgment, by shifting from swift reliance on extant convictions and habits to deliberative processes.

Several studies explore the impact of emotions on attention and learning. Many find that fear causes citizens to desire and seek out more political information (Brader et al., 2008; Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2008). This search for information tends to be selectively focused on what may be useful for the situation at

hand (Brader, 2006; Valentino et al., 2009), but also broader and more balanced, as it is less shaped by partisan or other confirmatory biases (MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2009). In many cases, though perhaps not all (Feldman & Huddy, n.d.), this seeking increases relevant factual knowledge (Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2008; Valentino et al., 2009). The effects of anger diverge sharply from this pattern. For example, anger appears to reduce the amount of time actually spent visiting political websites, shrink the number of web pages visited, and narrow searches to opinion-confirming sources, produce less thoughtful opinions, and inhibit accurate recall of information (Geva & Skorick, 2006; MacKuen et al., 2007; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007; Valentino et al., 2008; Valentino et al., 2009). In sum, these findings confirm that there exist two different decisions-making modes, one triggered by anger, focusing on defense of extant convictions and hence disinterested in disconfirming evidence or new information triggered, and a second, more deliberative and open mode that is triggered by anxiety.

Much of the research on decision-making and affect has been shaped by the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus et al., 2000). That account holds that anxiety increases attention to contemporary information relevant to the decision choice, while both anger and enthusiasm lead to automatic reliance on relevant convictions. Numerous studies indeed find that political judgments of anxious citizens are more responsive to available information (e.g., media messages, campaign content) and less closely tied to predispositions (e.g., party identification or ideology) or prior attitudes, while anger and enthusiasm push decision-making in the opposite direction (Brader et al., 2008; Brader, 2006; Druckman & McDermott, 2008; MacKuen et al., 2007; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Parker & Isbell, 2010; Redlawsk et al., 2010).[10] Banks and Valentino (2012) have applied the same interest in anger and anxiety to racial attitudes and find that anxiety undermines reliance on convictions, while anger strengthens it. Finally, Small and Lerner (2008) look at how a different emotion, incidental sadness, affected welfare policy judgments. Similar to what others have found for anxiety, sadness stimulated deeper processing of information and more attention to situational attributions, leading individuals to support more generous assistance.

5. Going Forward

Emotions have become a vibrant research topic within political psychology. As a result, we have a learned a great deal about the impact of emotions on opinion formation and political behavior, especially in electoral settings and under the threat of war or terrorism. Most attention has fallen on enthusiasm, fear, and anger, with only incipient consideration of other emotions to date. We are confident that research in the years ahead will deepen and broaden our understanding of these emotions and their implications for politics. It will also be important for political psychologists to devote greater study to the antecedents of political emotions, about which we know far less, and to illuminate

the full range of relevant emotions or emotional dimensions. For all its recent vigor, this field of inquiry remains relatively young. There are many productive paths forward as the field expands. We conclude this chapter by highlighting a number of theoretical, methodological, and substantive issues that merit attention from political psychologists over the next decade.

5.1. Theoretical Testing and Integration

Research in this field has been predominantly theory-driven, in the sense of proceeding from theoretical propositions about the function and operation of emotions in the human brain. Most studies, however, have been content to take up isolated propositions without situating their tests in a fuller theory of political emotions. Work on the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus et al., 2000) is the major exception. Nonetheless, studies have drawn—some loosely, some directly—on a number of related theoretical perspectives from social psychology and neuroscience, including cognitive appraisal theories (Scherer et al., 2001), appraisal tendency theory (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 2003), terror management theory (Landau et al., 2004), the hot cognition hypothesis (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Lodge & Taber, 2013), and intergroup emotions theory (Mackie & Smith, 2004). To the extent such perspectives are useful for understanding emotions in the domain of politics, political psychologists should extend or adapt them as necessary to articulate full theoretical accounts of political emotions. Moreover, with few exceptions, researchers have focused largely on testing propositions in accordance with a single perspective rather than testing competing theoretical explanations. The theoretical developments of this field require explicit consideration of how well empirical tests accord with not just one, but multiple theories.

