



CHAPTER 28

ORGANICISM IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

DAVID BOURCHIER

INTRODUCTION

IN May 1945, Indonesia's leading jurist, Dr. Supomo (1903–1958), outlined his vision for the soon-to-be-independent Southeast Asian nation. Drawing on his expertise as a customary law expert, he told an assembly of nationalists tasked with writing a constitution, “In the indigenous Indonesian system of government, officials are leaders who are unified with the people and are always obliged to maintain the unity and harmony of their society.” On this basis, Supomo argued that Indonesia's constitution should be based on what he called an “integralist state concept” (*staatsidee integralistik*) or the “family state principle” (*negara kekeluargaan*) in which there would be

no dualism between state and civil society. There will be no need for basic rights or human rights for the individual against the state, because individuals are organic parts of the state, each with their own position and responsibilities to contribute to the glory of the state. (Kusuma 2004, 127)¹

Indonesia today is a democracy, but the notion that the country's political and legal institutions should reflect “traditional cultural values” has played a significant part in Indonesia's modern history. The influence of integralism, or organicism as I refer to it here, reached a high point during the thirty-three-year dictatorship of President Soeharto (1921–2008). While Soeharto's New Order regime (1966–1998) is usually characterized as modernizing and developmentalist, it also presented itself as a champion of a uniquely Indonesian approach to authority and decision-making, one that gave pride of place to harmony, hierarchy, and consensus. Soeharto's ideologues frequently likened the state to a big family or village, presided over by a benevolent father figure. Organicism



provided the regime with both a legitimizing ideology and a stick with which to beat its critics for adhering to “imported” philosophies, including liberal democracy.

What makes organicism relevant to students of comparative political theory is that it represents a distinct approach to politics developed in conversation with both Asian sources and Western political theory. Since, I will argue, organicism shares features with ideologies adopted by conservative elites in some other countries, it also provides fertile grounds for comparison. It is a helpful case study of ideational borrowing and adaptation across spatial, temporal, and cultural boundaries.

Indonesia is the world’s fourth largest country and one of its most ethnically and religiously diverse. Thanks to its natural wealth and its strategic location straddling the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it has had a long and complex history of interaction with India, China, the Middle East, and Europe. Animist, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Islamic worldviews exist side by side. Centuries of often violent colonization by the Netherlands brought scores of kingdoms and sultanates under a single authority, creating the boundaries and administrative architecture of what has been known since 1945 as the Republic of Indonesia. Dutch rule exposed Indonesians to the ideological battles that raged in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nationalism, communism, social democracy, and liberalism all left their mark, as did a number of schools of Islamic thought influenced by thinkers from the Arab world. Historically speaking, then, Indonesia is as diverse ideologically as it is culturally. Organicism is but one among several competing streams of Indonesian political thinking.

My investigation is guided by some general premises regarding the nature of ideologies. First, ideologies are never completely consistent or coherent. Stuart Hall’s (1986, 6) contention that “there are always loose ends, breaks in the logic, gaps between theory and practice, and internal contradictions in any current of thought” is a crucial starting point for the study of any ideology. Second, ideologies are historically contingent. Examining organicism over time demonstrates clearly how its prominence in political discourse has fluctuated according to specific political circumstances. Directly related to this is the third premise that ideologies are always contested. Organicism has always existed alongside and in competition with other ideologies. This has clearly influenced the particular configuration that it has taken at different periods in history.

While the language of organicist ideology is overwhelmingly cultural, it is best understood as the product of a specific set of historical circumstances, interests, and institutions. My approach in this essay is informed by Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge (Mannheim 1993) and the poststructuralist writings of Edward Said (1994). The key insight of these authors for current purposes is that social phenomena ought to be analyzed with reference to the political and historical context in which knowledge about them was generated and reproduced. Ideologies, too, must be situated in their sociological context. As Carol Gluck (1985, 8) put it, ideologies have “dates, names and faces.”

The methodology adopted here then, is primarily historical. To understand organicism in Indonesia, it is necessary to explain how it originated, why it developed as a stream of political thinking, who promoted it, and how it was deployed in the Indonesian political system.



I begin with a brief overview of organicism as a concept, tracing its intellectual genealogy and the uses to which it has been put by political elites in various contexts. I then examine the study of organicism in Indonesia, making the point that to understand it primarily in culturalist terms overlooks the profound extent to which it developed in conversation with Western ideas of the East. In the main body, I present new research on how organicism developed in Indonesia, highlighting the role played by conservative nationalist elites influenced by interwar Dutch scholarship on legal anthropology and by Japanese cultural nationalism, both of which were indebted to some extent to German theories of the *Volksgeist*. I detail how organicism found expression in Indonesian constitutional thinking, in conservative political party programs, in the corporatist structures of political representation between the 1960s and the 1990s, and, perhaps most important, in the ideology of Soeharto's New Order regime. In this sense, it foreshadows the exceptionalist "Asian values" rhetoric espoused by political leaders in Singapore and Malaysia in the 1990s. The conclusion observes that while each manifestation of organicism will be different, there are common features that enable comparison across cultures and movements, including right-wing nationalist movements currently on the rise in the West.

ORGANICISM AND ITS CONTEXTS

"Organicism" has been used in many different disciplines, including metaphysics, aesthetics, music, literary criticism, and biology.² It is used here to describe a tradition of thinking about human societies as harmonious wholes, bound together by the force of custom and tradition. The essential idea is that political communities (or states) function like natural organisms in which the parts, be they individuals, families, or interest groups, exist to contribute to the well-being of the whole. The emphasis on organic unity and the "common good" requires that collective interests take precedence over individual or sectional interests and consensus takes precedence over institutionalized conflict, whether in the form of checks and balances, political contestation, or political rights. There is no clear distinction in this vision of politics between state and society or between rulers and ruled. Just as a head needs a body, a body needs a head.

Students of the history of European political thinking will recognize this concept. Analogies between the state and the human body go back almost as far as Western political philosophy. Aristotle's conjecture that "the state is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual since the whole is of necessity prior to the part" (*Politics* I: II: 12) was a key reference in European political thought for centuries. The notion that there was an underlying natural order to society and that it was incumbent on the authorities, conceived in either secular or religious terms, to realize the common good had a pervasive influence as a result of its incorporation into the corpus of Roman law, medieval natural law, and Catholic doctrine.

