THE STEPS TO RIVALRY:

POWER POLITICS AND RIVALRY FORMATION

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Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School of Vanderbilt University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of

DOCTOR of PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

August, 2003

Nashville, Tennessee

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To my parents and Ben Franklin

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who helped me along the way to fulfilling my ambitions to become a political science professor. Most important of all are my parents and family. Even if they did not exactly understand what I was doing this whole time, they were always supportive of my efforts, even if it meant I did not visit home for over a year at times.

At Whittier College I had a few important teachers, but none more so than Fred Bergerson. He always encouraged my academic efforts, even if I seemed to be uninterested in education. He saw something in me and encouraged my attendance of graduate school. Luckily, it all worked out, and I am proud to have finished my degree with his encouragement.

From Vanderbilt University, I owe everything to John Vasquez. After some initial difficulties with my transition to graduate school, he reassured me that he thought I had a future in academia. Without his support, I would not have finished my degree or found a research program that I believed in. I also thank Jim Ray and Donna Bahry for supporting my efforts in graduate school and encouraging my academic progress.

Unfortunately, Vanderbilt is not the same institution it was when I came to the school in 1999. The negative effects of a department in receivership was decreased by a vibrant research community in the International Relations subfield that sustained itself through the tough times. For that, I would like to thank John Vasquez and Jim Ray again, along with Richard Tucker, Katherine Barbieri, Brad Palmquist, Kwang Teo, Andrea Hatcher, and especially Chris Leskiw. I would also like to thank Sam Whitt for reminding me that our department is not an academic and social wasteland and Brandy Frazier for generally cheering me up during this whole process.

In the field of international relations, I would also like to thank a few people involved in the rivalry research program. I thank Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz for making their data available and for extensive comments over the years. I would also thank William Thompson and Michael Colaresi for making their data available. The past Vanderbilt cohort of graduate students was also important for passing along advice and data, they include Doug Gibler, Susan Sample, and Doug Lemke. Participants of rivalry and conflict panels over the years have also been important for providing feedback and encouragement. They include Cameron Thies, Jon Diccho, Brandon Prins, David Stevenson, and Michael Colaresi. I thank Samuel Williamson for graciously reading over the World War I chapter and commenting in general about the project. I would also like to thank Paul Hensel for serving on my dissertation committee and adding an another perspective to my work. Anne Gruner provided value advice and copy editing.

I also thank the various students I have had the fortune of teaching. They have forced me to solidify my ideas about conflict through the years. Their probing questions and ideas have helped me consider what exactly I want to say and achieve.

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STEPS OF RIVLARY

Introduction

What causes rivalry? This project will seek to explain the origins and development of interstate rivalry. An interstate rivalry is a pair of states who have a long-standing conflictual relationship that is characterized by its militarized nature and constant threat of conflict. Rivals experience frequent conflict in the form of repeated disputes and war.

The rivalry research program represents a new direction in the study of conflict. Instead on analyzing war and its origins, the study of rivalry contends that disputes between states are connected across time and space. The history of conflict between a pair of states is a factor often overlooked in conflict studies. There are certain pairs of states that experience more conflict than any other type of state dyad. The quantitative study of rivalry recognizes that rivalry is a process of continuous conflict between two long-standing enemies (Bremer and Cusack 1995). It is important to understand the process how these rivalries begin, escalate, and end so that we may comprehend how to prevent or manage conflict between pairs of states that are likely to become rivals

Thompson (2001) has found that seventy five percent of strategic rivals experience war. Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that over fifty percent of enduring rivals (only 63 dyads) have fought a war at one time during their duration. The question then remains, what are the causes of rivalry? If rival dyads are responsible for most of the war in the international system, a prudent course of action to decrease conflict is to focus on

those states that have a rivalry. To do this, we must first know who the rivals are and what causes lead these pairs of states into this dangerous relationship. Both Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Thompson (2001) have created datasets of rivals. A current course of action should consequently investigate the factors that lead to the development of rivalry. This enterprise will use both statistical techniques of a large-N nature and qualitative techniques to investigate the origins of rivalry. I will show a typical path to rivalry, as supported by statistical findings, and then illustrate this path through the use of a World War I case study that describes the origins of the rivalries and how the rivals interacted with each other prior to World War I.

Rivalry is a fundamental concept in social relations. Here, in the context of international politics, rivalry becomes a dangerous factor that leads states to war and conflict.[1] This work will be concerned with identifying the factors that lead to rivalry so that they may be prevented and managed in the future.

Why Rivalry?

There is a familiar path or road to war. The steps to war model (Vasquez 1993; 2000) holds that there are certain actions or foreign policy choices states make that increase the probability of war occurring within a dyad. Territorial disputes, power politics (alliance building, hard-liners in power, escalatory behavior, and arms races), and recurring disputes each move a state closer to war. This study will apply some of these findings to the study of international rivalry. The path to war is similar to the path to rivalry, but the rivalry process considers the timing and duration of long-standing conflict

[1] Conflict is a usual condition of rivalry, but it is not assumed to be the norm for rival pairs. The goal here is to understand why states are rivals and thus, why they engage in militarized conflict.

as the relationship between two enemies builds to an eventual war. I will be concerned with determining what factors distinguish rivals from pairs of states that have not entered into a rivalry.

Rivalry is a fundamental concept in all areas of life, from work to high school football. Rivalry involves competition and struggle between two or more actors over some stake. Vasquez (1993, 75-76 and 1996) defines a rivalry as a relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other. In international politics, rivalry involves the competition between two "international enemies" which are nation-states.

Recent literature in international relations has come to hold that rival dyads are more war prone and disputatious than any other type of dyad (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2000; 2001). The empirical analysis of international rivalries is a recent and important development in the field of international relations. The study of rivalry involves the assumption that disputes, crises, and wars are not independent events, but are connected across *time and space*. The study of rivalry brings the history of interactions between a pair of states into focus.

The empirical concept of international rivalry has allowed international politics to reconceptualize how the discipline studies conflict. In the past, the main focus concentrated on international war. If international rivalry accounts for over three fourths of wars in the first place, the study of conflict and international politics should be orientated toward preventing and managing the most severe forms of rivalry before they escalate to war. If the purpose of international politics and peace studies aims to prevent

the outbreak of war, we must concentrate on what is observable, manageable, and preventable, which is interstate rivalry.

There are three main types of conflictual dyads. According to Goertz and Diehl (2000), on one end of a hostility scale there are isolated conflicts, or non-rivals, that include dyads that only have one to two militarized interstate disputes before settling the contentious issue. Next, there are proto-rivalries, which have three to five militarized interstate disputes and do not last for more than 20 years. The most severe form of rivalry involves enduring rivals that have at least six militarized interstate disputes in a 20-year period. If rivals are likely to engage in war, what brings about the condition of rivalry itself? What is the difference between pairs of states who only have isolated conflict and those that become involved in enduring rivalries?

The literature on rivalries has only begun to identify the factors that will lead a state to initiate a rivalry or that make rival dyads substantively different from other disputing dyads. The central question this work will addresses is what makes states become rivals? How do a pair of states (or possibly a triad) identify each other as enemies and orientate their foreign policies toward the other? I believe the concepts of a conflict spiral (also the security dilemma) and grand strategy, as well as the steps to war theory, can help determine what factors lead states to become rivals.

Islands of Theory and Rivalry

In his article "Long Range Research in International Relations," Harold Guetzkow suggests that the cumulation of knowledge on the issues critical to international politics will come through the "patient construction over the years of a basic

theory of international relations." (1950, 421) Guetzkow advocates an "islands" approach to reach this goal. An islands of theory approach focuses on three different branches of international relations. It allows those branches to create their own theoretical and empirical explanations for the question they ask, and then seeks to integrate these findings into a cohesive explanation. I proceed with rivalry research in much the same way.

There are three branches of study in the causes of conflict research program. The first, and the most studied approach, is the causes of war. This approach seeks to find what factors lead to war, the most deadly form of conflict. Examples include studies by Geller and Singer (1998), Small and Singer (1982), and Vasquez (1993; 2000). Here the dependent variable is the outcome of war. One would seek to explain why war came about in the first place. Did it stem from power considerations, international norms, or bargaining failures?

The rivalry (or recurring conflict) research program characterizes the second approach. The probing question aims to explain how a pair of states becomes involved in a long-standing, protracted conflict over some issue. Due to the fact rival dyads are more likely to go to war than any other type of dyad, the origins and formation of rivalries must be explained to understand the dynamics of recurring conflict. Here, the dependent variable shifts to rivalry types. It is also of interest to study why some rivalries terminate and others do not.

The third and final approach is the causes of militarized disputes (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996) and crises (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). Rivalry considers the connection of militarized disputes and crises as a crucial aspect to recurring conflict. A rivalry is a

protracted conflict over a variety of disputes and crises. What then needs to be explained is how disputes and crises arise in the first place. There has been some early work in this area. Hensel (2001) and Huth (1996) both find that territorial issues are more likely to lead to disputes and crises.

This investigation will be mainly concerned with the second approach outlined, the causes of rivalry. I am not interested in solving the question of causes of war and disputes, but rather concentrate on the factors that lead to rivalry. Little work has been done in this emerging research program. It is hoped that a coherent story about the causes of conflict can develop once we know what factors lead to war, rivalry, and disputes, but at this early stage, I am focused on the causes of rivalry.

Explaining Rivalry

Suganami (2002, 308) notes that "explaining war is an activity that can be conducted with reference to a number of distinct questions. They include the following three kinds, though they are not exhaustive:

1. What conditions must be present for there to be war at all?
2. What conditions are likely to give rise to war?
3. How did this particular war come about?"

I find this orientation towards explaining war useful for my introduction to goals and organization of this research project concerning the formation of rivalries. This method allows for the clear orientation of the goals of this work. The three questions might be rewritten as follows:

1. What conditions must be present for there to be a rivalry at all?
2. What conditions are likely to give rise to rivalry?
3. How did this particular rivalry come about?

The first question discusses the necessary conditions (Goertz and Starr 2003) for rivalry development. There are certain conditions that I will argue are necessary for rivalry to develop. Two of these include the formation of politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups. These are enabling conditions for rivalry. Rivalry does not develop without the use of power politics because power politics foreign policy practices (alliances and arms races) are factors associated with the formation of rivalry, not the existence of peace within a dyad.

For a rivalry, each state must recognize the other as a rival. However, this is not a condition that can be operationalized easily for large-n datasets. This proves more useful for case study investigations into the origins of rivalry. Rivals must also have had some sort of militarized competition.[2] This work seeks to understand the origins of militarized rivalry, meaning that each pair of states must have at least one militarized interstate dispute during its lifetime (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer et al. 1996).

The necessary conditions of rivalry may include the existence of arms races and alliances, militarized competition, and recognition of the other state as a rival. Some conditions may be prerequisites to the formation of protracted conflict. This work will explore each of these two factors (alliances and arms races) and their influence on the development of rivalry.

[2] This is a condition relevant to this work. Clearly, there may be rivalries without a militarized element, but they will not be studied here. I am interested in what happens after a pair of states enter into a militarized relationship.

The second question relates to the sufficient conditions of rivalry. What factors make rivalry develop? While necessary conditions are important, they do not explain why an event occurs. They only suggest factors needed to be present for the event to exist. Sufficient conditions will disclose which events or factors (in combination) will bring about a rivalry relationship. I do not see these factors as automatic, but as probabilistic. In social science research, there are few propositions that can be treated as absolute since we are dealing with the real world where chance and error are factors. It is likely that once the conditions I suggest are observed, rivalry will develop.

The sufficient conditions analyzed in this project include alliances, arms races, linkages, territorial conflict, and grand strategy formation. Each of these steps lead pairs of states toward the formation of rivalry, and once they happen in some sort of additive combination, rivalry is likely to occur. It is important to identify these steps so that they may be avoided in the future.

The third condition relates to explanation of the origins of a specific rivalry. The main thrust of this project will be an empirical analysis of the process of rivalry development. A necessary supplement to this analysis is a narrative story describing the events that take place during the formation of rivalry.

In this project, I will use the World War I case to explain the process of rivalry development. Each of the factors (necessary and sufficient) outlined in this project is present during the formation of the rivalries prior to World War I. Once the rivalry patterns were established, the sides of World War I were virtually set in stone. While war could have been avoided, it is likely that the commencement of the rivalries prior to World War I made the outcome of war virtually automatic. With rivalries existent among

the states involved, merely a specific trigger to war could precipitate a typical path to war among those states.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation argues that interstate rivalries develop under conditions where power politics foreign policy practices are used. When threatened with a persistent enemy, states respond in a fashion outlined by a realist viewpoint (Morgenthau 1948). They "solve" the dilemma of a rivalry situation by building an alliance, participating in a military buildup, forming a grand strategy to counter that rival, and participating in outward uses of force to show commitment. As Vasquez (1993; 1998) suggests, the road to war is paved by power politics foreign policy practices. I find evidence that this is the case for the most dangerous forms of international enemies, interstate rivals.

The next chapter (chapter two) in this dissertation will outline the state of knowledge about rivals to this point. Who are the rivals, and under what conditions do they develop? In the end, I outline what we know about rivalry.

In chapter three, I outline a theory of rivalry, which I call the steps to rivalry theory. In this theory, rivalry is a process whereby states take certain actions that increase the probability that they will become enduring rivals. Rivalry is the most contentious state of conflictual relations, and states arrive in this situation as a result of using power politics strategies. Alliances and arms races can be seen as quasi-necessary and sufficient conditions. Territorial issues also lead states to become rivals. Forming a grand strategy to counter a potential rival and rivalry linkages is another step to rivalry.

Chapter four outlines the research design for the rest of the dissertation. This chapter lays out the propositions that will be tested, as derived from the theory. I also outline how the empirical analysis is conducted for each question concerning the development of rivalry. Rivalry is a process, and the research design choices I make are dependent on this fact.

Chapter five is the first of the empirical chapters, and here the relationship between politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, and rivalry is explored. I first ask if there is a relationship between alliances, mutual military buildups, and rivalry. I then develop the logic for, and test the proposition that these actions represent probabilistic necessary and sufficient conditions for rivalry.

Chapter six explores the timing of power politics strategies. Chapter five shows there is a relationship between alliances and arms races on one hand and rivalry on the other; what remains is to show that there is a true causal relationship. To understand this, timing becomes important. For an event to have an impact on a dependent variable, that event must to come temporally before the outcome. I seek to understand when power politics strategies are used during the life of a rivalry. For my theory to be empirically accurate, it must show correct chronological ordering. A process model is also used to test various propositions. A process model takes observations of rivals during their stages of life. Will the results change if the analysis is shifted to a process model that can account for the stages of rivalry?

Chapter seven explores rivalry linkages and their relationship to conflict within a rivalry. Rivalry linkages represent other ongoing rivalries or disputes that occur at the same time as the rivalry under question. Do simultaneous conflicts influence the course

of rivalry relations? Here, I find that the severity of a rivalry increases when states participate in other ongoing disputes.

Chapter eight summarizes and presents a complete rivalry process model. This represents the last statistical test of my theory. Here I seek to combine all the previous empirical findings to show their relationship in the process of rivalry development. This model will combine findings on alliances, mutual military buildups, territoriality, and state power status to underscore each variable's relationship with the presence of rivalry and to suggest their additive impact on the development of rivalry. Here I identify the typical paths to rivalry and note which cases fit which example.

Chapter nine seeks to explain the story of rivalry development and rivalry's relationship to war. This chapter traces the origins of the pre-World War I European rivalries. I also use the events surrounding the rise of World War I and the rivalries in existence during this time to explain how rivalry can be a causal mechanism for the war. I show how empirical variables presented in this project interact to create the story of the development of rivalry and, later, war.

Chapter ten presents a "fuzzy set" (Ragin 2000) test of my rivalry theory. The cases explored in this chapter will be confined to the sixty-three enduring rivals (Diehl and Goertz 2000). I will ask if the variables for alliances, arms races, rivalry linkages, and territorial disputes represent probabilistic necessary and sufficient conditions for enduring rivalry. This test is appropriate for the small number of enduring rivalries identified in the data. Here one can find the common characteristics for the most conflictual rival dyads.

Rivalry is a deadly state of nature for those dyads involved in enduring or strategic rivalries; therefore this work explains how rivalry develops and seeks to suggest ways that rivalry may be avoided. The last chapter in this work summarizes the findings in general and suggests policy advice that may help nations avoid a state of rivalry in the future. This work will shed light on what we know about rivalry now and what we will know about rivalry in relation to power politics strategies.

CHAPTER II

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RIVALRY?

Introduction

Rivalry is a fundamental concept in all areas of life. There are sports rivalries, interpersonal rivalries, and business rivalries. One type of rivalry that has important consequences for war and peace in the international system is the study of interstate rivalries. Interstate rivalries include a pair of recognized states who have formed a long standing, conflictual relationship with each other. This work will be concerned with the development and formation of interstate rivalries, but it is first important to understand what we know about rivalry to this point.

The empirical analysis of international rivalries is a recent and important development in the field of international relations. Empirical rivalry research began with the introduction of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID hereafter) data set (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer et al. 1996). Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) are defined as "united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996,163). The intensity scale ranges from threats to use of force to the most severe state of nature, war. Gochman and Maoz (1984) limit their MID cases to those disputes that involve independent nations and must be explicit, government sanctioned events.

Previous studies of international rivalries were limited to case studies that did not examine the entire population of rivalries; instead these studies focused on a few notable cases such as the Soviet Union versus the Untied States (Thompson 1998). The militarized interstate dispute dataset allows the analysis of the history of interactions among *all* hostile enemies. The disputes show a pattern of militarized conflict involvement that signifies the existence of a rivalry. What then must be studied is the common characteristics among all rival pairs.

Gochman and Maoz (1984) find that the thirty most dispute prone nations initiated 70 percent of the disputes and were targets of 60 percent of the disputes. They identify 36 “enduring rivalries” with more than seven disputes. Gochman and Maoz (1984) propose that, “the identification of enduring rivalries provides a preliminary response to complaints concerning lack of knowledge about international enemies and suggests the centrality of this phenomenon in world politics" (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 219).

With the introduction of the MID dataset, researchers began to see a pattern of conflict in which a small number of dyads accounted for a disproportionate number of disputes across time. Diehl and Goertz (2000, 60-63) find that only 25 percent of the MIDs and 17.1 percent of interstate wars occurred in isolated military conflicts (non-rivalries).[3] Enduring rivals have a 0.59 probability of war, and proto rivals have a probability of 0.32 that they will go to war (Goertz and Diehl 2000, 200). This empirical finding has led to a new focus in international relations.[4]

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[3] It must be kept in mind that Goertz and Diehl’s (2000) finding on the number disputes in rivalry is conditional on the fact that each rivalry type is coded by the number of disputes they have entered into.
[4] Colaresi and Thompson (2002) also find that rivalry makes escalation more likely during crisis situations. They also note that, “rivalry not only makes escalation more likely, but also significantly interacts with

Disputes and wars are not usually independent events, but are part of an ongoing relationship between two hostile nations. Goertz and Diehl (2000, 197) suggest "that our understanding of conflict and its potential for escalation to war is a function not merely of the attributes of the protagonists of the prevailing international system but also of the dynamics and interactions of the protagonists' rivalry relationship." If there is a relationship between each dispute, the disputes need to be studied in the context of their historical interactions rather than independently. The overwhelming majority of conflicts are a product of what Maoz and Mor (2002) call "international hate affairs," or rivalries. Diehl and Goertz (2000) suggest the field of conflict studies should be oriented towards the study of rivalries and not war. This project starts on a path towards this ultimate objective, but we first must understand exactly what a rivalry is.

What is a Rivalry?

Rivalries are typically identified as some form of repeated long-standing crisis or protracted conflict. Rivalry involves competition and struggle between two or more actors over some stake or issue that may vary. Some states are actually "addicted" to conflict with other states (Stoll 1984; Maoz 2002). The image of another state as an enemy endures in the relations between the states and in the minds of the leaders and the people. A rivalry essentially involves a hostile relationship with a recognized adversary.

Brecher (1984; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000) identifies protracted conflicts as hostile interactions over long periods of time. Within protracted conflicts are periods of

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more traditional predictors of conflict, such as capability ratios, the number of actors in a crisis, democracy, and issues under contention." (Colaresi and Thompson 2002, 263) Fazal (2002) also suggests that rivalry conflict results in state failure for buffer states. When a buffer state sits between a pair of states engaged in

high levels of hostile interaction considered international crises. Protracted conflicts can encompass many crises, sometimes over the same issue. At the heart of the study of rivalry lies the factor of protracted conflict.

Crises within protracted conflicts differ from independent crises in that a history of tension within the relationship already exists. McClelland (1972) identifies a danger in long-standing international conflict in that these types of disputes are prone to war.[5] He looks at fluctuations between peace and crisis within long-standing international conflicts to determine in which instances crises are in danger of escalating to war and what types of crises can be stopped short of war.[6] It is not just the crises alone that are dangerous, but the historic interactions that serve as a background to these disputes. If this background is overwhelmingly hostile, rivalry is likely to develop.

Wayman and Jones (1991) conceive of enduring rivalries as those marked by the continued existence of a conflictual situation for a prolonged historical period. Their effort was the first to seek an explanation of the causes and consequences of a large number of rival dyads. They operationalize rivalries with three components: severity, which requires five reciprocated militarized disputes that last at least thirty days; durability, which requires a period of twenty-five years between the outbreak of the first dispute until the last dispute; and continuity, which holds that a gap of ten years between

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rivalry, that buffer state is likely to die a state death. This suggest that rivalry is deeply connect with concepts of state death.

[5] In a recent test, Prins (Prins 2002) notes that bargaining behavior during a crisis differs for states involved in rivalry when compared to states not involved in rivalry.

[6] Other early studies on crises relevant to rivalry are Snyder and Diesing (1977), Holsti, North and Brody (1968), and Azar (1972).

disputes will terminate a rivalry unless the issues remain unresolved. They find twenty-eight enduring rivalries when using a preliminary version of the MID dataset.[7]

Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993) define rivalries as repeated conflicts with a certain degree of competitiveness and connection of issues. A MID is used to operationalize the competitiveness requirement. Diehl (1985) began by defining a rivalry as a pair of nations with at least three militarized disputes within a period of fifteen years. Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993; 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000,44-46) proceed to operationalize an enduring rivalry as those pairs of states with six MIDs within a period of 20 years. Proto-rivalries are those dyads that have up to five MIDs and fail to reach the enduring rivalry requirement in a 20-year period. Isolated conflicts, on the other hand, are those conflicts between dyads that involve one or two disputes and do not escalate to the proto or enduring stage (but they may escalate to war in a short period). Diehl and Goertz were the first to both establish a consistent dataset of interstate rivalries and provide useful coding rules for the operationalization of the term rivalry. Consequently, they remain the exemplars of the quantitative study of rivalry.

Defining rivalry by the number of MIDs within a dyad may limit the ability of the operational definition to capture the true meaning of rivalry and to account for all cases. Thus, Vasquez (1993,75-76; 1996) defines a rivalry as a relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other. A state's foreign policy decisions in the context of a rivalry are made to counter the foreign policy of a rival state and to attempt to deny gains to that rival.

[7] Wayman (1996) also has used enduring rivals to select cases to test power transition hypotheses (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980). He finds that rivals that have a power shift double the risk of

Denying gains to a rival is a central concept in rivalry theory. Rivalry assumes a zero sum game where one side seeks to ensure their own security through the destruction of a rival. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) perform an experiment in which their subjects can reduce other players money, but only if they give up some of their own cash. Zizzo and Oswald find that, "contrary to the predictions of the normal economics textbook, which stresses a narrow self-interest, we find significant evidence of burning. Two thirds of our laboratory subjects burn others – even though they have to give up some of their own money to do so." (Zizzo and Oswald 2001, 3) This demonstrates an individual's intent to deny gains to potential rival, even it if it threatens their own welfare. A similar dynamic works in rival interactions in the interstate system. States would then likewise become willing to "burn" themselves by engaging in war or disputes with a rival if only to deny any sort of gain or benefit to that rival.

Wendt (1999) uses the constructivist viewpoint to review the concepts of rivalry and of the enemy.[8] He notes (Wendt 1999, 261), "Enmity and rivalry both imply that the Other does not fully recognize the Self and therefore may act in a "revisionist" fashion toward it…A rival in contrast, is thought to recognize the Self's right to life and liberty, and therefore seeks to revise only its behavior or property." So a rival views the other as a political problem and a source of disagreement, but does not wish to destroy that enemy, only to change its policy and actions. This highlights a central condition of rivalry, issues of a territorial nature. Rivals sometimes wish to revise the property or territorial boundaries of their neighbors and rivals. Rivals also seek regime change within a rival nation, such as the current policy of the Bush administration towards Iraq.

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war occurring in that dyad.

[8] I thank Cameron Thies for pointing this out.

The Untied States does not wish to destroy its rival, Iraq, but rather to change Iraq's policy and system of government so that it may be a better (i.e. democratic) international actor. Sometimes rivals seek to deny an enemy's right to existence, but in most cases of interstate rivalry; the other only attempts to deny gains to the other state.

Under Wendt's version of the Lockean culture of rivalry, a macro-structure can influence the micro-level interactions of rivalry states (Wendt 1999, 283). The first and second ways this happens is through the use of accepted warfare that is also constrained. War is an acceptable response to a rivalry, but it generally should take a limited nature and serve as a "shock" to the rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 1995). As mentioned before, rivals accept an opposing side's right to existence. Therefore, rivals tend to fight constantly with a low level of violence. They experience frequent clashes and other types of disputes short of war that characterize their relationship as enemies. The third tendency is for states to balance the power of their rivals. Under the realist ideology, states seek balance to ensure their security (Waltz 1979). When balanced, rival states tend to fight for a long period of time without the ability to significantly impact the intentions of their rival since they lack the capabilities to do so. The final tendency is neutrality and non-alignment. If rivals can settle their differences, they can enter into a period of peaceful coexistence. They are not friends, and nor are they rivals.

Bennett (1997, 370) defines an interstate rivalry as a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some common issue(s) between them for an extended period of time. He argues that there must be some connection or overlap between the issues at state in various disputes that make up rivalries. The theory at work in this project acknowledges that issues are important in the study of rivalry, but there need not

be one particular issue at dispute between a pair of states. It only matters that one important issue (usually territorial) arises early in the life of the rivalry. After that point, states will fight over a variety of issues not connected to the original dispute. Once again, the intention of a rivalry is to deny any sort of gain to an enemy, or to "burn" the rival.

Using historical research, Thompson (2001) identifies a population of dyads (173 rivals from 1816-1999) that are strategic rivalries. Thompson (1995, 217) writes, "mutual identification of rivals as rivals is critical to the generation of the processes associated with rivalry behavior." Strategic rivalries must view each other as enemies, both be competitors, and must be independent states.[9]

The advantage of using of the strategic rival concept is that each state clearly identifies the other as an enemy, whereas the COW rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000) rely on a record of militarized disputes between the two states to operationalize the term rivalry. While one has the advantage of historical documentation, COW rivalries include low level rivals (proto) and non-rivals (isolated conflicts). It is important to test any hypothesis on rivalry development against instances when the states were not rivals. To truly get at what makes states rivals, we must know which states are not rivals and examine whether see if they exhibit different foreign policy practices.

[9] Views of the rival as an "other" or enemy can lead to a constructivist approach to rivalry where identities, ideas, and interests become important. There are a few relevant works in this developing area (DiCicco 2001; Thies 2001; 2001; 2003).

Rivalry as a Dependent Variable[10]

The study of rivalry as a dependent variable is a recent development. Rivalry is an outcome that we seek to explain and understand. Diehl and Goertz (2000, 6) note, "using rivalries, we avoid many of the problems that have plagued cross-sectional approaches. We do not fret about the definition of relevant dyads, nor do we need to worry about whether to focus on wars or war years." This approach allows for studying rivalries from their conception to termination in order to develop hypotheses about their internal dynamics. Hensel writes, "these studies typically emphasize the changing context across earlier and later phases of the same rivalry, and attempt to account for the movement of certain adversaries to full enduring rivalry while other adversaries resolve their differences much earlier." (Hensel 1998, 172) *Using rivalry as a dependent variable can lead to various "evolutionary" learning hypotheses about rivalries.* It is the notion that rivalries evolve or progress towards some sort of outcome that is central to the study of protracted crises.

Levy (1994) defines learning as a change of beliefs or the development of new beliefs as a result of observation or interruption through past experience. Learning is not a uniform practice for all states and actors; experiencing an event is key to learning, and actors and states draw different inferences from each event. Levy, furthermore emphasizes that another important concept is that change brought about through learning is derived from individual, domestic, and systemic variables. Expectations and perceptions (Jervis 1976) influence the individual. Domestic constraints influence what

[10] One could also use the concept of international rivalry as an independent variable. These studies are not covered in this dissertation, but an example of the use of rivalry as an independent variable is Oren (2003). Oren suggests the American political scientist's notion of democracy has been profoundly shaped by the international rivalries that the Untied States has engaged in.

changes can be implemented from the experienced event. In a rivalry system, events effecting each side will become the most salient experiences in the future for the pair of states.

Modelski (1990) identifies learning as lasting systematic change that is a result of past experience. It is in this sense that rivals (and the international system in general) can experience a form of evolutionary learning. Social evolution involves the changing patterns of interaction among social units. Social evolution differs from biological evolution in that it is not concerned with changes within biological organisms, but is similar in that neither has a set path of development.

It is important to note the evolutionary capabilities of rivalry in that rivalries are long-standing, tense relationships between two nations that experience changing patterns in their interactions. Evolutionary processes in world politics means that the interactions of states are dynamic rather than static events. States seek to change and adapt according to their environment. While some rivalries are stable and others are highly unstable with frequent war occurrence, both types learn how to interact with each other on a day to day basis in the absence of war and experience a beginning and an end that is not locked into a predetermined path. To find how rivalries end or terminate, the history of interactions within the states involved and between the nations involved must be explored to determine general evolutionary patterns.

Goertz and Diehl (1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000) conceive of a basic rivalry level (BRL) to account for the evolution of rivalries. The BRL concept is similar to Azar's (1972) concept of a normal relation's range. The interaction range of two nations usually exists in the middle of the scale between hostile interactions and friendly interactions in a

normal relations range (or BRL) model. A pair of states settles into an average level of conflictual or cooperative interactions through the life of their rivalry. Changes in the BRL can account for the evolutionary aspects of rivalry. An increase in the BRL will lead to war while a decrease will lead to termination. Goertz and Diehl also apply their model of political shocks (Goertz and Diehl 1995) to account for changes, specifically termination points, in the BRL of rivalries. Using a duration model, Goertz and Diehl (1998) find that 62 percent of their cases exhibit a pattern of flat relations, or stable BRL. The distribution of the remaining possibilities is split among increasing (6.7%), decreasing (4.4%), convex (13.3%), concave (4.4%), and wavy (8.9%) patterns.

