# Elena MolisUniversity of Granada | UGR · Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica

Elena Molis

PhD in Economics

## About

18

Publications

1,332

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245

Citations

## Publications

Publications (18)

Economic inequality is rising globally and due to developments in information technologies and globalization, nowadays individuals are more exposed to such an inequality than ever. Recent studies show that exposure to inequality may shape economic decisions. In this article, we test whether contributions in the public goods game are sensitive to in...

We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the so...

According to Alesina and Angeletos (2005), societies are less redistributive but more efficient when the median voter believes that effort and talent are much more important than luck in determining income. We test these results through a lab experiment in which participants vote over the tax rate and their pre-tax income is determined according to...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce maximum irreversible matchings and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al., 2006) and maximum stable matchings (Tan 1990, 1991b). These solution concepts are all core consistent. We find that almost stable matchings are...

The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We sh...

Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very differen...

We analyze absorbing sets as a solution for roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution provides the set of stable matchings when it is non-empty and some matchings with interesting properties otherwise. In particular, all matchings in an absorbing set have the greatest number of agents with no incentive to change partners. These “sati...

Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very differen...

There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism cal...

There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism cal...

Different solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set, ...) can be defined using either a direct or an indirect dominance relation. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we...

We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, as their offering and accepting decisions are only guided by the objective of improving upon the status quo. However, isolated individual mistakes, that do not disappear...

In this work, we use the experimental method to study agents decentralized decision-making in roommate markets in order to form a finite sequence of (myopic) blocking pairs to a stable matching. By using the approach by Haruvy an Unver [6], we describe the problem as a repeated roommate market and analyze the convergence outcomes of this process un...

For solvable roommate problems with strict preferences Diamantoudi et al. (Games Econ Behav 48: 18–28, 2004) show that for
any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blocking pairs leading to a stable matching. In
this paper, we define P-stable matchings associated with stable partitions and, by using a proposal-reje...

The lack of stability in some matching problems suggets that alternative solution concepts to the core migth be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution, wich always exists, either gives the matchings in the core or predicts some othe...

## Projects

Project (1)