Organicist ideas entered modern political theory as part of the conservative reaction to the individualist and rationalistic philosophies of the Enlightenment in general and



the French Revolution in particular. Edmund Burke (1729–1797) was the best known exponent in English, but the most influential organicist theorizing took place on the European continent among conservative Catholics and Romantic nationalists. The Catholic Church was a major target of the French revolutionaries and rejected outright the Enlightenment philosophies that had inspired it. The Vatican continued to promote its vision of society as an integrated spiritual family for the next two centuries through papal encyclicals and the writings of Catholic social theorists (Landauer 1983, 21–37).

Nationalist intellectuals in preunification Germany developed an alternative stream of organic theorizing based on the idea, attributed to Johan Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), that nations are defined by their *Volksgeist*—their historically evolved culture, language, and traditions (Berlin 2006, 223–236). In conscious opposition to French liberal universalism and social contract theory, German thinkers, including Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861), developed the theory that law was legitimate only to the extent that it was the product of slow and unconscious distillation of the historical and living traditions of a particular people (van Eikema Hommes 1979, 191–192). Adam Müller (1779–1829), the foremost political theorist of German Romanticism, conceived of the state as a comprehensive organic entity that embodied “all the needs of the heart, the spirit and the body” (O’Sullivan 1976, 66–67). Rejecting the “Roman” distinction between private and public, Müller held that “nature” had “already solved the constitutional problem in advance in every family” (Müller, as quoted in Landauer 1983, 11). Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was a celebrated exponent of the state–organism analogy and the *Volksgeist*, although he was concerned not with preserving rural tradition but with forging a conservative alternative to laissez-faire liberalism and strengthening the bureaucratic Prussian state.

In the early and mid-twentieth century, Catholic-inspired organicist theories were attractive to fascists in Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and, to a lesser extent, Germany because of their rejection of both liberalism and communism and their prescription of an all-encompassing corporate state. Organicism provided fascist movements with “an ideological formula that was at once populist by virtue of its appeal to communitarian sentiment, and reactionary in that it legitimized the suppression of political rights and the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of leaders in the name of the common good” (Bourchier 2015, 17).

With the demise of fascism, organicist theory lost all respectability among political theorists and was damned “beyond redemption” (Mure 1949, 205). Its subordination of freedom and individual rights led it to be considered intrinsically “undemocratic, fascist and totalitarian in its consequences” (Weldon 1947, 39–40). Opprobrium from theorists, however, did not mean that organicism had disappeared as a phenomenon. In Latin America, for instance, Alfred Stepan (1978) described the influence of “organic-statist” principles, informed by Catholic and Roman law theories of association, in shaping the corporatist system of interest group representation.

In his study of corporatism in Peru, Stepan provided a helpful way of analyzing organicism, charting a path between structuralism (Schmitter 1974) and culturalism (Wiarda 1973, 206–235). While Stepan lent toward structuralism, he argued (1978, 54n19) that “a sophisticated analysis of political cultures includes such non-*Weltanschauung*



concrete characteristics as different legal, institutional, and administrative historical traditions.” By focusing on these often-neglected aspects of the Iberian colonial heritage and by identifying their *cultural carriers*—most notably the legal system and the Catholic Church—Stepan was able to transcend standard structural approaches without resorting to essentializing and ahistorical values-based arguments. On this basis, Stepan argued, organicism should be understood as three things at once: a normative framework, a set of organizing principles, and a legitimizing formula “available” for use and adaptation. In a statement that could just as well have applied to Indonesia, Stepan observed that Latin American elites had often invoked organicist formulas, including communitarian ideologies and corporatist administrative devices, in response to “their perceptions of impending crises of modernisation and control” (Stepan 1978, 40). This provides a helpful way of thinking about organicism in the Indonesian context because it focuses attention on the structural legacies of colonialism and instrumental uses of organicism without overlooking the cultural appeal of the concept, without which it would have no traction as a legitimizing device.

THE STUDY OF ORGANICISM IN INDONESIA

Any discussion of political ideas in Indonesia must recognize the centrality of the state ideology of *Pancasila*, the “five principles” articulated in 1945 by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno (1901–1970). The five principles in themselves are quite unexceptional: belief in one supreme God; just and civilized humanity; national unity; democracy guided by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people. But such is the symbolic significance of Pancasila, which is embedded in the preamble of the constitution and depicted in the national coat of arms, that it acts as a “frame” (Oliver and Johnston 2000) within which most ideological contestation takes place in Indonesia. Thanks to a concerted and intensive “ideological education” program imposed over a period of decades by the Soeharto regime, Pancasila was invested with organicist meaning that survives to this day in conservative quarters. Pancasila came to stand for “uniquely Indonesian” values of harmony, hierarchy, and consensus. Soeharto called his system of government Pancasila ~~democracy~~ “based on the family principle” (Lubis 1993, 174) and promoted the concept of a Pancasila press, Pancasila industrial relations, and so forth in an attempt to lend cultural authenticity to his brand of authoritarianism. The terms “organicism” or “integralism,” then, are not in everyday use, but are implicit in the institutional and ideological legacies of the New Order that are still very much present.

Before introducing the seminal texts and writers in the organicist tradition, I will look briefly at some of the scholarly literature surveying the phenomenon of organicism in Indonesia. Feith and Castles’s (1970) pioneering anthology of Indonesian political thinking identified “Javanese traditionalism” as one of five streams of political thought in Indonesia during the 1945–1965 period alongside radical nationalism, Islam, democratic



socialism, and communism. They observed that while the political parties that embraced this outlook were never successful electorally, many mainstream politicians from the island of Java (which accounts for over half the population of Indonesia) were influenced by aristocratic Javanese notions of statecraft, which included a “yearning for order, hierarchy and tranquillity” and an aversion to egalitarianism and Islam (Feith and Castles 1970, 178–180). The authors associated this tradition with Java’s Hindu–Buddhist past and helpfully identified its main cultural carriers as the *pamong praja*, the corps of territorial administrators who served both the Dutch and the Japanese colonial regimes. As a salaried caste, the *pamong praja* and indeed many of their nationalist offspring shared a distaste for democratic political party competition, seeing it as disruptive of the social hierarchy within which they enjoyed a relatively privileged position. But while Javanese cultural ideals have indeed influenced the mindset and language of many leading politicians in Indonesia, Javanese traditionalism does not capture the scope or range of influences of what I have called organicism. What the most prominent organicists have in common is not so much their Javanese origins—they are ethnically diverse—but their social conservatism and a legal education.