Maoz and Mor (1998; 2002) believe that rivalries evolve (change over time) through experience in past conflict and changes in an actor's preferences. They use a formal model of Bram's (Brams and Mattli 1993; Brams 1994) theory of moves (TOM) to describe this process. The TOM formal model is a supergame where the outcome of the previous game determines how the player will play the subsequent game. Players (nations) are likely to continue a rivalry until they achieve some degree of satisfaction with the results.

Overall, Maoz and Mor (2002) find that rivalries evolve over time due to dissatisfaction with the status quo (measured by both preferences and the outcome of the last "game") and capabilities (specifically, symmetrical capabilities allow the rivalry to endure). Essentially, rivalries will continue until both states are satisfied with the status quo of their relations or one lacks the ability to change the status quo (asymmetrical capabilities). In concluding their study, Maoz and Mor's conclude with the conclusion that they need to endogenonize the factors not part of their model, including systemic

effects, regional effects, and domestic political events. Many factors are important to understand to conclude on the dynamics of individual rivalries.

Hensel (1996; 1998; 1999; Hensel and Diehl 1998) also believes that rivalries undergo a process of evolution or change over time. Suspicion, hostility, and grievances accumulated over time between two nations will predict the evolution from an early rival to a full-fledged, enduring rivalry where both sides expect the conflict to continue into the future.[11] Recurring conflict can be avoided if states choose to not respond to an initial dispute with a militarized response (Hensel and Diehl 1994). Sweeny (2001) also notes that conflict becomes less frequent and more likely to deescalate if the interests between the dyad grow similar over time.

As conflict continues, the severity of the disputes between the rivals increases (Hensel 1996). Disputes between rivals, no matter the issue, tend to endure and escalate as time goes by if those rivals demonstrate escalating bargaining tendencies. Colaresi (2000) does note, through the use of events data, that over time the conflict levels within rivalries tend to decline after a sharp increase, and that cooperation levels slowly increase over time. Rival disputes are also much more likely to result in stalemate outcomes (Hensel 1996).

Goertz, Jones, and Diehl (2003) have recently begun an investigation into the maintenance process of rivalries. Their exploration seeks to understand "not merely how rivalries end, but looking at the problem from the other direction, why they don't – and the theoretical and empirical explanations change accordingly." (Goertz, Jones et al. 2003, 2) They find that two factors influence the maintenance of rivalries; stalemate

[11] Hensel's (1996) phases are: early = disputes 1 and 2, intermediate = disputes 3-5, and advanced = any disputes after number 5.

outcomes and territorial disputes. Stalemate outcomes influence the patterns stabilized in the late stage rivalry. If a dispute during a rivalry results in a stalemate, that rivalry is likely to endure. Territorial disputes, by their nature alone, indicate the salience of the rivalry and influence its maintenance. Chapter three will more fully discuss the effects of territorial disputes on rivalry development.

Rivalries do not exhibit evolution in the sense of increased conflict patterns, but generally "learn" how to interact and continue the rivalry, sometimes with peaceful results. For Hensel (1999; Hensel and Diehl 1998), the rivalry process is not inevitable; but rather, a dynamic process that changes over time due to interactions with rival states is possible. Those pairs of states that do reach the advanced stage of rivalry or become enduring should grow more severe in their interactions, with wars more common during the later phases. I find the study of rivalry though the phases of development to be an important foundation for all future rivalry studies.

Explanations of Rivalry Initiation and Development

There have been few studies that suggest and test theories that would explain the initiation and development of rivalry. We therefore know little about how rivalries actually come about. Vasquez (1993; 1996) makes the point that two unequal dyads are not likely to develop mutual hostility and competition; rather, only those dyads with symmetrical capabilities will be able to sustain an enduring rivalry.[12] Hensel (1996) includes capability ratios as a control variable, and agrees that most rivalries will be

[12] Wayman (1996; 2000) finds some evidence that rivals are likely to be relative equals. Power parity seems to be an initial necessary condition for rivalry.

relatively equal in capability, but believes the question should be an empirical one supported by evidence.

While the empirical evidence counters the claim that enduring rivalries between two unequal states cannot develop (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 51), a closer look at those dyads with unequal power distributions (minor-majors states) shows that these rivalries are not significant overall (meaning they include such rivalries as United States versus Haiti and the U.S. versus Mexico). Such unequal power structures tend to be the cases where foreign policy practices are not oriented towards the enemy. One state may feel that another is a threat, but the feelings are not reciprocated in military practice. The Untied States and Mexico may technically be in a rivalry under Goertz and Diehl's requirement of six MIDs in a 25-year period, but the United States does not see Mexico as a valid threat or a source of competition. The United States was more likely concerned with its principal rivalry (Thompson 1995) with the United Kingdom during 1800's than with threats from Mexico. "Mixed" pair rivals usually are colonial conflicts such as France and China or dyads that exhibit less severe forms of conflict such as the United States and Haiti.

If unequal dyads do not produce significant (militarized) rivalries under Vasquez's (1993; 1996) and Thompson's (1995) definition of a rivalry, those unequal dyads reaching the militarized requirement for rivalry will likely undertake different steps towards the initiation of disputes and war. Unequal dyads involved in a militarized rivalry require further study. I believe that rival dyads with vastly unequal capabilities may act differently, but I prefer to think of my rivalry theory in more general terms. Therefore, I do not test propositions about the dynamics of different types of status dyads

(i.e. major versus major power and minor versus minor power rivalries), and perform most empirical tests on all status dyads.[13]

Maoz and Mor (1998; 2002) find through a game theoretic test of Brams' theory of moves (Brams and Mattli 1993) that enduring rivalries converge on conflict outcomes within a non-myopic sub game. Those sub-games that obtain a "cooperate" outcome do not escalate to the enduring state of rivalry. Asserting which move (conflict or cooperate) a state will choose depends on the state's satisfaction with the status quo and the presence of the capabilities to change the status quo. Dissatisfaction and the ability to change the status quo direct a state to choose a conflict outcome and escalate a rivalry, possibly to the enduring stage. Dissatisfaction and revisionist attitudes seem to be important for the persistence of rivalries, but these are variables that cannot readily be examined across all cases.

Goertz and Diehl (1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000) theorize that a political shock is a "quasi-necessary" and a "virtual necessary" condition for the initiation and termination of a rivalry. A political shock is a traumatic event in either the international system (world wars, changes in power distribution, and periods of territory shifts) or internal-domestic politics (regime change and civil war). In an empirical analysis, Diehl and Goertz (2000) find a political shock to be associated with rivalry initiation 95 percent of the time (60/63 cases) for enduring rivalries. They theorize that a political shock allows a "window of opportunity" for rivalry initiation. Colaresi (2001) tests a global war as a political shock hypothesis using a population of Thompson's strategic rivals (2001), and finds that a war shock only leads to the termination of rivalry, not the initiation.

[13] Although chapter ten does perform tests on the major, minor, and mixed status enduring rivalry subsets.

Hensel's (1996) escalating evolutionary approach to rivalries holds that rivalries are likely to advance and become "enduring" if the outcome of the first dispute is not resolved to both states' mutual satisfaction (see also Leng 1983; 1993).[14] The evolutionary approach also holds that high levels of severity of conflict (war) early in the life of a rivalry make confrontations in the future less likely. Choosing not to respond to a militarized dispute with the use of force makes a rivalry outcome less likely (Hensel and Diehl 1994). Rivalries evolve or experience a trend of increasing conflict throughout their life.

Goertz and Diehl (1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000) counter Hensel's (1996) model with a punctuated equilibrium model. The punctuated equilibrium model holds that once a rivalry experiences a political shock that initiates a rivalry, the states will become locked into conflict and the rivalry will only be terminated by another political shock.

Some also analyze the impact of domestic politics on rivalry development. Hensel (1998) notes that the "two-level game" approach (Putnam 1988) to conflict fits very well in the rivalry research program. In an examination of the Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry, Hensel (1998) finds that domestic political concerns disrupted ratification of some treaties that could have ended the rivalry. Mor (1997) also finds that changing domestic public opinion led to Israel's decision to enter into the Oslo negotiations, which aimed to settle outstanding issues with Palestine for a short period of time.

Looking at leadership tenure and rivalry, Enterline (1998) finds that greater levels of conflict between rivals reduces the tenure of leaders. Colaresi (2003) finds that rivalry and external threat significantly influence leadership survival rates when a state loses a

[14] Huth (1988) also finds that bully and conciliation strategies in past disputes will increase the probability of further disputes.

costly war. "Specifically, outside a rivalry a large loss greatly influences the risk of post-war leadership turnover." (Colaresi 2003, 25) Yet, losing a war during a rivalry does not effect the ability of leaders to retain their grasp on power. Looking at the diversionary war hypothesis (Levy 1989), Mitchell and Prins (2001) find that domestic turmoil tends to increase the probability of military action in settings of rivalry. Colaresi (2002, 25) also finds that leaders will deescalate a rivalry if the leader is in a secure power position, but will escalate the conflict within a rivalry if the rival is aggressive or the leader is unsure of his power base.

Current theories of rivalry initiation and development seem incomplete. Goertz and Diehl's (1995) "quasi-necessary" political shock condition is dependent on too many diverse factors to specifically account for rivalry initiation. It may also be correct that democracy reduces the likelihood of states entering into a rivalry (Hensel, Goertz et al. 2000), but the real causes of rivalry initiation still have not been effectively demonstrated.

Stinnett and Diehl (2001,21) argue that rather than having one cause, "they (rivalries) emerge from the conjunction of a large number of small, individually weak factors." Stinnett and Diehl find that behavioral factors (rivalry linkages and dispute outcomes) and structural factors (political shocks and great power involvement) each have a small impact on rivalry initiation. Colaresi and Thompson (2002) take a similar line and suggest two rivalry paths, one for positional and one for spatial rivalries. They find that, "contiguous, minor power dyads that were not asymmetrical in capabilities were most likely to follow that spatial path to conflict over territorial control. Major

powers and leading regional powers were most likely to follow the positional path to contention over relative influence and status." (Colaresi and Thompson 2002, 14)

The causes of war research program (Vasquez 1993) has argued that territorial conflicts, alliances, arms races, power parity, and hard-liners within domestic political structures are factors that increase the probability of war. The most fruitful pursuit of rivalry development theories could be the exploration of the types of territorial disputes leading to enduring rivalry and power politics practices that incite recurring conflict. This project will be concerned with the increased probability of rivalry development in dyads that use power politics foreign policy practices.

What Do We Know About the Development of Rivalry?

It might be useful at this point to outline what we currently know about rivalry development and what remains to be done in the future. We do know that, no matter what dataset is used, there is a direct relationship between war and rivalry. Thompson (2000) finds that 75 percent of his strategic rivals experience war. Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that 37 out 63 enduring rivalries experience at least one war. There are, however, very few factors accepted as findings that lead to the initiation and development of rivalry. There have been studies that explore the termination of rivalry, but this study is concerned with the development, initiation, and escalation of rival dyads.[15]

[15] Studies that explore rivalry termination include (Bennett 1996; 1997; 1997; 1998; Cioffi-Revilla 1998; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002). Diehl and Goertz (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000) have also explored rivalry termination, but have started a new data collection enterprise to recode the termination of rivals. This coding is based on the resolution of the conflict rather than the current termination coding which requires a ten year period of time without a militarized dispute to code a rivalry as terminated. Once this new dataset is collected, it will be possible to more accurately test and predict the termination of interstate rivalries.

The absence of a democratic pair of states appears to be a virtual necessary condition for rivalry (Hensel, Goertz et al. 2000). Democratic pairs of states do not go to war with each other (Maoz and Russett 1993; Ray 1995), and they also rarely participate in rivalries with each other. The one enduring democratic rivalry is between the United States and Great Britain. This rivalry stems from a long-standing dispute for independence that constituted the initial issue in the rivalry.

Newly independent status is the next important factor for rivalry development. Newly independent states are likely to participate in a rivalry. Goertz and Diehl (1995) identify status as one type of "shock" that can contribute to the development of a rivalry. Using the Thompson (2001) coding of rivalries, DiCicco finds that most rivalries are newly independent states, or "born under a bad sign." (DiCicco 2002, 1) Minor powers are also likely to become involved in a rivalry if they border a newly independent nation.

We also know that territorial disputes are associated with the development of a rivalry (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001). How these disputes are handled is key to the initiation of a rivalry (Leng 1983; Hensel 1996; Leng 2000). If a state does not respond militarily to a hostile threat, it is less likely to experience recurring conflict (Hensel and Diehl 1994). If a dyad also experiences a stalemate outcome during disputes after its initial origin, the conflict is then likely to become an enduring or proto-rivalry (Goertz, Jones et al. 2003). We also know that states unhappy with the status quo are likely to become rivals (Maoz and Mor 2002).

What becomes important for the development of a rivalry is what types of disputes a pair of states becomes involved in, and how they handle those disputes once they begin. Handling disputes in a power politics fashion (arms races, alliances, linkages,

and forming a grand strategy) will lead states to become interstate rivals. The next section will develop a fuller explanation of how and why rivalry occurs, and will then derive hypotheses to be tested from my steps to rivalry theory.

Known Factors Associated with Rivalry Development

1. **Autocratic Dyad (Hensel, Goertz et al. 2000)**
2. **Participation of Newly Independent States (Goertz and Diehl 1995; DiCicco 2002)**
3. **Territorial Disputes (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001)**
4. **Escalating Bargaining Demands (Hensel 1996; Leng 2000)**
5. **Rival Dyads are Dissatisfied Powers (Maoz and Mor 2002)**
6. **Militarized Response to Initial Dispute (Hensel and Diehl 1994).**
7. **Stalemate Outcomes During a Rivalry are Likely to Make Rivalries "Endure." (Goertz, Jones et al. 2003)**

CHAPTER III

A THEORY OF RIVALRY DEVELOPMENT: THE STEPS TO RIVALRY MODEL

Introduction

In this chapter, I lay out a general theory of rivalry that would account for the development of a rivalry between two states that have had at least one militarized interstate dispute. My general query in this work attempts to determine what factors make pairs of states that enter into conflict develop into militarized interstate rivals. The main model for rivalry development is called the steps to rivalry model. Theories involving the rivalry conflict spiral and grand strategy are also discussed to present a complete model of rivalry formation.

There are few basic assumptions that form the foundation of this theory, namely, my general outlook on rivalry dynamics. Primarily, states in a rivalry first must experience a serious conflict to start a rivalry situation. Rivalry cannot develop without militarized conflict.[16] Militarization of a hostile situation represents the key indication that a pair of states have entered into a rivalry. For now, I am only interested in the study of those states that have a militarized relationship.

Most of the empirical work on rivalry in later chapters is based on a rivalry dataset collected by Diehl and Goertz (2000). This work formalizes the operationalization of a term rivalry into a dataset where propositions of the conflict propensity of rivalry dyads can be tested. This dataset is based on two general rivalry

[16] Thompson (2001) does code a dataset that is independent of serious, militarized conflict. Very few dyads in this dataset experience zero conflict.

conditions: competitiveness and a connection of issues (Diehl and Goertz 2000). The competitiveness requirement is captured by the participation in militarized interstate disputes (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996). While all theoretical propositions will also be tested using a dataset not based on militarized instate dispute involvement (Thompson 2001), a basic assumption for all rivals is that they have participated in at least one militarized dispute during their lifetime. Without this assumption, it is unclear if the nature of conflict between a dyad can become hostile and dangerous.

A current example would be the state of relations between France and the United States in 2003. It seems there is an ongoing diplomatic rivalry between the two states. France has opposed numerous US policies, but the main issue currently involves the use of force in Iraq. While it is clear that the rivals seek to deny gains to the other and do not support the other's foreign policy initiatives, there is no indication that either side would ever consider using militarized force against the other. Without this possibility, it makes little sense to devote time and effort towards the study of these types of rivalries since they are less dangerous than the rivalry between Pakistan and India, for instance.

The next assumption is that the participants in a rivalry are an interstate dyad. This study concentrates on how a pair of states interact with each other. It does not matter what direction these interactions take place (Bennett and Stam 2000), or who does what to whom. If a pair of states is involved in a rivalry, both states are assumed to participate in conflict with each other and recognize the other as an enemy (Vasquez 1993; Thompson 1995). In a rivalry, each state acts and reacts to the other in the form of militarized threats or displays of force. No matter what the status of a rivalry dyad (major-major, minor-minor, or major-minor), rivalry pairs engage in conflict without

consideration of the strategic consequences of their actions in terms of power status. They are only concerned with how they are perceived by their rival and how the leadership and general population of the state sees their actions in regards to a rival. Rivals seek to deny gains to each other. In short, rivalry represents a case of state relations where states act and react to each other in a relatively equally conflictual manner governed by the laws of a zero-sum game.

This assumption also requires that rivalry pairs be made up of interstate members. They must be members of the interstate system as recognized by the correlates of war project (Singer 1979; Small and Singer 1982). While it is possible to explore the dynamics of rivalry relations between state system members and non-state system members, this has yet to be done because there is not data available that would meet these needs at this time. It might also be possible to explore the relations between intrastate rivals, but the theory outlined here is primarily formed to explain the relations of interstate pairs of legally recognized states.

Rival dyads in this study are confined to a pair of states. Rivalry dynamics might include the relations between three or more states, but these rivals would be complex rivalries. Complex rivalries involve states that have interdependent security relations with one or more states and must include at least three parties. In the future, it would be useful to create a dataset that would trace and determine who complex rivals are and when they occur. The rivalries between the U.S., USSR, and the Korea's; Israel, Egypt, and Syria; and China, U.S., and the USSR include complex rivalries that would each be coded as an individual complex rivalry (Goldstein and Freeman 1990; 1991). This work

will not be focused on complex rivalries, but it will look at how rivalries are linked, for example, when one state in a rivalry has an ongoing rivalry or dispute with another state.

The final assumption of this model relies on states' concern with security and survival. Because of this assumption, states act in a manner dictated by realist folklore (Vasquez 1993; Johnston 1995; Vasquez 1998). Foreign policy folklore specifies that once states are concerned with maintaining their survival, they often become involved in a security dilemma (Herz 1950) where actions taken to ensure the survival of a state are seen as endangering the security of another state. By acting in a realist fashion, states attempt to guard their survival by forming alliances, engaging military buildups, fighting over territorial acquisitions, outlining grand strategic plans to counter a rivalry, and participating in constant conflict with other states (rivalry linkage). Each of these factors leads to the development of rivalry by increasing the tension between a pair of states. Handling an initial militarized dispute with the power politics options outlined below increase the probability that a dyad will become severe rivals. This notion of realist foreign policy solutions when faced with a potential rivalry situation will form the foundation of the steps to rivalry theory.

Steps to Rivalry Assumptions

1. **Militarized competition**
2. **Interstate participants**
3. **Reliance on realist folklore**

Power Politics and Conflict

Power politics is the condition in foreign policy practice where force and power are utilized to settle disputes and exert influence on other states or actors. Vasquez (1983, 216) defines power politics as "actions based on an image of the world as insecure

and anarchic which leads to distrust, struggles for power, interest taking precedence over norms and rules, the use of Machiavellian stratagems, coercion, attempts to balance power, reliance on self-help, and the use of force and war as the ultima ratio."

Power allows a state to do what it wants, to take what it wants, and to flaunt the conventions of international norms. Yet, our notion of international affairs is shaped by conventional international norms, such as the norm of state sovereignty. Power and the use of force come in direct conflict with notions of peace and stability in the system. The problem is that it is assumed that state security depends on the realities of power and its use to protect a state from destruction (Morgenthau 1948).

When scholars speak of power politics, they usually emphasize the ability of power to protect the state. They speak of the limits of power and utility of force (Michalak 2001, 1). Yet, the use of power politics in this work is regarded in a negative light. Power and force are not a way to state security, but a path to war. This has been shown in the steps to war theory (Vasquez 1993), and it will be the foundation of my theory of rivalry. The central question in this project investigates what types of power politics practices lead to rivalry. To understand the central tenets of this work, one must first understand power politics and its use in international politics.

Anarchic World and the Struggle for Power

Morgenthau, perhaps the exemplar of power politics, suggests that all of international politics is a struggle for power. "Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may

ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself." (Morgenthau 1948, 13) In this manner, power is directly connected with the notion of survival and security.

The basic assumption for much of international relations theory is founded on the belief that the system is anarchical. The idea is that there is no central arbitrator in the system to judge and make authoritative decisions. As Michalak notes, "thus the first fact about international politics: the international system is a system without government." (2001, 2) Human nature is basically evil; we live in a Hobbesian world. As Morgenthau puts it, "the history of nations active in international politics shows them continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war." (1948, 21) States cannot be trusted to act in collegial manner because of human nature. Therefore, a state must possess power in order to ensure its own survival in the absence of a central arbitrator.

Yet, is anarchy really such a central concept to international politics and study of power? Since the lack of a central authority, or leviathan if you will, is an implausible counterfactual, should we really be studying the concept with such rigor? An inconceivable condition or factor seemingly cannot have an influence on an event. I believe the tendency to seek power and to mediate the effects of anarchy through power are nonetheless, central causes of the conflict in the world today. Believing that force and might will ensure security provides a sure path to war. Believing the central motivation of our enemies is enmity against the people and the state leads one to seek power and protection through alliances and military buildups. This project will show in this project that these two activities lead to rivalry and, later war. The central notion of security through power remains a fundamentally flawed concept.

Interests versus Norms and Rules

Central to the concept of power is the idea of the national interest. National interest is then defined as the territorial integrality, culture, or institutions of a state (Morgenthau 1948). The problem remains that the national interest of one state directly confronts the norms of the international system in most cases. To attack one state because its political outlook might threaten the security of one's institutions directly opposes the idea of self-determination and state sovereignty. These are the norms of the system, the normal operating procedures of the state. The concept of the national interest allows for the breaking of the rules and traditions important in the international system.

When the interests of the state are threatened, tradition dictates that the state act in a certain way to preserve its stability. The norm should be mediation and diplomacy, yet the norm often manifests as the use of force and power politics practices.

The Use of Force

Morgenthau notes that prestige is central to the perception of power in the system. "Besides the practices of diplomacy, the policy of prestige uses military demonstrations as means to achieve its purpose. Since military strength is the obvious measure of a nation's power, its demonstration serves to impress the others with that nation's power." (1948, 54) Power cannot be achieved without prestige, and prestige in the midst of the use of power is directly connected with the use of force. Thus, force is an accepted way to demonstrate power and acquire more prestige. The use of force represents one way for a state to acquire its goals in the international system. It is this tendency of action that leads to the security dilemma. The security of a state is threatened when the power of

another is displayed. To survive the state then seeks to enhance its own power by any means necessary.

Order through force is the dictum of power politics. It is this assumption that some contemporary peace scholars are fighting to change. The world does not work in the way some power politics scholars assume. Michalak notes, "in an anarchic international system, threats of force and the employment of force are essential for diplomacy designed to ensure peace, security, and order." (2001, 82)

Why must force be the way to peace? Surely, the norms of the system, international law and institutions can prevent the spread of war and conflict if they were accepted by all. Yet, contemporary statesmen continue to follow the norms of power politics practices. Consequently, my central theory in this work is anti-power politics. The use of force and power politics will lead pairs of states into dangerous protracted disputes.

Power Politics and Realism

Power politics, as a concept, is central to the theory of political realism in international relations. Realism as a theory is not central to the concept of power politics. When I speak of power politics in this work, I am not speaking of the theory of realism and balance of power, but of the use of power and force to solve international issues. I am not concerned with typical issues central to realism: self-help, deterrence, prudence, and the structural conditions of the system. This work is concerned with the types of power politics foreign policy practices typically used to settle issues at stake between a pair of states.

In the end, Morgenthau concluded that power as a force is undeniable in the system. Until the system can be changed, little can be done to stop the tendency of the use of force. I hope to show that the use of power as a force directly leads to the situation of rivalry.

The Steps to War

The steps to war model presented by Vasquez (1993) will serve as the basic for my steps to rivalry theory. In this light, it is important to discuss the model and its findings. The steps to war model (Vasquez 1993; 2000) holds that there are certain actions or foreign policy choices states make that increase the probability of war occurring between a dyad. Territorial disputes, power politics (alliance building, hard-liners in power, and arms races), and recurring disputes each move a state closer to war. "Power politics behavior, rather than preventing war, actually increases the probability that it will break out. This is because the main practices of power politics – alliances, military buildups, and the use of realpolitik tactics – increase insecurity and hostility motivating each side to take harder lines." (Vasquez 1993, 7)

Power politics or realist foreign policy practices lead a state down a path to war. Each step taken increases the probability of war. While the probability of war increases with each step taken, war does not become inevitable. States can end the movement towards war by settling an issue or decreasing their demands during a bargaining cycle (Leng 1983; 1988; 1993). War is brought on by a series of steps that increase in hostility and make the issues under contention intractable (Vasquez 1993). War then becomes likely, but not automatic. Central to the steps to war theory are the issues at stake in the

conflict, the role of alliances and military buildups, and the domestic attributes of the states.

Issues (Territorial Disputes) and War

Interstate war almost always results from a dispute over an issue at stake between two states. The trigger to many wars is not the underlying structural forces, alliance dynamics, or arms race patterns, but an issue (usually territory) on which two states disagree. Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) conceive of an issue-based approach to world politics where it is not important where values are allocated, but over what values entities fight over.

The key to finding the cause of any war centers on investigating what the states are fighting over (Diehl 1992). Territorial issues constitute the most common cause of war (Holsti 1991; Vasquez 1993; Vasquez and Henehan 2001).[17] Territorial disputes have the most salience for either member of the disputing party and are least likely to be easily divisible. Hensel suggests that "territory is often seen as highly salient for three reasons: its tangible contents or attributes, its intangible or psychological value, and its effects on a as state's reputation." (2000, 58) Vasquez (1995) argues that a nation territoriality is important in the study of war in that states fight over territorial issues, not solely because they are neighbors and constantly have opportunities to interact. "The territorial explanation of war assumes that human territoriality is a key to understanding

[17] Testing the territorial explanation of war has encountered various criticisms that it does not account for the rise of territorial disputes in the first place (Lemke and Reed 2001). Senese and Vasquez (2003) find that territorial claims increase the probability of a MID occurring and then territorial MIDs increase the probability of war. There is no selection effect at work in the study of territory and conflict.

much of interstate conflict and war in the modern global system." (Senese and Vasquez 2003, 3)

Vasquez (Vasquez 1993, 133) notes that, "since these issues do not always lead to war and often are resolved permanently, territorial issues are at most an underlying cause of war and not by themselves a sufficient condition for war." The manner in which territorial issues are handled in the context of a dispute then becomes important. For Vasquez, territorial disputes handled in a power politics fashion (alliances, arms races, hard-liners in power) are likely to result in war.

Alliances and War

Alliances are formal agreements between at least a pair of nations that commit a state to either intervene in a conflict, agree to remain neutral in conflict, or to consult the other state if conflict occurs. "Alliances merely formalize alignments based on interests or coercion." (Liska 1962, 3) Singer and Small (1966) produced the first alliance dataset and typology. Their typology divided alliances into defense pacts, neutrality pacts, and ententes. In an early test, Singer and Small (1968) find alliances positively influence the "frequency, magnitude, and severity of war."

Vasquez (1993, 161) suggests that alliances are part of the "political culture" of war. Alliances create a way to balance power and ensure security according to realist theories (Morgenthau 1948; Walt 1987). Siverson and Tennefoss (1984) show that if alliances promote equality in a dyad that includes a minor power, then war and escalation are not likely to occur. Alliances can be used to project power beyond a state's initial

capabilities, and may serve as instruments to manage national security objectives (Maoz 2000). Showing strength to an enemy may deter that enemy from attacking.

Snyder (1997) develops the notion of an alliance security dilemma in which alliances eliminate the fear that a state associates with an anarchic world and a multipolar distribution of power. Alliances then promote a new fear in their targets. Unfortunately, studies exploring the relationship between alliances and war often show support for an opposite hypothesis, that alliances increase the probability of war. Alliances truly symbolize a step towards war and conflict and not a way to ensure security of a state.

Levy (1981), for example, finds that alliances are almost always followed by war within five years of their formation. The 19th century represents the only anomaly in this finding. For this period, alliances are not associated with war onset due to Concert of Europe. Leeds et. all (2000) find, contrary to some theorists (Sabroskey 1980; Smith 1995), that alliances are reliable to undertake what is agreed upon under the formal treaty.[18] Alliances were reliable seventy five percent of the time for the time-period of 1816 to 1945 (Leeds, Long et al. 2000). There is no commitment dilemma for alliance members. Alliances are likely to lead to war and also bring in other third party joiners who must fulfill formal treaty obligations.

According to Gibler and Vasquez (1998), some alliances are positively associated with peace. Alliances that settle territorial questions typically increase the probability of peace within the dyad (Gibler 1997). In general, certain types of alliances increase the probability of war (Maoz 2000; Vasquez and Senese 2001). Certain types of alliances are more likely to result in conflict (Gibler 1997). Security alliances which include major

powers, no democracies, and dissatisfied powers also increase the probability of war between a dyad (Gibler 2000). Thus, a significant amount of evidence suggests that alliances are an important step to war. Left unexplored is the relationship between alliances and rivalry.

Military Buildups and War

An arms race signifies the rapid buildup of two opposing state's military capabilities. Arms races are a process by which two states compete to develop their arms to prevent attacks by the other state. Two main elements comprise the arms race relationship, interaction and acceleration (Richardson 1960; Sample 1998). First, an arms race signifies a competition between one state and another. A single state can have a military buildup, but this process is not mutual unless another state also competes in the competition. The other element fundamental to the arms race process is acceleration. The buildup of military capabilities must be significantly higher than the arms acquisition process in the previous years. Arms races essentially suggest a change in the military buildup patterns in two states.

Since World War I, theorists have asserted that arms races are a cause of war. The system of linking arms races in Europe compelled each state to increase its own arms to counter a potential rival (Stevenson 1988; 1996). The arms race process is relatively simple in that one state builds up its arms for either internal (budget, leadership tenure, or industry) or external (rivals, potential attack, or force modernization) reasons. This

[18] Kegley and Raymond (1982) also show that if there is a moderate amount of flexibility in the structure of alliances and when alliance commitments are considered binding by international norms, then war is less likely.

buildup compels a competing state to likewise buildup its own arms because of the security dilemma (Herz 1950).

