Elias Asproudis

• PhD
• Lecturer/Assistant Professor at Swansea University

We consider a Cournot duopoly consisting of two geographically separated firms, each associated with a local environmental-friendly trade union that exhibits climate solidarity. In the basic model, firms choose abatement technologies prior to bargaining over wages and employment with the unions. We show that wage demanded is decreasing as the union...

This paper investigates the abatement technology choice in Cournot-Bertrand, as well as in pure Cournot and Bertrand duopolies. It is argued that, under certain conditions, the Bertrand firm will choose a “dirtier” technology compared to its Cournot rival. Furthermore, when competing in quantities, firms choose greener technologies than when compet...

In this article, we explain how several environmental groups are attempting to influence environmental policy by changing the total amount of pollution allowed within the tradable emissions market. We highlight the case where environmental groups may participate in strategic behaviour to resemble co-operative coalition behaviour. We present an inte...

We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm’s decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards imp...

This paper investigates the effect of trade union structure on firms' technological choices when unions care about environmental protection. We compare a decentralized with a centralized union structure in a Cournot duopoly. Our results suggest that a decentralized structure provides higher incentives for the investment in cleaner technologies, alt...

In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental group to the reduction of emissions. For high values o...

If successful, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the United States and the European Union (EU) will account for over 40% of global GDP,1 making it the world’s largest free trade zone.

This paper analyses the behaviour, influence and role of third parties in tradable permits markets. Following the literature, it focuses on a framework in order to understand how society and third parties react against the firms’ emissions due to their participation in the tradable permits market. Therefore the paper reveals the tradable permits me...

Since the first environmental movement, a variety of conditions have influenced the Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations’ strategies and decisions. This diachronic evolution is dictated by the motivations and the objectives of the environmental groups. Following a review of the literature, an analytical framework for studying targets or mot...

I investigate the influence of the union structure on firms' environmental technological choice when the unions care for the environmental protection. Specifically, I compare the decentralised with the centralised structure under a Cournot duopoly. I show that the decentralised structure could always provide higher incentives to the firms for the a...

We model competition in an emissions trading system (ETS) as a game between two firms and environmental group. In a previous stage, firms endogenously choose their manufacturing technologies. Our results show that there is a U-shape relationship between how polluting the chosen technology is and the degree of the environmentalists’ impure altruism....