Freddy Huet

Freddy Huet
University of La Réunion · Faculty of Law and Economics

About

17
Publications
1,471
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
274
Citations

Publications

Publications (17)
Article
The literature focusing on public-private partnerships agreements points out the existence of information asymmetries that may affect the performance of these contracts. Indeed the private firm operating the service generally detain better information about the costs of the service than the public authority and may exploit this advantage to increas...
Article
Public-Private Partnerships and Investments at Contract’s end: the Case of the French Water Industry The efficiency of franchise bidding schemes for network industries has been challenged by many authors. One of the problems with this kind of schemes concerns the lack of investment’s incentives of the incumbent at the end of the contract. The goal...
Article
The efficiency of franchise bidding schemes for network industries has been challenged by many authors. One of the problems with this kind of schemes concerns the lack of investment's incentives of the incumbent at the end of the contract. The goal of this article is twofold. First, we explain why the French water industry is rather characterized b...
Article
Full-text available
Collusion seems to be a pervasive problem when regional monopoly rights are auctioned to private firms. This leads us to study whether firms may collude if the regulator uses yardstick competition to simulate competitive forces, and how collusion is affected when both schemes are used. Using an infinitely repeated game framework, we find that collu...
Article
Full-text available
Using original data concerning organizational choices made by French local authorities awarding their local public services, we show how the spatial dimension may contribute to the debate on public-private partnerships. If geographic agglomeration of private operators may be explain by some search of synergies and cost reduction, it may also be exp...
Article
Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by...
Article
There is a contradiction between the success encountered by franchise bidding or PPP (Public-Private Partnerships) agreements in several countries and the deficiencies emphasized by a part of the economic literature when this kind of agreement is used in network industries. The analysis of this contradiction is the central point of this Ph D. Sever...
Article
Yardstick competition is an incentive regulatory tool which allows the regulator to introduce virtual competition into locally monopolis-tic industries(Shleifer[1985]). As with any competitive environment, regulated firms may be incited to collude, thereby undermining the efficiency of yardstick competition. In this paper, we study incen-tives to c...
Article
Full-text available
We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a swi...
Article
Yardstick competition is an incentive regulatory tool which allows the regulator to introduce virtual competition into monopolistic industries. But as with any competitive environnement, regulated firms may have incentives to collude, thereby undermining the efficiency of the regulation. We study this issue using an infinitely repeated game framewo...
Article
Full-text available
L’efficacité des partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans les industries de service public en réseau a été remise en cause par de nombreux auteurs. Une des défaillances majeure reprochée à ce type d’accords concerne le manque d’incitation de l’opérateur en place à investir en fin de contrat. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, nous expliquo...
Article
Full-text available
Abstract Yardstick competition has been advocated by some economists as a means to introduce some virtual competition in regional monopo- lies. Through such a scheme, it has been shown that the regulator could benefit from informational externalities, thereby reducing its asymmetric information position when devising regulatory contracts (Auriol an...

Network

Cited By