The security dilemma holds that an increase in one state's security causes a decrease in another state's security. The response, according to balance of power logic (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), is to buildup one's own arms to counter the potential threat (Richardson 1960). This allows the opportunity window to open in regards to conflict (Most, Starr et al. 1989). A military buildup prepares a state for the eventual use of force, creating the means by which a state may carry out conflict. Interacting with other conditions, such as alliance ties and hard-liners in power, mutual military buildups signify a step towards war (Vasquez 1993).

Early quantitative tests of the connection between arms races and war only led to a debate over whether arms races are a cause of war, a symptom of preparing for war, or a completely unrelated event. Early tests by Wallace (1979; 1980) suggested a strong link between arms races and war. Over eighty percent of his (Wallace 1979) disputes in the context of arms races escalated to war. Diehl (1983), using a new measure of arms races (because Wallace's 1979) original dataset could not be replicated), conversely finds no link between arms races and war.

Recently, there has been a transition in that scholars have once again found support for a positive link between arms races and war. Using Horn's (1987) data on mutual military buildups, Sample (1996; 1997; 1998; 1998) later finds a strong link between war and mutual military buildups.[19] To be considered in a mutual military

[19] Bolks and Stoll (2000) operationalize arms races by the actual number of military equipment (capital ships) a pair of states has. This approach would be of little value to a study of rivalry where a majority of the rival dyads are land-locked states. They (Bolks and Stoll 2000) do find support for the security

buildup, for the decade proceeding the dispute, the average military expenditure growth rate must be higher than it was between the periods 1816 to 1913 or 1914 to 1993. Also, a state's military spending must increase prior to the dispute, and if another state meets the same conditions, it is in a mutual military buildup then exists (Sample 1998). Using this model, Sample shows that mutual military buildups are associated with war within five years, even controlling for the inclusion of the multiple dyads that interact prior to World War I and World War II (Sample 1996; 1997; 1998).

Using a multivariate model, Sample (1998; 2000) suggests that, even when controlling for issue type (considering that territorial issues are more likely to lead to war), the history of disputes between the pair of sates, and relative defense burdens, military buildups are still associated with war. In a later study, Sample (2002) includes all status types dyads in the model, finding that even minor powers show a strong relationship between military buildups and war. If mutual military buildups are positively associated with war occurrence, they may also be positively associated with rivalry occurrence, which would ultimately lead to war. This prospect will become a central research question in my inquiry into the origins of rivalry.

Domestic Attributes and War

Domestic factors can never be ignored in any theory of war or rivalry. The lack of data on the leadership characteristics or internal opinions of the people within a state prevents the development of theories regarding domestic politics and war (or rivalry).

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dilemma hypothesis in arms race dynamics. States response to actual or anticipated increases in military capabilities.

Vasquez (1993) does suggest that the context of decision making in a crisis situation is always shaped by the domestic political context in which states operate.

The main domestic factor that could push a state towards war is hard-liners in power. Hard-liners in power are prone to adopting power politics strategies to deal with a rival. Acomodationists in power, on the other hand, will try to settle of the issues at dispute.[20] Rather than showing resolve and signaling the intent to use force, acomodationists seek to find solutions to problems.

Images of the enemy may also hold relevance in war initiation. If the people of a state or the leaders identify another state as an enemy, it is easier to undertake conflict operations towards them. "What happens is that a growing number of people begin to feel that war may be necessary and this shift in attitude convinces the leadership that certain actions can be taken." (Vasquez 1993. 200)

War can be avoided if acomodationists gain power. If an acomodationist dominates a politically revisionist state, the demands that states put on the international system and on its rivals can be managed. Issues can be settled effectively and the severity of rivalry can be reduced. If hard-liners are in power, however, there is little chance of settlement and the severity of conflict between a rival will increase and likely result in war.

[20] Vasquez defines acomodationists as "individuals who have a personal predisposition that finds the use of force, especially war, repugnant, and advocates a foreign policy that will avoid war through compromise, negotiation, and the creation of rules and norms for non-violent conflict resolution." Hard-liners are "individuals who have a personal predisposition to adopt a foreign policy that is adamant in not compromising its goals and who argue in favor of the efficacy and legitimacy of threats and force." (Vasquez 1993, 202)

Recent Tests of the Steps to War

Because the foundation and background the steps to war theory provides for the steps to rivalry theory, it is important to note the credibility and support recent tests have afforded the steps to war theory. In a series of recent papers, scholars have gone to great lengths to test the steps to war theory. The majority of these tests are quantitative, but a few also demonstrate the impact of the theory on individual cases. Overall, empirical testing has supported the propositions of the steps to war model (Vasquez 1993).

Looking at the role of territorial disputes, Vasquez (2001) finds that territorial disputes increase the probability of war. This probability increases if the disputes fall under universalist time periods (Wallensteen 1984) when the norms of the international system are not bound by a consistent set of rules of behavior. During particularist periods, the norms of the system are not followed and the probability of war increases.

Vasquez (2002) has found that when a dyad is dominated by territorial disputes, is engaged in an enduring rivalry, and has at least one outside alliance, the probability of war is .863. If both states have an outside alliance, the probability of war raises to .891. In another test, Senese and Vasquez (2003) have found that if a pair of states has a dispute over territorial issues, both sides has an outside alliance, are engaged in a rivalry, and have an arms race, the probability of war is .910. The probability of war for disputes that are over territorial issues, have a rivalry, engage in an arms race, and have only one outside alliance is .903.

Senese and Vasquez (2002) also find strong evidence of an interaction between territorial issues and alliance configurations. Looking at the interactions between the participants of World War II in the Asian region, Vasquez and Gibler (2001) find that the

Second World War followed a typical steps to war pattern. First, the states disputed territorial issues. Later, the interaction between alliances, territorial contiguity, ongoing rivalry, and domestic hard-liners combined together to make war almost unavoidable. To this point, the steps to war theory has generated robust empirical results.

Steps to Interstate War:
Territorial Issues
-- Handling These Issues in a Power Politics Fashion:
Alliance Making
Military Buildups
Repeated Crises (Rivalry)
Crises Escalates to War When:
-- Physical threat to a territorial issue
-- Ongoing arms race
-- Escalation bargaining across crisis
-- Hostile spiral
-- Hard-liners in power on at least one side.
Table adapted from Vasquez (1996)

Steps to Rivalry Theory

Building upon the steps to war model (Vasquez 1993, chapter 3; 2000), I argue there are certain foreign policy practices that will increase the probability that a state will become involved in rivalry. Consider a model of rivalry development that sees the initiation and escalation of rivalry as a stepwise process. States that use realpolitik strategies (Leng 1983; 1993; 2000) in response to a potential enemy will increase the probability that the pair of states will eventually form an intense rivalry. Using these power politics strategies will make states lock into conflict that will escalate into a condition of dangerous rivalry.

The reorientation of the quantitative study of international politics must recognize the need to modify our theories to account for rivalry as well as war. The use of the steps to war model is open to this reorientation. While the steps to war model includes

recurrent crises as a step that leads to war, here it is adjusted to suggest that the recurrent crises at the enduring rival level can be the final step in a model. In my model, the outcome variable of interest is rivalry, rather than war.

The steps to rivalry model (see figure 1) would suggest that there is first a contentious issue over which a pair of states fights (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981). Territorial issues produce a greater commitment from states and raise the stakes involved in the conflict. In response to this isolated conflict or dispute, states use power politics strategies (alliances, arms races, and realpolitik tactics) to show resolve and signal intent.

The problem is that these realpolitik signals are negative actions that produce an equal response that can lead to the rivalry conflict spiral. A seemingly tangible issue like territory can become intangible and indivisible in the context of rivalry (Vasquez 1983). Repeated crises can make the issues at stake symbolize much more than originally intended. The issues are no longer concrete stakes that can be easily divided. Rivalry then becomes a contest not so much over a specific, divisible issue, but a long-standing conflict with a certain identified enemy spanning many issues.

The movement between stages of rivalry takes the form of steps. There are certain actions that a pair of states takes that increase the probability of rivalry. This relationship is not path dependent; rather, there are steps that can be taken (settling the issue at stake, consulting an international organization, or a larger threat can emerge) to avert rivalry once the process has started. Rivalry occurrence has to do with increasing the probability of a certain outcome as actions are taken. There are always ways to end a rivalry, and rivalry is never an inevitable outcome. Rivalries may end once the issues at

stake between the states are settled (Bennett 1997; Gibler 1997; Bennett 1998) or if the state finds another enemy that becomes their principal rival (Thompson 1995).[21]

Issues in Rivalry

One of the most important early contributions to research on the origins of rivalry remains the findings regarding issues, territorial disputes, and recurring conflict. Diehl (1985) hypothesizes that the geography (location) of militarized disputes will influence the probability of war occurring between major power rivalries. Huth (1996) finds that certain kinds of territorial issues are more apt to result in rivalries than other kinds of territorial issues. Hensel (1996) also finds that the presence of territorial disputes are likely to lead to recurring conflict. In an analysis of territorial settlements and rivalry, Gibler (1997) finds that states that sign territorial settlement treaties are not likely to become rivals. The absence of a territorial settlement treaty is a contributing factor to the development of rivalry.

Thompson (1995; 1998) maintains that the most important rivalries can occur between any two major powers either over positional issues (where one is in the international pecking order) or spatial (territorial) issues. Rasler and Thompson (1999; 2000) go on to show that major powers are mainly concerned with positional issues, countering Vasquez's (1996) claim that joining behavior influences the likelihood of war in dyads that do not have territorial disputes.

Tir and Diehl (2002) find that territorial disputes matter little for lower forms of rivalry (isolated conflicts), but have an impact at the proto and enduring rivalry level.

[21] For other studies on the termination of rivalries, consult (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Bennett 1996; 1997; 1997; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Bennett 1998; Cioffi-Revilla 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Cornwell

They conclude by stating that, "rivalry severity is more a function of the underlying issue the rivals disagree over (i.e. territorial control) than of opportunity to fight (i.e. proximity)" (2002, 263). Andersen (2001) also shows that territorial disputes influence the severity of conflict between rival dyads.

Rivals fight over various issues; moreover, simply looking at the occurrence of a single territorial dispute does not capture the true relationship between rivalry and territorial issues. One must look at how territorial disputes are handled as well as what portion of territorial disputes (territorial issue dominance) a dyad fights over to capture the complete dynamics that play into the territory-rivalry relationship. It is not so much the territorial disputes that are dangerous, but what steps a state takes in response to territorial issue that matters.

The steps to war theory (Vasquez 1993) has argued that territorial conflicts, alliances, arms races, power parity, and hard-liners within domestic political structures are factors that increase the probability of war. Among these, Vasquez (1993) argues that territorial disagreements are likely to produce rivalries much more so than other types of issues, and are more likely to result in war than other types of disputes. Vasquez and Leskiw (2001; also Valeriano 2002) find that the probability of rivalry increases when territorial issues dominate the issues contested between a pair of rivals (Wayman 2000). Hensel and Sowers (1998) also find that major power status and contention over territorial issues increases the probability of enduring rivalry and the likelihood of that dyad becoming involved in war.[22]

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and Colaresi 2002).

[22] See also (Hensel and McLaughlin 1996; Sowers and Hensel 1997) for similar findings.

The next step is to investigate why territorial issues are so rivalry prone. It is important to note that not all territorial disputes escalate to war or rivalry. What increases the likelihood of dispute escalation is how territorial disputes are handled. When territorial disputes are handled in a power politics manner, the dyad increases its chances of going to war and participating in a severe rivalry.

Alliances and Rivalry

Alliance is as original an event in politics as is conflict; it associates like-minded actors in the hope of overcoming their rivals. (Liska 1962, 3)

The theory that alliances negatively affect the peaceful interactions of nations has been a long studied proposition in the scientific study of war.[23] Alliances are thought to positively influence the conflict propensity of nations entered into opposing alliance blocks.[24] While the literature on the relationship between alliances and war is fairly clear, the relationship between rivalry and alliance ties has not been investigated.

It is generally accepted that alliances are formed primarily for security rather than "a sense of community." (Holsti, Hopmann et al. 1973, 5) There has been little work done regarding the relationship between alliances and the development of rivalry.[25] Alliances and rivalry are fundamentally linked concepts. Rivalry involves the quest for security when the intentions of one's enemy are not known. It is known that territorial disputes are more likely to go to war and increase the probability of rivalry (Vasquez 2000; 2000; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Vasquez and Leskiw 2001; Tir and Diehl 2002;

[23] See Vasquez (1993) for an extensive review of existing literature. Gibler (1997) is also useful for an exploration of how the alliance variable can be reconfigured to account for its propensity to increase the probability of violence between a dyad.
[24] Here, alliances are coded only if they are in opposing alliance blocs. Nations allied to each other are not counted as opposing alliances.

Valeriano 2002). What is important is how territorial disputes are handled once they occur; and handing territorial disputes in a power politics manner (forming alliances) is likely to increase the probability that the pair of states who have a dispute will become severe rivals.

In the context of rivalry, an alliance can push a pair of states towards a rivalry by activating the security dilemma (Snyder 1997). Positive increases in the security of one state, by the addition of alliance partner's capabilities, decreases the security of another state. In response, the "target" state is likely to form its own alliance to counter a threat.[26] This changes the relationship between the two states and pushes them towards permanently identifying the other as an enemy.

Alliances signal intent to another potential rival. When one state forms an alliance or utilizes an existing alliance to threaten another state, a crisis between the two states is likely to escalate. Alliances can never end a rivalry by balancing the force structures of the two sides; they can only increase the insecurity felt by either side, which leads the states involved to become rivals. Through a formal model, Sorokin (1994) notes that states rely on their ally's armaments when allied support is relatively cheap, but then tend to rely on their own armaments and capabilities when allied support is costly or their ally is militarily weak. This formal model suggests that, under some conditions, alliances can increase the conflict behavior between rival dyads.

Vasquez (1993, 176) suggests that alliances and arms races increase the hostility within a dyad and prepare the dyad to fight over an issue that will eventually result in

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[25] Gibler (1997) does discuss alliances and the settlement of the issues between rivals.
[26] Using a small number of great power rivalry cases, Walker (2000; 2001) finds that when major powers target a rival in an alliance, war is likely within the next five years.

war. Essentially, alliances and arms races increase the hostility in rival dyads and also augment the probability of war and a rivalry occurring when any issue is at stake.

Are Alliances and Arms Races a Necessary Condition of Rivalry?

Up to this point, I have spoken of alliances and arms races as probabilistic sufficient conditions of rivalry. This theory would also suggest that alliances and arms races are also necessary conditions for the development of rivalry. Each step taken towards a rivalry is necessary for the final outcome. Rivalry (and war) comes about through a series of steps. These steps take a probabilistic necessary condition form in that they will not happen in every case, but in almost every case (Ragin 1987; 2000; Goertz and Starr 2003). What matters for rivalry is how the relationship within a pair of states is managed once these steps are taken. If the states are managed in a power politics fashion, they will likely result in rivalry.

If a state has had a militarized interstate dispute and then forms an alliance to counter the threat, participates in an arms buildup, sets a grand strategy, or participates in other conflicts to show commitment, it is likely to become a proto or enduring rivalry by provoking the opposing side. This does not mean that states that form alliances to counter threats will always become involved in a rivalry. For rivalry to occur, alliances must almost always be present.

Necessary condition logic entails an “only if” assumption. A rivalry will develop only if alliances, arms races, and grand strategy are present. For a rivalry to occur, alliances must also occur. This does not mean that rivalry occurs once alliances are

formed. Only in certain situations of conflict will alliances lead to rivalry. What matters is how alliances are used in the context of a potential rivalry situation.

Wendt's (1999, 79) formulation of a necessary condition is also useful in the context of a rivalry. For alliances (or other factors) to be a necessary causal factor of rivalry, alliances and rivalry must exist independently of each other, the alliance must precede the rivalry temporally, and save for an alliance, the rivalry would not have occurred.[27] This central train of logic is key to the whole research design of rivalry origins. What does a rivalry need in order to come about? What factors are associated with a rivalry's origins, and do those factors follow a central temporal pattern and counterfactual logic?

Goertz and Starr (2003, 9) also illustrate the necessary condition theory in set-theoretic formation. For an alliance to be a necessary condition of rivalry through a set relationship analysis, rival dyads must be a subset of alliance participants. There are 332 alliances, so for a necessary condition hypothesis to be true, all 63 enduring rivalries must fall into the 332 alliance membership set.[28]

Necessary condition logic is not new in social science research, but has only recently been formalized as a method of causal analysis. Goertz and Starr (2003) list every instance of necessary conditions hypothesis in political science research. Scholars must be aware of the kinds of research designs they propose and the implications of such proposals. Namely, a necessary condition research design entails that the researcher select on the dependent variable (Most and Starr 1989; Goertz and Starr 2003). This

[27] The last factor in the line of logic for a necessary condition can be read as a counterfactual. If alliances did not occur, the rivalry would not have happened. As will be developed later, I believe that some factors such as alliances do satisfy the counterfactual necessary condition logic. See Goertz and Starr (2003) for a discussion of necessary conditions are counterfactuals.

work does that to a point in that all cases analyzed include at least one militarized interstate dispute. I am not concerned with what brings about the MIDs initially, but in how single conflicts can escalate to long-standing rivalries. I am also examining the conditions present in enduring or proto rivalry cases. It is in this way that I can investigate the "necessary conditions" of rivalry.

Alliances almost always are associated with the movement of a potential rival into the enduring rivalry phase. Alliances signal the intent to use power politics to handle a contentious issue, and thus activate the security dilemma. It is also important to understand that alliances must occur early in a pair of state's relationship to be accurately counted as a cause of rivalry. In an early investigation (Valeriano 2001; 2001), I have found that alliances are necessary conditions of rivalry and that they usually occur early in the life of a rivalry. Further chapters will develop and test these ideas.

Military Buildups and Rivalry

A mutual military buildup signifies the acceleration of arms acquisitions in response to some factor, usually an external threat. While arms races arise in the face of a potential rival or threat, it is not known if these potential rivals always transform into actual rivals. Sample (1998, 158) suggests, "it is critically important to an understanding of the effects of arming on war (or dispute escalation) to disaggregate the various parts of the Richardsonian argument: why countries arm, the character of arms, and the effect of arming." Countries arm in response to a security dilemma posed by a potential rival. The outcome of the arming process can result in the formation of an enduring rivalry or war. What needs to be investigated is the causal process between arms races and rivalry,

[28] There are 332 alliances in the Correlates of War Alliance dataset version 3.0.

or the effect arming (or any type of military buildup) has on a relationship between a pair of states.

Goertz and Diehl (1993) specify that arms races are more likely in enduring rivalries, but do not test the proposition. Diehl and Crescenzi state, "arms races truly only occur in enduring rivalry contexts and that military buildups in other contexts are probably misclassified as arms races." (1998, 114) Incidences of arms races in the context of isolated conflicts and proto rivalries still need to be researched. Sample asks, "But what if mutual military buildups are an element in a dyadic relationship that contributes to the commencement of the rivalry?" (1998, 158)

Arms races or mutual military buildups only happen following an initial conflict, but the timing and impact of buildups may vary. Likely arms races only occur late in a rivalry (at the proto stage), but they are still a factor that contributes to the development and escalation of a rivalry.

One advantage that the rivalry research program has in the study of the arms races is that there is no debate about the multiple arms races that interact prior to World War I and II (Altfeld 1983; Diehl 1983; Sample 1996). The rivalry approach necessarily requires a dyadic approach, so the multiple arms races prior to the world wars are included as dyads and not eliminated on the basis that they are all connected to one war.[29] They are included because they all impact different rivalries, which in turn impact the world wars in general.

A preliminary investigation by this author (Valeriano 2001) found that arms races in major powers are (quasi) necessary conditions for the development of enduring rivals

among major powers.[30] They also contribute to the formation of proto rivalries. What remains is to use Sample's (2002) new data on minor power arms races to test this proposition in the context of all rivals. The central query then becomes whether mutual military buildups are a necessary or sufficient condition for the development of all advanced rivalries. We know mutual military buildups contribute to war (Sample 1996; 1998; Sample 2000; Sample 2002), but do they contribute to the development rivalry first, and then push those rivals towards war?

The Rivalry Conflict Spiral

Vasquez (1993, 75-76 and 1996, 532-533) has defined a rivalry as a relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other. A militarized interstate dispute can be handled in two ways, and a cost-benefit analysis can look at what issues are involved as well as the costs and benefits of taking certain positions towards this issue. The second way a dispute can be handled is by an actor dimension. The disputants concentrate on who is involved rather than what is involved. Rivalries essentially signify when the conflict has moved beyond cost benefit calculus of

[29] In some studies of arms races, arms races are counted only once for each war, not individually for each dyad that experiences an arms race prior to war, i.e. the United Kingdom and Germany plus Russia and Germany prior to World War I.

[30] It is of note that I consider that my theory of rivalry development is both a sufficient and necessary condition causal process. Different questions require different tests and different types of theories. Looking at only enduring rivalries and arms races is a necessary condition research design since it requires that the statistical analysis select on the dependent variable (enduring rivalry). The theory in general is a probabilistic sufficient condition test, with some sections requiring necessary condition logic (see Vasquez 1996; Goertz and Starr 2003)).

disputes to an effect calculus where the conflict is defined by who (the actor) is involved rather than the issue at stake.[31]

The rivalry conflict spiral (much like the security dilemma) moves states towards conflict because of how they handle the crisis involving certain actors, not because of a rational calculation or misperception. First, actors agree or disagree on an issue. In rivalry, most states will automatically disagree on any issue, regardless of the issue at stake. Issues can be broken into three types, concrete, symbolic, and transcendent (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, chapter 2). Concrete issues can be easily divided into some tangible object (land, money, trade, or a treaty). Symbolic issues eventually move towards intangible divisions. The object no longer can be easily "seen" or divided. The actors take a zero sum position on the issue because they cannot and will not let the issue be divided. Transcendent issues infuse both concrete and symbolic stakes, and will generate a moral importance that ingrains them with highly intangible qualities.

For rivalry, the danger arises when states disagree on intangible issues like territory. This form of disagreement then leads to second phase of the conflict spiral, behavior. The second phase of the conflict spiral occurs when states exhibit positive or negative behavior towards each other. When faced with an issue, rivals take negative actions towards the other state. Negative actions can be threats of force, but I also argue that they represent power politics foreign policy choices in which states form politically

[31] Kegley and Raymond (1999) suggest that the enduring rivalry between Spain and France (1494-1683) could be counted as terminated many times when they settled the basic issues at stake between the rivals, but each time the rivalry flared up again a few years later. They (Kegley and Raymond 1999) believe that settling the issue in this case only gives the rivals an opportunity to pause before continuing an ongoing feud. Even settling the issues at stake does not end a rivalry if the rivals are committed to engaging each other as enemies.

relevant alliances and participate in military buildups as a symbol of negative affect behavior towards a state.

Negative responses (alliances and arms races) within rivalry become reciprocated actions. One state will escalate behavior if it sees its enemy using power politics strategies, causing the other to respond in kind. The response can then take the form of a use or threat to use force. The timing between threats decreases as the actions between the two states become more salient to the actors. These threats or uses of force lead to recurrent crises or rivalry if the state is not satisfied with the outcome of each militarized interstate dispute (Hensel 1996). These negative responses are part of an overall strategy (or grand strategy) states use to counter a rival. States then become involved in what is herein called grand strategic rivalries.

Linkages and Rivalry

The study of rivalry involves the assumption that disputes, crises, and wars are not independent events, but are connected across *time and space*.[32] How rivalries can be connected to each other remains to be disclosed. This event is what I call a rivalry linkage. Rivalry linkages help lock-in states into rivalry relationships. Linkages are ways of using power politics (force) to solve contentious issues, and can result in rivalry formation. Rivalry linkages will help push a dyad towards an enduring rival status. This work seeks to explore and develop the theoretical and empirical implications of rivalry linkages.

[32] The study of war also includes this problem, excluding Huth (1996). The theory of rivalry linkages is a significant difference from the steps to war theory.

Rivalries do not exist independent of other disputes between states. A dispute is linked to a rivalry if a party (state) outside the rivalry has a dispute with one member involved in a rivalry during the lifetime of that rivalry. The linkages between other disputes connect a rivalry to its ongoing threat environment.

The idea of conflict linkage originates with Rosenau's concept of linkage politics. Rosenau (1969) defines linkages as any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and causes reactions in another. Wilkenfeld (1973) goes on to use the concept to link domestic political dynamics to international political outcomes. For him, "the purpose of studying linkage politics is to gain a more complete understanding of events by taking account of a large number of variables that have a bearing on the ultimate behavior of a nation, whether the behavior be manifested in the domestic or international spheres." (Wilkenfeld 1973,1)

While this study does not attempt to explore the linkages between internal and external conflict environments, it does seek to explain conflict behavior by looking at simultaneous conflict interactions that occur between different pairs of states at the same time. From previous conflict literature, we know that the more actors involved in a crisis, the more likely that crisis is to escalate to war (Cusack and Eberwein 1982; James 1988; Brecher 1993). Colaresi and Thompson (2002, 283) find that the probability of war increases in rival dyads that interact in crises with multiple actors. It would then stand to reason that multiple simultaneous conflicts would increase the probability of a dispute escalating to war and rivalry. Multiple simultaneous conflicts suggest that each conflict can then be linked to a rival dyad. When conflict is linked and the number of actors involved in the situation increases, the probability of escalation increases.

Huth (1996, 54) is one of the few to investigate how conflict involvement with other states during the time of a dispute is likely to affect conflict. He finds support for the hypothesis that the level of political and military pressure a state applies towards a dispute decreases when states are involved in conflict with other states (Huth 1996, 121). He also finds that states involved in conflicts with other states are likely to be receptive to peaceful solutions to territorial disputes (Huth 1996, 145). States are not able to project military capabilities across multiple fronts, and therefore are likely to de-intensify conflict when faced with a third party dispute.[33]

The study of rivalry has left the idea of linkage politics relatively under-explored. Hensel and Diehl (1994) include preoccupation as one of the reasons that states may choose to respond to militarized disputes with nonmilitarized responses. "A state may be less likely to respond militarily when it is already preoccupied with an ongoing conflict elsewhere." (Hensel and Diehl 1994, 487) They hypothesize that states involved in other ongoing militarized disputes or civil war will be less likely to respond to militarized threats. States that are involved in other ongoing disputes (in the Latin American region) are less likely to respond to a military threat with a militarized response. Involvement in an ongoing civil war does in fact increase the probability that a response will be of a militarized nature.

Diehl and Goertz (2000) explore a variation of rivalry linkage that is influenced by war diffusion literature. [34] "Rivalry linkages stipulates that the severity and stability of rivalries AB and CD are influenced by their mutual linkage." (Diehl and Goertz 2000,

[33] Similar variables for concurrent dispute involvement are used in Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1992) and Gelpi (1997).

243) They are not interested in the multiple conflict states engage in, but in how one rivalry affects another completely different rivalry that does not include common states. Linkages occur through political pressure, arms transfers, and alliance ties (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 242).

The timing of rivalries can also influence their stability; "close times between enduring rivalries reinforce rivalry stability (duration) and increase the severity of enduring rivalry." (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 241) Multiple rivalries, within a short period of time, increase the severity of rivalry conflict in a dyad. In a recent test of the linkage hypothesis, as well as others, Stinnett and Diehl (2001) find no evidence that linkages significantly affect rivalry development.

Diehl and Goertz (2000) explore how alliance ties can link a rivalry together. For instance, the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War is linked to the rivalry between North and South Korea during the same time. A rivalry can also be linked through common enemies. The rivalry system in the Middle East is an example of this type of relationship. At one time, Israel has been engaged in rivalries with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq because of regional proximity.

I would call rivalries linked by alliance ties, or a common foe, complex rivalries.[35] Complex rivalries involve states that have interdependent security relations with one or more states, and must include at least three parties. In the future, it would be beneficial to create a dataset that would trace and determine who are complex rivals and when they occur. The rivalries between the U.S., USSR, and the Korea's; Israel, Egypt, and Syria;

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[34] See Most, Starr, and Siverson (1989) for review of war diffusion literature. Also, Diehl and Goertz first undertake a study of rivalry linkages in Goertz and Diehl (1997). Rivalry linkages are also mentioned in the introduction to Diehl (1998).

and China, U.S., and the USSR would all be complex rivalries that would each be coded as an individual complex rivalry. This project is not focused on complex rivalries, but on how rivalries are linked because one state in a rivalry has an ongoing rivalry or dispute with another state. A few of these linked rivalries may have a common foe or linked alliance commitments, but that is not the determining factor for their occurrence. A rivalry is linked if one state in the rivalry has a dispute or rivalry with another state at the same time as the original rivalry.

Ostrom and Job (1986) look at the United State's use of force during the cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union. They conclude that internal domestic factors have an impact on conflict propensity during a rivalry. Mitchell and Moore (2002) revise this finding by making methodological modifications, and find that external pressures have an impact in the decision to use force during a rivalry. In fact, decision making during a rivalry is much different than during conflict with a non-rival state. While domestic pressures may determine when force is used outside of a rivalry, rivalry impacts a leader's ability to make decisions in the first place. Ignoring a rival when belligerent moves are made will hurt a leaders internal standing.

Mitchell and Moore (2002) find that uses of force in a previous quarter influence the use of force in the next quarter, making it more likely that a state will use force. In the context of the Soviet-United States rivalry, disputes within the rivalry increase the likelihood that either state will use force, regardless of who the target is at the time. Rivalry places states in a situation in which they continually face conflict. Evidence from

[35] Goldstein and Freeman (1990; 1991) explore the complex rivalry between the U.S., Soviet Union, and China.

the Soviet-United States rivalry also suggests that this constant conflict will make states more likely to use force when challenged by anyone, not just a rival.

Vasquez (1996) examines how rivals can help expand a war. "Rivals brought in" is listed as a factor that promotes the expansion of war (Vasquez 1996). This variable is similar to the common foe element in Diehl and Goertz (2000), yet also alludes to the idea that multiple rivalries or conflict during a certain period of time may lead to the expansion of war. Vasquez (1996; 1998) finds that multiple rivalries during World War II led to the expansion of the war. He also suggests that multiple rivalries in the system are likely to lead to instability and world war (Vasquez 1998, 195).[36]

The idea of issue linkage may also contribute to the escalation of rivalries to war, and the expansion of those wars. Vasquez (1993, 233) suggests that the linkage of issues reduces the irresolvability of issues, thereby helping to generate rivalry between major states. This rivalry consequently leads major states to seek allies, which results in the linkage of even more issues and increases the probability of including violence-prone territorial issues in rivalry. Issue linkage ensures that crises will not be independent. Since issue linkage also makes issues less likely to be resolved, crises recur and build up.

