Froystein Gjesdal

Froystein Gjesdal
NHH Norwegian School of Economics | NHH · Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law

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16
Publications
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451
Citations

Publications

Publications (16)
Article
This paper analyses the relationship between economic value and accounting measures such as earnings, book value, rate of return and residual income. The long term nature of assets and the implied importance of the firm's history are explicitly recognized. Although the modeling makes heavy use of steady state (Stauffer(1971)) and constant growth as...
Article
This paper evaluates a large set of accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. Insight into the accrual process in a particular industry allows us to test and compare models using actual data (2066 firm-years over period 1988 - 2004) rather than simulations. Using detailed, non-public information about inventory, which is the obvious t...
Article
Full-text available
This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the existence of boards of directors, and investigates how a board's decisions depend on its composition and size. We show that information asymmetries cause outsiders on boards to make decisions more in line with the interests of creditors than those of shareholders; similarly, larger boards also fav...
Article
Providing data for the measurement of financial performance is a key objective of financial reporting. Rajan, Reichelstein, and Soliman (2007, Conservatism, growth and return on investment, Review of Accounting Studies, this issue) provide new insights into the well known biases involved in measuring return on investment (ROI) on the basis of accru...
Chapter
Moral hazard with hidden information refers to a control problem where the agent’s actions are observable, but not the information on which they are based. This paper analyses the case in which an agent (for example a subcontractor or a dealer) obtains perfect information before deciding on his action. The close relationship to adverse selection al...
Book
Rick Antle is the William S. Beinecke Professor of Accounting at the Yale School of Management, where he was the Senior Associate Dean from 2000 to 2005. Frøystein Gjesdal is a professor of Managerial Economics at Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and is currently Head of the Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law...
Article
This paper constructs a theory of dividend restrictions in incomplete markets in an attempt to better understand the role of accounting constructions in optimal dividend restrictions. An entrepreneur, through his company, borrows money from a lender, and repays the debt from a stream of stochastic cash flows. Dividend restrictions are used to balan...
Article
This article analyses the stock market's reaction to news about the Norwegian company VIP Scandinavia over a period of about a year and a half. The data show that the market relied to a great extent upon financial reporting as a source of valuation information. A tentative attempt is made to explain this finding in the light of earlier capital mark...
Article
General Outlook and Stabilization Theories and Policies of piecewis e linear incentive schemes are studied in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection. The form of the best such function is analyzed. Particular attention is given to the loss from using piecewise linear schemes relative to "optimal" schemes, as well as the gain from usin g si...
Article
Full-text available
This paper considers the use of imperfect information for risk sharing and incentive purposes when perfect observation of actions and outcomes is impossible, making complete contracting infeasible. The incentive-insurance problem is defined to consist of two parts: the choice of an information system and the design of a sharing rule based on the in...
Article
Full-text available
two anonymous referees for insightful comments. The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) has provided research support. The first version of the paper was written in 1999 under the name "The Decentralisation of Management Activities." Correspondence: Iver Bragelien, Scancor, Ceras 509, Stanford University, CA 94305-3084,...

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