David Reeve made a major contribution in his 1985 book *Golkar, an Alternative to the Party System*, in which he explored the philosophical origins of the corporatist “functional group” system of political representation utilized by presidents Sukarno and Soeharto. He identified a broad collectivist tradition of Indonesian political thinking shared by right- and left-wing nationalists that emerged during the colonial era in opposition to Western individualistic and liberal conceptions of politics. He rightly focused much attention on Supomo, the key thinker in this tradition, highlighting his affinity with aristocratic Javanese principles of philosophy and statecraft, including the Javanese mystical notion of the unity of *kawula* and *gusti*, which can be translated as “God and human,” “lord and servant,” or “ruler and ruled.” While Reeve also emphasized the importance of Supomo’s customary law studies, he underestimated the influence on him of illiberal European streams of political and legal thinking. In highlighting the indigenous origins of Supomo’s “family principle,” Reeve overlooked the commonalities between organicist political thinking and functional groupism in other contexts, making comparisons problematic.

Another influential study on the topic of organicism was written by Indonesian intellectual Marsillam Simanjuntak in 1989. Titled *Unsur Hegelian dalam pandangan negara integralistik* (Hegelian elements in the integralist state perspective), the Master of Law thesis, published as a book in 1994, critiqued the Soeharto regime’s claim that Indonesia’s constitution should be interpreted as a manifestation of Supomo’s “integralist” theory articulated in the constitutional debates of 1945 (Simanjuntak 1994). Drawing on the original transcripts of the 1945 debates, Simanjuntak made a powerful case that Supomo had been defeated by advocates of popular sovereignty and that the constitution should not be interpreted through an organicist prism. He also attempted to discredit the claim that Supomo was primarily inspired by indigenous customary law by drawing attention to Supomo’s explicit praise of Nazi Germany and wartime Japan, as well as his positive references to European philosophers, including Hegel, in his seminal speech. Simanjuntak’s



polemic had a significant impact politically, causing regime ideologues to temper their promotion of *staatside integralistik* and strengthening the hand of those arguing for a democratic interpretation of the constitution (Bourchier 2015, 220–230). Simanjuntak drew attention to parallels between Supomo and Hegel's concept of the state, but left many questions unanswered, including how a customary law expert like Supomo came to be influenced by Hegel and whether indigenous ideas had any role at all in Supomo's thinking.

Many of the gaps in Simanjuntak's work were filled by Peter Burns (1989, 2004) in his masterful studies of Dutch legal anthropology and its legacy in Indonesia. Burns explored not only the often-turbulent politics of customary law in colonial Indonesia but also the theoretical premises of the Leiden school, an influential group of legal anthropologists based at Leiden University, whose influence on government policy peaked in the 1920s. He demonstrated that the Leiden scholars were informed by German Romanticist von Savigny's approach to law as the distillation of cultural traditions and their prescription that law in Indonesia, at least as it applied to indigenous Indonesians, should be based on customary law rather than on abstract principles derived from the Western democratic tradition. The influence of this legal theory on Supomo and other legal scholars, Burns argued, shaped Indonesian thinking about law to a significant extent and is responsible for the enduring notion in Indonesia that the country's politics and laws should reflect the principles inherent in traditional customary law.

My own research, culminating in *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Idea of the Family State* (Bourchier 2015), attempted a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of organicism as a theory and an ideological device. This work identified linkages between European, Japanese, and Indonesian efforts to forge a conservative alternative to liberalism and communism and revealed the central role played by lawyers and law schools in sustaining organicist ideas and formulas in Indonesia.

Following the democratic *reformasi* movement and the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998, there was little interest in Indonesia in conservative political philosophies outside the Islamic tradition. When organicism or integralism was mentioned at all, it was, thanks largely to Simanjuntak's intervention, regarded as part of the legacy of the Soeharto regime and its widely derided program of ideological indoctrination. This picture started to change from the mid-2010s in reaction to the growing success of Islamist groups in influencing the legislative agenda of the government of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (b. 1949). Conservative nationalist politicians associated with the Gerindra Party sought to wind back the post-1998 democratic advances and revive the organicist rhetoric of the Soeharto years. Prominent constitutional scholar Jimly Asshiddiqie played a part in rehabilitating organicism, arguing in a 2015 book that Supomo's integralist concept underpins the Indonesian constitution and should be used as a reference point to solve a range of institutional problems (Asshiddiqie 2015, 81–82). The revival of interest in Supomo and his ideas at a time of nationalist and authoritarian resurgence globally provides added incentive to take organicism seriously.



MANIFESTATION IN INDONESIA

Adapting an Idea

Organicist political thought in Indonesia is primarily the product of conversations between European, Japanese, and Indonesian nationalist intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s, when Indonesia was still a Dutch colony. The key figure in Indonesia was Supomo, a scholar of customary law. Born into a Javanese gentry family, Supomo was one of a small number of Indonesians to be granted access to a Dutch-language secondary education. In 1923, after graduating from law studies in Jakarta, he enrolled at the law school at Leiden University, where he studied under the guidance of the great legal anthropologist Cornelis van Vollenhoven, whose thought we will treat below. On Supomo's return to Indonesia in 1927, he worked as a judge in the colonial administration before joining Indonesia's preeminent law faculty, where he became a professor in 1941. Following the Japanese invasion of 1942, Supomo was appointed to many senior advisory bodies and chaired the drafting committee for the 1945 constitution that is still in force today. As the primary author of the constitution and the first republican justice minister, Supomo had a considerable influence on subsequent discourse about the legal foundations of the Indonesian state, ideology, and the exercise of political power.