The linkage of issues generally increases the spread of conflict and the hostility between a pair of states who have linked issues at dispute. While issue linkage between rivalries cannot be examined with the current data available, linkages between rivalries themselves can be investigated.[37]

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[36] Thompson (2003) finds that the system of rivalries led to World War I.

[37] Using the ICB data, Colaresi and Thompson (2002) investigate the number of issues involved in a crisis and the probability of escalation to war. Their results are statistically insignificant. I would be useful to test the proposition that multiple issues increase the probability of war with a revised MID dataset.

Rivalry Linkage Theory

There are two countering theories at work in the exploration of rivalry linkages. Very little is known about how the environment in which a rivalry is forged affects its eventual conflict involvement. Since this is a preliminary study of the rivalry linkages, I will suggest two countering hypotheses that may be contribute to the dynamics of rivalry linkages. One maintains that multiple rivalries will serve to de-intensify another given a rivalry in that a state's attention is diverted from one enemy and placed on another. The other hypothesis proposes that many multiple rivalries would serve to intensify a rivalry in that states show a willingness to use force when called upon. States intensify a rivalry by raising the level of hostility in militarized disputes or participating in wars and other types of low level military conflict with fatalities. Rival states may need to show commitment in the face of an enduring enemy.

I seek to answer the question of how a rivalry between states A and C affects the rivalry between states A and B if those rivalries occur at the same time? Furthermore, what type of dynamic does this create?

Rivalry Weariness

The first proposed hypothesis I will call rivalry weariness. This bears resemblance to the weary titan hypothesis proposed by Friedberg (1988). A state involved in a deadly war (or rivalry) with another state may eventually become disenchanted with the current conflict and seek to tackle other international problems that do not involve its main rival. This would serve to de-intensify the rivalry with a principal rival. The costs of long term conflict with one state could lead a rival to reevaluate its

international commitments and refocus its efforts towards new, emerging threats. Third party conflict will thus serve to deescalate a rivalry.

Along a similar line, a rival state may be faced with a new enemy that demands its time and effort to counter this new threat. The state is not "weary" of facing its primary rival, but is forced to deal with a new threat to its existence or national interest. Thompson (2000) suggests that there might be a limitation on the number of serious rivalries in which a state can engage. States have limited military resources that they can commit to an international crisis or war. A state cannot deal with multiple crisis at one time for the fear that one crisis will overwhelm the state and force it into a costly defeat. Leadership survival depends in part on the ability of states to win the wars and disputes they fight (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).

Thompson (2000) suggests this scenario as a plausible comparison to World War I diplomacy. "Even the strongest states find it highly taxing in resources and energy to cope with several rivals simultaneously. As a consequence, decision-makers, of both major and minor powers, are apt to downgrade old rivals once news begins to emerge if only because there appear to be natural limitations on how many intense conflicts states can sustain simultaneously." (Thompson 2000, 4)

Prior to World War I and the turn of the century, Great Britain reassessed its rivalry commitments. It ended its colonial rivalries and settled disputes with the United States, Russia, and France. As a result, Great Britain could face Germany and its raising naval power capabilities, which threatened Britain's colonial empire and shipping lanes.

Rivalry Commitment

The second possible dynamic at work in rivalry linkages could be called rivalry commitment. For deterrence to work, a state must have credibility.[38] For this reason, some states participate in extraneous military affairs to enhance their credibility in the international system. "It thus sometimes appeared useful for the United States (as well as the Soviet Union) to engage in military ventures to enhance overall credibility." (Rosecrance 1992) During the enduring rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States participated in other rivalries and disputes with such states as Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam.[39] The Soviet Union fought a war in Afghanistan as well as supported military action in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

Multiple rivalry involvement can lead to an escalation of a rivalry when a state uses third party conflict to show commitment towards a principal rivalry (Thompson 1995). Other ongoing rivalries may only show a willingness of a state to use force when confronted with difficult bargaining situations. However, when faced with a principal rivalry, states will continue to use force and intensify their main source of conflict. According to this theory, other ongoing rivalries only help to enhance and refocus the energy a state has in regards to its main enemy.

It may be that states with long-standing enduring rivalries may participate in other rivalries to enhance their position within their primary rivalry. The findings of Vasquez (1996; 1998) show that multiple rivalries serve to interact with principal rivalries and lead to multiparty wars and disputes. The power politics behavior of states tells them to

[38] Whether or not deterrence actually works in the real world is not of concern here, it is only important in that leaders think that it will work and that they may be able to avoid conflict through threats.
[39] Kinsella (1995) also explores "nested rivalries" influenced by the superpower rivalry.

face any threat with a powerful display of force. Hence, states that act in a power politics manner are more likely to follow a path to war, not peace (Vasquez 1993).

The concept of rivalry linkage also brings back into focus the concept of rivalry grand strategies. A rival forms a grand strategy in response to the actor that threatens its security. States cannot form multiple grand strategies to counter multiple enemies; their principal rivalry continues to gain the most attention and does not deescalate.

Grand Strategy and Rivalry

The concept of grand strategy is a useful theoretical application that can help explain the formation of a rival relationship. A grand strategy is the political, military, and economic response to potential and active threats (Hart 1972; Posen 1984; Rosecrance and Stein 1993). Theoretically, grand strategy is conceived as a theoretical statement that connects the political and military strategies that are established to ensure a state's survival. In the context of a rivalry, states form a grand strategy to counter a potential rival. By forming a grand strategic plan to deal with that rival, a state ultimately creates a self-fulfilling rivalry prophecy. A grand strategy does not contribute to the stability or security of relations within a dyad, but creates an atmosphere of tension that can lead to the rivalry conflict spiral.

Scholars use a concept of grand strategy to show how a state "can cause security for itself." (Walt 1987, 2) All states are assumed (by realist scholars) to have an overall grand strategy to deal with all potential and active military threats. This view is incomplete in that not all states are concerned immediately with survival unless threatened. Survival is the basic political goal of all states. Grand strategy comes into

play when states seek to do more than survive, and necessarily involves either the management or destruction of a rival state. Formation of a grand strategy generally takes the form of an offensive maneuver intended to ensure survival, not merely security.[40]

For a state to have a grand strategy it must have an identified rival.[41] International rivalries are the most conflictual pairs of states in the international system. What we need to truly understand conflict, war, and strategy is a theory of grand strategy that is connected to the concept of international rivalry. The implications of this development are that the concept of grand strategy is empty without rivalries. Rivalry generates grand strategies, and states without rivalry will not have grand strategies.

It should be noted that most states have multiple contingency plans for possible conflict scenarios. States like the Untied States and the USSR during the Cold War were prepared for any eventuality in the world stage. What is important to remember about this contingency plans is that they were usually restricted to war plans and were not always active plans, but plans to be used in case of conflict. Once initial disputes developed, these grand strategic plans are placed into operation and then push a pair of states towards rivalry. There is a qualitative difference between having plan to deal with a neighbor in a conflict and activating a plan to deal with a potential enemy.

The quantitative examination of rivalry seems to leave out the strategic aspect of rivalry. Rivalry is not an automatic relationship that all states fall into. Hobbesian thought can be applied to some countries and not to others. Why would a country enter

[40] See Mearsheimer (2001) for an example of an work in the offensive realist tradition, where states are assumed to be power maximizing and not mainly concerned with survival.
[41] An alternative hypothesis might be that grand strategy is conceived in presence of a critical issue (Henehan 2000, chapter 3).

into a possibly deadly rivalry? This important question can lead us towards a better understanding of peace and war.

What is Grand Strategy?

Copley (2000) suggests that grand strategy is a discipline unto itself. "By grand strategy, we mean the science (and art) of bringing in all major disciplines into the process of defining a nation's goals, the structural elements needed in the attainment of those goals, and the principle methods of achieving those goals. Therefore the grand strategy process must consider and integrate the subordinate working strategies, such as psychological strategy and underneath this the component political, military, economic and other strategies." (Copley 2000, 2)

Posen (1984) conceives of grand strategy as the connection between the political ends and military means. The military means are located in the military doctrine which exists to ensure state survival (Posen 1984, 25). The idea that a military doctrine is meant to ensure survival is not useful for the operationalization of grand strategy; rather, the fact that all states seek to survive should be taken as a given in international relations. This is not a concept that needs to be directly connected to neo-realism (Waltz 1979). Survival is the basic level political ambition of all states; and grand strategy comes into play when states seek to do more than survive. Grand strategy involves the management, defense from, or destruction of a rival state.

Grand Strategic Rivalry

Grand strategy is a concept born out of rivalry. It is valid to use the concept without analyzing the threat environment of a state. When encountered with a threat to the perceived security of a nation, some states respond in ways that promote rivalry. This response is usually what can be called realpolitik, or realism. In such a situation, a state encounters a threat or potential rival. There is a threat to fight over some contentious issue like territory. Once this happens, hard-liners (Vasquez 1993) in power can create a grand strategy that would detail how the hard-liners are to deal with the "problem" state. Grand strategy then leads states into rivalry by dictating the course of relations, usually in a conflictual manner. War plans are the most common variant of grand strategy within states.

A grand strategy instituted in rivalry will typically take the form of power politics strategies. States fall back on "realist folklore" which maintains that states should balance internally (military buildups) and externally (alliances) to ensure survival (Vasquez 1993). In this work, I demonstrate that grand strategies are empty without an identified rival and that power politics grand strategies will not ensure survival, but lead to instability and further conflict between rivals. A grand strategy is a means to war and conflict for states, not a way to peace and stability.

If rivalry intends to bring the concept of history and historic animosity back into international relations, why then has the study of rivalry ignored the aspects of strategy, military doctrine, and conflict experience? This project focuses on how power politics contribute to the development of rivalry and grand strategies between rivals. It also investigates the linkages between rivals and the other ongoing militarized interstate

disputes in which states are involved. A state involved in a rivalry develops a grand strategy to counter one rival, not multiple rivals.

In order to operationalize the variable of grand strategy one must connect it to international rivalry. Therefore, I will define grand strategy as the political, military, social and economic strategy of a state to respond to threats, real and perceived, of a primary and possibly, a secondary rivalry.[42] A state cannot have a true grand strategy without a rivalry.

Conclusion

The preceding chapter lays out a theory of rivalry formation. I call this theory the steps to rivalry theory. First, a pair of states fights over an issue, usually territorial. In response to the issue at stake between a potential rival, the states seek and enhance alliance ties and commitments and they also participate in military buildups. To show resolve, they fight in other disputes and rivalries. They ultimately form an overall grand strategy to counter an enemy state. All these steps combine to produce conflict spirals, which ultimately leads a pair of states to rivalry and, possibly, war.

The steps to rivalry theory is similar in logic to the steps to war theory. It should be pointed out that steps to war theory has been found to be much more predictive than originally thought. It applies to many situations, including the development of rivalry, not just war.[43] It is also likely that hard-liners in power may contribute to the

[42] I add social dimensions to the traditional definition of grand strategy in that one cannot dismiss the possibility of cultural rivalry without studying the concept. Although this will not be undertaken in this project, it is open to investigation whether nations develop a cultural strategy as well as a military strategy in response to rivals.

[43] I left out hard-liners in power as a step to rivalry because there are no data on the internal leadership characteristics available at this time. There may be an opportunity to develop a steps to rivalry model that includes domestic factors in the future. Braumoeller (2002) suggests that there is a nested relationship in

development of a rivalry, but they are mainly a force towards pushing rivals towards war, not rivalry in the first place. However, for a hard-liner to use an enemy state as a scapegoat or further his/her own conflictual tendencies, one must already be in a severe rivalry.

To the steps of war theory, I have added two important factors, one being conflict linkages. Rivals linked to other conflicts (rivals) may increase the probability that any rival state will get into disputes with other nations. This may show commitment and serve as a signal to a rival that the state is willing to fight for any issue. I have also added the concept of grand strategy. Grand strategy is the idea that a state develops a plan to ensure its security. Grand strategy emerges as a result of the symptoms of an ongoing development of a rivalry. A state will only development plans to attack and defend against a rival; states do not develop grand strategies in the absence of rivalry. In this way, the rivalry concept can enhance thinking about the grand strategy of states, and grand strategy can become a necessary condition for rivalry development.

Power politics and realist theory is central to this inquiry about the origins of rivalry. Realist theory (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) suggests that power is the ultimate consideration for any state in the international system. Power determines interests (Morgenthau 1948) and can either ensure survival (Waltz 1979) or the security (Mearsheimer 2001) of state. It is because of these realist conceptions of security that states enter into rivalry in the first place. Ensuring survival through arms buildups, alliances, grand strategy, and constant territorial disputes leads a state to put its

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the decision to undertake a great power rivalry. His model incorporates elements of the citizen, the state, and the system. Yet this work is only at the theoretical point and yet to develop testable data.

own survival in danger throughout the initiation of a rivalry. Power politics does not dictate a path to peace and hegemony, but a path towards constant conflict.

<u>The Steps to Rivalry</u>
Territorial Issues
Alliance Formation and Participation
Military Buildups
Conflict Linkages
Grand Strategic Plans
Conflict Spiral



<u>Figure 1</u>
The Steps to Rivalry

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN: THE PROCESS OF RIVALRY DEVELOPMENT

Introduction - The Process of Rivalry Development

This project is concerned with the development of rivalry. What makes pairs of states rivals? A model is suggested that includes various steps that are taken towards rivalry. These steps take the form of power politics foreign policy strategies.

Research design choices are important in the study of conflict. Bennett and Stam (2000) show that different dataset configurations can lead to differing results and interpretations. Bennett also shows that research design choices can influence whether or not selection effects are statistically present in a model (Bennett, Baker et al. 2002). This chapter will outline the research design choices employed in the investigation of the steps to rivalry theory.

The development of rivalries is a phenomenon that results from a process or set of events that combine to produce an effect, rivalry. Bremer (1995, 11) notes, "we typically have attempted to explain/predict the attributes of conflict without reference to the process whereby those conflicts come into being and changed over time…In my view the genesis and evolution of militarized interstate conflict can be better represented by a process model because the transition from peace to war and back to peace is a multistage procedure in which the sequence of events and choices plays a critical role."

Understanding rivalry as a process, the steps to rivalry theory outlines the events in this process that occur on the road to rivalry. Pairs of states are likely to become involved in rivalry when they use power politics strategies. Alliances, arms races,

linkages, territorial disputes, and grand strategy each represent steps in a multistage procedure leading to rivalry. Although researchers are not currently able to apply multistage models of selection with more than two stages in statistical models, we can try to approximate the method by various statistical means. This work includes the timing of events and additive effects as important factors in the development of rivalry.

There will be three main strategies of empirical investigation in this project. The first involves a discrete choice model where each option is a binary choice among three possible outcomes (enduring rivalry, proto rivalry, or strategic rivalry). The second involves breaking down each rivalry into stages (isolated, proto, and enduring) to investigate the conditions present in the dyad during each stage (Hensel 1996). Are rival states during the isolated stage likely to have alliances? Are they likely to have alliances formed during the late stage of enduring rivalry? The timing of power politics strategies becomes important in a process model. The final route of investigation involves a combined model, whereby each step is represented to investigate its additive effects and the combined probabilities of each outcome. I will consider the probability of a dyad becoming an enduring rivalry if it has had an alliance, arms race, linkages, and a territorial dispute during its lifetime. Using a combined probability model, this paper will identify the most dangerous pairs of potential rival states.

In some cases of social science work, it is also useful to look at necessary conditions. In the case of rivalry, it is appropriate to ask if a certain event is observed during a rivalry phase. This information can allude to the unique characteristics of rivalry phases. Necessary conditions both enhance the findings in regards to probabilistic sufficient conditions and suggest the common characteristics observed for rival dyads.

In this work, I will use the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions to guide research design questions about the development of rivalry. This chapter will review the theoretical underpinnings of this project and present the theory according to the logic of sufficient and necessary conditions. From the steps to rivalry theory I will derive hypotheses that can be tested from the model, outline how these hypotheses will be tested, and finally, discuss the implications of selection effects for this work.

Steps to Rivalry: A Review

Chapter three addresses the steps to rivalry model. This model presents the development of rivalry as occurring through a series of steps that each combine to make a rivalry outcome probable. Rivalry is not a path dependent process, but a path whereby each action a state makes on the road to rivalry increases the probability that the event will occur. Events along the road to rivalry only make a rivalry outcome more probable, not automatic.

Certain foreign policy choices increase the probability that a state will become involved in a rivalry. Rivalry development is a stepwise process whereby each factor helps lead a state down a path towards rivalry. The factors that are most likely to result in rivalry are power politics strategies. Influenced by realist theory, power politics strategies usually take the form of moves such as the building of alliances, military buildups, and escalating bargaining demands.

The first step in the steps to rivalry model would be a contentious issue in dispute between two states. As stated earlier, territorial issues produce greater commitment by states in that the nature of the conflict becomes symbolic, rather than divisible.

Territorial claims become more salient when occurring in the context of repeated crises. Territorial claims handled in a realpolitik fashion result in further crises. When territorial disputes arise, states can do little to compromise over the issue, and realpolitik tactics are usually employed if there is a militarized response to the territorial issue at question (Hensel 2000).

Realpolitik actions aim to increase the security of one state, but usually end up creating a decrease in security of the other potential rival. Perceiving a decrease in their own security, the opposing state employs their own realpolitik tactics. The state seeks to "burn" the enemy by denying them any sort of gains. The situation that develops is a conflict spiral and a security dilemma, making the use of power politics the initial step on the road to rivalry.

Various issues may prompt a state to respond to a threat in a power politics fashion, one of which being a territorial dispute. However, territorial disputes alone do not bring about war. It is how territorial disputes are handled that contributes to their high conflict proneness. One way of handling a territorial dispute is through the use of alliances, a realpolitik tactic. Alliances are meant to increase the security of one state, but end up decreasing the security of both sides (Vasquez 2000).

Military buildups likewise decrease the security of both sides. Building up one side's arsenal only increases the probability that the opposing side will build up its own arsenal. In this case, the security dilemma results whereby alliances and mutual military buildups create a context and provide the opportunity for the development of rivalry.

Rivalry linkages and the formation of a grand strategy also represent steps toward rivalry. Linkages with other conflicts can serve to intensify an initial conflict, and other

ongoing simultaneous disputes can be used to show commitment by one side. This situation ultimately produces a security dilemma once again. A potential rival will feel its own security is threatened by the belligerent nature of its enemy. States will also form grand strategies to deal with a potential rival. When these strategies take the form of power politics moves, the probability of rivalry increases.

Probabilistic Conditions of Rivalry: The Logic of Sufficient Conditions

The theory outlined in chapter three of this project approaches the factors associated with rivalry development through the logic of sufficient conditions. Each step towards rivalry is considered a probabilistic sufficient condition for a rivalry outcome. States are likely to become rivals when the causal path delineated occurs. Alliances, arms races, linkages, territorial issues, and the development of grand strategy are events that can help produce rival pairs.

Sufficient conditions are important in that they suggest how and when an event or variable can produce an outcome. In this model, the outcome is rivalry. Alliances and arms races are sufficient conditions of rivalry. Not every case of alliance or arms race will produce rivalry, but on balance, each factor is probabilistically sufficient to produce the rivalry outcome.

Sufficient conditions also suggest the indispensable events for a causal process to occur. In their absence, rivalry is unlikely to occur without power politics foreign policy strategies. It is useful to think of sufficient (as well as necessary conditions) conditions not as absolute, but as probabilistic. Ragin (2000, 109) notes, “the procedures outlined in the previous sections for assessing necessity and sufficiency, therefore, must be modified

to take these troubling aspects of social data – error, change, randomness, and other factors – into account. In short, these common data and evidence problems provide a very strong motivation to employ analytic techniques that make some use of probability theory, especially techniques that address the problem of drawing inferences from imperfect evidence." Since the study of rivalry deals with social data and imperfect evidence, this work will not adhere to a strict notion of necessary and sufficient causation. Rather, the theory is simply probabilistic.

Ragin (2000, 109) suggests that "rather than impose absolute standards in all investigations, researchers also can make inferences about sufficiency using probabilistic methods." Ragin defines a series of cut points that can be used in non-absolute sufficient models. If the variable is present at a proportion greater than .65, the condition can be labeled as "usually sufficient." A variable that is present at a proportion greater than .80 is "almost always" sufficient. Labeled "more often than not," the lowest category, which requires a proportion greater than .50. Ragin suggests that the benchmarks are arbitrary and can be assigned by the researcher prior to an analysis. In this project, I will rely on Ragin's (2000, 114) cut point formula to determine if an event is "usually sufficient," "almost always sufficient", and "more often than not sufficient." Table 1 outlines the cut points used in future chapters.

Table 1
Necessary and Sufficient Condition Cut Points

.50	More often than not sufficient
.65	Usually sufficient
.80	Almost always sufficient

Necessary Conditions of Rivalry

The steps to rivalry theory proposed in this project assumes that the steps taken to enter into a rivalry can also take the form of necessary conditions. Each step taken towards a rivalry is necessary for the final outcome. Rivalry (and war) comes about through a series of steps. These steps take a probabilistic necessary condition form in that they may not happen in every case, but in almost every case (Ragin 1987; 2000; Goertz and Starr 2003). It might be useful to select on the dependent variable (rivalry) to determine if there are any necessary conditions of rivalry in this theory.

The crucial factor in the rivalry process is how the relationship within a pair of states is managed once these steps are taken. If they are managed in a power politics fashion, they will likely result in rivalry.

If a pair of states has had a militarized interstate dispute and then forms an alliance to counter the threat, participates in an arms buildup, sets a grand strategy, or participates in other simultaneous conflicts, it is likely to become a proto or enduring rivalry. This does not mean that states that form alliances to counter threats will always become involved in a rivalry. For rivalry to occur, alliances must almost always be present. Alliances are necessary for rivalry.

Necessary condition logic entails an "only if" assumption. A rivalry will develop only if alliances and arms races are present. This does not mean that rivalry occurs once alliances are formed. Only in certain situations of conflict will alliances lead to rivalry; rather it matters how alliances are used in the context of a potential rivalry situation. This theory does not address the causes of initial disputes, but instead focuses on how those

disputes are handled once they arise. The question then becomes, what makes disputes recur?

Wendt's (1999, 79) formulation of a necessary condition is also useful in the context of a rivalry. For alliances (or other factors) to be a necessary causal factor of rivalry, alliances and rivalry must exist independently of each other, the alliance must precede the rivalry temporally, and save for an alliance, the rivalry would not have occurred.[44] This central train of logic is key to the whole research design of rivalry origins. What does a rivalry need to come about? What factors are associated with its origins? Does it follow a central temporal pattern and a counterfactual logic?

Goertz and Starr (2003, 9) also illustrate necessary condition theory in a set-theoretic formation. For an alliance to be a necessary condition of rivalry, rival dyads must be a subset of alliance participants. There are 332 alliances, so for a necessary condition hypothesis to be true, all 63 enduring rivalries must fall into the 332 alliance membership set.[45]

Necessary condition logic is not new in social science research, but has only recently been formalized as a method of causal analysis. Goertz and Starr (2003) list every instance of necessary conditions hypothesis in political science research. Scholars must be aware of the kinds of research designs they propose, as well as the implications of such proposals. A necessary condition research design entails that the researcher select on the dependent variable (Most and Starr 1989; Goertz and Starr 2003). This work does that to a point in that all cases analyzed must include at least one militarized

[44] The last factor in the line of logic for a necessary condition can be read as a counterfactual. If alliances did not occur, the rivalry would not have happened. As will be developed later, I believe that some factors such as alliances do satisfy the counterfactual necessary condition logic. See Goertz and Starr (2003) for a discussion of necessary conditions as counterfactual conditions.

interstate dispute. Chapter 10, using the Boolean method, only looks at the conditions of enduring rivals. I am not concerned with what brings about the MIDs in the first place, but in how single conflicts can escalate to long-standing rivalries. This work also probes the conditions present in enduring or proto rivalry cases. For enduring rivals, this project will look at only the 63 cases; for proto rivals, the project will look at only the 223 cases. In this way the probabilistic "necessary conditions" of rivalry may be investigated.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses tested here treat rivalry as the dependent variable and seek to explain the process of rivalry development. This study will be concerned with factors that distinguish isolated conflicts from proto and enduring rivalries. Rivalries form when disputes between a pair of states are handled in a certain way. The use of power politics leads a state on the path of the rivalry conflict spiral. Each state identifies the other as an enemy and attempts to deny benefits to that enemy. During the life of a rivalry, states send signals to each other. The formation of alliances and arms races are negative signals that increase the hostility within a rival dyad. (See figure 1 for a decision tree)

Current studies of rivalry evolution have neglected the exploration of some possible variables that will likely increase the chances of rivalry development. Some do hypothesize that most rivalries will be initiated over territorial disputes (Hensel 1996; Vasquez and Leskiw 2001; Valeriano 2002), but there are other internal factors that are likely to increase the chances of a dispute between a pair of states escalating to the enduring rivalry stage. Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl (2000) show that there has only been one case of a democratic dyad moving past the isolated conflict or proto-rivalry stage.

[45] There are 332 alliances in the Correlates of War Alliance dataset version 3.0.

Thompson (1995) and Vasquez (1993) believe that most rivalries will occur between relatively equal states. Stinnett and Diehl (2001) find a small impact for behavioral factors such as dispute settlement outcomes and rivalry linkages.

Vasquez (2000, 349) poses the question, "are there certain foreign policy practices that distinguish dyads that are rivals from those that are not?" Handling crisis (or rivalries) with responses associated with power politics (alliance making, military buildups, and arms races) will increase the probability that an isolated conflict between two states will become a proto-rivalry (3-5 disputes) or an enduring rivalry (6+ disputes over 20 years).[46]

A strategy of peace through strength sets in motion the security dilemma common in international politics (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978). Jervis (1978, 169) states, "the security dilemma exists when many of the means by which states try to increase its security decrease the security of others."

The security dilemma is the causal mechanism in the process of rivalry formation. Making an alliance or building up one's military may not always lead to war, but it will certainly be associated with rivalry relationships and development of the rivalry conflict spiral. Increasing one's security through power politics activates an action-reaction pattern of conflictual relations that increase security, threat perception, hostility, and conflict. Such underlying factors encourage military disputes to recur, which by definition produces rivalry. From this logic, hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 would be expected to be true.

[46] Also a strategic rivalry according to Thompson's (2001) coding.

H1.1 Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
H1.2 Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

Most and Starr (1989, 66) argue that those who study international conflict can only logically look at the factors necessary for the occurrence of an event. This project does not take such a strong line, but important characteristics can be isolated by looking at the necessary conditions of rival dyads. Power politics foreign policy practices may be necessary conditions of rivalry. The question remains whether, are power politics practices alone are able to bring about rivalry escalation, and whether power politics are practices observed in a reasonable number of rival cases so as to be called necessary for rivalry escalation? Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 explicitly state the proposition outlined above.

H2.1 Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.2 Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.3 Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
H2.4 Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.

With the above hypotheses, I hope to find that alliances and military buildups are necessary conditions of rivalry development. I now move beyond the numbers and examine the process of how the timing of foreign policy choices move a pair of states towards a violent rivalry.

Just because alliances and arms buildups are observed more often in enduring rivalries and proto-rivalries does not document a causal process. The findings might be a typical example of a spurious relationship. The question remains, are alliance formations

and arms races responses to being in an advanced stage of rivalry or a process that moves a state towards advanced rivalry? What effect does alliance formation or participation in arms races have on recurring conflict?

A possible spurious finding should prompt the investigator to look at the historical process that resulted in the pattern, not to jump to efforts that show that the finding can be explained by other variables. We must first look at the variables suggested here (alliances and arms races) to see if they show a temporal ordering consistent with the theory to allow for causation. It is important to investigate first the hypothesized cause and not the possible control variables.

It is difficult to address causes in statistical analysis, therefore this analysis will look at the timing of alliance formation (and arms races) to determine if alliance formation is a possible cause of rivalry escalation. Chronologically what comes first, power-politics strategies or recurring crises? This study predicts that politically relevant alliances and military buildups will lock in early in the life of the rivalry and contribute to the escalation (or steps) towards the manifestation of proto and enduring rivalries (outlined in hypotheses 3.1 and 3.3). I also predict that mutual military buildups will occur early in the life of rivalry and contribute to the movement towards the more severe forms of rivalry (hypotheses 3.2 and 3.4).

H3.1: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.2: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.3: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage).
H3.4: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage).

Most and Starr (1989) argue that conflict studies should move beyond why questions of why and into questions of how. Looking at the escalation of hostility between rival dyads will get to the question of how the process of conflict in rivalry develops. Here I am interested in the outcome of the process of power politics foreign policy behavior (Most and Starr, 1989: 8).

I next consider whether power politics practices directly contribute to the escalation of conflict between dyads. According to the logic of the previous hypotheses, power politics practices lead a state down a path toward rivalry. To become rivals, states need to escalate bargaining demands so as deny benefits to a competitor. This process of increased bargaining demands results in escalatory behavior.

Consider that the timing of alliances may have an impact on the dynamics of escalation, and thus interstate war. Dyads that use power politics early in their lifetime may be more likely to experience war. Instead of using a basic rivalry level severity variable, I will use a dichotomous war or no war variable to test this proposition on escalation.

H4.1 Dyads that form politically relevant alliances early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.
H4.2 Dyads that participate in mutual military buildups early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.

This study will also investigate at how rivalries are linked to each other through simultaneous conflict involvement. To truly test any idea of a rivalry linkage, one must look at the times a state involved in a rivalry is simultaneously involved in another rivalry or dispute at the same time. How does this conflict involvement influence and shape the course of rivalry relations?

As suggested by a rivalry linkage theory in chapter three, two hypotheses may result from rivalry linkages or simultaneous rivalries. The rivalry weariness theory would predict that the severity of a rivalry would decrease as the number of simultaneous rivalries increases. States involved in a rivalry can only have a limited number of outside disputes (Thompson 2000). Dyads with a high average number of rivalries will be likely to have a lower rivalry severity level. The severity of conflict between a rival dyad will be negatively impacted by the number of simultaneous rivalries a rival dyad is involved in during its lifetime.

A more likely hypothesis is the rivalry commitment theory. The rivalry commitment theory would predict an increase in the severity of conflict between a rival pair as the number of simultaneous rivalries increases. The idea is that principal rivals will show commitment and resolve through multiple dispute involvement. This process will have the result of an increase in the severity of conflict between any rivalry type.

