Christoph Engel

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods | COLL

Defendants should be judged on the merits of the case, not on prejudice, rumors, or evidence obtained through questionable methods. This is why criminal law of procedure regulates which information can be introduced in a trial. Two types of prohibited evidence are the criminal history of the defendant (the defendant shall not be considered more lik...

Many social ills can be modelled as a public bad. In such scenarios, private benefit is often immediate while the public damage takes some time to materialize. In this experiment, we investigate the behavioral effects caused by such delays in the realization of collective harm. By manipulating the weight with which the damages caused by group contr...

Why do people punish experienced unfairness if it induces costs for both the punisher and punished person(s) without any direct material benefits for the punisher? Economic theories of fairness propose that punishers experience disutility from disadvantageous inequality and punish in order to establish equality in outcomes. We tested these theories...

Judges in multiple US states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, California, and Florida, receive a prediction of defendants’ recidivism risk, generated by the COMPAS algorithm. If judges act on these predictions, they implicitly delegate normative decisions to proprietary software, even beyond the previously documented race and age biases....

We report on our test of the Large Language Model (LLM) ChatGPT (GPT) as a tool for generating evidence of the ordinary meaning of statutory terms. We explain why the most useful evidence for interpretation involves a distribution of replies rather than only what GPT regards as the single "best" reply. That motivates our decision to use Chat 3.5 Tu...

The German Constitutional Court has powers that are no weaker than the powers of the US Supreme Court. Justices are openly selected by the political parties. Nonetheless, public and professional perception are strikingly different. Justices at the German court are not believed to be guided by the policy preferences of the nominating party. This pap...

Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to profoundly transform and enrich experimental economic research. We propose a new software framework, "alter_ego", which makes it easy to design experiments between LLMs and to integrate LLMs into oTree-based web experiments with human subjects. Our toolkit is freely available at github.com/mrpg/ego...

Legitimacy may result from support for projects that a government implements. However, legitimacy may also result from the opportunity to participate in the selection process of projects. We tested the strength of these competing sources of legitimacy experimentally and their relationship. We find a straightforward effect of the former: the more pr...

Objectives Peer effects on the decision to commit a crime have often been documented. But how little does it take to trigger the effect? Method A fully incentivized, anonymous experiment in the tradition of experimental law and economics provides fully internally valid causal evidence. A companion vignette study with members of the general public...

As a complement to high-cost cooperation as assessed in economic games, the concept of social mindfulness focuses on low-cost acts of kindness. While social mindfulness seems quite natural, performed by many most of the time (reaching a level of 60–70 percent), what happens if such acts become more costly, and if costs become more salient? The pres...

Legal research is a repeat offender-in the best sense of the term-when it comes to making use of empirical and experimental methods borrowed from other disciplines. We anticipate that the field's response to developments in eye-tracking research will be no different. Our aim is to aid legal researchers in the uptake of eye-tracking as a method to a...

Panel effects have been widely studied in randomly composed panels. However, for many courts, panel composition stays constant. Then judges become familiar with each other. They know what to expect from each other. Mutual trust may develop. A local culture may emerge. If rejection is the default, familiarity is likely to help plaintiffs, as familia...

The law is permanently under construction. Most legal change is intentional. A legislator, a court, or one of the law's subjects hopes to better achieve a purpose by switching from one rule, one interpretation, or one remedy to the next. Yet empirically, legal innovation tends to be a process that takes time. At the macro level, the diffusion path...

Judges are human beings. Is their behavior therefore subject to the same effects that psychology and behavioral economics have documented for convenience samples, like university students? Does that fact that they decide on behalf of third parties moderate their behavior? In which ways does the need matter to find a solution when the evidence is in...

Legal cases are frequently inconclusive. One source of inconclusiveness is the necessity to balance conceptually incompatible normative considerations. Still the judiciary seems to do so reasonably well. How can it? In this study, we exploit eye tracking as a window into the mental process. A first study tests whether information processing reflect...

This paper studies a probation program in Cologne, Germany. The program, which has a clear rehabilitative focus, offers intensified personal support to serious juvenile offenders over the first 6 months of their probation period. To evaluate the program's impact on recidivism, we draw on two research designs. Firstly, a small‐scale randomized trial...