Supomo's constitutional thinking is articulated most clearly in two speeches from the 1940s. In the first, delivered upon taking up the position as professor in 1941, Supomo painted a bleak picture of Western law as reflecting the rampant individualism that had prevailed in Europe since the nineteenth century. He then pointed to a "new stream of thinking" that had emerged in Europe in the twentieth century that treated societies not as collections of isolated units, but rather as parts of a greater whole and wholes as inseparable from their component parts. Referring to a number of Dutch jurists writing in the 1930s, Supomo argued that "the individual isolated from society is a mere illusion since people can only really be human when they belong to a collective" (Supomo 1970, 7). The organicist conception of society implied in this stream of thought was made explicit in a reference to the French legal philosopher Louis Josserand, whom Supomo cites as arguing that individuals exercise their rights only in the context of the social body of which they are cells (8). Referring to contemporary developments in industrial relations law in Europe, Supomo concluded that there was "a clear tendency in the West to limit the autonomy of the individual for the good of the collective" (9).

The main thrust of Supomo's speech, however, was that the sorts of collectivistic ideas and practices being experimented with in Europe already had deep roots in Indonesian society and were expressed in its customary law. Drawing on his own research and the findings of Dutch scholars who had written about customary law in several parts of Indonesia, Supomo argued that in customary law, society always came before the individual. In contrast to the West, individuals were regarded in traditional Indonesia as existing first and foremost to meet the needs of society. Individuals saw themselves as



part of society, and society, he added, regarded individuals as specialized parts of itself. “In this way, social awareness and individual awareness dissolve into one another,” confirming the essentially “communal character” of Indonesian customary law that he credited van Vollenhoven with having identified in 1917 (Supomo 1970, 11).

Supomo’s debt to his Leiden mentors here is significant. Van Vollenhoven, professor of law at Leiden University, was the leader and intellectual force behind a major endeavor to catalog the kaleidoscopic world of customary law in Indonesia and to argue for its recognition in Dutch colonial policy. Informed by von Savigny’s Historical School tradition of law, van Vollenhoven was a strong advocate of *Volksrecht* (law emerging from the people) as opposed to *Juristenrecht* (lawyer’s law). He recognized that the battle against *Juristenrecht* had been all but lost in Europe, but he believed it could be won in Indonesia if it could be established that there existed an intact indigenous tradition of law, separate from Islamic and Western influences.³ This predisposed him toward a Romantic view of customary law as embodying the values of harmony and cooperation that had been lost in Europe to rationalism and individualism. Indonesian novelist and lawyer Takdir Alisjahbana observed that van Vollenhoven essentially found what he set out to find: a communal and harmony-loving folk, uncorrupted by Western ideas (Alisjahbana 1975, 72; Bourchier 2015, 23). By the time Supomo arrived to study in the Netherlands, it was possible to talk about a Leiden orthodoxy according to which Indonesian communities were assumed to constitute organic wholes existing in harmony with the environment. “The optimal condition of the community and the individuals who were its members was static, balanced and harmonious” (Burns 2004, 115). This romantic and ahistorical view of traditional Indonesian culture, together with the Historical School dictum that law should be built on the foundation of a nation’s indigenous traditions, had a profound impact not only on Supomo and his lawyer colleagues but also on Indonesian nationalist thought more broadly.

Supomo gave his second and better-known speech on organicism in May 1945, at the tail end of three years of occupation by Japan, which was part of the attempted expansion of the Japanese empire based on an ideology of Asian races united under a single Asian power. To provide some context, during the brutal occupation Indonesians were subjected to a steady diet of Japanese propaganda geared to servicing its war needs, but also promoting its distinctive cultural nationalist ideology that had emerged in Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. Developed largely in reaction to the influx of European governing principles during the Meiji era, Japanese nationalists associated with the military promoted the idea that Japan was “one great family nation [comprising] a union of sovereign and subject” with the imperial household as the “head family of the subjects and the nucleus of national life” (Monbusho 1949, 83, 90). Influenced by the same German stream of legal thinking as the Leiden scholars, Japanese nationalist intellectuals rejected individualistic, materialistic, and liberal ideas of politics and law in favor of an organicist communitarian model based on indigenous Japanese tradition and customs. In line with calls by intellectuals such as Ōkawa Shūmei for other Asian countries to reject Western thinking in favor of realizing “their own popular spirit” (Najita and Harootunian 1989, 729–734; Ōkawa 1943, 37–40), one of the first advisory bodies set up by the Japanese occupation authorities in Indonesia was the Research Council on



Customary Law and Past State Organization. Supomo's expertise in customary law was greatly valued by the Japanese, who appointed him to the body charged with drafting an Indonesian constitution.

At issue in the constitutional debates of 1945 was, first, the philosophical basis of the future Indonesian state, its *Staatsidee*.⁴ In his speech in May of the same year, Supomo started by rejecting both liberal and Marxist traditions of thought. Liberalism, he said, was based on individualism and the idea of a social contract.⁵ This was clearly untenable in Indonesia, he argued, because individualistic principles in Western Europe and America end up dividing and alienating people from one another and from society. Individualism on a national level, he maintained, had given rise to imperialism, greed, and exploitation. Supomo portrayed Marxism in equally negative terms as a theory rooted in antagonism between groups. While a dictatorship of the proletariat may suit the Russians, he said, it would be altogether out of step with Indonesia's traditional social character (Kusuma 2004, 125). The tradition of political thought most in tune with Indonesia's patterns of organization, Supomo argued, was "integralism" (*teori integralistik*), which he traced to the work of "Spinoza, Adam Müller, Hegel and others." In this theory, the task of the state was "not to guarantee the interests of either individuals or groups, but rather to protect the interests of the whole society." The state, Supomo argued, was synonymous with "the social order as a whole," in which

all groups, all parts and all members are bound tightly to one another to form an organic unity. The crucial feature of a state based on this way of thinking is the all-embracing character of national life. The state does not favour the strongest or the largest group, and does not place too much store on the interests of individual, but rather looks after the well-being of all aspects of the life of the nation as an indivisible whole. (Kusuma 2004, 124–125)

Supomo then summarized what he saw as the key features of Indonesian culture in the highly Romantic, orientalist terms that by then formed a standard part of the discourse of national identity among many older-generation nationalists. Supomo spoke of the basic impulse among Indonesians and in Indonesian culture toward the "unity of life" in both the corporeal and the spiritual realms. This entailed a unity between the microcosmos and macrocosmos, between servant and lord (*kawulo dan gusti*), between the people and their rulers. It regards all individuals and groups

as having their own particular allotted places and roles in life [*dharma*] in accordance with the laws of nature and the whole of everything as being directed towards outwards and inwards spiritual balance. The individual human being is separable neither from other human beings nor from the natural world. . . . This is the totalitarian concept, the integralist concept of the Indonesian nation which is manifest in the traditional constitutional order. (Kusuma 2004, 126)

Evidence of this harmony between rulers and ruled, Supomo said, could be found in Indonesian village life, where village heads "always consulted with their people" to



“preserve the spiritual bonds between the leaders and the people as a whole.” In this atmosphere of unity, “all groups in society are encompassed by the spirit of *gotong royong* (mutual aid) and the family state principle.” On the basis of this evidence, Supomo concluded that if the committee was to establish a state in tune with the Indonesian national character and social structure, integralism was the only valid philosophical basis for it (Kusuma 2004, 127).