H5.1: The severity level of a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in a rival dyad.
H5.2: The probability of strategic rivalry increases according to the number simultaneous disputes a dyad is engaged in.
H5.3: The probability of proto and enduring rivalry involvement increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in the dyad.

Chapter three developed the concept of grand strategy to include rivalry. Grand strategies are empty without an identified rival; therefore, I hypothesize that states with grand strategies will have rivalries. States with grand strategies should also manifest these strategies with the formation of alliances, participation in military buildups, and the changing of strategic doctrine to counter an enemy early in the life of the conflict.

In the study of grand strategies and rivalry, I believe that a state will form a grand strategy early in the life of the rivalry to counter a potential rival state. This event will

influence the path of escalation to conflict for the rivals. It may also be that states only form grand strategies once in the late stages of rivalries. If this were the case, the theory would be falsified. For a grand strategy to have an impact on the development of a rivalry, the strategy must be formed during the early stages of a rivalry.

H6: Pairs of states will develop a grand strategy to counter an identified rival early in the life of the conflict.

Research Design and Methodology

Gartzke and Simon (1999) argue that empirical research on rivals suffers from what can be called a "hot hand" error. Rivals are no more than a pattern of unrelated events.[47] Gartzke and Simon (1999, pg. 779) then note, "For enduring rivalry research to progress…it must justify why researchers should only examine certain cases. Further, the approach can only be rationalized if it is shown that subsequent disputes are caused by factors unique to the presence of rivalry."

In this project, I will test the hypothesis that the foreign policy practices of rivals are different from those dyads that do not escalate to the proto or enduring rivalry level. We know little about the process of rivalry formation, but I do hope to show that rivals are unique dyads in that they exhibit different foreign policy patterns than other types of dyads.

[47] A few scholars dispute this claim through empirical evidence. Colaresi and Thompson (2003) find little support for the "hot hand" theory. They report, "our results support the serial crisis hypothesis, and suggest that the probability of subsequent crises and wars increase with each past crisis." (Colaresi and Thompson 2003, 1) Hensel (2001) also suggests the "hot hand" theory is theoretically and empirically flawed. He points out that much of the criticisms that Gartzke and Simon make have already been dealt with in the literature. Nonetheless, this dissertation still makes its central inquiry to demonstrate that rivals are unique dyads and do act differently than other types of dyads.

Who is a Rival? The Dependent Variable

The first step in testing the hypotheses identified above is to produce a population of unique rivalry cases. According to Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993), the rivalry population will include isolated conflicts (1-2 disputes), proto-rivalries (3-5 disputes), and enduring rivalries (6+ disputes over 20 years).[48] Diehl and Goertz (2000) identify and produce a dataset that accounts for all types of rivalry and the militarized disputes that correspond with each rivalry.[49] In this work, each rival dyad represents a unique dyad that has experienced militarized conflict during its lifetime.

Thompson (2001) also produces a dataset of rivals that includes 174 strategic rivals. All hypotheses (except for the escalatory hypothesis) will also use the Thompson rival population as the dependent variable. This should insure independent confirmation of each finding by using two completely different datasets produced independently. It should also confirm that the hypotheses are tested across those cases, which are historic rivals, and those rivals identified by using a dispute threshold approach.

Ex Post Facto versus Evolutionary Models

Hensel (1996) points out that most studies of rivalry are concerned with ex post facto developments of hypothesis testing (i.e. enduring rivals identified after the fact).[50] The central question of this project, however, aims to identify whether there are certain factors present during each stage of rivalry. This work takes the suggestion of Hensel

[48] Isolated conflicts are not rivals. They are included in the study as the non-rival cases.
[49] Available at http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/faculty/diehl.html

and seeks to test evolutionary models of rivalry escalation. The unit of analysis takes the form of rival dyads suggested by Diehl and Goertz (2000).

There are 1166 cases in a "ex post facto" research design. To also account for an evolutionary research design, a new dataset will be created containing observations for each stage of rivalry during the life of a rival dyad. For instance, an enduring rival will have observations at the isolated conflict stage (early stage), the proto stage (intermediate stage), and finally, the enduring stage (advanced stage). When utilizing an evolutionary model, the rivalry phases will be spoken of as stages. The evolutionary research design will include 1515 cases of rival dyads.

Every test of the hypotheses will use both the conventional ex post facto and the evolutionary model to determine the number of cases used to test each hypothesis. Results should not differ between the two tests, but it is important to include an evolutionary research design to account for the process of rivalry escalation and take observations during the life of the rivalry, not at one particular time point. Every hypothesis will be tested using the standard 1166 population and 1515 evolutionary-stages population.

Testing the Hypotheses

The maximum likelihood estimation techniques will be the primary technique used to test the links between rivalry and power politics strategies. In this study, the primary dependent variable (rivalry type) takes the form of a categorical outcome measured as isolated conflict, proto rivalry, and enduring rivalry. I will now describe how each hypothesis will be tested.

Probabilistic Sufficient Condition Hypothesis
H1.1: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
H1.2: Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

To test hypotheses one, I will first construct basic bivariate tables that show whether or not power politics strategies are used during each stage of rivalry. Conditional and base probabilities will be calculated for each outcome. I will then test the hypothesis using a multinomial logit model.

Multinomial logit produces estimates of the probability of each outcome (isolated conflict, proto-rivalry, or enduring rivalry) occurring given the independent variables, and makes no assumption about the order of the outcomes. The dependent variable is rivalry stage (defined as isolated conflict, proto-rivalry, and enduring rivalry). Ordered logistic regression will not be used since it is unclear whether the rivalry stages (as developed by Diehl and Goertz 2000) is a clear interval measure. Predicted probabilities and risk ratios will be calculated to suggest the substantive interpretations of each coefficient.[51]

Probabilistic Necessary Condition Hypothesis
H2.1: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.2: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.3: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
H2.4: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.

[51] Long (1997) discusses the use of predicted probabilities. Predicted probabilities will be generated using the Spost commands (Spost is detailed in Long and Freese 2001). Gould (2000) discusses the use of relative risk rations to interpret multinomial logit coefficients.

To test hypotheses two, I will develop the necessary conditions methodology suggested by Braumoeller and Goertz (2000).[52] Braumoeller and Goertz (2000) contend that necessary conditions have been an underexamined aspect of international politics. While power politics strategies may not be sufficient conditions that can alone bring about rivalry, they may be necessary conditions.

I will conduct tests of the hypothesis to determine if power politics is a necessary condition of rivalry. The first step is to isolate each category in two by two tables. I will first see if the conditions are present in all enduring rivalries, and then I will test the proposition according to the proto-rivalry outcome.

Braumoeller and Goertz (2001, 848) suggest testing for necessary conditions by "constructing a one-sided 95 percent confidence interval around p and rejecting the necessary condition hypothesis if that confidence interval is inconsistent with estimates of error." This will allow me to further suggest that power politics may be a necessary condition for rivalry formation. I will use a similar method to test the sufficient and necessary conditions of enduring rivalries. Charles Ragin's "fuzzy set" method is useful for the exploration of sufficient and necessary factors in a medium number of cases.

Chapter ten will conduct a fuzzy set test of the steps to rivalry theory. Hypotheses one and two will be tested on the enduring rivalry population, as well as the strategic rivalry population (Thompson 2001) and severe rivalry (those rivals with more than 13 disputes) subsets. The fuzzy set method can be applied to probabilistic sufficient and necessary conditions. This method tests the statistical significance of the findings in the model. The method also allows for the exploration of causal conditions that are jointly sufficient for an outcome, which in this case is rivalry.

[52] Most and Starr (1989, chapter 3) also discuss process of testing necessary conditions hypotheses.

H3.1 When a relevant alliance is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.2 When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.3 When a relevant alliance is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage).
H3.4 When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage)

To test hypothesis three, I will code alliance formation and mutual military buildup timing. I have to disaggregate the disputes within each rivalry to look at the timing of alliance formation and mutual military buildups. What now must be determined is when in the life of a rivalry a state forms politically relevant alliances and participates in mutual military buildups. To tackle this important question, I will code when states make power politics foreign policy choices. Using the COW alliance listing, I investigated when the relevant alliance counted in the dataset originated. I then assigned this observation with the appropriate code.

H4.1 Dyads that form politically relevant alliances early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.
H4.2 Dyads that participate in mutual military buildups early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.

To test the hypothesis on war involvement, I will observe if a war is fought during the lifetime of a rivalry. I hypothesize that rivalries that form and use power politics early in their lifetime will be more likely to experience war. If this proves to be the case, we know an important amount of information about the most contentious rivalries, those that experience war. This model will use war as the dependent variable to see if those rivalries that use power politics early in their life (coded as one for yes and zero for no use of power politics) are more likely to fight wars.

H5.1: The severity level of a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in a rival dyad.
H5.2: The probability of strategic rivalry increases according to the number simultaneous disputes a dyad is engaged in.
H5.3: The probability of proto and enduring rivalry involvement increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in the dyad.

To first test hypothesis five, I will produce simple bivariate statistics looking at the probability of a member of a rival dyad getting into a new dispute and how that new dispute affects the original rivalry. I will then use a multinomial model to test how new disputes and rivals impact the escalation of rivalries with the added presence of control variables, contiguity and territorial disputes.

States involved in severe rivalries will not likely get into new disputes. If this is true, testing should show little evidence of multiple concurrent international enemies. The opposing may be true, especially if states use power politics. Pairs of states that fight in multiple simultaneous conflicts are then more likely to become proto and enduring rivals.

H6: Pairs of states will develop a grand strategy to counter an identified rival early in the life of the conflict.

To test hypothesis six, I will have to rely on a qualitative method to determine the impact of rivalry grand strategies on rivalry formation and escalation. The first step will involve undertaking a few case studies to test the plausibility of the hypothesis. These cases will be confined to the pre-World War I rivalries in Europe. Chapter nine will identify when war plans dealing with rivalry are developed and how those war plans influenced the war that resulted in 1914.

Strategic Rivals

This paper will also test each of the hypotheses using Thompson's (2001) rival population. This should ensure independent confirmation of each finding by using two completely different datasets produced independently of each other. Each rivalry Thompson coded was matched with its appropriate rivalry number under Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding.[53] This will allow us to use the conflict behavior information collected by Diehl and Goertz and the MID project to test our hypothesis according to dispute information (i.e. issue codes). Not all of Thompson's rivals are encountered in the Diehl and Goertz's dataset simply (see Table 6 in Chapter 5) because some did not have MIDs, and others were coded as starting after 1993, the last date of data collection for MID 2.1.

Factors Increasing the Probability of Rivalry: The Independent Variables

The main independent variables in this study are mutual military buildups and politically relevant alliances. If there ever was a mutual military buildup or relevant alliance at any time during a stage of rivalry, it is counted as a positive observation.[54] Alliance information is taken from the correlates of war alliance dataset version 3.1.[55]

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[53] I am aware that this operatalization of the Thompson dataset is different from what was intended. The dataset is intended to by used in a dyad year fashion to measure the perceptions of rival pairs. Here, I am using a dicthomous variable to code whether or not a dyad already engaged in a MID is a strategic rival. In the future, the analysis will also be run using a dyad year research design that is not dependent on the existence of MIDs.

[54] Mutual military buildups are measured from Horn's (1987) data as taken from Sample (2002). Extensive discussion of the measures and their extension can be found in Sample (1996). The operational definition of arms race takes the form of a mutual military buildup, but the terms can be used interchangeably.

[55] The version 3.1 data was collected by Gibler and Sarkees (2002). This version is based on early alliance data collected by the COW project (Singer and Small 1966; Small and Singer 1969).

A new measure of alliance involvement called politically relevant alliances is used as an independent variable. Senese and Vasquez (2001; 2001) create a dataset of politically relevant alliances based on the conditions below.

An alliance is classified as politically relevant to a specific dispute if any of the following conditions are met:

1) If the state in question is a minor state, then any alliance it has with a major state is relevant.
2) If the state in question is a minor state, then any alliance it has with another minor state is relevant, if that minor state is in the same region as the "target" involved in the dispute.
3) If the state in question is a major state, then any alliance it has with a major state is relevant.
4) If the state in question is a major state, then any alliance it has with a minor state is only relevant if that minor state is in the same region as the target of the dispute. (see Senese and Vasquez 2001)

Politically relevant alliances allow one to count only those alliances that can directly influence conflict behavior. This new dataset is a significant advance from the usual operationalization of the alliance variable, where a positive observation is noted if there was any alliance present. Alliances where the states are allied to each other are not counted as politically relevant alliances in this project.

A rivalry is linked if one state in the rivalry has a dispute or rivalry with another state at the same time as the original rivalry. This study will explore linkage relationships for all types of rivalry.[56] A new variable was created called simultaneous rivalry (simriv) if either state A or B in a rivalry had another dispute with any other third party during the life of the rivalry.[57] This new variable will be fully explained in Chapter seven.

[56] Diehl and Goertz (2000) explore linkage relationships for enduring rivalries.
[57] For example, The United States and Mexico could be involved in rivalry from 1880 to 1920. If the U.S. has a dispute with Canada during the years 1890-1899, it would be counted as one simultaneous rivalry. Also, if Mexico has an ongoing rivalry with Cuba from 1867-1901, it would also be counted as one simultaneous rivalry. Examples here are hypothetical.

Vasquez and Leskiw (2001; Leskiw 2001) and Vasquez and Henehan (2001) develop a new variable called issue dominance to account for the issues over which states fight in recurrent conflicts. An issue dominance measure allows one to code which type of issue over which states fought in a majority of the disputes comprising a rivalry. Rivalries that have territorial issue dominance should be the most conflict prone.

Diehl and Goertz (2000) provide for a variable called basic rivalry level (BRL) that can be used to measure escalation. The BRL variable can account for the rise in hostility between a dyad as time goes on, and is calculated by using either the number of fatalities in each dispute or by the hostility level of the dispute.[58]

Several control variables will be used in this study. The first is contiguity. States that are contiguous are most likely to get into disputes (Bremer 1992). It is important to control for contiguity to ensure that findings on alliances are not spurious or driven by proximity, rather than other factors. I also control for status. Major states are more likely than any other type of state to become involved in conflict (Bremer 1992). This study will not control for democracy since only one enduring rivalry was ever consistently jointly democratic (Hensel, Goertz et al. 2000).

I also added a variable for the nuclear weapons capabilities of states. Pairs of states that have nuclear capabilities are coded as one if at least one side has nuclear weapons. This variable is taken from Sample's (2002) recent data on mutual military buildups. The nuclear weapon variable could be considered a direct factor that leads to rivalry, but it may also been seen as a potential control variable to account for the actions of nuclear states.

[58] For an extensive description, see Diehl and Goertz 2000, appendix B.

Selection Effects

The issue of selection bias has been an important issue in the study of conflict in recent years (Signorino 1999; Smith 1999; Reed 2000; Lemke and Reed 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002). Selection effects refer to the choices as one stage of a process that can impact the next stage of a process. Choices made early in a relationship may determine the future choices and outcomes of a relationship. Fox example, democracies may win the wars they fight more often than autocracies because they select themselves only into those conflicts they have a high likelihood of winning (Reiter and Stam 2002).

I expect the question of selection effects to have no impact on the overall value of the findings in this study. However, it may still be important to investigate if there is a selection process at work. There may well be a selection process at work in that pairs of states engaging in militarized interstate disputes are likely to act differently than those who do not. That fact is not surprising and it is suggested in the theory. What is important for rivalry, however, is how disputes are handled once they occur, not why they occur in the first place.

Bennett et. all (2002) show that selection effects concerns are not as widespread as initially through, and research design choices impact the likelihood of finding a statistical selection effect. In conclusion, they find (Bennett, Baker et al. 2002, 1) "across a set of reasonable research design specifications that employing a selection model only rarely changed the results that we obtained when running models without selection." Senese and Vasquez (2003) also notice that running a selection model did not change the interpretation of their results. The original territorial model that delineates the path to

war through territorial disputes does not go against the finding that territorial claims are likely to result in territorial disputes.

A selection effects test of the steps to rivalry theory will have to be conducted in the future. At this point, there are no data available to test the proposition that pairs of states that engage in militarized disputes will act differently that those that engage in recurring conflict. Additionally, there are no observations available for the independent variables in this model (relevant alliances and mutual military buildups). Only when this data is collected in the future will it be possible to conduct a selection effects test of the steps to rivalry theory.

CHAPTER V

POWER POLITICS AND RIVALRY: RELEVANT ALLIANCES AND MILITARY BUILDUPS AS NECESSARY AND SUFFIECIENT CONDITIONS FOR RIVALRY FORMATION

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the relationship between alliances, mutual military buildups (arms races) and rivalry. Exploring the empirical regularities of rivalry outcomes, I find that all of the proposed factors represent steps along a road to rivalry. Each step increases the probability that rivalry will eventually occur.

In this analysis, I rely on a necessary and sufficient condition theory of causal analysis. A sufficient condition suggests that an event will always produce some sort of outcome. In this case, rivalry is the predicted outcome for the use of power politics foreign policy practices. The presence of these events encourages and promotes the development of rivalry.

Power politics practices are also necessary conditions of rivalry. For a condition to be necessary, it must occur each time the outcome variable is observed. Without the presence of such event, the outcome does not occur. Analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions of rivalry suggests that alliances and mutual military buildups are related conditions for rivalry development. While these conditions are not universal, they do happen on balance most of the time a rivalry forms. Understanding the sufficient and necessary conditions of rivalry is the first step towards ending the enduring, protracted conflicts that populate the interactions of some of the most dangerous and warlike pairs of states in the international system.

Hypotheses

The "steps to rivalry theory" outlined in chapter three suggests that relevant alliances and mutual military buildups are factors associated with the development of rivalry. Alliances signify an attempt to increase security of one state by increasing its military capabilities. States attempt to ensure their survival through alliances. Generally an increase in the security of one state determines that an opposing state will also seek to increase its own security in response to this action. The state perceives a decrease in their own security and seeks to rectify the situation through the buildup of opposing alliance blocks or other means. Repeated conflict is likely to result from the process once these events occur.

The same procedure that results from alliance formation also suggests that military buildups will result in an increased probability of conflict. States buildup their militaries to ensure their own security. In a rivalry situation, this results in a Richardsonian (1960) arms race process. Here, that process is measured as a mutual military buildup (Sample 1996). When a pair of states decides to participate in a mutual military buildup, the security of each state is threatened and force usually employed when substantive issues arise and become a source of disagreement for the pair of states.

In this chapter, I will explore how alliances and mutual military buildups might be sufficient and necessary conditions of rivalry development through empirical testing. Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 represent sufficient conditions of rivalry development. Those pairs of states that participate in relevant alliances have an increased probability of rivalry situations. This process is not universal in that each time there is an alliance, a rivalry

will follow, but it is probabilistically sufficient that the rivalry will occur. The same holds true for mutual military buildups (hypothesis 1.2).

H1.1: Pairs of states that form relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
H1.2: Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

Hypothesis 2.1 through 2.4 represent probabilistic necessary conditions for rivalry. Each time the outcome variable is observed (rivalry), it is probabilistically likely that the independent variables, mutual military buildups and alliances, will also be observed. Politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups are necessary conditions for rivalry.

H2.1: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed relevant alliances.
H2.2: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have formed relevant alliances.
H2.3: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
H2.4: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.

Chapter four discussed the research design choices for this chapter, and they will be briefly reviewed here. In testing the necessary and sufficient conditions of rivalry, I rely on both bivariate statistics and multinomial logit modeling to determine the impact of each independent variable on the outcome. The first main independent variables in this chapter are relevant alliances, which are derived from the work of Senese and Vasquez (2001; 2001; 2003). Here, alliances are relevant if they include a major state or a minor state from the same region as the dyad under question. Alliance information is taken from correlates of war alliance version 3.0 (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). Mutual military buildups are taken from the specifications employed by Sample (1996; 2002), who used Horn's (1987) measure to operationalize the term. Sample includes both

major and minor state military buildups. The hypothesis in this chapter refers to military buildups, but as employed in this project, I will only study mutual military buildups. In the future, it will be important to investigate the term through non-dyadic military buildups, but currently the data and the term is employed in its dyadic form. Military buildups need to be a reciprocated process to be considered arms races, but single military buildups may have the same influence on rivalry dynamics as dyadic military buildups.

The main dependent variable in this analysis is taken from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding of rivalry. They distinguish the most severe rivals, enduring rivals, who have had at least six disputes over a twenty-year period. The next category is proto rivalries, which includes pairs of states with three or more disputes within a twenty-year time period. Isolated conflicts represent the non-rivalry category in that these dyads have between one or two militarized interstate disputes. In this chapter, I also use Thompson's (2001) strategic rivalry coding as a dependent variable. Here, the dependent variable is a binary outcome between strategic rivalry and no strategic rivalry.

Results

To test hypotheses one and two, I will first construct basic bivariate tables that show whether or not power politics strategies give rise to each rivalry phase. Conditional and base probabilities are calculated for each outcome. I then test the hypothesis using a multinomial logit model.

Multinomial logit produces estimates of the probability of each outcome (isolated conflict, proto-rivalry, or enduring rivalry) occurring given the independent variables,

and makes no assumption about the order of the outcomes. The dependent variable is rivalry stage (defined as isolated conflict, proto-rivalry, and enduring rivalry). Ordered logistic regression was not used since the method is inappropriate for the data used in this project. Predicted probabilities and risk ratios will be calculated to suggest the substantive interpretations of each coefficient.[59]

[59] Long (1997) discusses the use of predicted probabilities.

Table 2
Rivalry Type and Relevant Alliances
0 = No Alliance 1 = Relevant Alliances

Rivalry Type	Isolated	Proto	Enduring	Total
No Alliance	180 (159.2) 85.3%	28 (40.4) 13.3%	3 (11.4) 1.4%	211
Alliance	700 (720.8) 73.3%	195 (182.6) 20.4%	60 (51.6) 6.3%	955
Total	880	223	63	1166

Percentages are calculated for row values.
Value in parenthesis is expected value.

Rivalry Type	No Alliance	Alliance	Total
Isolated	180 20.4%	700 79.5%	880
Proto	28 12.5%	195 87.4%	223
Enduring	3 4.7%	60 95.2%	63
Total	211	955	1166

Percentages are calculated for column values.
Pearson chi2(2) = 15.47 PrValue = 0.000
*allied to each other not counted as a relevant alliance.

Enduring Rivalries	Obs.	Exp.	Total	BaseProb	Pcond	Zscore	Pval
No Alliance	3	11.4	211	.054	.014	-2.57	.001
Alliance	60	51.6	955	.054	.063	1.23	.109

Proto Rivalries	Obs.	Exp.	Total	BaseProb	Pcond	Zscore	Pval
No Alliance	28	40.4	211	.191	.013	-6.58	.001
Alliance	195	182.6	955	.191	.204	1.02	.154

Isolated Conflict	Obs.	Exp.	Total	BaseProb	Pcond	Zscore	Pval
No Alliance	180	159.2	211	.755	.85	3.21	.001
Alliance	700	720.8	955	.755	.732	-1.65	.049

BaseProb = total for category\total overall Pcond = obs\total
Exp. = base prob. * total

Table 2 outlines the basic bivariate relationship between rivalry and relevant alliance formation. The first thing that can be understood from this table is that relevant alliances do not represent universal sufficient conditions of rivalry (hypothesis 1.1). Not all alliances lead to rivalry. In fact, there are 700 alliances observed during the isolated conflict stage. What is important to note, however, is that the probability of rivalry increases when relevant alliances are observed. For isolated conflict, the base probability of the event is .755, but the conditional probability is .732. This shows that the probability of isolated conflict declines when alliances are observed. The Zscore for this factor, which measures the strength and statistical significance of the finding in the two by two table, is negative for relevant alliances observed during isolated conflict. The value, –1.65, is statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, the probability of isolated conflict increases when there are no alliances observed. The Zscore for this value is 3.21 and is statistically significant. The expected value for the no relevant alliance cell was 159, according to the base probability. There are 180 observations when there are no relevant alliances. The probability of isolated conflict is high, but the value decreases when alliances are observed.

For proto rivalries, we expect a value of 182 alliances for the category, but only observe 195 relevant alliances. The Zscore for proto rivalry is 1.02, which does not reach statistical significance at .154. For enduring rivalries, we observe 60 relevant alliances, but only expect 51.6. This results in a positive Zscore of 1.23. This value is close to statistical significance at .109, a reasonable value since the category has only 63 cases.

Table 2 shows that relevant alliances are probabilistic sufficient conditions of enduring and proto rivalry.

This table also directly answers the necessary condition hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2. According to rivalry type, relevant alliances are observed in a majority of the proto and enduring rivalry cases. All but three of the 63 enduring rivalries (60/63, 95 percent) have observed relevant alliance formation during their lifetime. This means that almost every enduring rivalry has either one outside alliance, or both sides have an outside alliance. Those pairs of states allied to each other were not counted as positive observations. According to the base probability of enduring rivalry occurrence, 51.6 enduring rivalries were expected to have positive alliance observations during this stage. The fact that 60 enduring rivalries had a positive observation for alliance formation shows that the relationship is strongly positive.

For proto-rivalries, 195 out of 223 cases demonstrate positive observations for relevant alliances. Eighty-seven percent of the proto-rivalry cases had at least one outside alliance. This also represents a probabilistic necessary condition for proto-rivalry occurrence (hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2). For both proto and enduring rivalries, the necessary condition hypothesis cannot be falsified at this point.

Table 3
Relevant Alliances and Rivalry
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
R. Alliance	0.511	.228	0.025	1.556	.594	0.009
Contiguity	0.262	.167	0.116	0.395	.273	0.149
Major Powers	1.245	.222	0.000	1.502	.321	0.000
Constant	-2.039	.227	0.000	-4.36	.579	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category
N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -769.631

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
R. Alliance	1.66	0.025	4.74	0.009
Contiguity	1.30	0.116	1.48	0.149
Major Powers	3.47	0.000	4.49	0.000

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Alliance = 0 + Cont=0	0.860	0.126	0.012
Alliance = 1 + Cont=1	0.702	0.224	0.072
Difference	-0.158	+0.098	+0.06

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Alliance = 0 + Cont = 0 + Major Power = 0	0.875	0.113	0.011
Alliance = 1 + Cont = 1 + Major Power =1	0.419	0.411	0.168
Difference	-0.456	+0.298	+0.157

Table 3 presents results for a multinomial logit test for hypothesis 1.1. The results support the proposition that states forming relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto and enduring rivalries, but are less likely to be observed in isolated conflicts (hypothesis 1.1). For the enduring rivalry category, relevant alliances generate a coefficient of 1.556 and are statistically significant at 0.009. Contiguity has a positive impact on the model, but is not statistically significant at 0.149. Major power dyads generate a coefficient of 1.502 and is statistically significant at 0.000.

For the proto rivalry category, relevant alliances generate a coefficient of 0.511 and are statistically significant at 0.025. Contiguity once again is not statically significant. Major powers have a similar impact at 1.245 and the factor is statistically significant at 0.000.

One way to interpret the model is to look at the relative risk ratios. When compared to the base category of isolated conflict, relevant alliances have positive ratios of 1.66 for proto rivalry and 4.74 for enduring rivalry. Major power dyads also have high relative risk ratios of 3.47 for proto rivalry and 4.49 for enduring rivalry.

Predicted probabilities also draw a similar picture. If the values for relevant alliance and contiguity are set at one, the probabilities are 0.072 for enduring rivalry, 0.224 for proto rivalry, and 0.702 for isolated conflicts. If the values are set to zero, isolated conflict has a predicted probability of 0.860, a negative difference of 0.158. While the highest predicted probability (0.860) is found during the isolated conflict stage, it is important to note that this prediction is based on the absence of alliances and contiguity. When relevant alliances are observed, the probability decreases to 0.702.

The direction of the relationship between isolated conflict and relevant alliances is negative.

Proto rivalry has a probability of 0.126 and 0.012 for enduring rivalry when relevant alliances are present. The probability for proto rivalry almost doubles when the factors are present, and the outcome is close to six times an increase for enduring rivalry.

The relationship is even stronger when the values are set to one for a relevant alliance, contiguity, and a major power dyad. For enduring rivalry, a positive observation results in a probability of 0.168 and a zero observation results in a value of 0.012. For proto rivalry, if all values are set to zero, the probability is 0.113; if the values are set to one, the probability is 0.411.

Table 4

Rivalry Type and Mutual Military Buildups

0 = No Military Buildup 1 = Military Buildup

*In the tables to follow, military buildup refers to mutual military buildups

Rivalry Type	Isolated	Proto	Enduring	Total
No Military Buildup	681 (653.9) 75.5%	183 (191.2) 20.29%	38 (56.8) 4.21%	902
Military Buildup	45 (71.78) 45.5%	29 (21.0) 29.29%	25 (6.23) 25.25%	99
Total	726	212	63	1001

Percentages are calculated for row values.

Value in parenthesis is expected value.

Rivalry Type	No Military Buildup	Military Buildup	Total
Isolated	681 (93.8%)	45 (6.2%)	726
Proto	183 (86.32)	29 (13.68)	212
Enduring	38 (60.32)	25 (38.68)	63
Total	902	99	1001

Percentages are calculated for column values.

Pearson chi2(2) = 77.26 Pr = 0.000

Enduring Rivalries	Obs.	Exp.	Total	BaseProb	Pcond	Zscore	Pval
No Military Buildup	38	56.8	902	.063	.042	-2.60	.001
Military Buildup	25	6.23	99	.063	.253	7.78	.0001

Proto Rivalries	Obs.	Exp.	Total	BaseProb	Pcond	Zscore	Pval
No Military Buildup	183	191.2	902	.212	.203	-0.66	.246
Military Buildup	29	21.0	99	.212	.293	1.972	.024

Isolated Conflict	Obs.	Exp.	Total	BaseProb	Pcond	Zscore	Pval
No Military Buildup	681	653.9	902	.725	.755	2.017	.02
Military Buildup	45	71.78	99	.725	.455	-6.02	.001

BaseProb = total for category\total overall Pcond = obs\total

Exp. = base prob. * total

Table 4 outlines the basic bivariate relationship between rivalry and mutual military buildup occurrence. This table can first test the sufficient condition hypothesis 1.2. Not all mutual military buildups lead to rivalries. What is evident is that the probability of a rivalry increases when mutual military buildups are observed. For the enduring rivalry category, the Zscore is positive and statistically significant at 7.78. We expect to find 6.23 mutual military buildups during the enduring rivalry stage, but observe 25. The base probability for the outcome is .063, but the conditional probability for the variable is .253, a strongly positive finding. Mutual military buildups are thus probabilistic sufficient conditions for enduring rivalries.

