Denis Claude

University of Burgundy | UB · UFR Science Economique et de Gestion

This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogenei...

Recent contributions in tourism economics acknowledge that the tourism market is imperfectly competitive and, as such, should be studied from an industrial organization perspective. This approach seems especially relevant to shed lights on one issue of importance for tourism destinations: how to achieve sustainable tourism development? Indeed, it h...

Previous research revealed that the strategic role of delegation contracts disappears if two quantity‐setting firms outsource input production to a monopolistic supplier. I show that this role is restored if the assumption of a downstream duopoly is relaxed. Thus, delegation contracts allow downstream profit‐maximizing owners to commit their firms...

Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations re-lated to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategicdelegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. It is shown that strategic marketinteraction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy...

We introduce price-markup objectives into a model of supply function competition. We characterize the corresponding supply-function equilibrium and study its qualitative properties. Adherence to price-markup targets is conducive to reduced market competition and increased firm profitability. While pursuing such goals reduces social welfare, welfare...

Review of: Theory of Innovation Failure and Application in Aerospace Missions, Qeios.

This paper explores the link between upstream input pricing and downstream strategic delegation decisions. It complements earlier contributions by studying how environmental emissions and tax payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from profit maximization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are c...

This paper explores the dynamic properties of price‐based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogenei...

This paper studies the optimal environmental policy in a mixed market when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule,...

This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity compétition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax ru...

This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogenei...

This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.

In this article, the authors consider mixed oligopoly markets for differentiated goods, where private and public firms compete either in price or quantity. This is a study of the welfare effect of privatization— interpreted as partial strategic delegation of the public firm to a private manager with profit concern. It is shown that partial privatiz...

This paper focuses on the economic assessment of environmental policies that rely on the participation and cooperation of local communities. It argues that such policies have an intrinsic value that is ignored by the usual methods of economic valuation. This omission results from an adhesion to welfarism, a doctrine according to which the evaluatio...

Consumers do not necessarily understand the economic trade-offs that determine the optimal level of pollution and the functioning of environmental policy instruments. When the optimal policy is implemented, market mechanisms ensure that consumption decisions are guided by correct price signals. However, green consumers may not simply react to these...