As noted in the introduction, Supomo argued that since the integralist state concept implied “the unity of the constituted people” (Kusuma 2004, 127), there would be no need for legal safeguards such as political and human rights to protect individuals abuses of power. In a section of the speech that would be routinely passed over by Soeharto-era officials, Supomo said that the integralist theory was manifest in Imperial Japan and (recently defeated) Nazi Germany. The German state, he said, was based on the principle of totalitarianism (*totaliter*), a term that Supomo used interchangeably with integralism. This was expressed, Supomo elaborated, in the National Socialist precept of *das Ganze der politischen Einheit des Volkes* (the totality of the political unity of the people). He also referred with approval to the Nazi idea that the leader should have unlimited authority over his people (*ein totaler Führerstaat*). “The principles inherent in the National Socialist approach of unity between the leaders and the people and of unity within the state as a whole,” he argued, “fit together well with the Eastern way of thought” (Kusuma 2004, 126). Supomo’s praise for the Japanese system, if less surprising, was also fulsome. At the core of the Japanese state, said Supomo, “was the abiding spiritual and temporal unity of the Most Esteemed Emperor, the state and the whole Japanese people. The Emperor is the spiritual focus of the entire populace and underpinning the state is the family principle” (Kusuma 2004, 126). Japan’s emphasis on unity and the family principle, he said, were likewise “very compatible” with traditional patterns of Indonesian social organization.

In an attempt to allay fears about the implications of his concept, Supomo assured his audience that the new Indonesian state would not “disregard the existence of groups as groups or individuals as individuals. That’s not the point of it!” (Kusuma 2004, 128). Supomo said that the state would

recognize and respect the existence of groups and individuals, but ~~stressed that~~ all must be aware of their position as an organic part of the state as a whole, with the responsibility to uphold unity and harmony among all the constituent parts.

In fairness to Supomo, there is little in either his character or his other writings to suggest that he was seriously proposing a goose-stepping fascist regime. What he appears to have wanted was a state with a powerful leader who would preserve the aristocracy-linked administrative apparatus of the colonial era intact. His integralist state is best seen as an attempt to ward off pressure from Muslim delegates arguing for an Islamic state and nationalists inspired by democratic principles, which he saw, quite rightly, as a threat to the social status quo inherited from the Dutch colonial state and maintained, in large part, through the Japanese occupation.

In the course of the constitutional debates, Supomo was forced to concede ground to advocates of the rival concept of popular sovereignty, including leading nationalist



intellectuals Mohammad Hatta and Muhammad Yamin. The constitution adopted on August 18, 1945, contained weakly worded but nonetheless significant guarantees of the right to free speech and association, equality of citizens before the law, judicial independence, and a stipulation that legislative decisions should be made on the basis of voting, leading some scholars to conclude that Supomo's integralist state concept had been decisively defeated (Simanjuntak 1989, 238–239). Other sections of the brief and hurriedly assembled document, however, have been used to support an organicist reading (see, e.g., Attamimi [1990] 2003, 237). The Pancasila, incorporated into the preamble, commits Indonesia to “democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives,” invoking the village-style consensual decision-making championed by Supomo, while Article 33 specified that the economy was to be based on the family principle. Enormous power was vested in the presidency and there was no guidance provided on how the legislature was to be constituted other than that it would contain “representatives of regions and groups.” In a section authored solely by Supomo, government leaders were enjoined to embody the spirit of the family principle, because if they acted individualistically, the constitution would be “meaningless in practice” (Constitutionnet 2016, author's translation).

Retreat and Resurrection

Japan's surrender to the Allies and the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945, plunged Indonesia into nearly five years of violent revolution against the returning Dutch. With the unleashing of popular energies, there was little sympathy for the *pamong praja* elite and their vision of a conservative organic state. Tainted by its Japanese-era origins, the 1945 constitution was ignored almost from its inception as social democratic nationalists gained the upper hand politically. Soon after the Dutch were finally forced to depart in late 1949 and Indonesia won formal independence, the country adopted a highly democratic interim constitution based on a parliamentary rather than a presidential system.⁶

During Indonesia's boisterous period of liberal democracy in the first half of the 1950s, organicist ideas were restricted to two relatively marginal groups. The first consisted of *pamong praja* administrators unhappy with the disruptive influence of political party competition in the towns and villages of Indonesia. Their political vehicles were the Greater Indonesian Unity Party and Parindra, both of which were wiped out in Indonesia's first national elections in 1955 (Feith 1962, 436). The second was a group of army officers and lawyers led by general Abdul Haris Nasution, whose League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence campaigned against the party system, cleverly appropriating Pancasila for the first time as a symbol of opposition to parties and electoral contestation, rather than a symbol of compromise between opposing ideologies. Together with constitutional scholar Djokosutono,⁷ Nasution was instrumental in translating the kind of conservative organicist vision articulated by Supomo in 1945 into a political formula based on a return to the 1945 constitution and the promotion of



corporatist “functional group” representation as an alternative to multiparty parliamentary democracy (Bourchier 2015, 98–106; Turner 2017).