The results are similar for the proto rivalry category. The Zscore is positive and statically significant at 1.972. We expect to find 21 mutual military buildups, but observe 29. This finding shows that the probability of proto rivalry increases when mutual military buildups are observed. Once again, hypothesis 1.2 gains support in that military buildups are probabilistic sufficient conditions for proto rivalry.

For isolated conflict, the relationship between mutual military buildups and isolated conflict is again negative. The Zscore for the observation of military buildups is negative at –6.02 and statistically significant. The base probability of the event is .725, but the conditional probability is .455, showing a decrease when mutual military buildups are observed.

This table also directly tests hypotheses 2.3 and 2.4. For isolated conflicts, there are 45 observations of mutual military buildups and 681 negative observations. For the proto rivalry category, there are 183 negative observations and 29 positive observations.

In the enduring rivalry category, there are 25 mutual military buildups. Close to forty percent of the enduring rivalries have a positive observation for mutual military buildups.

The relationship between military buildups and rivalry can be better illustrated by the expected number of military buildups. According to the enduring rivalry category, there should be 6.23 observations during this stage. In reality, there were 25 observations. Mutual military buildups occur more frequently than would be expected by chance. Nonetheless, hypotheses 2.3 and 2.4 cannot be accepted; mutual military buildups are not necessary conditions for enduring or proto rivalry because they do not reach acceptable cut off points established in chapter 4. Looking at the timing of mutual military buildups and rivalries will better explore the relationship and the negative finding.

Table 5
Mutual Military Buildups and Rivalry Type
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Military Buildups	0.738	.252	0.003	2.154	.304	0.003
Contiguity	0.145	.167	0.387	0.119	.283	0.387
Major Power	1.08	.224	0.000	1.125	.336	0.000
Constant	-1.49	.108	0.000	-3.709	.210	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category
N = 1001
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -695.924

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
Military Buildups	2.09	0.003	8.62	0.000
Contiguity	1.15	0.387	1.12	0.672
Major Power	2.96	0.000	3.08	0.001

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
MB = 0 + Cont=0	0.765	0.194	0.040
MB = 1 + Cont=1	0.469	0.288	0.242
Difference	-0.296	+0.094	+0.158

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
MB = 0 + Cont = 0 + Major Power = 0	0.786	0.176	0.036
MB = 1 + Cont = 1 + Major Power =1	0.249	0.401	0.349
Difference	-0.537	+0.225	+0.313

Table 5 presents results for a multinomial logit test for hypothesis 1.2. The results support the sufficient condition proposition that states participating in mutual military buildups against each other are more likely to become involved in proto and enduring rivalries. For the enduring rivalry category, military buildups generate a coefficient of 2.154, and this factor is statistically significant at 0.003. Contiguity has a positive impact on the model, but is not statistically significant at 0.387. Major power dyads generate a coefficient of 1.125 that is statistically significant at 0.000.

For the proto rivalry category, military buildups generate a coefficient of 0.738 and are statistically significant at 0.003. Contiguity once again is not statically significant. Major powers have a similar impact at 1.08, and the factor is statistically significant at 0.000.

One way to interpret the model is to look at the relative risk ratios. When compared to the reference category of isolated conflict, military buildups have positive ratios of 2.09 for proto rivalry and 8.62 for enduring rivalry. Major power dyads also have high relative risk ratios of 2.96 for proto rivalry and 3.08 for enduring rivalry.

Predicted probabilities also elicit similar results. If the values for military buildup and contiguity are set at one, the probabilities are 0.242 for enduring rivalry, 0.288 for proto rivalry, and 0.469 for isolated conflicts. If the values are set to zero, isolated conflict has a predicted probability of 0.765, creating a difference of 0.296. Proto rivalry has a probability of 0.194 and 0.040 for enduring rivalry. While the probabilities for the proto rivalries do not increase much with military buildups, enduring rivalry moves from a probability of 0.040 to 0.242, representing an increase by almost a factor of six.

The relationship is even stronger when the values are set to one for a military buildup, contiguity, and a major power dyad. For enduring rivalry, a positive observation results in a probability of 0.036 and a zero observation results in a value of 0.349. For proto rivalry, if all values are set to zero, the probability is 0.176; if the values are set to one, the probability is 0.401.

Findings Based on Thompson Strategic Rivals

Tables 6 and 7 provide a descriptive breakdown of the results of analysis of Thompson's (2001) rivals. Table 12 lists a breakdown of all relevant information comparing the Thompson rival dataset to the Goertz and Diehl dataset. In total, 198 rivals and isolated conflicts were coded as occurring during the Thompson rivalry years. Four strategic rivals were not coded because they occur after 1993, the end of the last militarized dispute dataset update. Twenty-seven strategic rivals were not coded because they did not occur in the Goertz and Diehl dataset.[60] This means that these rivals did not have militarized disputes and thus cannot be analyzed for the occurrence or non-occurrence of power politics foreign policy practices. It would be useful in the future to investigate the origins of these 27 rivals to determine what explains their lack of dispute involvement.

[60] Examples include most dyads involving Austria, Belize and Guatemala, the recent Bosnia-Serbian rivalry, early disputes between Burma and Thailand, and a few dyads involving Egypt and other Arabic states.

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Thompson Rivals

Number of Rivals coded as Thompson Rivalries = 198
New Rivals not in Diehl and Goertz = 4
Rivals that have no observations in Diehl and Goertz = 27

(Note: China and Russia are considered one rivalry by Diehl and Goertz (from 1862-1986) while Thompson (2001) codes two rivalries (1816-1949 and 1958-1989). Therefor I count 199 Thompson rivals that have matches in Diehl and Goertz, but only 198 are coded.)

Table 7
Thompson Rivals Compared to Goertz and Diehl Rivalry Type

Rivalry Type	Not Thompson Rival	Thompson Rival	Total
Isolated Conflict	801 (83%)	79 (40%)	880
Proto Rivalry	149 (15%)	74 (37%)	223
Enduring Rivalry	18 (2%)	45 (23%)	63
Total	968	198	1166

The most striking of these rivals are those that include Austria-Hungary. Austria has had relatively small dispute involvement, but was involved in most of the wars in the Europe during the 19th and 20th century. It is clear that the Serbian-Austrian rivalry was important for the development and initiation of World War I, but it does not occur in the Diehl and Goertz (2001) data.[61] This adds strength for the need of a qualitative investigation of all rivalry cases to support conventional quantitative analysis.

It is interesting and useful to compare the coding of Thompson's rivals to the rivalry types Diehl and Goertz code based on dispute involvement (Table 7). Forty percent of Thompson's rivals would be coded as isolated conflict under Diehl and Goertz (2001). This means that a significant portion of Thompson's rivals had a low number of disputes through their life. Also captured in this measure is the fact that some of

[61] See Schroeder (1999) for a discussion of the French and the Habsburg rivalry.

Thompson's rivals have multiple rivals under the Diehl and Goertz coding.[62] Some of Thompson's rivals have an enduring rival, possibly an isolated conflict, and proto rivalry observation during their lifetime.

Thirty-seven of Thompson's rivals would be coded as proto-rivals and twenty-three are coded as enduring rivals. Thompson's rival coding captures 45 out the 63 (about 71 percent) possible enduring rivals under Diehl and Goertz (2000). Next the Thompson rivalry data is tested to determine the impact of territorial disputes on the occurrence of rivalry.

Table 8
Relevant Alliances and Rivalry
Coefficient Estimates, Logit Model for Thompson Rivalry

	Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Alliance	-0.303	.185	0.102
Contiguity	0.713	.158	0.000
Constant	-1.625	.183	0.000

N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -518.396

Predicted Probabilities for Thompson Rivalry

	No Rivalry	**Thompson Rivalry**
Ally = 0 + Cont = 0	0.835	0.165
Ally = 1 + Cont = 1	0.771	0.228
Difference	-0.064	-0.063

[62] Some of the Thompson rivalries have multiple rivals under the Diehl and Goertz coding rules because the years of rivalry differ and the lack of disputes for a period of ten years means that Diehl and Goertz code their rivalries as terminated.

Table 8 presents the results for relevant alliances according to strategic rivalries. This table tests the sufficient condition hypothesis 1.1. The coefficient for alliance is negative, but not statically significant. The relationship here is opposite what is expected, but nothing can be gathered from this model in that the results are not statically significant. For strategic rivalry, the relationship between alliances and rivalry may be random. It is clear from the Diehl and Goertz (2000) data that alliances do have an impact on rivalry, so proposition 1.1 is not rejected in this case. There is simply no support for this factor according to strategic rivalry.

Table 9
Mutual Military Buildups and Rivalry
Coefficient Estimates, Logit Model for Thompson Rivalry

	Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Military Buildup	1.00	.237	0.000
Contiguity	0.556	.169	0.001
Constant	-1.85	.114	0.000

N = 1001
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -459.3015

Predicted Probabilities for Thompson Rivalry

	No Rivalry	**Thompson Rivalry**
MB = 0 + Cont = 0	0.865	0.1351
MB = 1 + Cont = 1	0.574	0.426
Difference	-0.291	+0.291

Table 9 presents the results for mutual military buildups according to strategic rivalries. This table tests the sufficient condition hypothesis 1.2. The coefficients for mutual military buildups and contiguity are both positive and statistically significant. Looking at the predicted probabilities, if a mutual military buildup is present along with

contiguity, the probability of a strategic rivalry is 0.426. If the values are set to zero, the probability of strategic rivalry is 0.1351. Here, proposition 1.2 once again is confirmed.

Assessment

The first factor I have investigated is relevant alliances. Those pairs of states that participate in relevant alliances (at least one outside alliance) are more likely to become involved in rivalry. It does seem clear that relevant alliances are both a probabilistic necessary and sufficient condition of rivalry development. In regards to necessary conditions, it can be said that relevant alliances are "almost always sufficient" conditions for both proto and enduring rivalry (Ragin 2000).[63]

This analysis also shows that rivalry becomes more likely if states are involved in military buildups. The probability of proto and enduring rivalry, as well as a strategic rivalry, occurrence increases when mutual military buildups are present. Accordingly, the probability of isolated conflict decreases when mutual military buildups are present. While mutual military buildups are consistent with the hypotheses presented here in that they are probabilistic sufficient conditions of rivalry, they are not necessary conditions. Not all proto or enduring rivals have experienced mutual military buildups. The next chapter in this work explores this question in relation to the timing of the events.

Another point about mutual military buildups has to do with the basic steps to rivalry theory. Currently, military buildups are measured only if they are mutual, meaning both sides have to increase their military budgets for a positive observation to be counted. In the future, it may be useful for the military buildup to be collected by state, rather than dyad. Those states that have independent military buildups may be more

likely to become rivals. If the variable was changed, it would also make the measure more compatible with the alliance variable, which is coded monadically. Currently, a positive observation is made if either state has an outside alliance. The probability of rivalry would increase if one used a variable for both sides having an outside alliance, but the current operationalization of the variable seems to work very well. The military buildup measure should eventually conform to this standard, especially in the case of rivalry. It may be that military buildups are one sided in mixed rivalries (major-minor powers). Major powers will not need to accelerate their weapons procurement since they are already at a high level, but a minor power may need to accelerate to catch up. This type of "one sided" arms buildup could have important consequences for the dynamics of rivalries.

According to the coding of Thompson's (2001) strategic rivalries, all the hypotheses presented can be accepted. There are no significant deviations from the results when using the Diehl and Goertz (2000) data. The only difference lies in the relationship between alliances and strategic rivalries. In a logit model, the results are not statistically significant so we can infer nothing from this model. This factor needs to be investigated more using the case study method. To this point, no conclusions can be made as to why the relationship differs with the use of varying datasets. All other tests pass in a similar way to the standard research design, regardless of the dataset used.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have found that relevant alliances are both a probabilistic necessary and sufficient condition for development of both proto and enduring rivalry.

[63] See Table 1 for cut-off points.

The results were inconclusive for the strategic rivalry coding (Thompson 2001). Alliances represent a significant step along the road to rivalry. When states use alliances in response to an initial dispute, they are likely to experience recurring conflict.

It is also know that mutual military buildups are probabilistically sufficient conditions for the development of rivalry. While mutual military buildups are not necessary conditions of rivalry, we do know that if a state participates in a mutual military buildup and it does not go to war during the first two disputes, the states are likely to become rivals.

These findings suggest that Vasquez's (1993) steps to war theory can be much more predictive that originally thought. With modifications of that theory, this project has been able to explain the development of rival dyads. With the identification of the causes of rivalry, we can then seek to reduce the conflict between the most dangerous types of enemies on the international stage. Specifically, those states that use power politics strategies are more likely to become rivals and then experience war.

Regardless of the type of dyad (major-major, minor-minor) or time period, know that alliances and mutual military buildups are dangerous steps that a pair of states can take, and that these steps will then likely result in rivalry. How the timing of these steps and the different stages of rivalry influence the development of rivalry would now prove useful for investigation.

CHAPTER VI

TIMING THE STEPS TO RIVALRY

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the effect that the timing of power politics strategies has on rivalry dynamics. In chapter five, I showed that a relationship exists between power politics strategies and the development of rivalry. Alliances and mutual military buildups are associated with the onset of severe rivalry (proto or enduring rivalry), but what remains to be shown is that there is a true causal relationship as understood by the temporal ordering of the process of rivalry development. These power politics events should come early in the life of a rivalry.

To understand the relationship between the independent variables (alliances and mutual military buildups) I must explore the timing of the events. The ordering of events is important for any type of causal connections. For an event to have an impact on the dependent variable, it needs to come before that outcome. I seek to understand when power politics strategies are used during the life of rivalry.

In this chapter, I also investigate the relationship between the stages of rivalry and development of rival dyads. Here I use an evolutionary research design (Hensel 1996) to investigate the causes of rivalry development. Using an evolutionary design allows investigation of whether power politics events (alliance and military buildups) influence the severity of a rivalry. It thus then follows that war will be more likely to occur in rivals that use power politics strategies.

For my steps to rivalry theory to be empirically accurate, temporal ordering must follow a consistent and hypothesized pattern. Power politics moves must come early in the life of a rivalry to be able to influence the course of action after the event occurs. This chapter will look at when events happen and how they influence course of rivalry development thereafter in order to further understand the process of rivalry development.

Hypotheses

In this chapter, I will first revisit hypothesis one using an evolutionary research design. Here I look at the stages of rivalry to determine if each event occurs early in the life of the rivalry and if it then influences the outcome variable, rivalry. Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 are then rewritten to incorporate the stages of rivalry. It is hypothesized that power politics strategies will be employed early in the life a rivalry (usually prior to or during the first two disputes).

H1.1: States that form politically relevant alliances against each other at an early rivalry stage are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
H1.2: States that participate in mutual military buildups at an early rivalry stage are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

While hypothesis two has not been reworked to incorporate stages into its predicted outcome, it is nevertheless important to retest the necessary condition hypothesis in light of a stages research design. Therefore, I will once again look at the bivariate statistics of proto and enduring rivals to determine if power politics strategies are necessary conditions for rivalry.

H2.1: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.

H2.2: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.3: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
H2.4: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.

Hypothesis three directly tests notions of timing and the formation of rivalry. Here I ask when the alliance or mutual military buildup occurred during the life of the rivalry. I hypothesize that these events should come early in a rivalry (usually prior to or during the first two disputes). To investigate this hypothesis, I use the stages research design, asking when the events occurred in relation to the initial disputes between the dyad.

What comes first, power-politics strategies or recurring crises? I predict that politically relevant alliances will lock in early in the life of the rivalry and contribute to the escalation (or steps) towards the manifestation of proto and enduring rivalries (outlined in hypotheses 3.1 and 3.3). I also predict that mutual military buildups will occur early in the life of rivalry and contribute to the movement towards the more severe forms of rivalry (hypotheses 3.2 and 3.4).

H3.1: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.2: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.3: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage).
H3.4: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage)

Hypothesis four relates to the severity of conflict between a rival dyad. While I do hypothesize that alliances and arms races are necessary conditions of rivalry, they are not universal necessary conditions. Some cases of enduring rivalry do not experience

politically relevant alliances. The relationship between mutual military buildups and rivalry is also weak, as reported in chapter five. Here I ask if the severity of conflict, as measured by war occurrence, is affected by the timing of power politics strategies. I hypothesize that rival dyads will be more likely to experience war if they contain power politics foreign policy moves early in their lifetime.

H4.1 Dyads that form politically relevant alliances early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.
H4.2 Dyads that participate in mutual military buildups early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.

Research design choices were previously discussed in detail in chapter four and summarized in chapter five. Once again, I use politically relevant alliances to operationalize alliances. Mutual military buildups as measured by Sample (2002) are used to operationalize military buildups and arms races.

The main dependent variable in this analysis is taken from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding of rivalry. This analysis is very similar to chapter five, but here the dependent variable represents rivalry stages. In the evolutionary research design (originally discussed in chapter four) there are 1515 rivalry cases as compared to the 1166 conventional design. A new dataset was created that has observations for each stage of rivalry during the life of a rival dyad. The stages are early (first and second disputes), intermediate (disputes 3 through 5), and advanced (disputes after number 6). For instance, an enduring rival will have observations at the early stage, the intermediate stage and finally, the advanced stage. The evolutionary research design will include 1515 cases of rival dyads.

Results for the stages test should not differ from the results obtained in chapter five, but it is important to include an evolutionary research design to account for the

process of rivalry escalation and take observations during the life of the rivalry, not at one particular time point.

This chapter also adds in rivalry timeline plots. These plots detail the events during the duration of a rivalry. It is hoped that these plots will identify when power politics strategies are used during a rivalry. Through the use of graphs, readers may be better able to understand the dynamics of an ongoing rivalry.

Results

To test hypotheses 3.1 and 3.3 on timing, I code alliance formation timing according to stages. Here I disaggregate the disputes within each rivalry to look at the timing of alliance formation. It must now be determined when in the life of a rivalry a state forms politically relevant alliances and participates in arms races. To investigate this, I will code when states make power politics foreign policy choices. Using the COW alliance listing (Gibler and Sarkees 2002), I noted when the relevant alliance counted in the dataset occurred, and then counted this observation with the appropriate code.

Table 10
Alliance Timing Distribution
Results for coding timing of alliance formation during rivalry or early stage.

During Early Conflict Stage

Alliance Timing	Early Stage
No Alliance	181 (20.5%)
With Alliance	699 (79.4)
Total	880

During Intermediate Rivalry Stage

Alliance Timing	Intermediate Stage
No Alliance	32 (14.3%)
Alliance at Early Stage	188 (84.3)
Alliance at Intermediate Stage	3 (1.3)
Total	223

During Advanced Rivalry Stage

Alliance Timing	Advanced Stage
No Alliance	3 (4.7%)
Alliance at Early Stage	55 (87.3)
Alliance at Intermediate Stage	4 (6.4)
Alliance at Advanced Stage	1 (1.5)
Total	63

Table 10 presents the results regarding the timing of alliance formation according to rivalry stages, addressing hypotheses 3.1 and 3.3. During the early stage, seventy-nine percent of cases had relevant alliances. This represents the fact that alliances alone are not sufficient conditions of rivalry. Alliances increase the probability of rivalry occurrence, but do not completely account for their formation. To understand this factor, we must consider that rivalry development is a multi-causal phenomenon. Later models of rivalry development will introduce the combined effects of each factor contributing to rivalry occurrence.

During the intermediate rivalry stage, 188 alliances were formed during the isolated stage. Only three alliances were formed late in the life of the rivalry. This

shows that for intermediate rivalry, alliances do occur early in the lifetime of the rivalry and can contribute to the existence of recurring disputes.

During the advanced rivalry stage, fifty-five enduring rivalries formed alliances during the early stage. Four enduring rivalry dyads formed alliances during the intermediate stage, and one alliances formed during the advanced stage, after dispute six. This shows once again that alliances contribute to the existence of serious rivalries and occur early in their life. For a cause to have an effect, it must come before the relevant outcome, and this appears to be the case for relevant alliance formation. Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 fail to be falsified to this point.

Table 11

Mutual Military Buildup Timing Distribution

Results for coding timing of alliance formation during rivalry or early stage.

During Early Stage

Military Buildup Timing	Early Stage
No Military Buildup	835 (94.9%)
With Military Buildup	45 (5.1)
Total	880

During Proto Rivalry Stage

Military Buildup Timing	Intermediate Stage
No Military Buildup	196 (87.9%)
Military Buildup at Early Stage	17 (7.6)
Military Buildup at Intermediate Stage	10 (4.4)
Total	223

During Enduring Rivalry Stage

Military Buildup Timing	Advanced Stage
No Military Buildup	38 (60.3%)
Military Buildup at Early Stage	3 (4.7)
Military Buildup at Intermediate Stage	7 (11.1)
Military Buildup at Advanced Stage	15 (23.8)
Total	63

War and Military Buildups at the Early Conflict Stage

War	No Military Buildup	Military Buildup	Total
No	716 (85.7%)	21 (46.7%)	737
Yes	119 (14.3)	24 (53.39)	143
Total	835	45	880

To test hypotheses 3.2 and 3.4 on timing, I coded mutual military buildups according to stages. Here I disaggregate the disputes within each rivalry to look at the timing of the military buildup. Using Sample's (2002) data on mutual military buildups, I looked for when the buildup counted in the dataset occurred. I then counted this observation with the appropriate code. Table 11 presents the results regarding the timing of mutual military buildups according to rivalry stages. During the early stage, there were 45 observations of mutual military buildups. This number was much higher than I expected to observe. Breaking down the early stage according to war occurrence, it is found that 24 of the 45 military buildups resulted in war. Over half of the buildups led to war, likely ending the rivalry early and settling the issues at contention. Those pairs of states with military buildups during an early stage are primed for rivalry, but sometimes do not have enough disputes for this event to occur. Military buildups can directly lead to war and this is likely why some military buildups are observed in isolated conflicts.

During the intermediate rivalry stage, 17 buildups are observed during the early stage. There are ten observations during the intermediate stage. When a military buildup occurs in a proto rivalry, it is likely to occur early. This result fails to falsify hypothesis 3.4.

During the advanced rivalry stage, there are three military buildups during the early stage. There are seven observations during the intermediate stage and 15 during the advanced rivalry stage. When military buildups occur in enduring rivalries, they are likely to occur late in the rivalry. This finding demonstrates that military buildups are likely to occur once enduring rivalries have had a significant number of disputes. Hypothesis 3.2 is falsified with current military buildup data.

Rivalry Stages

As mentioned previously, a rivalry stages research design was also used to test my hypotheses. This design more accurately represents the fact that rivalry occurs as a process. Rival dyads move through stages, and it may be important to take observations for rivalry occurrence according to their stages of development and evolution. The tests for rivalry occurrence should pass in the same fashion as the previous models, but it is important to make sure that this proposition is statistically accurate in the data. In this model, timing is taken into account and each independent variable must be present during the stage of rivalry evolution for it to count as a positive factor in rivalry development.

Table 12
Rivalry Type and Relevant Alliances by Stages

880 Early Conflicts
223 Intermediate Stage Rivals (223 at Intermediate Stage +223 at Early Stage =446)
63 Advanced Rivals (63 at Advanced Stage + 63 at Intermediate Stage + 63 at Early Stage = 189)
880+446+189=1515 Total Rival Dyads

0 = No Alliance 1 = Relevant Alliances

Rivalry Stage	**Early**	**Intermediate**	**Advanced**	**Total**
No Alliance	224 (202.4) 85.17%	36 (49.6) 13.69%	3 (10.9) 1.4%	263
Alliance	942 (963.6) 75.24%	250 (236.4) 19.97%	60 (52.1) 4.79%	1252
Total	1166	286	63	1515

Percentages are calculated for row values.
Value in parenthesis is expected value.

Rivalry Stage	**No Alliance**	**Alliance**	**Total**
Early	224 20.4%	942 80.1%	1166
Intermediate	36 12.6%	250 87.4%	286 (19.13)
Advanced	3 4.7%	60 95.2%	63 (5.40)
Total	263	1252	1515

Percentages are calculated for column values.
Pearson chi2(2) = 14.296 PrValue = 0.001
*allied to each other not counted as a relevant alliance.

Table 12 describes the bivariate relationship between alliance formation and rivalry stages. This table tests the necessary condition hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. The results here do not differ from Table 2, showing that the relationship between rivalry stages and alliance formation is not dependent on the stages of rivalry development. For advanced rivals, sixty of the sixty-three rivals experience politically relevant alliances. During the intermediate rivalry stage, 250 of the 286 rivals experience politically relevant

alliances. Thus, alliances are a factor in the development of rivalry, regardless of research design.

Table 13
Relevant Alliances and Rivalry Stages
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Intermediate Stage			**Advanced Stage**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
R. Alliance	0.409	.187	0.029	1.255	.522	0.016
Constant	-1.748	.173	0.000	-4.02	.504	0.000

Early Conflict Stage is reference category
N = 1515
Prob > chi2 = 0.0068
Log likelihood = -976.311

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Intermediate		**Advanced**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
R. Alliance	1.50	0.029	3.50	0.016

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
Alliance = 0	0.839	0.146	0.015
Alliance = 1	0.755	0.198	0.047
Difference	-0.084	+0.052	+0.032

Table 13 presents the similar results to table 3, and the values do not change much. This table addresses hypothesis 1.1 with the rivalry stages research design. The main difference between table 3 and table 13 is the use of rivalry stages analysis. In this

case, late alliances formed after the intermediate stage for intermediate rivals and those alliances formed after the advanced stage for advanced rivals were dropped as positive observations. Independent variables of contiguity and major power dyads were not added to the rivalry stages dataset, so there are no control variables used in this model. The coefficient for intermediate rivalry stage and alliance formation is 0.409 and the coefficient for the advanced stage is 1.255. Both factors are statistically significant.

For advanced rivalry, the predicted probability of the outcome occurring increases from 0.015 without alliances to 0.047 when alliances are observed. The relative risk ratio is also 3.50 when compared to the base category.

Intermediate stage rivalries exhibit the same pattern as advanced rivalries. The relative risk ratio for intermediate rivalry with the observation of alliances is 1.50. The predicted probability increases from 0.146 to 0.198 when alliances are observed.

Table 14
Rivalry Stages and Mutual Military Buildups
0 = No Military Buildup 1 = Military Buildup

Rivalry Stage	**Early**	**Intermediate**	**Advanced**	**Total**
No Military Buildup	1101 (1068.3) 79.32%	249 (262) 17.94%	38 (57.7) 2.74%	1388
Military Buildup	65 (97.7) 51.18%	37 (24) 29.13%	25 (5.3) 19.69%	127
Total	1166	286	63	1515

Percentages are calculated for row values.
Value in parenthesis is expected value.

Rivalry Stage	**No Military Buildup**	**Military Buildup**	**Total**
Early	1101 94.4%	65 5.5%	1166
Intermediate	249 87.1%	37 12.9%	286
Advanced	38 60.32%	25 38.68%	63
Total	1388	127	1515

Percentages are calculated for column values.
Pearson chi2(2) = 100.05 Pr = 0.000

Table 15
Mutual Military Buildups and Rivalry Stages
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Intermediate Rivalry Stage			**Advanced Rivalry Stage**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Military Buildups	0.923	.217	0.000	2.41	.287	0.000
Constant	-1.48	.070	0.000	-3.36	.165	0.000

Early Stage is reference category
N = 1515
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -949.39

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Intermediate Rivalry		**Advanced Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
Military Buildups	2.51	0.000	11.14	0.000

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Stage

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
MB = 0	0.793	0.179	0.027
MB = 1	0.511	0.291	0.197
Difference	-0.282	+0.112	+0.17

Tables 14 and 15 describe the relationship between mutual military buildups and rivalry stages. The results here do not change from the earlier tests contained in tables 4 and 6. Mutual military buildups once again contribute to the development of rivalry.

Table 14 outlines the basic bivariate relationship between rivalry and mutual military buildup occurrence. This table addresses the necessary condition hypotheses 2.3 and 2.4. For early stage rivalries, there are 65 observations of mutual military buildups

and 1101 negative observations. For the intermediate rivalry category, there are 249 negative observations and 37 positive observations. In the advanced rivalry category, there are 25 mutual military buildups. Close to forty percent of the advanced rivalries have a positive observation for mutual military buildups.

Table 15 presents a multinomial logit test of hypothesis 1.2 according to rivalry stages. The coefficients are both positive and statistically significant. Of interest here is both the relative risk ratios and the predicted probability. For advanced rivalry, the relative risk ratio when compared to the base outcome of the early stage is 11.14. For intermediate rivalry the risk ratio is 2.51. The predicted probabilities also show a pattern of increase when mutual military buildups are observed. During an advanced rivalry, the probability of the event occurring increases from 0.027 with no alliances present to 0.197 with alliances present. For intermediate rivalry, the probability of the event occurring increases from 0.179 without alliances to 0.291 when alliances are observed.

War, Rivalry, and Power Politics

Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that war is likely if the rival dyad experiences foreign policy foreign practices during an early stage. For this analysis, the dependent variable turns to war. I have argued that an important advancement in the study of rivalry is its focus on recurring conflict and not war. This is not to suggest that war should not be studied or that it is not useful to empirically analyze the conditions of war. Here, I suggest that if power politics practices are used early, war is likely to occur. This implies that those rivalry dyads that rely on power politics tactics are more likely to experience war. Escalation towards deadly conflict is more likely to occur when early alliances and

arms races are observed. If the opposing hypothesis were true (that early alliances and arms races were associated with peace), the theoretical foundations of this project would be of little use. The conditions of power politics practices in rivalry would tell us little about the dynamics of violent conflict. It is important to empirically test the proposition that power politics moves lead to rivalry, and then suggest that they also lead to war. If this finding were not empirically accurate, there is little need to study rivalry and power politics since violent conflict would be unlikely to result.

Table 16
Power Politics Rivalry and War
Coefficient Estimates, Logit Model for War

	Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Early Alliance	.348	.203	.086
Early Arms Race	1.23	.206	.000
25% Terr	1.63	.146	.000
Constant	-2.72	.211	.000

N = 1515
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -628.87

Predicted Probabilities for War

	War
Early Alliance = 0 + Early Arms Race =0	0.106
Early Alliance = 1 + Early Arms Race =1	0.367
Difference	0.261

Table 16 presents the results for hypothesis four. Using a rivalry stages research design (1515 cases), I find that the formation of early alliances and participation in early

military buildups are both factors associated with war. Using a logit analysis where war is the dependent variable, the coefficient for early alliances is .348. The pvalue is 0.086, thus not meeting the standard criteria of being below 0.05, but still within reason at <0.10.

