Francesco Caruso

• PhD
• Assistan Professor (RTDb) at University of Naples Federico II

Identifying a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of a two-player Stackelberg game could be not a manageable task, especially when the players have a continuum of actions and the follower’s best reply correspondence is not single-valued. Aim of the paper is to investigate the issue of construction of SPNEs in Stackelberg games by exploiting per...

The study on how equilibria behave when perturbations occur in the data of a game is a fundamental theme, since actions and payoffs of the players may be affected by uncertainty or trembles. In this paper, we investigate the asymptotic behavior and the variational stability of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in one-leader one-follower S...

We address the numerical approximation of bilevel problems where a Nash equilibrium has to be determined both in the upper level and in the lower level. Widely applied in engineering and economic frameworks, such models are an extension of the well-known Stackelberg duopoly model and of the classical bilevel optimization problem. In this paper, the...

In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follower among his optimal responses, one can associate different types of mathematical problems. We present formulations and solution concepts for such problems, together with their possible roles in bilevel optimization, and we illustrate the crucial is...

Regarding the approximation of Nash equilibria in games where the players have a continuum of strategies, there exist various algorithms based on best response dynamics and on its relaxed variants: from one step to the next, a player's strategy is updated by using explicitly a best response to the strategies of the other players that come from the...

In one-leader one-follower two-stage games, also called Stackelberg games, multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (henceforth SPNEs) arises when the best reply correspondence of the follower is not a single-valued map. This paper concerns a new method to approach SPNEs which makes use of a sequence of SPNEs of perturbed games where the bes...

The literature results about existence of Nash equilibria in continuous potential games exploit the property that any maximum point of the potential function is a Nash equilibrium of the game (the vice versa being not true) and those about uniqueness use strict concavity of the potential function. The following question arises: can we find sufficie...