Nasution and Djokosutono’s formula initially appealed to Sukarno, who had been consigned to a largely ceremonial position under the democratic constitution and was actively seeking to assume a more commanding role in politics. In the period between 1956 and 1959, Sukarno, with the support of the army leadership, demolished multiparty democracy and revived the authoritarian 1945 constitution, establishing a new system of government he called guided democracy (Lev 1966). The key advisory body in Sukarno’s guided democracy was a powerful National Council, comprising military leaders as well as appointed representatives of functional constituencies of workers, youth, women, intellectuals, peasants, and others who were supposed to reflect society as a whole.

Like his colleague Supomo had done in 1945, Djokosutono justified the shift to a corporatist system of representation with reference both to European trends and to Indonesian culture. A crisis in liberal democracy in Europe, he argued, was leading countries on both the left and the right to embrace functional representation as well as greater executive authority vis-à-vis legislatures. Criticism by party leaders that functional representation was reminiscent of fascism was soon overwhelmed by Sukarno’s insistence that guided democracy was an expression of Indonesia’s “national personality.” Sukarno explicitly rejected “50 percent plus one” decision-making, checks and balances, and judicial independence in favor of indigenous principles of *gotong royong*, the family principle, *musyawarah* (deliberation), and *mufakat* (consensus) (Feith 1962, 515; Bourchier 2015, 110–116). Opponents of the new “Indonesian-style” democracy were branded “lackeys of the West.” The reversion to the 1945 constitution gave renewed currency to the body of ideas developed by Supomo during the Japanese occupation, illustrating organicism’s utility as a normative framework, a set of organizing principles, and a legitimizing formula to political leaders—in this case, Sukarno and the army—intent on subordinating and corraling countervailing political forces.

Sukarno’s rhetoric of harmony and cooperation was a useful tool in attempting to subdue the parties, but once he found that the military were taking advantage of the corporatist system of representation to advance their own political ambitions, he decided to re-empower the parties, in particular the Beijing-aligned Indonesian Communist Party. By the early 1960s, Indonesian politics had become fatally polarized between an increasingly communist-leaning Sukarno and a coalition of anticommunist parties allied with the military. While Sukarno abandoned his organicist rhetoric, the military came increasingly to embrace it as their own, advocating the notion that functional groups, called *Golkar* in Indonesian, were the legitimate representatives of the Indonesian people (Bourchier 2015, 118–120).

Soeharto and the Family–State Idea

When the military, under Major General Soeharto, seized power in 1965, its first priority was to crush its main rival, the 20 million–strong Indonesian Communist Party. Once



this deed was accomplished at the cost of approximately half a million lives, Soeharto's New Order regime set about reconfiguring the political and ideological landscape.⁸ Anxious to recover from international isolation and economic ruin, the regime represented itself to the outside world as modern, democratic, proinvestment, and development oriented. Steered by US-educated technocrats, the country achieved a remarkable economic revival and Indonesia was welcomed back into the Western fold. The instincts of the military, however, were deeply conservative. While allowing the trappings of democracy, the military put in place a system of rule that ensured that political parties, parliament, and the judiciary were subordinated to its control. The organizational logic of the regime was corporatist, with the military's "apolitical" electoral vehicle Golkar ostensibly representing the entire society through its constituent functional groups of farmers, women, youth, doctors, and so on (Reeve 1985, 269–280). In reality, these monopoly organizations licensed by the government—analogous to corporatist bodies in imperial Japan, fascist Italy, and several Latin American regimes—functioned more to control their constituencies than to represent them.

One of Soeharto's main political problems after toppling the nation's founding father was to establish the legitimacy of his regime. Indonesia's very identity had been formed in opposition to Western colonialism and imperialism. The capitalist program of modernization Soeharto was embarking on had no positive historical resonances. Embracing organicism of the type articulated by Supomo provided a way of lending cultural authenticity to the new regime, as well as a rationale for suppressing populist forces including political parties and trade unions.

Soeharto's ideologues did this by recasting the state ideology of Pancasila in conservative organicist terms. Sukarno, they said, had betrayed Pancasila by allowing foreign ideologies and individualistic thinking to poison Indonesia. The New Order would bring Indonesia back in line with the authentic Pancasila, which, drawing on the authority of Supomo and other customary law scholars, they identified with "traditional" village values of hierarchy, harmony, and order. By identifying Pancasila with the "essential and eternal character of the Indonesian nation" and declaring the New Order its custodian and savior, Soeharto's ideologues gave the regime a great deal of latitude to determine what was acceptable behavior. Over the next three decades, Pancasila was a constant point of reference and was used to justify the suppression of free speech, free organization, free elections, voting in parliament, judicial independence, liberalism, political and human rights, and even opposition itself. "In Pancasila Democracy," said Soeharto,

there is no place for a Western style opposition. In the realm of Pancasila democracy, we recognise *musyawarah* [deliberation] to reach the *mufakat* [consensus] of the people. . . . We did not recognise opposition as in the West. Here we do not recognise opposition based on conflict. (Elson 2001, 239–240)

The organicist contours of New Order ideology were perhaps most apparent in its official Pancasila indoctrination program, implemented nationally in the 1980s and 1990s. From primary schools to the armed forces, Indonesians were repeatedly drilled



with the notion that being Indonesian meant subordinating individual interests to those of the community and nation, accepting one's place in the social order, abiding by the patriarchal norms of society, and respecting authority. The state was routinely likened to a traditional village or family in which all citizens were expected to take part according to their station in life. Extending the family analogy, Soeharto took on the title of Indonesia's "Father of Development." By the mid-1980s, Indonesia was officially an integralist state, with students expected to study Supomo's 1945 speech as a guide to understanding politics and the constitution (Bourchier 2015, 209–214).

The coercive capacity of this ideology is obvious. Binding citizenship so tightly to a conservative indigenist construction of national identity enabled the government to label anyone who engaged in oppositional politics anti-Pancasila and, therefore, by implication, un-Indonesian. This accusation was first leveled against leftists, but then against Muslim and liberal critics of the New Order regime, particularly after 1983 when all social organizations were required to adopt Pancasila as their sole philosophical foundation (Lubis 1993, 167–173). Antisocial elements were often described as a cancer on the body politic and rebellious regions were naughty children that needed to be taught a lesson.

