Filipe Martins

This paper fits in the theory of international agreements by studying the success of stable coalitions of agents seeking the preservation of a public good. Extending Baliga and Maskin, we consider a model of N$$ N $$ homogeneous agents with quasi‐linear utilities of the form uj(rj;r)=rα−rj$$ {u}_j\left({r}_j;r\right)={r}^{\alpha }-{r}_j $$, where r...

In this work, we consider a classic international trade model with two countries and one firm in each country. The game has two stages: in the first stage, the governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either: (a) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (b) cooperatively (social optimum); in the second stage, firms...

We study an evolutionary dynamics for the contributions by agents to a common/public good in a generalized version of Baliga and Maskin’s environmental protection model. The dynamical equilibria consist of three scenarios: a single agent contributing to preserve the good with its optimal contribution level, and all the other agents being free-rider...

We make two fits of an ODE system with 5 equations that model immune response by CD4\(^+\) T cells with the presence of regulatory T cells (Tregs). We fit the simulations to data regarding gp61 and NP309 epitopes from mice infected with lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus LCMV. We optimized parameters relating to: the T cell maximum growth rate; the...

In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I&T), firm's innovation, and worker's levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I&T pov...

We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens , government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and...

The problem of the consumption or provision of common and public goods is a well known and well studied problem in economic sciences. The nature of the problem is the existence of non-excludable externalities which gives rise to incentives to free-riding behaviour. There are several economical frameworks trying to deal with the problem such as coal...

We fit an immune response model to data reporting the CD4+ T cell numbers from the 28 days following the infection of mice with lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus LCMV.We used an ODE model that was previously used to describe qualitatively the behaviour of CD4+ T cells, regulatory T cells (Tregs) and interleukine-2 (IL-2) density. The model conside...

The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that...

One fundamental question in biology is population extinction and persistence, i.e., stability/instability of the extinction equilibrium and of non-extinction equilibria. In the case of nonlinear matrix models for structured populations, a bifurcation theorem answers this question when the projection matrix is primitive by showing the existence of a...

We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stag...