David Lagziel

David Lagziel
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev | bgu · Department of Economics

Doctor of Philosophy

About

14
Publications
1,510
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
12
Citations
Citations since 2017
9 Research Items
12 Citations
201720182019202020212022202301234
201720182019202020212022202301234
201720182019202020212022202301234
201720182019202020212022202301234
Introduction
Dealing with screening\selection problems and applied theory.
Additional affiliations
October 2017 - present
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Position
  • Lecturer
June 2012 - September 2017
Tel Aviv University
Position
  • PhD Student

Publications

Publications (14)
Article
Full-text available
This paper studies the impact of noisy signals on screening processes. It deals with a decision problem in which a decision-maker screens a set of elements based on noisy unbiased evaluations. Given that the decision-maker uses threshold strategies, we show that additional binary noise can potentially improve a screening, an effect that resembles a...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study dynamic screening problems where elements are subjected to noisy evaluations and, in every stage, some of the elements are rejected while the remaining ones are independently re-evaluated in subsequent stages. We prove that, ceteris paribus, the quality of a dynamic screening process is not monotonic in the number of stages. Specifically,...
Article
Full-text available
We define and characterize the notion of strong robustness to incomplete information, whereby a Nash equilibrium in a game u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{documen...
Article
Full-text available
We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage...
Article
This paper deals with the issue of screening. It focuses on a decision maker who, based on noisy unbiased assessments, screens elements from a general set. Our analysis shows that stricter screening not only reduces the number of accepted elements, but possibly reduces their average expected value. We provide a characterization for optimal threshol...
Preprint
Full-text available
This paper deals with the issue of manipulation. We formulate a general competition framework where private values are attributed to players, along with the ability to manipulate these values using costly noise. Although manipulation carries no clear advantages, our analysis shows that a stiff competition leads to a unique equilibrium where all pla...
Preprint
Full-text available
This paper offers two related insights into the problem of screening. The first concerns a decision maker who screens elements, from a general set, based on noisy unbiased assessments. We show that stricter screening not only reduces the number of accepted elements, but possibly derogates their average expected value. The second insight extends the...
Article
Full-text available
A decision maker repeatedly exerts effort to produce output. His past average performance defines his reward. We show that the decision maker's optimal strategy dictates a cyclic, oscillatory performance throughout the stages. Our model applies to a wide-range of economic settings where agents are subjected to history-based payoffs, including an R&...
Article
Full-text available
We design incentives schemes for portfolio managers that filter out suboptimal portfolio managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in the single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only obser...
Article
Full-text available
In this paper we offer two contributions to the field of credit auctions. First, we compare first- and second-price credit auctions and provide solvency-dependent conditions such that one mechanism dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs of all the parties involved. In addition, we present a new possibility of using bid caps in credit auct...
Article
Full-text available
An investor has some funds invested through investment firms. She has additional funds to allocate among these investment firms according to the firms' performance. While the investor tries to maximize her total expected earnings, each investment firm tries to maximize the overall expected funds it manages. A rule that determines how funds are to b...
Research
Full-text available
An investor has some funds invested through investment firms. She also has additional funds to allocate among these investment firms according to the firms' performance. While the investor tries to maximize her total expected earnings, each investment firm tries to maximize the overall amount of funds it will be allocated to manage. A reward scheme...
Article
A decision maker (DM) has some funds invested through two investment firms. She wishes to allocate additional funds according to the firms' earnings. The DM, on the one hand, tries to maximize the total expected earnings, while the firms, on the other hand, try to maximize the overall expected funds they manage. In this paper we prove that, for eve...
Article
We consider a sequential decision problem where the decision maker is informed of the actual payoff with delay. We introduce a new condition, which generalises the condition given by Blackwell and ensures that the decision maker can approach a fixed closed and convex set under delay. We show how the convergence rate to the approachable set is sensi...

Network

Cited By

Projects

Project (1)
Project
Design competitions between portfolio managers to generate optimal expected results for the investors.