The world has more than 200 states. Many states are federations and hence consist of multiple jurisdictions. Seemingly there is thus ample room for a social science approach to comparative law. In this perspective, each legal order produces a data point. Variance in the solutions adopted by different legal orders is used as evidence that a certain...

Adopting the paradigms, findings and tools of behavioral economics has opened a promising avenue for legal research. This article sketches the broader framework within which the papers assembled in this special issue may be placed.

Information has a long history of being used with the intention to influence people's behavior, particularly in situations where people are likely to condition their own behavior on what they expect most others to do. We experimentally study how selective (favorable or unfavorable) information about past cooperativeness of unrelated groups affects...

Panel effects have been widely studied in randomly composed panels. However for many courts, panel composition stays constant. Then judges become familiar with each other. They know what to expect from each other. Mutual trust may develop. A local culture may emerge. If rejection is the default, familiarity is likely to help plaintiffs, as familiar...

Experimental participants are more likely to follow an arbitrary rule the more others in their reference group do so as well. The effect is most pronounced for individuals who follow few rules when not knowing others’ behavior. Unlike what is observed for conditional cooperation, learning that only few others follow a rule does not reduce rule foll...

Die Worte Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl kommen im Grundgesetz nicht vor. In ständiger Rechtsprechung betont das Bundesverfassungsgericht, dass das Grundgesetz keine Entscheidung über die deutsche Wirtschaftsverfassung getroffen hat. Gleichwohl hat das Gericht häufig über das Verhältnis von Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl entschieden. Es hat den Wettbewerb, a...

Open Access link: https://esforum.de/forums/ESF29_Deliberate_Ignorance.html

The Wisconsin Supreme Court allows machine advice in the courtroom only if accompanied by a series of warnings. We test 878 US lay participants with jury experience on fifty past cases where we know ground truth. The warnings affect their estimates of the likelihood of recidivism and their confidence, but not their decision whether to grant bail. P...

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information. The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or...

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information. The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or...

Behavioural law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioural economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution-free state of nature. In modern societies, the law’s subjects never see this state of nature. However, a rich arrangement of informal and...

Choice is a key concept of our time. It is a foundational mechanism for every legal order in societies that are, politically, constituted as democracies and, economically, built on the market mechanism. Thus, choice can be understood as an atomic structure that grounds core societal processes. In recent years, however, the debate over the right way...

What is the impact of caseload on judicial decision making? Is increasing judicial staff effective in improving judicial services? To address these questions, we exploit a natural, near‐randomized experiment in the Israeli judiciary. In 2012, six senior registrars were appointed in two of the six magistrate's court districts. The choice of district...

Frequently in experiments there is not only variance in the reaction of participants to treatment. The heterogeneity is patterned: discernible types of participants react differently. In principle, a finite mixture model is well suited to simultaneously estimate the probability that a given participant belongs to a certain type, and the reaction of...

Antitrust authorities all over the world are keen on the presence of a particularly aggressive competitor, a “maverick”. Yet there is a lack of theoretical justification. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In a pretest, we class...

Most people pay their taxes most of the time, even if the expected disutility from enforcement is too low to deter tax evasion. One potential reason is tax morale and, more specifically, rule following. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes just because participants are told they are supposed to pay is indeed pronounced. Ye...

According to coherence-based models of legal judgment, individuals form coherent mental representations to make sense of the available evidence. In this process, evidence supporting the emerging assessment is accentuated, resulting in coherence effects. Dependent on specific implementations of coherence-based models, in legal tasks both overweighti...

Can self-set normative goals restrain free-riding in a social dilemma? In a first experimental study, we test the effect of two different types of self-set normative goals on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Focusing on the level of contributions that one can at least be expected to make proves effective at restraining the m...

We test 494 households participating in the German Socio Economic Panel SOEP to examine risk taking by one household member that affects a second household member. Choices cannot be explained by (short term) strategic behavior. Respect for the risk preference of the counterpart is at best imperfect. Two findings suggest preference dependence: parti...