Mutual military buildups also exhibit a positive coefficient at 1.23 with a pvalue of 0.00. As a control variable, I also added territorial conflict into the analysis. If the dyad identifies at least twenty five percent of its disputes as territorial in nature, it is likely to experience war. The coefficient is 1.63 and statistically significant.

Predicted probabilities are the easiest way to interpret this model. If there are no early arms races or early alliances (there might be late arms races or alliances), the probability of war occurring in a dyad that experiences a militarized interstate dispute is 0.106. If the dyad experiences an early alliance and early arms race, the probability of war is 0.367, a difference of positive 0.261.

Rivalry Plots and Timing of Events

In an effort to better understand the dynamics of rivalries and the events during their lifetime, it might be useful to look at a few lifetime plots of rivalry events. Each plot here details the events during the life of a major-major enduring rivalry. Disputes are marked with lines that indicated their level of hostility (between five and zero). Alliances are indicated, along with the date and participants. Arms races are also indicated along with the date of their inception.

A potential issue for the data used in this project is the timing of individual alliances during a rivalry. Currently, the coding of alliance timing is dependent on the

programming of the dataset used in this analysis. This dataset can contain alliances formed previous to the rivalry, but also those alliances still in effect when the rivalry forms. It can also contain alliances that are renewed during the rivalry. When I previously coded the onset of alliances and arms races by hand, the majority of the cases experience alliance formation after the first dispute. I did not think it was important to distinguish between those alliances already formed and those newly formed after the rivalry since this action would eliminate quite a few important alliances. The onset of rivalry is arbitrary and is based on the date of a militarized dispute. Reconceptualizing the dataset would throw out some potentially important information. In an effort to alleviate any potential concerns about the timing of alliances, rivalry plots will be used to illustrate the events during the life of a rivalry.

Each rivalry plot takes an individual major-major enduring rivalry and plots out the duration of the rivalry.[64] Within each rivalry, it is noted when on the timeline the rivalry become a proto (dispute number 3) or enduring rivalry (dispute number 6). Taking the alliance dataset, each politically relevant alliance is plotted according to its initiation. Arms races are also plotted according to their initiation. These plots will help show the course of rivalry events in an easy to understand format.

United States and USSR (1947-1989)[65]

This rivalry in interesting because of the multiple alliances formed during its duration. Both states were actively engaging in power politics strategies. Early in the

[64] These rivalry plots were first constructed by the author for an early conference presentation. Hilde Ravlo was then hired by John Vasquez to complete plots for all 63 enduring rivals. The entire set of plots will be used for a future project in collaboration with Vasquez.
[65] Figures for this section are located in Appendix C.

rivalry, the USSR formed alliances with China, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. The United States also formed the NATO alliance prior and during the commencement of the proto-rivalry (dispute three).

Each state continuously formed and reformed alliances during the rivalry. There is a marked increased in alliances between the proto and enduring stage, suggesting that these alliances may have been important factors in pushing this rivalry to the forefront of each state's foreign policy planning. By the initiation of the enduring rivalry (1955), each state had alliances arrayed against each other to prepare for possible conflict. Issues such as the post World War II management of Europe and Berlin may have been the most important events for the rivalry, but the continuos use of alliances is also a clear factor when time plots are viewed.

As far as arms races go, this rivalry follows the typical pattern. The arms races do not come early, but then again, do not exactly come late in the life of the rivalry (baring any nuclear arms race). Here, there are two arms races in 1953 and 1955, before and during the sixth dispute and the onset of the enduring rivalry. The arms races seem to be a significant factor driving these states to rivalry, not a symptom of an advanced rivalry.

The Untied States and China (1949-1974)

Early in the rivalry, the United States signed significant alliance pacts that are relevant to the Asian region. The NATO alliance is formed during and around the first disputes with China. After a series of three disputes in a short period of time, the United States also formed alliances with the Philippines and Australia in 1951 and Japan in 1952 as well as South Korea in 1953. The United States also signed a defense pact with the

Republic of China in 1954; Taiwan was China's main rival. China also formed a few relevant alliances late in the rivalry, but the state does take the typical Asian course of little alliance involvement.

Between the onset of proto rivalry and enduring rivalry, the United States and China engaged in two arms races in 1951 and 1953. In total, this rivalry fits the steps to rivalry theory quite closely. It must also be remembered that this rivalry is deeply coupled with the USSR and United States rivalry. Events in that rivalry are linked to the United States and China rivalry.

United Kingdom and Germany (Prussia) (1887-1922)

This rivalry began with a short burst of disputes around 1887. Three disputes quickly drove this rivalry to the proto rivalry stage. Early, there are alliances evident in the rivalry. In 1887, the United Kingdom signed an entente with Italy and Austria-Hungary, removing potential allies of Germany from any conflict with Britain. Germany also signed a non-aggression pact with Russia in 1887.

Through the life of this rivalry, there are multitudes of important alliances that are formed and reformed. Chapter 9, on the pre-World War I rivalries will detail these events in much greater detail.

There is an arms race around the onset of the enduring rivalry in 1919. An important naval rivalry began around the turn of the century and this event is not captured through the data. The significance of the naval arms race will be detailed in chapter 9.

United Kingdom and Russia (USSR) (1940-1985)

It is evident that the United Kingdom and Russian rivalry began with the constant formation and reformation of relevant rivalries. Immediately before and during the first few disputes in this rivalry, Russia allied with Germany, Finland, Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom itself. The rivalry lay dormant for a few years while the two sides were allied to each other during World War II. Once the war was over, the rivalry began anew and once again was punctuated by alliance commitments. Most importantly, the United Kingdom joined the NATO alliance in 1949.

The USSR formed the Warsaw pact in 1955, a little after the start of the enduring rivalry. Two arms races are also identified in 1953 and 1955. While World War II clearly delayed the onset of an intense rivalry between these states, the relationship has always been characterized by power politics moves.

Russia (USSR) and Japan (1895-1984)

The Russian and Japanese rivalry is another rivalry that is punctuated by early power politics moves. Both Russia and Japan formed relevant alliances around and after the first dispute. In 1894, Japan signed a defense pact with Korea and Russia signed a defense pact with China in 1896. Up to and after the Russo-Japanese war, there are quite a few relevant alliances formed. These all take place before the onset of the enduring rivalry stage.

As far as arms races go, there are quite a few late in the life of the rivalry. There are five arms races between 1935 and 1941. There are also three arms races between 1963 and 1969. While the arms races are not power politics events that came early in the

life of this rivalry, they did help the rivalry become long standing, the longest in the Diehl and Goertz (2000) dataset.

Russia (USSR) and China (1862-1986)

The Russian and Chinese rivalry is another long-standing Asian rivalry that does not follow the typical power politics path. Although there are numerous relevant alliances observed during the life of the rivalry, none are observed before the proto rivalry stage. There are quite a few alliances formed between the proto and enduring stage, suggesting that these events could help drive the rivalry to its enduring stage. It should be noted that China, like most Asian states, did not rely on alliance politics to dictate foreign policy decisions. China did not see a marked increase in alliance formation until the rise of Communist China after 1949.

In this dyad, there is one arms race in 1962, very late in the rivalry. It likely this event did not drive the rivalry to become long standing and most likely represents the direct preparation for war between the states.

Germany and Italy (1914-1943)

Germany and Italy, although frequently allied to each other, did have a long-standing rivalry. Very early in the rivalry, there are numerous power politics events. Both nations were active in the alliance dynamics before the outbreak of World War I. Germany allied to Austria-Hungary and other regional powers. Italy sided with the allied powers in World War I because it could not side with Austria during the war (see Chapter 9 for details).

The two states also participated in two arms races in 1914 and 1915. Alliances and arms races in this dyad both seem to drive the ongoing rivalry and constrain the choices and strategic alignments each side could take against each other. While not exactly bitter enemies, they did have long-standing issues at stake and did not find themselves on the same side until World War II.

France and Germany (Prussia) (1830-1887)

Early in this rivalry, both sides formed relevant alliances to deal with the real security threat each posed to the other. Germany allied with Austria and Russia in 1832. France allied with Spain, Portugal, and the Untied Kingdom in 1833. Both of these events can be seen as direct reactions to the first few disputes in this rivalry. During the rivalry's lifetime, there are numerous relevant alliances observed. It is also important to note that during the start of the enduring rivalry stage (dispute six); there was an arms race.

The rivalry between France and Germany (also known as Prussia during this time) is one of the best examples of a long-standing enduring rivalry. This rivalry experienced many wars during its duration and was not settled until the outstanding territorial issues between the two states were finally resolved after World War II. Looking at this rivalry plot, it is evident that each side was continuously seeking to revise and enhance its security posture the face of the threat of its rival. Neither side was content to keep existing alliance alignments and continuously swapped partners in response to the ongoing security environment of Europe during the time.

France and Germany (1911-1944)

This rivalry lay dormant for twenty-four years before starting up again before World War I. Like most rivals, these states were born fighting. Each side engaged in alliance formation moves early in the life of the rivalry. France allied with the United Kingdom, Italy and Russia. Germany allied with Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria before the onset of the proto rivalry stage.

This rivalry experiences one of the few early arms races (before the proto rivalry stage) in 1914. This was primarily a result of the impending war in Europe. They also experienced an arms race in 1936. Perhaps most significantly, the two nations were participating in an ongoing land arms race during the rivalry's lifetime. Each military continuously revamped their plans and strategy in the face of their rival. This also meant the revision of force structure plans that had a direct influence on the course of the rivalry (see Chapter 9).

China and Japan (1873-1958)

This rivalry represents the outlier for the typical pattern of rivalry development, at least for major-major status enduring rivals. There are no alliances or arms race early in the life of the rivalry. What this rivalry does show is the typical power politics strategies of Asian regional nations. There is a marked nonuse of alliance commitments for all Asian nations until after World War II. Around that time, and the 1930's, this rivalry showed an increase in the use of power politics. There are repeated arms races in 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1941. There are also repeated and shifting alliance commitments after this time. It is clear that this rivalry did not need to use or rely on power politics to

push the rivalry to the proto or enduring stage. This rivalry must be studied to find out why this case is such an outlier when compared to other enduring rivals.

United Kingdom and Russia (1876-1923)

During this rivalry, both sides formed relevant alliances before the onset of the proto rivalry stage. The United Kingdom allied with Turkey in 1877. Russia also allied with Austria in 1877. There is also evidence of constant alliance reshaping and formation before the onset of the enduring rivalry stage. Neither side was able to settle their issues until the end of World War I. Even then, the rivalry restarted again during the Cold War.

Assessment of Rivalry Plots

It is hoped that these rivalry time plots show an illustrative relationship between rival states. This type of relationship is hard to identify with descriptive data. Here, we can see the timing of the onset of the rivalry along with when power politics moves are made. It is clear that most power politics moves are made early in the life of the rivalry. This mainly holds for alliance developments. Arms races follow the typical pattern of late development, but only late in that they tend to happen around the onset of enduring rivalry. These plots show that arms races happen during the advanced stages of a rivalry, but not near the end. It is possible that these arms races, while not driving the onset of rivalry, are important factors that makes rivalries endure and more fully developed.

Another important aspect of these plots is that they describe the evolutionary nature of rivalries. Here, partners shift and balance according to international events. The rivalries do not develop in isolation, but are influenced by the events in their

surrounding neighborhoods and the greater international system at large. While alliances may help a rivalry lock-in early, the alliances themselves are not locked-in and continuously shift during the rivalry a long-standing conflict.

To keep information to a manageable size, only major-major status enduring rivalries are analyzed here. Plots were generated for all enduring rivalries and these do not differ from the major-major rivalry plots presented here. The major-major rivalries are only used as a baseline since there are more ongoing events during their lifetime, making it easier to see and describe the rivalry timeline. Other rival pairs do not deviate and rivalry plots for all enduring rivals will be used in a later project.

Assessment

One factor I have investigated is politically relevant alliances. Those pairs of states participating in politically relevant alliances at an early phase pose an increased likelihood of rivalry involvement. This relationship does not change if the process-stage type model is used. Moreover, using a process-stage model presents a much tougher test for my hypothesis in that timing is now relevant for any data analysis. It does seem clear that alliances are both a probabilistic necessary and sufficient condition of rivalry development, no matter which research design is employed to investigate the question.

It is now clear that politically relevant alliances occur early in the life of rivalry. Prior to or during the first two disputes, it is likely that a proto or enduring rivalry dyad used alliances to bolster their security. This usually results in the formation and development of rivalry itself. Any attempt to increase a state's security early in its life usually results in a perceived decrease in security for the opposing side. The realpolitik

process these events trigger becomes the causal mechanism for the development of rivalry.

This analysis also shows that rivalry becomes more likely if states become involved in military buildups, even when employing a stages research design. The probability of proto and enduring rivalry occurring increases when mutual military buildups are present.

I also observed that the timing of military buildups varies. There is no consistent pattern like that observed in the timing of politically relevant alliances. In all likelihood, military buildups occur late in the life of a rivalry. The existence of a military buildup signals that a pair of states is involved in an enduring rivalry. If a military buildup occurs at the isolated conflict stage, the dyad is likely to engage in war and end any potential rivalry. Mutual military buildups therefore do not create rivalries, but they are signs that a rivalry is forming or has already formed. They are also strong factors in the relationship between disputes and escalation to war (Sample 1996; 2002).

Mutual military buildups clearly do not occur only in the context of rivalry as some suggest (Diehl and Crescenzi 1998). There are 45 cases of mutual military buildups during the early rivalry stage, and twenty-four of these led directly to war, thus ending the rivalry. Twenty-one of these cases do not lead to war, and these cases need to be investigated in the future. One cannot assume that arms races will occur only during a rivalry relationship; rather, a significant number of mutual military buildups occur outside of rivalries. Restricting the domain of cases to rivalry limits the ability of arms race studies to truly explain the relationship between conflict and military buildups.

It is important to note that the findings to this point demonstrate that some aspects of the steps to war model can be applied to rival dyads. The findings here fail to falsify the initial hypotheses. Enduring rivals exhibit a similar path towards violent conflict when compared to war dyads. The results here are even stronger in that alliances become a quasi-necessary condition for rivalry development. There is also sufficient evidence to show that participation in alliances and mutual military buildups increases the probability of enduring and proto-rivalries.

The causes of war approach should not be abandoned in the study of rival dyads; rather, traditional causes of war findings can be applied to the evolution and escalation of rivalries. This relationship is strongest for enduring rival dyads. Alliances almost always exist in major state enduring rivalries. Alliance formation consequently serves as a probabilistic necessary condition for enduring rivalry.

It is also important to test the hypothesis on rivalry in the context of war occurrence. This entire empirical enterprise is of little value if it cannot predict the conditions under which violent conflict occurs. Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that the probability of an enduring rivalry is 0.59. Here the question is, if early alliances and early arms races are observed in a dyad, is that dyad more likely to experience war? This hypothesis appears to be empirically validated. The probability of war for dyads having early alliances and early arms races is 0.367. The probability of war is only 0.106 if the dyad does not have an early power politics move. This shows that dyads that use power politics are more likely to become rivals, and in turn become more likely to experience war.

Throughout the life (mainly early) of an enduring rivalry, both states will form politically relevant alliances and participate in mutual military buildups to counter the original threat. This finding is not meant to support a realist theory of international politics and potential for peace through balancing. The fact that states form alliances prior to and during the life of a rivalry is not a condition of peace, but a factor that leads to both war and rivalry (Vasquez 1993).

Conclusions, Caveats, and Future Research

Vasquez (1993) contends that the traditional realpolitik notions of foreign policy practice often lead to war, not peace. The original query of this project was to determine if proto and enduring rival dyads exhibit different foreign policy practices when confronted with an ongoing dispute. The use of power politics is associated with severe manifestations of both *war and rivalry*. This analysis suggests that certain practices of power politics, namely alliances, may be necessary conditions for setting off a pattern of recurring disputes that result in interstate rivalry.

It is also important to note that power politics foreign policy practices are used early in the life of a rivalry. Dyads that are enduring or proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances early. This behavior becomes a necessary condition of rivalry. It remains for in-depth case studies to be undertaken to show the causal path between initial disputes, alliance formation and escalation to the proto and enduring rival stages.

One criticism for which this data analysis might suffer is selection effects and omitted variable bias (King, Keohane et al. 1994,203; Lemke and Reed 2001). It is not

the goal of this analysis to determine which states have had MID, but which types of dyads repeatedly enter into MIDs with a specific party. The test here concerns which factors are necessary for conflict to recur in a dyad. Scholars (Bennett, Baker et al. 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2003) have also recently shown that selection effects concerns might not be as prevalent as previously thought. What is important is that the theory outlined here concerns what factors gives rise to repeated MIDs, not what makes those MIDs occur in the first place.

The findings here do not demonstrate a direct causal link between rivalry development and the presence of alliances and arms races, but show that there is a high probability that alliances will be observed in the most severe forms of rivalry. At this point I do not know why certain states choose to strategically interact with each other in the first place. This work, however, does show that once states engage in a militarized dispute, they are likely to develop into severe rivalries if they engage in power politics behavior.

It should also be noted that studies of rivalry should not be limited to the enduring rival dyads. To explain the development, maintenance, and termination of a rivalry, one must compare the enduring rivalry cases with rivals in the isolated and proto stages. It would also be beneficial to compare the results of the rival cases to all cases of international interactions (dyads without militarized disputes). Despite the need to compare rivalry cases to those cases without conflict, it still has not been shown that the results from analysis such as this will make an empirical difference. The selection effects (King, Keohane et al. 1994; Lemke and Reed 2001) argument should not be used to dismiss existing findings of the rivalry research program, but to spur on future research

that seeks to account for these possible alternative hypotheses. Future research should not merely select to inquire about the enduring rival cases, but attempt to explain the interactions between all forms of rivalry and conflict.

Despite these possible caveats, this analysis has found strong support for the hypothesis that proto and enduring rivalries will display different foreign policy practices than isolated conflicts. We also know that dyads that use power politics foreign policy practices early in a rivalry will be more likely to experience war.

CHAPTER VII

DISPUTE LINKAGES AND INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES: SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICT INVOVLMENT AND THE BASIC RIVALRY LEVEL

Introduction

The study of rivalry involves the conclusion that disputes, crises, and wars are not independent events, but are connected across *time and space*. What has been left out of the study of rivalry is how rivalries can be connected to each other. This event is what I call a rivalry linkage. In this chapter, I seek to explore and develop the theoretical and empirical implications of rivalry linkages. A dispute is linked to a rivalry if a party (state) outside the rivalry has a dispute with one member involved in a rivalry during the lifetime of that rivalry. The theory proposed here suggests that rivalry linkages lead to an increased severity of conflict (the basic rivalry level) within a rivalry.

For rivalry, relationships matter. The rise of the study of rivalry can be attributed to a focus on the history of relations between a pair of states. The currents and flows of diplomatic and military exchanges between a pair of states affect the duration and severity (basic rivalry level) of international rivalries.[66] What also affects the course of rival relations is the simultaneous conflictual relations one state may have with another state (outside the rivalry) during the life of a rivalry. The relations within a rivalry matter, but it is also important to look at the relationships forged outside of the rivalry and how those relations influence a rivalry's development.

[66] The basic rivalry level measures the severity of conflict within a conflictual dyad. It factors in the number of military deaths or the level of hostility for the dispute to determine the overall severity of conflict within a dyad.

The study of rivalry has left out how one rival my affect another rival. It is important to know how many other rivalries in which a state is involved during the life of a rivalry. Multiple rivalries may serve to de-intensify (decrease in conflict severity) a current rivalry by focusing the energy of a state away from a rival towards a new rising threat. Multiple rivalries may also serve to intensify a rivalry. Persistent conflict involvement may show a commitment to the use of force to solve international problems and show a form of determination to restrain a primary rivalry. The use of force is an attempt to use realpolitik notions of offense and military threats to manage international disputes. Once in one rivalry, states may then rely on force to settle issues with another dispute partner.

This chapter seeks to understand and explore how rival linkages could affect the development of interstate rivalries. Diehl and Goertz state, "we cannot ignore the impact of broader environment on these dyads (rivals)." (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 241) The concept of rivalry linkage captures a type of environmental influence on a rival dyad, or rivalry neighborhoods if you will. The central question of this study will be whether or not rivalry linkages serve to intensify or de-intensify a rivalry relationship. Here I argue that simultaneous conflicts lead to an intensification of the severity of conflict (as measured by the basic rivalry level) between rivalry dyads.

Relevant Literature

Rivalry is the study of recurring disputes and the influence of these disputes on ongoing conflict environment in the system. Disputes occur over long periods of time in a concentrated area between two states. Left unexplored is the connection between

different rivalries and the probability of escalation of linked rivalries. Chapter three outlined the state of knowledge regarding conflict linkages and the probability of escalation.

To shortly review, early studies of linkages (Rosenau 1969; Wilkenfeld 1973) were mainly concerned with how the domestic level can be linked with the international level in the exploration of the sources of conflict. Putnam (1988) suggests a two-level ratification game in operation for all international events. Namely, a leader must first consider the domestic level of support and then make a decision regarding an international event at the international level. This two-level game suggests a linkage between international and domestic politics.

Multiple actors in crises or disputes increase the probability of war and disputes (Cusack and Eberwein 1982; James 1988; Brecher 1993). However, very little is known about how disputes may be connected to each other. Multiple actors increase uncertainty in disputes, and multiple disputes may also increase uncertainty within a rivalry.

Both Huth (1996) and Hensel and Diehl (1994) find that the probability of a dispute decreases if one state is involved in another ongoing conflict. Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that linkage through a common foe or ally increases the severity of an enduring rivalry. I would suggest that these types of linkages are complex rivals that involve more than two states. The aspect of complex rivals needs to be explored in the future, but here I am concerned with linkages through simultaneous conflict involvement.

Looking at the United States-Soviet rivalry, Mitchell and Moore (2002) discover that disputes within the rivalry make it more likely that either state will use force against

other targets. The rivalry situation increases the probability of outside conflict involvement.

Very little other work has been done in context of a rivalry situation. Thompson (2003) and Vasquez (1996; 1998) both suggest that multiple rivalries are likely to lead to war, the most severe form of conflict. In this chapter, I investigate whether the severity of conflict (as measured by the basic rivalry level) within a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries. Finding that the severity of conflict increases when there are other ongoing rivalries suggests that the realist folklore dynamic is active in rivalries. While engaged in a rivalry, pairs of states that are rivals are more likely to use force and display their power capabilities when threatened by other states.

Rivalry Linkage Theory

In this chapter, the main dependent variable will be rivalry severity (or the basic rivalry level). This variable is taken from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding of the basic rivalry level. This indicator measures the severity of conflict for rivalry dyads. Rivalry severity increases according to the level of hostility in the MID (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996) and the number of military fatalities during conflict within the dyad. Diehl and Goertz (2000, 291) note, "Our first operational principle in constructing a severity measure from all disputes and wars is therefore this: if fatality levels are greater than zero, then the severity level is a function of those battle deaths. The second principle is that if the fatality level is zero, then the severity level is a function of the level-of hostility variable for the dispute." An index was created that takes the interval scores for the level

of hostility or fatalities. The values for the basic rivalry level indicator fall between one and a little over 200 for each particular dispute within a rivalry.

Previously (chapter three), I have suggested two competing hypotheses regarding the impact of rivalry linkages on the severity of conflict, or the basic rivalry level. The first hypothesis includes the rivalry weariness proposition. Multiple rivalries will serve to decrease the severity or basic rivalry level of a rivalry dyad. States can only focus on one enemy at a time. Multiple simultaneous rivalries should serve to de-intensify a conflict. The other opposing hypothesis entails the rivalry commitment hypothesis, and this theory is derived from a realist folklore standpoint dominant in this project. According to this theory, states use power and force to show commitment and deal with rivals. These states will show a willingness to use force when threatened, and showing commitment in the face of an enduring enemy will serve to intensify the severity within a rivalry.

Rivalry Weariness

Rivalry weariness theory suggests that no state can focus its attention on more than one enemy at a time. While the strategic doctrine of the United States has been focused on the ability to fight a two front war in areas such as Iraq and China, the reality of the proposition has been called into question. The current conflict in Iraq (Gulf War II) suggests that a state must commit all its forces to deal with any enemy. Lack of commitment to the current conflict would result in reduced force levels and decreased combat effectiveness during that two front wars often lead to spectacular defeat (World War I and II).

As Friedberg (1988) suggests, even a hegemon cannot overextend itself and deal with multiple enemies. Before 1900, Britain sought to settle its outstanding colonial (see chapter nine) conflicts and focus its efforts on the threat posed by Germany. This dynamic may be at work in all rivalries.

While the rivalry weariness theory serves as a persuasive explanation for the dynamics of multiple conflict involvement, it is mostly derived from an outlier example. The example posed by the British Empire and its collapse may not be at work for all pairs of states. Rather, it is likely that a larger realpolitik framework may exist. In this case, the rivalry commitment theory would suggest a persuasive explanation for the majority of rivalries and their linkage to ongoing conflict in other dyads.

Rivalry Commitment

The rivalry commitment theory suggests a course of action for states dealing with multiple rivals. As Rosecrance (1992) notes, the United States and Soviet rivalry was characterized by multiple simultaneous conflicts. The severity of conflict between the main rivals did not decline, but instead increased as each state engaged in other ongoing proxy conflicts in which they felt the need to engage. In this way, multiple conflicts serve to intensify a rivalry.

Commitment to the use of force is a realpolitik tactic that some states may feel compelled to use in order to prove creditability when pressed by multiple rivals. In a deterrence situation, the effectiveness of a state's defensive position relies on another state's perception of the commitment of that state to use force when threatened. It is then suggested that a state is willing and prepared to use weapons (even nuclear weapons)

when threatened by a rival. When a proxy conflict or simultaneous conflict is dealt with through force, the other ongoing conflict is not ignored, but dealt with in a forceful manner to deter the main rival. Multiple rivalry involvement can lead to the escalation of the severity of conflict within a rivalry when a state uses third party conflicts to show commitment towards its main rival. These proxy conflicts or rivalries do not divert the attention of the rival pair, but refocus it towards denying any sort of gain to a rival.

A realist explanation of rivalry would suggest that force should be used to preserve the peace. As we now know, however, the uses of force and power politics strategies are a step to war, not peace. This same dynamic exists in the dynamics of rivalry linkages. Multiple ongoing rivalries will increase the severity of conflict within a rivalry.

If support for the rivalry commitment proposition manifests, I would also suggest that the number of multiple rivalries will be a predictor of the type of rivalries in which pairs of states will become involved. The central theory in this project suggests that realpolitik bargaining tactics lead to an increased probability of either proto and enduring or strategic rivalries. If multiple rivalries are a sign of realpolitik tactics in operation for the foreign policy of states, it would follow that the number of rivalries will lead to severe rivalries (either enduring or strategic). The rivalry commitment proposition would ultimately imply to the proposition that multiple rivalries lead to certain types of rivalry relationships.

Hypotheses

To truly test any idea of a rivalry linkage, one must investigate instances when a state involved in a rivalry is concurrently involved in another rivalry or dispute. How does this type of conflict involvement influence and shape the course of rivalry relations?

As suggested by a rivalry linkage theory, two hypotheses that can result from rivalry linkages or simultaneous rivalries. The rivalry weariness theory would predict that the severity (as measured by the basic rivalry level) of a rivalry would go down as the number of simultaneous rivalries increases. States involved in a rivalry can only have a limited number of outside disputes (Thompson 2000). Dyads with a high average number of rivalries may be likely to have a lower rivalry severity level. The severity of conflict between a rival dyad will be negatively impacted by the number of simultaneous rivalries in which a rival dyad is involved during its lifetime.

Hypothesis 5.1 suggests rivalry commitment theory would reflect the true course of relations for rivalry dyads, and the rivalry commitment hypothesis would predict the severity of conflict between a rival pair would increase as the number of simultaneous rivalries increases. The idea is that principal rivals will show commitment and resolve to a rivalry partner through multiple, outside dispute involvements. This will have either no impact or will result in an increase in the severity of conflict between the rivals.

H5.1: The severity level of a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in a rival dyad.

Hypothesis 5.2 suggests that the probability of a Thompson (2001) strategic rivalry will also increase according to the number rivalry linkages in which the dyad is engaged during the rivalry. The coding of the basic rivalry level variable is consistent

only with the Diehl and Goertz (2000) rivalry dataset. Here the prediction is that dyads will likely be involved in strategic rivalries if they are involved in multiple simultaneous disputes.[67] Strategic rivalries include pairs of states who have a long-standing historical animosity towards each other and recognize the other side as a threat. This coding of rivalry is not dependent on the militarized nature of rivalry conflict, but on the mutual recognition of each state as a rival.

H5.2: The probability of strategic rivalry increases according to the number simultaneous disputes a dyad is engaged in.

Hypothesis 5.3 would then follow that any finding showing an increase in the basic rivalry level would increase according to the number of simultaneous rivalries a dyad is involved. It then becomes likely that pairs of states become proto and enduring rivalries as the number of simultaneous disputes observed in a dyad increases. Here the dependent variable is the rivalry type outcome. If the severity level of a rivalry decreases according to the number of simultaneous disputes, it would prove likely that pairs of states with multiple simultaneous disputes would be involved in isolated conflicts.

H5.3: The probability of proto and enduring rivalry involvement increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in the dyad.

Research Design

For this analysis, Diehl and Goertz's (2000) rivalry dataset is used to identify rivalries.[68] Each rivalry is taken as a unique case, so there are 1166 rivalries in the dataset. A rivalry is linked if one state in the rivalry has a dispute or rivalry with another state at the same time as the original rivalry. This study will explore linkage relationships

[67] Strategic rivalries are not principle rivalries, only rivalries where each state recognizes the other as a rival.
[68] The dataset can be obtained at http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/faculty/Diehl/diehl3lnk.htm.

for all types of rivalry.[69] A new variable was created called rivalry linkage if either state A or B in a rivalry had another dispute with any other third party during the life of the rivalry. These third party disputes are unique rivalry cases as taken from the Diehl and Goertz (2000) rivalry dataset with 1166 unique dyad observations. Each time any state involved in a rivalry dyad engaged in another dispute with an outside party during the life of the rivalry, that new dispute was counted as a linked rivalry. These linked conflicts can include isolated conflicts or proto and enduring rivalries. It makes no theoretical difference which type of rivalry (proto or enduring) in which a state becomes involved, only that it participates in multiple disputes at one time.