As Soeharto's political coalition began to fray in the early 1990s, critics began expressing increasing frustration, both with the authoritarian structures of the New Order and with its endlessly repeated ideological nostrums. The contradiction between the organicist rhetoric of state ideologues and the dynamic realities of life in a rapidly industrializing country became all too glaring. Cynicism about Pancasila indoctrination classes became commonplace. One student summed up the mood: "If Pancasila springs from people like me, why do I have to listen to these brain-dead lectures on it? Shouldn't they (the lecturers) be listening to me?" (Quinn 1995). Rampant corruption and nepotism, especially in the president's family, turned the "family principle" rhetoric of the regime into the butt of jokes. Simanjuntak's revelation that the government had routinely covered up Supomo's admiring references to Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany in his 1945 speech further undermined the credentials of integralism and therefore the ideological foundations of the regime.

By the time the Asian financial crisis triggered Soeharto's fall from power in 1998, organicism was all but discredited. Under the leadership of his more democratically minded successor, Dr. B. J. Habibie (b. 1936), the Pancasila indoctrination program was quickly abolished and there was no more talk of integralism or the family state outside of the ever-conservative military and Indonesian law schools. To the surprise of many observers, the nation embraced all that was supposedly antithetical to Indonesian culture: multiparty democracy, free speech, the separation of powers, voting in parliament, and human rights guarantees. A series of constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002 saw the constitution democratized almost beyond recognition.⁹

Indonesia's post-Soeharto democracy has not yet experienced the kind of crises that saw elites deploy organicist ideology in the late 1950s or the mid-1960s to justify moves to neutralize popular pressures and centralize control. This does not mean it has gone away. As in the early 1950s, organicism remains popular among the military and among some legal scholars who continue to revere Supomo and his *Volkgeist*-based arguments.



The 2014 presidential campaign by Soeharto's former son-in-law, Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, was replete with promises to roll back democratic reforms and return Indonesia to its national personality based on the principles of *gotong royong* (mutual aid), *musyawarah* (deliberation), and communalism. Prabowo did not win, but the fact that he attracted the support of 45 million Indonesians suggests that there is still a substantial constituency for the rhetoric of organicism. Supomo has also enjoyed a revival among legal scholars, with the first justice of the Constitutional Court, Jimly Asshiddiqie, arguing in 2015 that the problems confronting Indonesia's governance could be overcome if Supomo's integralism was once again regarded as the guiding philosophy behind the Indonesian constitution. So, while multiparty democracy remains the preferred format for Indonesian politics, discourses of holism, cooperation, and organic unity continue to resonate with many Indonesians' sense of identity and are never far from the surface. Organicism remains a resource available to future political leaders, not only as a legitimizing formula and a set of organizing principles, but also as a vision of how best to align Indonesia's politics and its culture.

CONCLUSION

The biography of organicism in Indonesia illustrates how political theories in the non-Western world can develop in dialogue with Western political theories, drawing inspiration both from Western and from non-Western political thinking and culture. Historical evidence that political ideas flow across space, time, and cultures should make us wary of treating non-Western political theories either as discrete and distinct entities or as simple transplants from West. Acknowledging reciprocity should not, however, lead us to take ideologies any less seriously. Organicism clearly took on a life of its own in Indonesia and was successfully associated with values such as cooperation, family, and consensus that many Indonesians consider integral to their identity. Recent efforts by political leaders to reactivate organicist rhetoric underscore its continuing potency.

It is important at the same time to examine both Western and non-Western theories with a critical eye, bearing in mind first that they are often contested within their own societies, and second, that they are the product of real political struggles at specific times and places. To understand political theories, it is necessary to understand their historical evolution. This means looking critically at who developed them and for what purposes. This is challenging because it requires a knowledge of the language, culture, politics, and history of particular locales. But it is only through understanding theories in their political, cultural, and historical context that we can comprehend them.

While the application of political theories will always generate its own discourse and peculiarities, students of comparative political theory should always be alert to family resemblance. Comparison is perfectly possible. Distinguishing features of organicism as a normative framework include a focus on the nation as embodying organic unity, an assumption of the underlying unity of society, the primacy of the community over the

individual, particularism over universalism, and duties over rights. As a set of organizing principles, it will emphasize state corporatism and representation based on occupations rather than ideologies. As a legitimizing formula, it will typically emphasize the family bond between the ruler and the ruled, a striving for the common good, and the idea that the nation's legal and political structures reflect its unique culture and traditions. Many of these features are found in other political theories and ideologies, including Parsonian functionalism, integralism, fascism, corporatism, "Asian values"-style communitarianism, state Shinto, and even state-sponsored Confucianism.

Literature on organicist or integralist political thinking has typically associated it with conservative Catholicism and Iberian influences. As we have seen, however, it was inspired in other contexts by *Volkgeist* theories of the nation, stemming from the early days of German nationalism. But like nationalism, organicism has long outgrown its origins and there is no reason why groups that do not share these structural or ideational legacies cannot foster and deploy it for their own purposes. While some of the distinguishing features described above may be embraced by progressive or environmentalist movements, they are typically more attractive to right-wing nationalist or conservative movements keen to defend the political or cultural status quo from perceived threats. The rise of right-wing nationalism in Europe has already furnished several examples of movements using explicit organicist rhetoric in their attempt to galvanize members of their supposedly primordial national communities against real or metaphorical foreigners. Understanding organicist theory, then, can provide insights into the internal logic and ideology of right-wing parties and regimes not only in the non-Western world, but also in the West.

NOTES

1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
2. A common theme of organicism in each of these disciplines is the rejection of mechanistic models in favor of organic ones in which there is an intimate relationship between a coherent whole and its parts. Helpful overviews include Phillips (1970) and Rajan (2004).
3. The clearest guide to van Vollenhoven's corpus is H. W. J. Sonius's extended introduction to a collection of translations of van Vollenhoven's key writings edited by J. F. Holleman (1981).
4. *Staatsidee*, a German word in common use by Dutch and Indonesian jurists at the time, derives from positivist legal philosophy. It is perhaps best translated as "state concept," the fundamental principle governing all aspects of state organization and law, including the constitution.
5. A partial translation of this speech is available in Feith and Castles (1970, 188–192). The full Indonesian text is reproduced in Kusuma (2004, 124–133).
6. The interim constitution of 1950 was adopted on August 17, 1950, following a period of nearly eight months under a federal constitution. All three of these constitutions included Pancasila in their preambles.
7. Professor Raden Djokosutono (1904–1965) was Indonesia's foremost authority on constitutional law with an encyclopedic knowledge of both European scholarship and Javanese literature. Besides playing a vital role in setting up academic institutions in Indonesia,

- he also helped General Nasution and Sukarno design and legitimize formulas to advance their own power at the expense of democracy (Lev 1966, 215–216; Bouchier 2015, 104–105, 110–114).
8. The best study of the 1965 coup is Roosa (2006). The anticommunist pogrom of 1965–1967 was poorly documented, but has been the subject of much scholarly, literary, and cinematic attention. See Cribb (1990), Pamuntjak (2014), and *The Act of Killing* (2012).
 9. The best source on the post-1998 constitutional changes is Butt and Lindsey (2012).