Law is for humans. Humans suffer from cognitive limitations. Legal institutions can help humans by making these limitations irrelevant. This experiment shows that strong property rights serve this function. In theory, efficient outcomes obtain even without strong property rights. In a hypothetical world where cognitive ability is perfect, individua...

What is the impact of caseload on judicial decision-making? Is increasing judicial staff effective in improving judicial services? To address these questions, we exploit a natural, near-ran-domized experiment in the Israeli judiciary. In 2012, six senior registrars were appointed in two of the six magistrate's court districts. The choice of distric...

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information. The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or...

Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World - edited by Yun-chien Chang December 2019

Much of political debate focuses on the concern that machines might take over. Yet in many domains it is much more plausible that the ultimate choice and responsibility remain with a human decision-maker, but that she is provided with machine advice. A quintessential illustration is the decision of a judge to bail or jail a defendant. In multiple j...

Jeremy Bentham brought enlightenment to criminal policy. He argued that the primary purpose of criminal sanctions should be deterring future crime. To that end he advocated complete transparency. This article investigates Bentham's intuition in a public goods lab experiment by manipulating how much information on punishment experienced by others is...

We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for ”moral wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate selfishness

Economic experiments are often based on the claim that some heterogeneous behavioural trait affects response to treatment. This trait is measured in another part of the experiment, using a multiple price list. Frequently, choices on such a list are not perfectly consistent. In this paper we argue that this inconsistency is a resource. It informs th...

Arguably, for many citizens the perceived expected disutility from sanctions is smaller than the monetary gain from tax evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes even absent enforcement is indeed pronounced. Yet voluntary compliance is reduced if participants l...

Frequently in experiments there is not only variance in the reaction of participants to treatment. The heterogeneity is patterned: discernible types of participants react differently. In principle, a finite mixture model is well suited to simultaneously estimate the probability that a given participant belongs to a certain type, and the reaction of...

Under the standard model in law and economics, agents maximize expected profit subject to constraints set by legal rules. In such a model, the expected reaction to legal innovations is immediate. However, this is not what we observe after class actions have been introduced into Israeli law. For a long time, the new procedure was rarely utilized. Th...

We study the effects of legal protection on the likelihood of efficient trade. Fairness norms that affect the parties’ willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) may depend on how strongly the entitlement is protected. We show that our participants can be divided into three groups corresponding to three fairness norms: negative types,...

The most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. This paper inves-tigates Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab experiment, by manipulating how much infor-mation on punishment experienced by others is available to would-be o...

Decision-makers often mean to react to the behavior of others, knowing that they only imperfectly observe them. Rational choice theory posits that they should weigh false positive versus false negative choices, and assess possible outcomes and their probabilities, if necessary, attaching subjective values to them. We argue that this recommendation...

Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really needs their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? We experimentally investigate a situation in which donors do not know the financial endowment of the recipient for certain, but still have some information on the distribution the endowments are drawn from. In the experiment, we find th...

Behavioral law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioral economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution free state of nature. In modern societies, the law’s subjects never see this state of nature. However a rich arrangement of informal and for...

An increasing fraction of donations is channeled through donation intermediaries. These entities serve multiple purposes, one of which seems to be providing donors with greater certainty: that the donation reaches its intended goal, and that the donor may be sure to receive a tax benefit. We interpret this function as insurance and test the option...

From a normative perspective the order in which evidence is presented should not bias legal judgment. Yet psychological research on how individuals process conflicting evidence sug-gests that order could matter. The evidence shows that decision-makers dissolve ambiguity by forging coherence. This process could lead to a primacy effect: initial tent...

Public goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be non-standard. We introduce the problem of the mechanism design literature into a public good experiment. Va...

In a nutshell, price cap regulation is meant to establish a quid pro quo: regulators are obliged by law to intervene only at rare, previously defined points in time, and only by imposing an upper bound on prices; firms are meant to justify regulatory restraint by adopting socially beneficial innovations. In the policy debate, a potential downside o...

On the doctrinal surface, there is a deep divide between common and continental law when it comes to the origin of contractual obligations. Under continental law, in principle a unilateral promise suffices. Common law by contrast requires consideration. When it comes to deciding cases, the divide is much less pronounced. But for the most part the l...