Gary Bornstein

Gary Bornstein
Hebrew University of Jerusalem | HUJI · Center for the Study of Rationality

About

39
Publications
12,463
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3,799
Citations
Citations since 2017
0 Research Items
1156 Citations
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2017201820192020202120222023050100150200
2017201820192020202120222023050100150200
2017201820192020202120222023050100150200

Publications

Publications (39)
Article
Three computer-controlled experiments were conducted to study interactions between individuals and non-cooperative groups in prototypical social-dilemma games. The asymmetric competition between an individual and a group was compared with symmetric control conditions where both competitors were either individuals or groups. All games were played re...
Article
Costly individual participation in intergroup conflict can be motivated by “in‐group love”—a cooperative motivation to help the in‐group, by “out‐group hate”—an aggressive or competitive motivation to hurt the out‐group, or both. This study employed a recently developed game paradigm (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008) designed specifically to disti...
Article
In today's increasingly interconnected world, deciding with whom and at what level to cooperate becomes a matter of increasing importance as societies become more globalized and large-scale cooperation becomes a viable means of addressing global issues. This tension can play out via competition between local (e.g. within a group) and global (e.g.,...
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The genetic origins of altruism, defined here as a costly act aimed to benefit non-kin individuals, have not been examined in young children. However, previous findings concerning adults pointed at the arginine vasopressin receptor 1A (AVPR1A) gene as a possible candidate. AVPR1A has been associated with a range of behaviors including aggressive, a...
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Two experiments utilized a new experimental paradigm—the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma— Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game—to study how relative deprivation at the group level affects intergroup competition. The IPD-MD game enables group members to make a costly contribution to either a within-group pool that benefits fellow ingroup members, or a...
Article
Full-text available
Economic games observe social decision making in the laboratory that involves real money payoffs. Previously we have shown that allocation of funds in the Dictator Game (DG), a paradigm that illustrates costly altruistic behavior, is partially determined by promoter-region repeat region variants in the arginine vasopressin 1a receptor gene (AVPR1a)...
Article
Full-text available
Converging evidence from both human and animal studies has highlighted the pervasive role of two neuropeptides, oxytocin (OXT) and arginine vasopressin (AVP), in mammalian social behaviours. Recent molecular genetic studies of the human arginine vasopressin 1a (AVPR1a) and oxytocin (OXTR) receptors have strengthened the evidence regarding the role...
Article
What motivates individual self-sacrificial behavior in intergroup conflicts? Is it the altruistic desire to help the ingroup or the aggressive drive to hurt the outgroup? This paper introduces a new game paradigm, the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma - Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game, designed specifically to distinguish between these two motives....
Article
What motivates individual self-sacrificial behavior in intergroup conflicts? Is it the altruistic desire to help the in-group or the aggressive drive to hurt the out-group? This article introduces a new game paradigm, the intergroup prisoner's dilemma-maximizing difference (IPD-MD) game, designed specifically to distinguish between these two motive...
Article
Human altruism is a widespread phenomenon that puzzled evolutionary biologists since Darwin. Economic games illustrate human altruism by showing that behavior deviates from economic predictions of profit maximization. A game that most plainly shows this altruistic tendency is the Dictator Game. We hypothesized that human altruistic behavior is to s...
Article
Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effect...
Article
In this chapter, I lay out a classification of social situations—situations of interdependent decision making—based on the type of decision makers involved. Then, using this framework, I review the decision-making literature and point out the gaps that still exist in it. The classification of social situations, or games, builds on a distinction bet...
Article
Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this two-person game, player 1 can claim any part of player 2’s resources, and player 2...
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Full-text available
This article puts forward a parsimonious framework for studying subjective perceptions of real-life intergroup conflicts. Four studies were conducted to explore how individuals perceive the strategic properties of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Studies 1 and 2 found theory-driven associations between people's subjective perception of the conflic...
Article
Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effect...
Article
Full-text available
Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can claim any part of player 2's resources, and player 2 c...
Article
Two types of intergroup conflicts modeled as team games, a game of assurance where the groups' incentive to compete is purely fear and a game of chicken where the groups' incentive to compete is purely greed, are examined. The games involved competition between two 3-person groups. The players discussed the game with other in-group members, then me...
Article
Intergroup conflicts generally involve conflicts of interests within the competing groups as well. This article outlines a taxonomy of games, called team games, which incorporates the intragroup and intergroup levels of conflict. Its aims are to provide a coherent framework for analyzing the prototypical problems of cooperation and competition that...
Article
We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a repeated game between two “teams” with one, two, or three players in each team. We found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person t...
Article
This study uses an experimental approach to examine whether markets are sensitive to the internal incentive structure of the competitors. Toward this goal, we modeled the competitors in a price competition duopoly game as three-player teams. Each player simultaneously declares a bid (price) and the team whose total bid was lower won the competition...