REFERENCES

- Alisjahbana, Sutan Takdir. 1975. *Indonesia: Social and Cultural Revolution*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Asshiddiqie, Jimly. 2015. “Konstitutionalisme dalam pemikiran Soepomo” [Constitutionalism in Soepomo’s thought]. In *Soepomo: Pergulatan tafsir negara integralistik; Biografi intelektual, pemikiran hukum adat dan konstitutionalisme*, edited by Pusat Studi Tokoh Pemikiran Hukum, 72–93. Yogyakarta: Thafa Media.
- Attamimi, Hamid S. (1990) 2003. “The Separation of Powers Is Alien to Our Constitution.” In *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*, edited by David Bouchier and Vedi Hadiz, 237. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 2006. *Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: Their Rise and Influence on Modern Thought*. Edited by Henry Hardy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bouchier, David. 2015. *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Idea of the Family State*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Burns, Peter. 1989. “The Myth of Adat.” *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 28: 1–127.
- Burns, Peter. 2004. *The Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Law in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Butt, Simon, and Tim Lindsey. 2012. *The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis*. Oxford: Hart.
- Constitutionnet. 2016. *The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia* (pre-amendment version). Accessed February 13, 2017. <http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/1945-constitution-republic-indonesia-o>.
- Cribb, Robert, ed. 1990. *The Indonesian Killings of 1965–66: Studies from Java and Bali*. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia 21, Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
- Elson, Robert. 2001. *Suharto, A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feith, Herbert. 1962. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Feith, Herbert, and Lance Castles, eds. 1970. *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Gluck, Carol. 1985. *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*. Studies of the East Asian Institute. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, Stuart. 1986. “Variants of Liberalism.” In *Politics and Ideology*, edited by James Donald and Stuart Hall, 34–69. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Holleman, J. F., ed. 1981. *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law*. Introduction by H. W. J. Sonius. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Kusuma, Ananda B., ed. 2004. *Lahirnya undang-undang dasar 1945: Memuat salinan dokumen otentik Badan Oentoeik Menyelidiki Oesaha-2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan* [The birth of the 1945



- constitution: Authentic documents of the Investigating Committee for Independence Preparations]. Depok: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia.
- Landauer, Carl. 1983. *Corporate State Ideologies. Historical Roots and Philosophical Origins*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Lev, Daniel. 1966. *The Transition to Guided Democracy, Indonesian Politics 1957–1959*. Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
- Lubis, T. M. 1993. *In Search of Human Rights: Legal–Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 1966–1990*. Jakarta: PT Gramedia and SPES Foundation.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1993. *From Karl Mannheim*. 2nd expanded ed. Edited by Kurt Wolff. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Monbusho. 1949. *Kokutai no Hongi, Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan*. Edited by R. K. Hall. Translated from Japanese by John Owen Gauntlett. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mure, Geoffrey R. G. 1949. “The Organic State.” *Philosophy* 24 (90): 205–218.
- Najita, Tetsuo, and Harry D. Harootunian. 1989. “Japanese Revolt against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century.” In *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 6, edited by Peter Duus, 711–774. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ōkawa, Shūmei. (1943) 1975. “The Spiritual Basis of Asian Revolution and Unity.” In *Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, edited by Joyce Lebra, 36–40. Tokyo: Oxford University Press.
- Oliver, P., and H. Johnston. 2000. “What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5 (1): 37–54.
- O’Sullivan, Noel. 1976. *Conservatism*. London: Dent.
- Pamuntjak, Laksmi. 2014. *The Question of Red*. Seattle: AmazonCrossing. Translation of *Amba*, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2013.
- Phillips, D. C. 1970. “Organicism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 31 (3): 413–432.
- Quinn, George. 1995. “Re: Mata Kuliah Filsafat Pancasila Menghilang” [Re: The disappearance of Pancasila philosophy materials]. Post to indonesia-l news distribution list. November 9, 1995.
- Rajan, Tiloamma. 2004. “Organicism.” *English Studies in Canada* 30 (4): 46–50.
- Reeve, David. 1985. *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Roosa, John. 2006. *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’État in Indonesia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Said, Edward. 1994. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” In *The New Corporatism: Social–Political Structures in the Iberian World*, edited by Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, 85–131. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Simanjuntak, Marsillam. 1989. *Unsur Hegelian dalam pandangan negara integralistik* [Hegelian elements in the integralist state perspective]. Master’s thesis, University of Indonesia.
- Simanjuntak, Marsillam. 1994. *Pandangan negara integralistik: Sumber, unsur, dan riwayatnya dalam persiapan UUD 1945* [The integralist state perspective: Sources and genealogy in the preparation of the 1945 constitution]. Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti.
- Stepan, Alfred. 1978. *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Supomo. 1970 [1941]. *Hubungan individu dan masyarakat dalam hukum adat* [The connection between individual and society in customary law]. Jakarta: Pradnya Paramita.



- The Act of Killing*. 2012. Produced by Signe Byrge Sørensen. Directed by Joshua Oppenheimer. Denmark: Final Cut for Real DKFilm, 122 min.
- Turner, Barry. 2017. *A. H. Nasution and Indonesia's Elites: "People's Resistance" in the War of Independence and Postwar Politics*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- van Eikema Hommes, H. J. 1979. *Major Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy*. New York: North-Holland.
- Weldon, Thomas D. 1947. *States and Morals: A Study in Political Conflicts*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Wiarda, Howard J. 1973. "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The corporative model." *World Politics* 25: 206–235.

