Fernando Rudy Hiller

Fernando Rudy Hiller
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México | UNAM · Institute of Philosophical Research

PhD in Philosophy

About

16
Publications
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Introduction
I received a PhD in philosophy from Stanford in 2016. I work in ethics, mainly in moral responsibility. I am particularly interested in attributions of blame in situations of ignorance, both factual and moral. I also have interests in philosophy of action and in the theory of practical rationality. I am a research fellow at the Institute of Philosophical Research, UNAM, in Mexico City.

Publications

Publications (16)
Article
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Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this paper I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and critici...
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In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions....
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This paper discusses the commitment account of assertion (CAA), according to which two necessary conditions for asserting that p are the speaker's undertaking a commitment to justify her assertion in the face of challenges and the speaker's licensing the audience to defer justificatory challenges back to her. Relying on what I call the "cancellatio...
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In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity —which consists in making coher...
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The first objective of this paper is to present an interpretation of Groundwork III which aims to establish two main points: first, that Kant offers there a theoretically-grounded deduction (in a Kantian sense) of freedom/morality-as-autonomy; second, that Kant also offers a separate deduction of the categorical imperative. Thus, contrary to what s...
Chapter
In this chapter I survey the two main families of views about the moral psychology of moral responsibility, i.e., about the mental capacities or psychological functioning that distinguishes responsible agents from non-responsible agents. These are self-expression views, which maintain that responsible agency is essentially about being able to expre...
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In this article I discuss David Shoemaker’s recently published piece “Responsibility: The State of the Question. Fault Lines in the Foundations.” While agreeing with Shoemaker on many points, I argue for a more unified diagnosis of the seemingly intractable debates that plague (what I call) “responsibility studies.” I claim that, of the five fault...
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Many philosophers think that a necessary condition on moral blameworthiness is that the wrongdoer can reasonably be expected to avoid the action for which she is blamed. Those who think so assume as a matter of course that the expectations at issue here are normative expectations that contrast with the non-normative or predictive expectations we fo...
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Non‐reflectivist real self views claim that people are morally responsible for all and only those bits of conduct that express their true values and cares, regardless of whether they have endorsed them or not. A phenomenon that is widely cited in support of these views is inverse akrasia, that is, cases in which a person is praiseworthy for having...
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An important recent debate in the philosophy of action has focused on whether there is a persistence requirement on intention and, if there is, what its proper formulation should be. At one extreme, Bratman has defended what I call Strong Persistence, according to which it’s irrational to abandon an intention except for an alternative that is bette...
Article
I examine the question of whether people are sometimes morally blameworthy for what I call ‘slips’: wrongful actions or omissions that a good-willed (or at least no ill-willed) agent inadvertently performs due to a non-negligent failure to be aware of relevant considerations. I focus in particular on the capacitarian answer to this question, accord...
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In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by fo...
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In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensit...
Article
An article on the epistemic or knowledge condition for moral responsibility, written for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/
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In this discussion I review John Broome's characterization of normative reasons, consider a problem raised by Jonathan Dancy, and explore possible solutions on Broome's behalf. I conclude that Broome's account faces an internal tension.
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La imagen de Andrés Manuel López Obrador fue construida como "un peligro para México" durante la campaña presidencial de 2006. En particular, se estudian los mecanismos semánticos empleados en los spots negativos patrocinados por el Partido Acción Nacional para crear una imagen de aquél como un político cuyos programas de gobierno generarían endeud...