At the same time, there is considerable potential for theoretical integration as well as differentiation. For example, one need not see approaches like affective intelligence and cognitive appraisal theories as inherently or completely incompatible, given that they tend to emphasize different aspects of emotional response (e.g., preconscious versus postconscious appraisals). Indeed, by taking greater note of the temporal resolution, it is not hard to envision affective responses in the brain as multilayered. On one level, the brain may automatically encode and respond to sensory data with positive and negative affects as a useful mechanism for sorting objects and experiences according to their implications for the self, consistent with the hot cognition and somatic marker hypotheses (Damasio, 1994; Lodge & Taber, 2005). On another level, preconscious appraisals may further differentiate emotional responses through the activation of a limited set of modular or dimensional systems that adapt behavior to meet the needs of the situation, consistent with affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2000), affective neuroscience approaches (Panksepp, 1998), and functional evolutionary accounts (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). On yet a third level, postconscious appraisals may enable highly differentiated self-understandings of emotional responses that shape subsequent efforts to manage both the experience and expression of those emotions, consistent with cognitive appraisal theories (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001; Tracy et al.,

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2007). Tellegen, Watson, and Clark (Tellegen et al., 1999a; 1999b), for example, find support for a three-level hierarchical structure of affective experience, moving from global bipolar affect to discrete emotions, based on self-report data. Efforts at theoretical integration and consideration of the multilayered nature of affective experience can improve our understanding of each constituent emotional process as well as focus our attention on which processes are most relevant for illuminating particular political experiences.

5.2. Measurement

Issues of measurement pose some familiar and some unique challenges to the study of emotions that have received relatively light consideration and treatment within political psychology. Psychologists have used a variety of tools to try to measure emotional reactions, including most notably verbal self-reports, psychophysiological measures, and human coding of facial or other body movements (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999). Self-reports are by far the most common form of measurement in social and political psychology owing to ease of use and low cost. But reliance on verbal reports is tricky for at least three reasons. First, people have tenuous access to their emotional states—indeed, emotions frequently occur outside of conscious awareness. Second, as with any self-reported behavior, subjects can censor or edit their answers to meet perceived social expectations. Third, as discussed earlier, the vagaries of everyday language do not align perfectly with scientific conceptions. A person might equally well use the terms "disgusted" or "angry" to describe his reaction at another individual's transgression, and yet also use "disgusted" to describe his feelings at seeing insects in his food, when "angry" would not be a suitable descriptor. Similarly, in the English vernacular, people might say they are "anxious" either when they are worried (i.e., fearful) or when they are eagerly anticipating (i.e., enthusiastic about) what is to come.

In light of these problems, it is tempting to turn to biological aspects of emotional response that do not require conscious awareness, cannot be easily controlled, and are not filtered through linguistic conventions. Paul Ekman and his students, for example, have developed and refined a detailed system for coding facial expressions that has been subject to extensive cross-cultural validation and application in numerous domains (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). Others have deployed a variety of tools to monitor directly such bodily reactions as heart rate, skin conductance, muscle tension, electrical activity, and blood flow. These techniques come with their own serious handicaps, however. Both facial coding and psychophysiological monitoring are laborious and require direct observation of subjects, often under highly controlled conditions. Some of the methods—electroencephalogram (EEG), facial electromyography (EMG), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)—are particularly apt to feel invasive and artificial. Moreover, while emotions are clearly tied to patterns of visceral and brain activity, decades of research have failed to yield evidence of a clear one-to-one correspondence between specific emotional states and autonomic, visceral, and brain indicators (Larsen, Bernston, Poehlmann, Ito, & Cacioppo, 2008).

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In view of the particular strengths and weaknesses of each measurement approach, specific studies and especially extended research programs tend to benefit from triangulating through the use of multiple methods (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999). Nonetheless, given the predominance of self-reports and their necessity for survey studies, greater attention is warranted to best practices in obtaining reliable and valid emotional self-reports. Two useful guidelines that emerge relatively clearly from earlier work (Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006) include (1) asking about the intensity (how much?) of emotions toward some target yields results comparable to asking about the frequency (how often?) of such emotions (both are superior to offering binary response options or a checklist); and (2) as with any latent construct, multiple-item scales yield stronger measures; specifically it is typically critical to include two cognate terms and preferably three or more for each emotion (dimension) the researchers seeks to tap, especially if the goal is to differentiate among highly correlated positive or negative affects (e.g., fear vs. anger vs. sadness).

