Denis Claude

Denis Claude
University of Burgundy | UB · UFR Science Economique et de Gestion

Ph.D. in Economics

About

19
Publications
982
Reads
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56
Citations
Citations since 2016
6 Research Items
25 Citations
201620172018201920202021202201234567
201620172018201920202021202201234567
201620172018201920202021202201234567
201620172018201920202021202201234567
Introduction
Denis Claude is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Burgundy and a member of the Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon (LEDi: EA 7467). Denis Claude's fields of specialization are industrial organization and environmental economics.
Additional affiliations
September 2011 - present
University of Burgundy
Position
  • Professor (Assistant)
March 2010 - September 2011
French National Centre for Scientific Research
Position
  • Research Associate
Description
  • Migration, Climate change, Differential game,
October 2006 - July 2008
HEC Montréal - École des Hautes Études commerciales
Position
  • PostDoc Position
Description
  • Differential games, Environmental economics, Tourism, Reputation, Green market, Green infrastructure
Education
December 1996 - December 2001
Université de Montpellier
Field of study
  • Economics

Publications

Publications (19)
Article
This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogenei...
Article
Recent contributions in tourism economics acknowledge that the tourism market is imperfectly competitive and, as such, should be studied from an industrial organization perspective. This approach seems especially relevant to shed lights on one issue of importance for tourism destinations: how to achieve sustainable tourism development? Indeed, it h...
Article
Previous research revealed that the strategic role of delegation contracts disappears if two quantity‐setting firms outsource input production to a monopolistic supplier. I show that this role is restored if the assumption of a downstream duopoly is relaxed. Thus, delegation contracts allow downstream profit‐maximizing owners to commit their firms...
Article
Full-text available
Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations re-lated to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategicdelegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. It is shown that strategic marketinteraction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy...
Preprint
Full-text available
We introduce price-markup objectives into a model of supply function competition. We characterize the corresponding supply-function equilibrium and study its qualitative properties. Adherence to price-markup targets is conducive to reduced market competition and increased firm profitability. While pursuing such goals reduces social welfare, welfare...
Chapter
This paper explores the link between upstream input pricing and downstream strategic delegation decisions. It complements earlier contributions by studying how environmental emissions and tax payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from profit maximization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are c...
Article
This paper explores the dynamic properties of price‐based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogenei...
Article
Full-text available
This paper studies the optimal environmental policy in a mixed market when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule,...
Article
Full-text available
This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity compétition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax ru...
Article
Full-text available
This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogenei...
Article
Full-text available
This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.
Article
In this article, the authors consider mixed oligopoly markets for differentiated goods, where private and public firms compete either in price or quantity. This is a study of the welfare effect of privatization— interpreted as partial strategic delegation of the public firm to a private manager with profit concern. It is shown that partial privatiz...
Chapter
Full-text available
This paper focuses on the economic assessment of environmental policies that rely on the participation and cooperation of local communities. It argues that such policies have an intrinsic value that is ignored by the usual methods of economic valuation. This omission results from an adhesion to welfarism, a doctrine according to which the evaluatio...
Article
Full-text available
Consumers do not necessarily understand the economic trade-offs that determine the optimal level of pollution and the functioning of environmental policy instruments. When the optimal policy is implemented, market mechanisms ensure that consumption decisions are guided by correct price signals. However, green consumers may not simply react to these...

Network

Cited By

Projects

Projects (3)
Project
This project brings together a set of contributions that study how firms might behave under incomplete information.
Project
This project brings together a set of contributions that study how delegation decisions affect (or are affected) by different types of externalities.