Cillian McHugh

Cillian McHugh
University of Limerick | UL · Department of Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy

About

25
Publications
8,127
Reads
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118
Citations
Introduction
The main focus of my research to date has been on morality and moral judgement, and in particular, moral dumbfounding; when a person defends a moral judgement in the absence of reasons. My interests extend beyond the moral domain to include learning and knowledge acquisition, categorisation, skill/expertise, meaning, motivation, and memory. My theoretical interests include Ecological Psychology, Embodiment, and Dynamical Systems.
Additional affiliations
August 2018 - present
University of Limerick
Position
  • Lecturer
August 2018 - present
University of Limerick
Position
  • Lecturer
Education
September 2013 - June 2018
Mary Immaculate College
Field of study
  • Psychology
September 2008 - June 2012
Mary Immaculate College
Field of study
  • Psychology and Primary Teaching

Publications

Publications (25)
Article
Full-text available
At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied ma...
Article
Full-text available
Reducing the spread of infectious viruses (e.g., COVID-19) can depend on societal compliance with effective mitigations. Identifying factors that influence adherence can inform public policy. In many cases, public health messaging has become highly moralized, focusing on the need to act for the greater good. In such contexts, a person's moral ident...
Preprint
Reducing the spread of infectious viruses (such as COVID-19) can depend on societal compliance with effective mitigations. Identifying factors that influence adherence can inform public policy. In many cases public health messaging has become highly moralized, focusing on the need to act for the greater good. In such contexts, a persons’ moral iden...
Article
Authoritarianism emerges in times of societal threat, in part driven by desires for group-based security. As such, we propose that the threat caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was associated with increased authoritarian tendencies and that this can be partially explained by increased national identification. We tested this hypothesis by collecting cr...
Article
Full-text available
Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and str...
Preprint
Full-text available
Background: Although citizens in countries worldwide took coordinated steps to support collective public health during the COVID-19 pandemic, the processes that encourage citizens to adhere with COVID-19 restrictions are not fully understood. Method: A three-wave study with a sample of Irish citizens (N Wave 1 = 1,800) was conducted during the COVI...
Article
Full-text available
The effectiveness of measures introduced to minimise the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome CoronaVirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19) depends on compliance from all members of society. The Irish response to COVID-19 has been framed as a collective effort, fostering national solidarity. However, dominant representations of the national communi...
Article
Full-text available
Observed variability and complexity of judgments of 'right' and 'wrong' cannot currently be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category form...
Article
Full-text available
The COVID‐19 pandemic has given rise to unprecedented and extraordinary conditions. It represents a profound threat to health and political and economic stability globally. It is the pressing issue of the current historical moment and is likely to have far‐reaching social and political implications over the next decade. Political psychology can inf...
Preprint
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding is the phenomenon that is observed when people defend a moral judgement even though they cannot provide a reason for this judgement. Dumbfounded responding may include admitting to not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations (e.g., “It’s just wrong”) as justification for a judgement. Published evidence for dumbfoun...
Preprint
Full-text available
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a devastating global health crisis. Without a vaccine or effective medication, the best hope for mitigating virus transmission is collective behavior change and support for public health interventions (e.g., physical distancing, physical hygiene, and endorsement of health policies). In a large-scale international co...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people defend a moral judgment even though they cannot provide a reason in support of this judgment. Across a series of studies (N = 1081) we developed methods and materials for measuring and testing dumbfounded responding. We then identified specific situational features and individual differences that moderate dumbf...
Article
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-bas...
Preprint
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people defend a moral judgement even though they cannot provide a reason in support of this judgement. It manifests as an admission of not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations (“it’s just wrong”) or tautological reasons (“because it’s incest”) as justifications for a judgment. We test a dual-processe...
Preprint
Full-text available
Observed variability and complexity of judgments of 'right' and 'wrong' cannot currently be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category form...
Presentation
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people defend a moral judgement even though they cannot provide a reason in support of this judgement. It manifests as an admission of not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations (\enquote{it’s just wrong}) or tautological reasons (\enquote{because it’s incest}) as justifications for a judgment. It is c...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people defend a moral judgement even though they cannot provide a reason in support of this judgement. It manifests as an admission of not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations (“it’s just wrong”) or tautological reasons (“because it’s incest”) as justifications for a judgment. It typically occurs for...
Preprint
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-bas...
Article
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has not been published in peer-review form, or directly replicated. Despite limited empirical examination, dumbfounding has been widely discussed in moral p...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Moral dumbfounding occurs when a person maintains a moral judgement even though they cannot provide supporting reasons. It is characterised by an admission of not having reasons or by unsupported declarations (“It’s just wrong!”). Despite being widely discussed in the moral psychology literature, there remains some controversy over whether the phen...
Conference Paper
The present study is an attempted replication of Study 1 from Cameron, Payne, and Doris (2013). The premise of Cameron et al's study is that manipulating emotions can change moral judgements. They found that a person's ability to distinguish between their emotions (emotional differentiation) moderates the effect incidental emotion on moral judgemen...

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Projects

Projects (2)
Project
Studies investigating a categorisation approach to moral judgement.