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Full-text available
We use a laboratory experiment to study the extent to which investors’ choices are affected by limited loss deduction in income taxation. We first compare investment behavior in the no tax baseline to a tax control setting, in which the income from investments is taxed. We find that investors significantly reduce their risk-taking as predicted by t...
Article
We studied conflict resolution in two types of intergroup conflicts modeled as team games, a game of Assurance where the groups’ incentive to compete is purely fear, and a game of Chicken where the groups’ incentive to compete is purely greed. The games were operationalized as competitions between two groups with three players in each group. The pl...
Article
We expand the set of outcomes considered by the tournament literature to include draws and use games from post-war chess tournaments to see whether strategic behavior can be important in such scenarios. In particular, we examine whether players from the former Soviet Union acted as a cartel in international all-play-all tournaments - intentionally...
Article
Intergroup conflicts are characterized by conflicts of interests within the competing groups as well. The intragroup conflict stems from a basic fact: while all group members are better off if they all cooperate in competing against the outgroup, each individual group member is better off defecting. The Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game is p...
Article
The intergroup prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game was played repeatedly in an attempt to distinguish the dynamic process associated with reciprocation at the intergroup level from that resulting from adaptation at the individual level. Results show that when players were not allowed to communicate with one another, they gradually learned that it does no...
Article
We studied the effect of intergroup competition on behavior in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al. 1990. Amer. Econ. Rev. 80, 234–248). The group with the higher minimum won the competition and its members were paid according to the game's payoff matrix. The members of the losing group were paid nothing. We found that intergroup competition i...
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Full-text available
This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group h...
Article
The authors introduce a new team game, the intergroup chicken game, to model intergroup conflicts involving bilateral threats (e.g., military conflicts, industrial disputes). The group that wins the game is the one that competes while the other group yields, and the benefits associated with winning (e.g., territory, higher wages) are public goods f...
Article
We review two experiments in which the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) team-game was compared with a single-group prisoner’s dilemma (PD). The first experiment compared the games when played once. We found that although the IPD and PD games are strategically equivalent, subjects were more likely to cooperate in the intergroup than in the single...
Article
Two team games are introduced: a game of assurance and a game of chicken. The games were operationalized as a competition between two teams, with three players on each team, and were compared either with or without the opportunity for a within-team discussion. The authors found that the vast majority of the teams in both game types chose to compete...
Article
We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as...
Article
This paper examines the effect of intergroup competition on intragroup cooperation. Three experiments are reviewed. The first experiment establishes that intergroup competition can effectively increase intragroup cooperation in a laboratory setting where symmetric players make binary decisions in one-shot dilemma games. The second experiment shows...
Article
Repeated interaction in integroup conflict was studied in the context of two team games: the intergroup public goods (IPG) game and the intergroup prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game. The results reveal (a) a main effect for game type; subjects were twice as likely to contribute toward their group effort in the IPG game than in the IPD game, and (b) a Ga...
Article
Attempts to generalize recent results by G. Bornstein, I. Erev, and O. Rosen (see record 1991-07180-001), demonstrating that competition between groups can reduce free riding in an experimental Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The present study tested the effectiveness of intergroup competition as a solution to free riding in a lifelike orange-picking tas...
Article
It is commonly assumed that uncertain information can be reduced to numerical probabilities without biasing preferences. It is also implicitly assumed in much research and many applications that people can express these probabilities. In contradiction to these assumptions Experiment 1 shows that the production of probability assessments biases deci...
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Full-text available
Forty-eight groups participated once in an intergroup conflict in which two groups of equal or unequal size competed for the provision of step-level (binary) public goods. The study included a two-factorial design with preplay communication versus no preplay communication defining one dimension, and equal group size versus unequal group size defini...
Article
Studied single-stage intergroup competition for public goods in small groups with total resources of equal size and binary contributions. In Experiment 1, the two competing groups were of equal size, but the individual resources (endowments) within each group differed from one member to another. The main finding was a negative relation between the...
Article
Full-text available
We report two experiments which compared individual and group behavior in the two-player centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981). In Experiment 1 the joint payoff of the two players increased linearly as the game progressed whereas in Experiment 2 it remained constant. In both experiments the game was played either by two individuals or by two (three-pers...
Article
Two experiments with 114 male undergraduates studied intergroup competition as a structural solution to social dilemmas. In Exp 1, Ss participated in a one-shot "give-some" game (R. M. Dawes; see record 1980-30361-001). A change in intragroup reward structure from a social dilemma into a step-level public goods problem was associated with a signif...

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