Recent research in progress parallels other work in survey methodology by assessing the costs and benefits of question-and-response formats in self-administered questionnaires, relevant both for laboratory studies and for the increasingly prevalent use of Internet surveys. For example, the use of a sliding scale generates more reliable and valid measures in many situations (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2009). Consistent with other work on survey methods, the use of a grid format to administer a battery of emotion items notably reduces completion time over asking items separately on sequential computer screens. However, subjects seem to report stronger positive emotions and weaker negative emotions when presented with a grid relative to answering the items sequentially (Brader, Valentino, & Karl, 2012).[11]

One question that arises often concerns the level of specificity required vis-à-vis the target of emotion. For example, if one wishes to examine the impact of anxiety on voting decisions, what is the appropriate target for the emotional self-report question? Should we expect only anxiety about the candidates or the choice between them to be relevant? How about more diffuse but obviously politically relevant anxiety about the current conditions or future direction of the country? How about anxiety over frequently relevant issues, such as anxiety about economic conditions, security in an age of terrorism, or cultural change at the hands of large-scale immigration? Finally, is it possible that anxiety over seemingly unrelated matters—stresses about an impending deadline at work, nervousness over an upcoming romantic date, the presence of a snake in the room—could affect voting decisions as well? Research to date suggests that integral and incidental affects produce similar behavioral consequences (Adolphs, 2009; Brader, 2005; Isbell & Ottati, 2002; Small et al., 2006; Way & Masters, 1996b). That said, studies in political psychology largely have failed to compare directly whether target specificity moderates the impact of emotional responses.

5.3. Promising Avenues for Future Research

In addition to the preceding theoretical and methodological issues, many substantive topics are ripe for further consideration. One is the link between *emotions* and

personality. In recent years, political psychology has seen renewed interest in personality, especially from a trait theory perspective (see Caprara and Vecchione, chapter 2, this volume). Psychologists have long posited the existence of trait analogs to specific emotional states, for example, "trait anxiety," "trait anger," and "disgust sensitivity" (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994; Watson & Clark, 1991). These traits may be conceptualized as an individual's propensity to experience certain emotions more (or less) often and more (or less) intensely, perhaps due to a greater (or lower) sensitivity to the associated environmental triggers or the tendency to generate relevant appraisals. Thus, a person who quickly becomes enraged at the slightest provocation is likely to score high in trait anger. Researchers often treat emotional traits and states as interchangeable predictors when pursuing the implications of particular emotions (Inbar & Gilovich, 2011; Inbar et al., 2009; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).

Emotions have also been tied to more general personality constructs. For example, two scales promulgated as part of a more comprehensive five-factor model of personality (the "Big Five") are closely associated with emotions. Specifically, the trait of extraversion is linked to the experience of positive emotions, and the trait of neuroticism is linked to the experience of negative emotions (McCrae & Costa, 2003). Another general construct is empathy, which is regarded as a disposition that has both cognitive and affective elements (Davis, 1994; Morrell, 2010). Empathy concerns an individual's ability or tendency to understand and react emotionally to other people's experiences. It inhibits aggression and antisocial behaviors that are harmful to others (Tangney et al., 2007).

The antecedents of political emotions are a neglected topic in research generally, but what research has been done is predominantly focused on situational rather than predispositional triggers. Only a handful of studies have considered how personality traits influence the experience and expression of political emotions (Bizer et al., 2004; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Wolak & Marcus, 2007). Further research in this vein can shed light, for example, on who is apt to be most responsive to specific types of emotional appeals—persuaded to reconsider one's views when faced with a fear-inducing threat, mobilized to political violence when angered by injustice, motivated to vote by a guilt-inflected reminder of civic duty, or moved to volunteer out of sympathy when officials plea for help in the wake of disaster. Some researchers also have suggested links between emotional traits and the development of liberal-conservative political orientations (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2008; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).

