Francesco Fallucchi

Francesco Fallucchi
Università di Parma | UNIPR · Department of Economics

PhD

About

31
Publications
2,898
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154
Citations
Introduction
Francesco Fallucchi currently works as Senior Assistant Professor (Rtd-b) at the Department of Economics and Management of the University of Parma. Francesco does research in Behavioural Economics, Experimental Economics and Industrial Organization.
Additional affiliations
September 2010 - August 2014
University of Nottingham
Position
  • PhD Student

Publications

Publications (31)
Article
Full-text available
We apply the classifier-Lasso (Su et al. 2016) to detect the presence of latent types in two data sets of previous contest experiments, one that keeps the grouping of contestants fixed over the experiment and one that randomly regroups contestants after each round. Our results suggest that there exist three distinct types of players in both contest...
Preprint
Full-text available
Experiments which elicit preferences for conditional cooperation in public goods games with linear payoffs find that about one-quarter of people approximately match the average contributions of others. To identify from among possible explanations proposed for this strong form of conditional cooperation, we extend the elicitation method of Fischbach...
Article
We validate experimentally a new survey item to measure the preference for competition. The item, which measures participants’ agreement with the statement “Competition brings the best out of me”, predicts individuals’ willingness to compete in the laboratory after controlling for their ability, beliefs, and risk attitude (Niederle and Vesterlund,...
Preprint
Full-text available
Many important economic outcomes result from cumulative effects of smaller choices, so the best outcomes require accounting for other choices at each decision point. We document narrow bracketing -- the neglect of such accounting -- in work choices in a pre-registered experiment on MTurk: bracketing changes average willingness to work by 13-28%. In...
Article
A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber in J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524, 2013). The Krupka–Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination gam...
Preprint
Over the first half of March 2021, the majority of European governments suspended Astrazeneca's Vaxzevria vaccine as a precaution following media reports of rare blood clots. We analyse the impact of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) March 18th statement assuring the public of the safety of Vaxzevria and the immediate reinstatement of the vacci...
Preprint
Full-text available
Over the first half of March 2021, the majority of European governments suspended AstraZeneca's Vaxzevria vaccine as a precaution following media reports of rare blood clots. We analyse the impact of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) March 18th statement assuring the public of the safety of Vaxzevria and the immediate reinstatement of the vacci...
Article
Full-text available
Testing is widely seen as one core element of a successful strategy to curtail the COVID-19 pandemic and many countries have increased their efforts to provide testing at large scale. As most democratic governments refrain from enacting mandatory testing, a key emerging challenge is to increase voluntary participation. Using behavioural economics i...
Article
Full-text available
We design an experiment to study investment behavior in different repeated contest settings, varying the uncertainty of the outcomes and the number of participants in contests. We find decreasing over-expenditures and a higher rate of ‘dropout’ in contests with high uncertainty over outcomes (winner-take-all contests), while we detect a quick conve...
Article
Full-text available
We investigate how individuals react to different types of asymmetries in experimental two-player Tullock contests where contestants expend resources to win a prize. We compare the effects of three different sources of asymmetry: resources, abilities and possible outcomes. We find that overall competitive effort is greatest in the presence of asymm...
Article
Full-text available
Competition between groups is ubiquitous in social and economic life, and typically occurs between groups that are not created equal. Here we experimentally investigate the implications of this general observation on the unfolding of symmetric and asymmetric competition between groups that are either homogeneous or heterogeneous in the ability of t...
Article
Full-text available
The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an enormous burden on health systems, and guidelines have been developed to help healthcare practitioners when resource shortage imposes the choice on who to treat. However, little is known on the public perception of these guidelines and the underlying moral principles. Here, we assess on a sample of 1033 American...
Preprint
Full-text available
A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The Krupka-Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alt...
Preprint
Full-text available
The Covid-19 pandemic has placed an enormous burden on health systems and guidelines have been developed to help health care practitioners when resources shortage imposes the choice on who to treat. However, little is known on the public perception of these guidelines and the underlying moral principles. Here, we assess on a sample of N = 1033 Amer...
Preprint
Full-text available
We validate experimentally a new survey item to measure the preference for competition. The item, which measures participants' agreement with the statement "Competition brings the best out of me", predicts individuals' willingness to compete in the laboratory after controlling for their ability, beliefs, and risk attitude (Niederle and Vesterlund,...
Article
We experimentally investigate the role of moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experimental paradigm, proposers can increase the overall size of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. In a first study, we find that responders are not willing to engage in ‘immoral’ transactions onl...
Article
We conduct a real-effort experiment to test the effects of an affirmative action policy that reserves a share of the prize to subjects of a disadvantaged category in rent-seeking contests. We test three potential pitfalls of the affirmative action policy: (i) whether the introduction of the policy distorts effort and selection in the contest, (ii)...
Article
Full-text available
We propose a framework for identifying discrete behavioural types in experimental data. We re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contribution games. Using hierarchical clustering analysis, we construct a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies. We identify four types with distinct stereot...
Working Paper
Full-text available
We experimentally investigate the role of moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experimental paradigm, proposers can increase the overall size of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. In a first study, we find that responders are not willing to engage in ‘immoral’ transactions onl...
Preprint
Full-text available
In this paper, we systematically analyze and test how heterogeneity in abilities, both within and between groups, affects competition between groups.
Article
Full-text available
We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail...
Article
Full-text available
We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditure...