Debora Digioacchino

Debora Digioacchino
Sapienza University of Rome | la sapienza · Department of Economics and Law

PhD

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40
Publications
2,376
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147
Citations

Publications

Publications (40)
Article
In this paper, we present an agent‐based model in which taxpayers ‘live’ in a network and care about their social reputation. Individuals decide whether to pay or to evade taxes considering the expected economic net benefit and the reputational cost from tax evasion. Individuals differ in income and in the weight they attach to social reputation, w...
Article
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This paper provides a simple model of hierarchical education to study the political determination of public education spending and its allocation between different tiers of education. The model integrates private education decisions by allowing parents, who are differentiated according to income and human capital, to top up public expenditures with...
Article
We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale...
Article
This paper investigates how mass media potentially act on preferences for redistribution. Our hypothesis is that media contribute to shaping the value system of a person, which affects support for redistribution. A theoretical model is proposed which combines demand- and supply-driven media bias. On the demand side, the model considers two types of...
Article
Standard redistributive arguments suggest that the impact of household income on preferences for public education spending should be negative, because wealthier families are likely to oppose the redistributive effect of public funding. However, the empirical evidence does not confirm this prediction. This paper addresses this 'puzzle' by focusing o...
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This paper studies the effect of income inequality on tax evasion. To discuss the topic, we present a simple model, based on Benabouand Tirole [1], that incorporates incentives for tax compliance such as punishment and fines, intrinsic motivation and social norms. Since we consider a regressive system of incentives to comply, income inequality incr...
Chapter
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are recognized as a key factor in socioeconomic development and societal evolution. According to the European Commission, “the ICT sector is directly responsible for 5 percent of European GDP, with a market value of € 660 billion annually, but it contributes far more to overall productivity growth (2...
Article
Firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and the education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social pla...
Article
Empirical cross-country evidence suggests that countries position themselves along a sort of Market Regulation (MR)-Social Expenditure (SE) trade-off "line". Theoretically, it is clear that there exists a certain degree of substitutability between SE and MR, since both can provide a cushion against socio-economic risks. However, market regulation i...
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This paper argues that when considering the political viability of deregulation policies, it is crucial to take into account the political sustainability of fiscal measures to compensate the losers of reforms or to accommodate any temporary negative effect on aggregate demand. This implies that the political determinants of market regulation (MR...
Article
In a two-period model, firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chose...
Article
Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and...
Article
It has been argued that the notion of a European social model is misleading and that there are in fact different European social models with different features and different performances in terms of efficiency and equity. In this paper, we look at the welfare state from a political economy point of view and interpret the different regimes as possib...
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Recently, it has been argued that the notion of a European social model is misleading and that there are in fact different European social models with different features and different performances in terms of efficiency and equity. In this paper, we look at the welfare state from a political economy point of view and interpret the different regimes...
Article
This paper proposes a stylized two-period, two-country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and loca...
Article
Competition in public administration is often advocated as a solution to bureaucrats’ corruption. However, there are no well developed analyses of how competition could succeed and the issue of its detailed design has not been carefully addressed so far. In this paper, we put forward a series of models that help understand what competition in publi...
Article
This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulat...
Article
We study interactions between two policymakers, central bank and government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the first stage, the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution for the second stage, in which a differential game is played between the two policymakers. It is shown that, if...
Article
Full-text available
This paper proposes a stylized two-period two-country model illustrating the role played by the distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country’s level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy as the outcome of the interaction between the domestic government and interest groups (locals and foreigners) w...
Article
Full-text available
The incidence of public expenditure in education appears to be skewed in favour of the middle and upper classes. This paper inquires into the determinants of this bias using a political economy approach. We develop a model with two time periods with an election occurring between the two. In the first period, agents differ in their initial wealth. I...
Article
This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary-fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis-à-vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smo...
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Full-text available
We use a simple theoretical model of a monetary union where myopic discretionary fiscal policies generate excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following a shock. We advocate the adoption of a flexible debt targeting approach. By setting a long-term debt target and by raising the political cost associ...
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Full-text available
The main arguments for the Stability and Growth Pact turn on the need to protect the European Central Bank against inflationary pressures from the fiscally prodigal countries (repudiation through inflation). Taking a political economy approach, in this paper we inquire into the conditions under which national governments may reach the decision for...
Article
We model a two-party representative democracy with citizen-candidate in which the leader is elected while the central-banker is appointed by the leader. Assuming that fiscal policy is 'more important' than monetary policy, we show that, if some individuals who dislike inflation get organized in a lobby and offer campaign contribution to the party t...
Article
Full-text available
This paper studies the interaction between two autonomous policymakers, the central bank and the government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the first stage the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution to be applied in the second stage, in which a differential game is played between...
Article
Full-text available
We develop a two period model to investigate what makes the promise to repay public debt credible. We explor a political solution excluding any role for long-run reputational arguments. There are two sources of heterogeneity among individuals: wealth and income. Differences in asset holdings determine individuals’ preferences over monetary policy;...
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Full-text available
In cases where policy makers accept "bribes" offered by organised lobbies or interested parties, government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adapt this structure to model debt repudiation. We consider a one-period model in which two generations, parents and children, are present, and debt titles are unevenly...
Article
In cases where policy makers accept "bribes" offered by organised lobbies or interested parties, the government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adapt this structure to model debt repudiation. We consider a one-period model where two generations are present, parents and children, and debt titles are unevenly...
Article
Full-text available
. In cases where policy makers accept "bribes" offered by organised lobbies or interested parties, the government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adopt such structure to model debt repudiation. We consider a one period model where the government has to decide whether and to what extent to honour inherited p...
Article
We simulate a ‘fictitious play’ model with bounded memory and mistakes by agents. This model gives global convergence to a unique equilibrium. Our simulations suggest that in 2×2 games the risk dominant equilibrium is selected, both in the case of two players and in that of a large population with random matching.
Article
Full-text available
This paper proposes a stylized two-period two-country OLG model illustrating the potential role played by the nationality of investors on the incentives for a government to renege on its domestic debt. The two countries belong to a Monetary Union where monetary policy is decided by the Union’s Central Bank, while fiscal policy is set by each nati...
Article
This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulat...
Article
Full-text available
We model a two-party representative democracy with citizen-candidate in which the governor is elected while the central-banker is appointed by the governor. Assuming that fiscal policy is "more important" than monetary policy, we show that, if some individuals who dislike inflation get organised in a lobby and offer campaign contribution to the par...

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