A second broad domain for future research is the role of emotions in group processes, both *intragroup* and *intergroup relations*. What role do emotions play in tying citizens together and directing the activities within small advocacy groups, election campaign teams, large political organizations, or social movements? How do emotions shape the relationship between leaders and followers? Such questions about intragroup dynamics are hardly new (Finifter, 1974; Verba, 1961), but they have slipped out of focus in contemporary political psychology (Mendelberg, 2005). In the 1980s and early 1990s, researchers at Dartmouth College laid down a sizable foundation of work on how emotional expressions and nonverbal behavior shape the relationships between leaders and followers in mass societies (Masters & Sullivan, 1989a; 1989b; McHugoLanzetta,

Sullivan, Masters, & Englis, 1985; Sullivan & Masters, 1988a; 1988b; Warnecke, Masters, & Kempter, 1992; Way & Masters, 1996a; 1996b). However, studies of the topic have become less frequent (Bucy & Bradley, 2004; Bucy & Grabe, 2008; Bucy & Newhagen, 1999; Glaser & Salovey, 1998; Stewart, Waller, & Schubert, 2009; Stroud, Glaser, & Salovey, 2005) and have focused almost exclusively on political candidates, especially US presidential candidates. Political psychologists have yet to delve far into studying how emotions shape the bonds among group members or between leaders and followers in small-scale political organizations, protest movements, or in authoritarian societies.

One place to start, for example, is for political psychologists to engage with recent work in political sociology, which has begun to explore the ways in which emotions shape the development, maintenance, and activities of advocacy groups and social movements (Barbalet, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2001; Gould, 2009; Jasper, 2011; see also Klandermans & Stekelenburg, chapter 24, this volume). Given strong interest in political discussion and deliberation (see Myers & Mendelberg, chapter 22, this volume), another fruitful avenue for future research is to examine the implications of emotions for communication and decision-making in deliberative settings (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008; MacKuen et al., 2010). Yet a third possibility is for political psychologists to take seriously the affective nature of social and political group identities. Emotions may be useful indicators of the strength of in-group identification (Greene & Elder, 2001), but specific emotions experienced as a group member have more nuanced implications for whether and what sorts of actions she is willing to undertake (see Huddy, chapter 23, this volume).

In contrast, research on intergroup processes—prejudice, conflict, cooperation—has flourished in contemporary political psychology (e.g., see chapters in this volume by Kinder, chapter 25; Green and Staerklé, chapter 26; Hewstone and Al-Ramiah, chapter 27; and Bar-Tal and Halperin, chapter 28). Negative affect, ranging from mild dislike to intense hatred, has long been a defining element of prejudice toward out-groups. But, when probed, people express a much more complex array of negative emotions toward out-groups—anger, fear, pity, disgust, guilt—and, in some cases, even positive emotions—sympathy, gratitude, and admiration. Although simple, summary measures of prejudice or "group affect" are useful as ubiquitous, powerful predictors of behavior, political psychologists should move away from heavy reliance on prejudice to take greater account of specific out-group emotions, which will lead to much finer-grained insights about the causes and consequences of both intergroup conflict and cooperation.

Two very similar, relatively new theories in social psychology—Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie & Smith, 2004; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) and a Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to Intergroup Affect (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005)—provide promising foundations for pursuing this work. Each posits that distinct appraisals or threat perceptions of out-groups evoke specific emotions toward those groups, leading to distinctive "profiles" or patterns of emotions—anger, fear, disgust, pity, envy—that members of one group feel toward each out-group in their environment (Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009; Iyer & Leach, 2008). Given what has been

learned about the function and consequences of specific emotions, these theories point the way to distinct predictions for political attitudes and behavior depending on the outgroup implicated. Very little work to date has tested such political implications (Cottrell, Richards, & Nichols, 2010; Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003), and thus political psychologists could contribute greatly to the development of these perspectives and enrich their own understanding of intergroup relations in doing so (see both Huddy, chapter 23, and Stein, chapter 12, this volume).

A third direction for future research is the study of *individual and institutional efforts to control emotions*. While there is considerable psychological research on individuals' efforts to regulate their own emotions, research on efforts to influence the emotions of others for political purposes is relatively rare. Studies of the antecedents of political emotions lag behind studies of effects and have focused predominantly on the individual appraisals, situational outcomes, and events depicted in news stories. In contrast, few studies examine explicit efforts to influence emotions, especially those with a recurring or institutionalized basis.

One limited exception is research on the use of emotional appeals in electoral or issue advocacy messages to sway audiences (Brader, 2006; Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000; Roseman et al., 1986; Weber, Searles, & Ridout, 2011). Even this small body of work focuses more on the effectiveness of specific emotional triggers than on the strategy and tactics adopted by candidates, political parties, and interest groups. There are many questions we could ask about such emotional strategies in political communication (Brader & Corrigan, 2005; Ridout & Searles, 2011; Weber et al., 2011): Which emotion or mix of emotions do these political actors try to evoke in their audiences? Does the desire to elicit specific emotions affect decisions about who is targeted and when? To what extent do political actors condition their emotional strategies on the emotional strategies of their rivals?

Political efforts at manipulating emotions, of course, extend well beyond campaign and issue ads. Numerous other recurring events in and out of election campaigns are occasions for eliciting public emotions: party conventions, campaign rallies, national parades, state funerals, and high-profile political speeches (e.g., the State of the Union speech, with its perennial presidential invocation of national achievements and future goals delivered to a regular refrain of congressional applause and cheers). From time to time, political leaders launch "campaigns" to persuade the public toward some course of action (e.g., extending rights to protect previously marginalized groups, passing legislation to reform healthcare access, preparing the country for war). In studying how and why politicians try to elicit emotions in these persuasive campaigns, it is equally important to consider the limits on their capacity to generate the desired emotions (cf. Lupia & Menning, 2009).

Not all efforts at emotional control aim at arousing emotions; some seek to inhibit or quell emotions. Take, for example, certain courtroom rituals in the United States. Officers of the court convey and expect a serious, civil demeanor. A bailiff or other officer instructs those present to rise and to be silent. A judge may insist on keeping "order in the court" in the face of emotional outbursts and limit the introduction of evidence

when she deems its emotional impact to outweigh its probative value. Such rituals can serve other important purposes as well, but they are designed in part to inhibit the role of emotions in judicial proceedings.[12] Political psychologists need to study efforts to inhibit or lessen emotional arousal, a topic they have to date largely ignored, for such efforts play a role in both ritual and extraordinary aspects of political life. Leaders, for example, often try to calm their citizens during crises or when they worry that fear will turn into panic or anger into violence—speaking to the country in the wake of military attacks, civil unrest, terrorism, natural or civil disaster, political shootings, or economic collapse ("The only thing we have to fear is fear itself"). One challenge faced by governments in the United States and elsewhere following terrorist attacks has been how to balance the need to encourage the public to stay alert for threats while also reassuring them that they are safe. Autocratic leaders try to manage emotions at least as much as their democratic counterparts. Just as leaders in China, Iran, or elsewhere may foment public anger at foreign powers, for example, they may also try to restrain such emotions in service of their domestic and foreign policy goals (e.g., Stockman, 2013). How effective are such attempts to keep public emotions "under control" or to assuage fear, anger, or other already-aroused emotions? Does the level of difficulty and the effectiveness of particular approaches vary across emotions?

Finally, a fourth frontier ripe for further study is the *resonance of emotional appeals with past experience and present context*. Most research on the impact of emotionally evocative messages focuses tightly on differences across appeals and individuals, with little consideration of how the emotional appeal resonates with the audience. In some cases, success in eliciting emotions may depend on how appropriately the appeal fits with "tenor of the times" or the current "public mood." Is it possible to stoke economic anxieties in a time of prosperity, or generate partisan enthusiasm after a string of political losses? In other cases, a topic—crime, perhaps—may be perpetually more susceptible to fear appeals. The impact may also depend on resonance with an individual's prior experiences. Is it easier to arouse anger (moral outrage) among those who have experienced injustice themselves or witnessed it firsthand? Researchers should also be mindful of the temporal dimension: how long does emotional resonance last, how quickly does it decay?

These suggestions—personality, group dynamics, external control, resonance—are hardly exhaustive of promising directions for future work. Replication and extension of existing lines of research on antecedents and effects of emotions will also be important; so too are the issues of theoretical development and methodological refinement mentioned earlier. In a relatively short time, research on emotions has gone from a topic that received little explicit consideration in studies of politics to a central theme in political psychology. We have tried to highlight in this chapter how much we have learned from this explosion of interest already, as well as to suggest several next steps for the advancement of the field. We suspect that the relevant chapter in the third edition of the *Political Psychology* handbook, 10 or more years from now, will provide even greater cause for celebration at the progress in our understanding of the political psychology of emotions.

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Notes

1. The longevity of that conception is remarkable. As we write this chapter, the investment company Raymond James has as its principal advertising theme: "When investing, we remove the vagaries of emotion. Because they are vagaries." Their advertising text continues: "Just to make one thing perfectly clear, we are not some unfeeling financial automatons. Emotions are a wonderful thing. It's just that emotions can trump logic and play havoc with investing." The remainder of the ad text continues in that same vein: turbulent, irrational emotions that, while making us human, compete with cold implacable but efficacious reason.
2. For more on conceptions of emotion and its relationship to reason, see (Frazer, 2010; Krause, 2008).
3. As with "intelligence" and "attitudes," as research has continued, these homogenous concepts soon confronted disconfirming results. Rather than splitting these concepts into separate scientific categories, in the main, accommodation was achieved by adding subcategories to account for otherwise discrepant results. Hence we have now multiple forms of intelligence rather than one, and we now have "implicit" and "explicit" attitudes. In each instance the option of concluding that these concepts are flawed was rejected. Thus implicit and explicit attitudes continue to be categorized as attitudes even though they have quite different properties (e.g., the former most likely are located in procedural memory and are nonverbal; while the latter are located in semantic memory and are verbal in character).
4. Though here, as elsewhere, Roger Masters and his colleagues were examining this affect well before others turned to it (Masters & Sullivan, 1989a; 1989b; 1993; McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, & Englis, 1985; Sullivan & Masters, 1988a; 1988b), as were Conover and Feldman (1986).
5. That it takes, using Libet's estimate, 500 milliseconds for conscious representations to arise and that affective appraisals arise in less than 100 milliseconds both before and "outside" of consciousness is now widely accepted and often demonstrated, as for example in Todorov's work (Todorov & Ballew, 2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006).
6. We will not be surprised to find that these three dimensions are insufficient. Work, largely done with animals, argues for a distinction between fear and anxiety largely having to do with the role of memory in enabling conditioning for one, fear, but not for the other, anxiety (Davis & Shi, 1999; Davis, 1992a; 1992b; Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010).
7. For example, empathy has long been of interest, and it has been proposed as a vital and distinct facet of affect shaping particular "we" versus "they" interactions (Brothers, 1989; Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell, & Hagen, 1985; Morrell, 2010).
8. In his cognitive appraisal account, Lazarus (1994) in fact differentiates them into at least three categories: joy/enthusiasm, pride, and hope. But this is consistent with our argument in that Lazarus's distinctions are based on the relational (self-environment) meaning of the emotions, not on evidence of their empirical consequences.
9. Although, in many cases, it may seem obvious what makes people feel happy or enthusiastic, it is not always so. For example, Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, and White (2006) experimentally manipulated news stories to emphasize either similarity or difference in the racial policy stances of George W. Bush and Al Gore in the 2000 election. Blacks responded with significantly higher enthusiasm for Gore in the "difference condition," even though what differed was not a more positive take on Gore's position,

but instead the implication that Bush was more hostile to black interests (than in the similarity article).

10. There are those who dissent on the persuasiveness of these studies (Ladd & Lenz, 2008; 2011), though see (Brader, 2011; Marcus, MacKuen, & Neuman, 2011).
11. It remains unclear from the extant studies which set of responses—grid or sequential—yields more valid measures.
12. At the same time, of course, some aspects of court proceedings are clearly intended to arouse emotions. For example, in criminal trials, prosecutors may use horrific photos of the crime scene to elicit disgust and harsher judgments, or some jurisdictions may allow emotional testimony from family and friends at sentencing hearings.

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