Rivalry severity (BRL or Basic Rivalry Level) is used as a variable to determine the severity of conflict within the rivalry. The hypothesis presented here (hypothesis 5.1) suggests that the severity level of a rivalry will increase according to the number of rivalry linkages observed. Severity is measured according to level of hostility or number of deaths in the militarized disputes contained in the rivalry, and the measure is based on a scale of 0-200.[70]

Territorial disputes are known to increase the probability of disputes and wars.[71] Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) and Valeriano (2002) have shown that the probability of rivalry increases when the disputes within a rivalry are dominated by territorial revisionist claims. Here I use a dummy variable (1=yes) when the modal type of dispute within a dyad is of a territorial nature. I also use a dummy variable for contiguity to ensure that disputes between neighbors are not driving the findings in this analysis. The severity of conflict within a rivalry may be predicted by the location of the rivalry. It

[69] Diehl and Goertz (2000) explore linkage relationships for enduring rivalries.
[70] See Diehl and Goertz (2000), appendix B for details on this measure.

may be that the location of disputes drives the level of hostility within dispute; it would thus be important to control for that factor.

Results

To first test hypothesis 5.1, I produce simple statistics describing the relationship between simultaneous rivalry involvement and rivalry types. I then use a regression analysis to test the impact of rivalry linkages on the basic rivalry level of a dyad, with control variables for contiguity and territorial disputes.

If it is true that states with multiple conflicts are not involved in strategic or proto and enduring rivalries, testing should show little evidence of multiple international enemies at one time according to rivalry type. The opposing argument is more likely to be true, especially if states use power politics to solve initial disputes. States that fight in multiple simultaneous conflicts are then more likely to become strategic or proto and enduring rivals, as describe in hypothesis 5.2 and 5.3.

We know very little about the characteristics of rivals with outside dispute involvement. A few summary statistics might serve to better underscore the relationship between rivalry and simultaneous conflict involvement disputes.

[71] See Vasquez (1993) for theory.

Table 17
Summary Statistics for Rivalry Linkages Variable
Number of Rivalry Linkages

For All Rivalry types	**1166 Obs.**
Mean	13.99
Std. Dev.	15.07
Min = 0	Max = 129

For Isolated Conflict	**880 Obs.**
Mean	10.66
Std. Dev.	9.65
Min = 0	Max = 61

For Proto Rivalries	**223 Obs.**
Mean	19.64
Std. Dev.	16.02
Min = 0	Max = 79

For Enduring Rivalries	**63 Obs.**
Mean	40.46
Std. Dev.	32.27
Min = 3	Max = 129

The mean number of simultaneous rivalries for all possible rival dyads is 13.99 (see Table 17). The standard deviation is 15.07. It seems that all rivalries have a fairly high number of linked rivalries or disputes. For isolated conflicts, the mean number is 10.66. Here some isolated conflicts have zero linked rivalries, and others have up to 61 linked rivalries. For proto rivalries, the mean number of linked rivalries is 19.64 and the standard deviation is 16.02. The maximum number of linked rivalries for this category is slightly higher at 79 when compared to the 61 maximum number of linked rivals for linked isolated conflicts. Enduring rivalries average a significantly higher amount of linked conflict, primarily due to their longer lifespan. Each enduring rivalry must last at

least 20 years, allowing states involved in enduring rivalries to accumulate a high number of simultaneous rivalries and disputes. Here the mean is 40.46 and the standard deviation is 32.27. The minimum number of linked rivalries is three and the maximum is 129.[72]

Table 18
Regression Estimates for Basic Rivalry Level and Rivalry Linkages

	Coef.	**Std. Err.**	**Pvalue**
Linkages	1.28	.104	0.000
Territorial Disputes	48.79	3.34	0.000
Contiguity	6.609	3.49	0.59
Constant	66.04	2.71	0.000

Dependent variable is rivalry severity level or BRL
Obs = 1166 (represents unique rivalry dyads)
$R^2 = 0.22$

The next step is to run a regression model that will analyze the relationship between the number of simultaneous rivalries within a rivalry and the basic rivalry severity level, hypothesis 5.1. Table 18 shows that the coefficient for rivalry linkage is positive and statistically significant. As the number of rivalry linkages increases, the basic rivalry level within the dyad increases.

The results for the variables of contiguity and territorial disputes are all positive. Territorial disputes are statistically significant, but contiguity lacks statistical significance at 0.59. Contiguity has a positive impact on the rivalry severity level, but it can not be verified that the impact is not a random relationship. The standard errors for these variables are rather large, but the standard error for the rivalry linkage variable is within reason at 0.104. The R squared for this relationship is 0.22, which is quite impressive since other factors (such as power differentials and regime type) that could influence the

[72] Maximum value is for the rivalry between Germany and Italy during World War II.

relationship not examined at this time.[73] This finding would suggest that rivalry linkages and territorial disputes have a meaningful impact on the basic rivalry level, whereas contiguity does not. Pairs of states that have multiple disputes and territorial issues at stake within a rivalry will become severe rivalries (as measured by the basic rivalry level).

Table 19
Rivalry Linkages and Strategic Rivalry
Coefficient Estimates, Logit Model for probability of Strategic Rivalry

	Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Linkages	0.026	.005	0.000
Contiguity	1.03	.169	0.000
Territorial Disputes	.749	.165	0.000
Constant	-2.39	.149	0.000

N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -504.642

Predicted Probabilities for Thompson Rivalry

	No Rivalry	**Strategic Rivalry**
Linkages = 0 + Cont = 0	0.9188	0.0812
Linkages = 1 + Cont = 1	0.8020	0.1980
Linkages = 10 + Cont = 1	0.7618	0.2382
Difference between 0 and 10	-0.157	+0.157

Table 19 presents the results for rivalry linkages according to Thompson's (2001) strategic rivalries, hypothesis 5.2. Here the dependent variable is not the basic rivalry level, but whether or not a dyad is engaged in a rivalry where each side perceives the

[73] I do not think it is appropriate to examine a meta-type model in such an early investigation of a relationship. This will only serve to drive up the R squared value and not advance knowledge about rivalry relationships.

other side as a rival. A logit analysis was utilized since the dependent variable is a categorical value between zero and one.

The coefficients for rivalry linkages, contiguity, and territorial disputes are all positive and statistically significant, meaning that linkages, location, and the type of issue have an important and significant impact of the probability of strategic rivalry. Looking at the predicted probabilities, if rivalry linkages are present along with contiguity, the probability of a strategic rivalry is 0.1980. If the values are set to zero, the probability of strategic rivalry is 0.0812. It is unlikely that any rival will have only one linkage, so if the rivalry has, for example, ten rivalry linkages and is contiguous, the probability of a strategic rivalry is 0.2382. The difference between having no linkages and at least ten linkages is 0.157.

Table 20

Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type and Rivalry Linkages

Dependent Variable is either Isolated Conflict, Proto Rivalry, or Enduring Rivalry

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coef.	S.E.	P>|z|	Coef.	S.E.	P>|z|
Linkages	0.055	.007	0.000	0.095	.008	0.000
BRL	0.011	.001	0.000	0.019	.002	0.000
Territorial Disputes	-0.861	.213	0.000	-0.808	.361	0.025
Contiguity	0.595	.181	0.001	1.42	.345	0.000
Constant	-3.36	.203	0.000	-7.29	.512	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category, robust standard errors

N = 1166

Log likelihood = -640.399

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
Linkages	1.056	0.000	1.099	0.000
BRL	1.011	0.000	1.02	0.000
Territorial Disputes	0.422	0.000	0.445	0.025
Contiguity	1.81	0.001	4.16	0.000

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Linkages = 0	0.901	0.093	0.0057
Linkages = 1	0.896	0.097	0.0063
Linkages = 10	0.836	0.149	0.0138
Difference	-0.065	+0.056	+0.008

Difference measures the different between linkages=0 and linkages=10

Table 20 estimates the ability of rivalry linkages to influence the probability of different rivalry types (isolated conflict, proto, and enduring rivalry) occurring, hypothesis 5.3. Here the dependent variable takes the values of one (isolated conflict) through three (enduring rivalry). The easiest way to interpret multinomial logit coefficients is through relative risk ratios. Relative risk ratios compare the probability of each outcome to the base category, which is isolated conflict (Gould 2000).

Table 20 shows that the risk ratio of a proto-rivalry is 1.056 with rivalry linkages present, as compared to isolated conflict outcome. It also shows that the risk ratio of enduring rivalry is 1.09 when compared to isolated conflict. Clearly, the risk of proto and enduring rivalry increases as the number of rivalry linkages increases, but the effect is not dramatic.

Predicted probabilities were also calculated for the model. During the isolated conflict stage, rivalry linkages decrease the probability of an isolated conflict occurring by 0.065 if the difference is taken between the value of zero and ten for the number of simultaneous rivalries. During the proto rivalry stage, a positive observation of rivalry linkages increases the probability of proto-rivalry in the dyad by 0.056. The enduring stage also shows a positive probability when there are at least ten rivalry linkages present. The probability increases from 0.0057 to 0.0138 (a difference of 0.008).

Table 21
Truncated Regression Estimates for BRL and Rivalry Linkages

	Coef.	**Std. Err.**	**Pvalue**
Linkages	7.20	1.99	0.000
Territorial Disputes	220.5	59.97	0.000
Contiguity	37.14	20.29	0.067
Constant	-102.1	56.61	0.071

Dependent variable is BRL
Obs = 1166 (represents unique rivalry dyads)
Log likelihood = -6107.80
No R^2 reported in Truncated Regression

Table 21 presents a different test of proposition 5.1 to ensure that the bound values of the dependent variable do not impact the direction of the results. Since the values for the basic rivalry level measure are truncated between 0 and 215, running a standard linear regression might produce inconsistent parameter estimates. Due to this possible concern, a truncated regression model is also run, which binds values between 0 and 215, as seen in Table 21.

The coefficients for this analysis do not change the direction of the findings, but they do become larger. Here the coefficient for rivalry linkage involvement is 7.20, which is positive and statistically significant. The relationship between the dependent variable and the control variable remains positive, similar to the results presented in table 18.[74]

[74] I also ran the analysis truncated the severity dependent variable between the values of 100 and 200. A value of over 100 represents cases where fatalities were evident. The results do not dramatically change for the analysis of the rivalry linkage variable when considering only those disputes with fatalities.

Table 22
Valeriano vs. Diehl and Goertz: Regression Estimates for Basic Rivalry Level

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Pvalue
Linkages	0.317	0.150	0.040
Territorial Disputes	14.50	9.13	0.118
Contiguity	-20.34	10.21	0.051
Constant	151.32	9.88	0.000

Dependent variable is basic rivalry level
Obs = 63
$R^2 = 0.21$

Diehl and Goertz Results (2000: page 258, Table 12.5)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Pvalue
Ally	0.49	0.46	0.30
Common Disputes	1.70	0.81	0.04
Common Foe	-4.03	2.82	0.16
Contiguity	1.33	0.77	0.09
Constant	67.56	6.23	0.001

Dependent variable is basic rivalry level
Obs = 63
$R^2 = 0.27$

In summary, for rivalry linkages, hypothesis 5.1 cannot be falsified (table 18). As a potential rival dyad experiences external conflict, the severity of the rivalry will increase. The probability of strategic rivalry (hypothesis 5.2) or proto and enduring rivalry (hypothesis 5.3) occurrence also increases as the number rivalry linkages observed increases.

It might also be useful to compare the results gathered using the rivalry linkage variable to Diehl and Goertz's (2000) results for a different test of rivalry linkages. As reflected in table 12.5 (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 258), the basic rivalry level increases for the variables of linked alliances, common dispute, common foe, and contiguity. For the

common foe variable, the correlation is negative in that common enemies decrease the severity of conflict between a rival dyad.

Analyzing the rivalry linkage variable on only the 63 enduring rivalry cases Diehl and Goertz use, the basic rivalry level also increases as the number of rivalry linkages increases (see Table 22). The coefficient is 0.317, which is similar to the coefficient of 0.49 that Diehl and Goertz conclude for common alliance ties, their version of rivalry linkages. In this regression, the rivalry linkage variable (as well as contiguity) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level; which is impressive since there are only 63 cases in this analysis. In the Diehl and Goertz table, the common dispute variable is significant. In my analysis, I find that the basic rivalry level in enduring rivalries increases as rivalry linkages (as measured by simultaneous disputes) are observed.

Assessment

In this analysis, an increase in the number rivalry linkages predicts an increase in the basic rivalry level within a rivalry dyad. The regression model shows that simultaneous rivalries positively affect the severity variable (basic rivalry level). Hypothesis 5.1 cannot be falsified at this point (table 18). An increase in the number of rivalry linkages shows that the basic rivalry level increases for a rivalry dyad. States are either using force in disputes to show a commitment to prevent an aggressor, or engaging in power politics behavior.

Hypothesis 5.2 suggests that the number of rivalry linkages should positively influence the probability of strategic rivalry occurrence. Hypothesis 5.2 also cannot be

falsified, as seen in Table 19. An increase in the number of rivalry linkages increases the probability of strategic rivalry.

Hypothesis 5.3 predicts that the probability of proto and enduring rivalry should increase according to the number of rivalry linkages observed. The multinomial logit model (Table 20) shows that the probability of proto and enduring rivalry increases as rivalry linkages are observed. Hypothesis 5.3 also cannot be falsified.

The theory would suggest that the rival states are showing either resolve in the face of a primary rival or that the rivals are expressing commitment and credibility to attempt to deter the opposing rival. These types of actions lead to escalation of conflict within rivalries. Repeated outside conflict involvement for rivals does not lead to decrease in hostilities, but an increase.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have found that as the number of rivalry linkages increase, the severity of conflict (as measured by the basic rivalry level) within a rival dyad increases. This finding supports the rivalry commitment hypothesis. These results suggest that outside military ventures could be used to enhance credibility and resolve between a principal rivalry. Multiple conflict involvement at the same time represents the state's willingness to use force when confronted with challenges to important issues. It shows a commitment to use realpolitik tactics when confronted by rivals. The states that use power politics tactics are more likely to become involved in rivalries; in fact, they are likely to become involved in several rivalries at the same time. To further test this hypothesis and put these results in context, case studies need to be conducted on a large

sample of rivalries. Chapter nine, addressing the pre-World War I rivalries, will show how rivalry linkages can influence the severity of conflict within a rivalry. As the rivals in the system become linked through simultaneous dispute involvement, alliance ties, and arms races, the severity of the conflict between rivals increases.

The results of this study represent just a fraction of what can be done with a simultaneous rivalry variable. According to the analysis conducted here, I do not know how time itself affects the basic rivalry level within rivals. A dyad year study of simultaneous rivalries would be a useful pursuit in the future, but only with the use of a continuous variable that measures the severity of conflict through time. However, no such existing variable can be used at this time. The basic rivalry level variable used here only has observations when a dispute arises. To test the impact of rivalry linkages through time, one would need a dyad year variable that measures severity.

Vasquez (1983; 1993) suggests that conflict linkage across issues would increase the severity of conflict within the dyad. Simultaneous rivalry involvement might also capture this type of issue linkage. An exploration of this query will have to be done in the future.

In regard to conflict management and policy, I would give the same advice as Diehl and Goertz (2000); explicitly, states should decrease the number of simultaneous rivalries in which they are concurrently involved. Simultaneous disputes show a willingness to use force and may be an eventual permissive cause leading to war. Persistent use of force creates a dangerous situation locally and internationally. War should be avoided at all costs, and a decrease in the involvement in rivalries is one way to accomplish this goal.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROCESS OF RIVALRY DEVELOPMENT: A COMPLETE RIVALRY MODEL

Introduction

This chapter will provide a conclusion for the large-N data analysis in this project. Here, I reevaluate all the previous empirical findings in order to depict the process of rivalry development through the use of a combined probability model. I combine the effects of each independent variable (politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups) and add some tests for new independent variables (territorial disputes and nuclear weapons) to determine which pairs of states are more likely to become rivals.

The steps to rivalry theory presented in chapter three suggests that the path to rivalry is a series of steps taken by a pair of states. These steps usually take the form of power politics foreign policy strategies. Furthermore, politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups increase the likelihood that a rivalry will develop. Territorial disputes and nuclear weapons are also introduced as other types of power politics strategies increasing the probability of rivalry.

In testing the steps to rivalry theory, I seek to examine and explain the additive impact of each factor on the process of rivalry development; each step taken will combine to increase the probability of rivalry occurrence. Once a pair of states participates in a few of these steps, that pair will become more likely to participate in strategic or enduring and proto rivalries. At the end of this chapter I present the most likely paths to rivalry. The analysis presented here suggests that pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances, participate in military buildups, fight in territorial disputes, are major powers,

and posses nuclear weapons are likely to become enduring and proto rivals. This finding represents the most likely road to rivalry.

Hypotheses

It is first useful to revisit the first set of hypotheses in this work. I show in chapter 5 and 6 that mutual military buildups and politically relevant alliances are probabilistically sufficient conditions for the development of rivalry. Each of these factors increases the likelihood that a rivalry will occur, given the conditions. This chapter presents an additive model of this claim.

H1.1: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
H1.2: Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

In this additive model, I add a new set of hypotheses relating to territorial disputes. As stated previously in chapters two and three, territorial disputes increase the probability of rivalry occurrence. In this chapter, I retest this proposition, adding a territorial dispute variable to my model. Hypothesis seven suggests that territorial disputes are probabilistic sufficient conditions for rivalry.

H7: Pairs of states that experience militarized conflict over a significant number of territorial disputes are more likely to experience rivalry.

In this analysis a significant number of territorial disputes is represented through the use of a territorial issue dominance variable. Vasquez and Leskiw (Leskiw 2001; Vasquez and Leskiw 2001) and Vasquez and Henehan (2001) developed a new variable called issue dominance to account for the issues over which states fight in recurrent conflicts. An issue dominance measure allows one to code which type of issue over which states fought in a majority of the disputes comprising a rivalry. This issue

dominance variable will be applied to the test of the steps to rivalry model. The probability of rivalry occurrence should increase when the disputes in a dyad are dominated by territorial revisionist claims.

There are two different measures that can be used to determine the dominance of territorial disputes in a given relationship. The first measure is coded as positive (one) if 25% of the MIDs in a dyad are over territorial revisionist issues. A second issue dominance measure is coded as positive (one) if the modal number MIDs between the dyad are focused on territorial revisionist claims.

The twenty-five percent territory variable will be relied on for most of the models because this variable fits with the theory more closely than the modal variable. Rivals that have a significant amount of territorial conflict (at least twenty-five percent) captures the initial source of conflict for the dyad and allows the states in dispute to fight over many different issues during the life of that rivalry. Territory alone cannot drive the movement towards severe rivalry, but it does help the dyad along the path to rivalry.

H8: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

Hypothesis eight presents the additive sufficient prediction hypothesis. In combination, the factors of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, and territorial disputes are more likely to lead to dangerous (enduring or proto rivals, and strategic rivals) rivals. Chapter ten will present a “fuzzy test” of this theory with the same variables, but confined to enduring rivals. A fuzzy set test of this hypothesis serves as a better way to test an interactive model among a medium number of cases (usually less than 100) with binary variables.

H9: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, and posses nuclear weapons are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

Hypothesis nine presents an additional test of this additive model. Nuclear weapons represent both offensive and defensive weapons meant to ensure the security of the state that posses them. Like alliances and military buildups, I believe that possession of nuclear weapons by a state does not encourage security, but rather promotes rivalry. States that obtain nuclear weapons, a negative power politics tactic, should be more likely to use force against those states with which they are in dispute. This development will lead to the formation of dangerous rivalries. Hypothesis nine tests this prediction and adds nuclear weapons as a factor in the additive model of rivalry development.

Chapter four discussed the research design choices for this chapter. In testing the additive sufficient conditions of rivalry, I rely on both bivariate statistics and multinomial logit modeling to determine the impact of each independent variable on the outcome. The first main independent variables in this chapter are politically relevant alliances which are taken from the work of Senese and Vasquez (2001; 2003). In their data, alliances are relevant if they include a major power or a state from the same region as the dyad under question. Alliance information is taken from correlates of war alliance version 3.0 (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). Mutual military buildups are taken from Sample's (1996; 2002) data that includes both major and minor power mutual military buildups.

The main dependent variable in this analysis is taken from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding of rivalry. Diehl and Goertz distinguish which pairs of states are the most

dangerous rivals, enduring rivals, which have had at least six disputes over a twenty-year period and who do not have any long standing enmity directed toward the other. The next category is proto rivalries, which includes pairs of states with three or more disputes within a twenty-year time-period. Isolated conflicts represent the non-rivalry category in that these dyads have between one or two militarized interstate disputes. In this chapter, I also use Thompson's (2001) strategic rivalry coding as a dependent variable. Here, the dependent variable is a binary outcome between strategic rivalry and no strategic rivalry.

I also use a variable indicating the nuclear weapons capabilities of states. Pairs of states that have nuclear capabilities are coded as one if at least one side has nuclear weapons. This variable is taken from Sample's (2002) recent data on mutual military buildups. The nuclear weapon variable could be considered a control variable, but it may also be a direct factor that leads to rivalry.

Results

Table 23 provides evidence to support the proposition (hypothesis 7) that a pair of states whose relations involve numerous territorial disputes are more apt to have recurring disputes, and thus likely to become enduring and proto rivalries.[75]

[75] This analysis is an indirect replication of Vasquez and Leskiw (2001). Here I use multinomial logit to estimate the probability of rivalry occurrence according to rivalry type. Vasquez and Leskiw's original analysis presented two by two tables to test the proposition.

Table 23
Territory and Rivalry I
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type
Twenty Five Percent Territory

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
25% Terr	0.540	.155	0.000	0.935	.262	0.000
Contiguity	0.059	.160	0.708	0.033	.275	0.903
Constant	-1.588	.107	0.000	-3.03	.209	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category
N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002
Log likelihood = -789.274

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
25% Terr	1.71	0.000	2.54	0.000
Contiguity	1.06	0.708	1.03	0.903

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

Only 25% Territory

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
25% Terr = 0	0.7955	0.166	0.038
25% Terr = 1	0.6748	0.241	0.084
Difference	-0.121	+0.075	+0.046

25% Territory and Contiguity

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
25% Terr = 0 + Cont=0	0.798	0.163	0.038
25% Terr = 1 + Cont=1	0.666	0.248	0.084
Difference	-0.132	+0.085	+0.036

Table 23 estimates the probability of rivalry type during each stage, while controlling for contiguity.[76] The twenty-five percent territory variable is statistically significant and positive for both proto and enduring rivalry when compared to the base category, isolated conflicts. Contiguity is positive but not statistically significant in the model.

The easiest way to interpret multinomial logit coefficients is through relative risk ratios. Relative risk ratios compare the probability of each outcome to the base category, which was isolated conflict. Table 23 shows that the risk ratio of a proto-rivalry is 1.71 with the twenty-five percent territory present as compared to isolated conflict outcome, and shows the risk ratio of enduring rivalry is 2.54 when compared to isolated conflict. It is clear that the risk of proto and enduring rivalry increases when the dyad has at least 25% territorial disputes.

Predicted probabilities were also calculated for the model. During the isolated conflict stage, a positive observation for >25% territory decreases the probability of isolated conflict by 0.121. During the proto rivalry stage, a positive observation of 25% territory increases the probability of proto-rivalry in the dyad by 0.075 (from 0.166 to 0.241). The enduring stage also shows a positive probability when the dyad has at least 25% of its disputes over territorial issues during its lifespan. The predicted probability increases from 0.038 to 0.084 for enduring rivalry (a difference of 0.036), demonstrating that the probability of rivalry type doubles when states have more than twenty-five percent of their disputes dominated by territory.

[76] Contiguity is used as a control variable to rule out the possibility that the occurrence of rivalries is better predicted by measures of contiguity. It also used to show that territorial disputes, even when controlling for the location of a pair of states, are more apt to lead a state to become involved in rivalry and war.

Table 23 also presents the combined probabilities from rivalry type with positive observations for 25% territory and contiguity. These results differ very little from the predicted probabilities gathered using only the 25% territory variable. Overall, the results show that territorial disputes positively influence the probability of both proto and enduring rivalry occurrence.

Table 24
Territory and Rivalry II
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type
Fifty Percent Territory

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
50% Territory	-.118	.168	0.481	0.214	.272	0.430
Contiguity	0.097	.158	0.541	0.074	.271	0.784
Constant	-1.37	.100	0.000	-2.73	.191	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category
N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.82
Log likelihood = -799.54

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
50% Territory	0.88	0.481	1.239	0.430
Contiguity	1.10	0.541	1.07	0.784

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

Only 50% Territory

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
50% Territory = 0	0.753	0.197	0.050
50% Territory = 1	0.760	0.177	0.063
Difference	+0.007	-0.02	+0.013

50% Territory and Contiguity

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
50% Territory = 0 + Cont=0	0.758	0.192	0.049
50% Territory = 1 + Cont=1	0.748	0.186	0.065
Difference	-0.01	-0.006	+0.016

Table 24 estimates the probability of rivalry type during each stage using the modal territory variable, while controlling for contiguity.[77] The territory variable (as a modal variable) is not statistically significant for both proto and enduring rivalry when compared to the base category, isolated conflicts. Contiguity is positive but not statistically significant in the model.

Table 24 shows that the risk ratio of a proto-rivalry is 0.88 with the modal territory variable present as compared to isolated conflict outcome, and shows the risk ratio of enduring rivalry is 1.239 when compared to isolated conflict. The risk of proto and enduring rivalry increases when the dyad has modal territorial disputes. Predicted probabilities are also calculated for the model, but they are of little value in that the model is not statistically significant. Using the modal territory variable, no new information about the relationship between territory and rivalry can be gathered.

Findings Based on Thompson Strategic Rivals

Table 25 also provides evidence to support the proposition (hypothesis 7) that a pair of states whose relations involve numerous territorial disputes is more apt to have recurring disputes, and likely to become rivals under Thompson's coding of strategic rivalry. Table 25 estimates the probability of rivalry when controlling for contiguity. The >25% territory variable is statistically significant and has a positive coefficient of 1.190. Contiguity is also positive (0.737) and statistically significant in the Thompson model.

[77] Table 23 investigated the influence of territorial disputes when 25 percent of the disputes in the dyad are over territorial issues.

Table 25
Territory and Strategic Rivalry I
Coefficient Estimates, Logit Model for Thompson Rivalry
Twenty Five Percent Territory

	Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
25% Terr	1.190	.162	0.000
Contiguity	0.737	.163	0.000
Constant	-2.38	.136	0.000

N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -492.2399

Predicted Probabilities for Thompson Rivalry

25% Territory Only

	No Rivalry	**Thompson Rivalry**
25% Terr = 0	0.895	0.105
25% Terr = 1	0.721	0.279
Difference	-0.174	+0.174

25% Territory and Contiguity

	No Rivalry	**Thompson Rivalry**
25% Terr = 0 + Cont = 0	0.915	0.084
25% Terr = 1 + Cont = 1	0.612	0.387
Difference	-0.303	+0.303

The easiest way to interpret the logit coefficients is through predicted probabilities. The probability of strategic rivalry in a dyad that has less than 25 percent territorial disputes is 0.105. In dyads that have more than 25 percent territorial disputes, the probability of rivalry is 0.279. Adding in the factor of contiguity to a combined probability model indicates that the probability of strategic rivalry is 0.387 when both factors are present. The probability of rivalry is only 0.084 when none of the factors are present.

Table 26
Territory and Strategic Rivalry II
Coefficient Estimates, Logit Model for Thompson Rivalry
Fifty Percent Territory

	Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
50% Territory	0.766	.162	0.000
Contiguity	0.737	.160	0.000
Constant	-2.14	.126	0.000

N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -492.2399

Predicted Probabilities for Thompson Rivalry

50% Territory Only

	No Rivalry	**Thompson Rivalry**
50% Terr = 0	0.870	0.130
50% Terr = 1	0.757	0.243
Difference	-0.113	+0.113

50% Territory and Contiguity

	No Rivalry	**Thompson Rivalry**
50% Territory = 0 + Cont = 0	0.896	0.105
50% Territory = 1 + Cont = 1	0.656	0.344
Difference	-0.239	+0.239

Table 26 presents the results for the modal territory variable according to strategic rivalries. The coefficients for territorial disputes and contiguity are both positive and statistically significant. Looking at the predicted probabilities, if the modal territorial dispute variable is present along with contiguity, the probability of a strategic rivalry is 0.344. If the values are set to zero, the probability of strategic rivalry is 0.105. If only

the modal territorial dispute variable is positive, the probability of strategic rivalry is 0.243.

It appears that Thompson's (2001) coding of rivalry captures those dyads who have a history of territorial conflict much better than the Diehl and Goertz (2000) dataset. This appears to be the one key difference between the two datasets (also see Chapter 10 for this finding). Those pairs of states that recognize the other as a rival seem to fight over territorial disputes more often than those rivalries coded using the dispute density approach (Diehl and Goertz 2000). While the Thompson (2001) dataset may capture a majority rival dyads that fight over territorial disputes, this may be because historical documents used to code the rivals make much out of historical animosity over territorial issues, and not policy and regime disputes that the dispute density approach captures. I would conclude that both datasets are important. The Diehl and Goertz dataset is relied on here because it allows exploration of the militarized nature of conflict within the rivalries. Some of the Thompson rivals conversely exhibit no history of militarized conflict, a key assumption in the steps to rivalry theory.

Complete Additive Model

Table 27 presents results for a multinomial logit test of what I call the complete steps to rivalry model. This table directly tests hypothesis nine, the additive sufficient condition proposition. Here, all the factors investigated previously are added into one model. It is first important to look at the direct relationship between some of these factors and rivalry. Here, I consider the combined effects of military buildups, alliances, territory disputes, contiguity, and major powers. The rivalry linkage variable was not

used in this model since the result was insignificant and represents a potential intervening variable.

Table 27
Complete Rivalry Model
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Military Buildup	0.714	.258	0.006	2.105	.304	0.000
Alliance	0.496	.229	0.031	1.389	.591	0.019
25% Terr	0.454	.159	0.004	0.654	.274	0.018
Contiguity	0.223	.169	0.186	0.345	.280	0.218
Major Power	1.13	.220	0.000	1.15	.339	0.001
Constant	-2.22	.235	0.000	-4.789	.586	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category
Robust Standard Errors
Missing Values = 0 for Military Buildup
N = 1166
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -739.569

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
Military Buildup	2.04	0.006	8.21	0.000
Alliance	1.64	0.031	4.01	0.019
25% Terr	1.57	0.004	1.90	0.018
Contiguity	1.25	0.186	1.41	0.218
Major Power	3.09	0.000	3.16	0.001

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

The results support the proposition that states that form politically relevant alliances, participate in military buildups, and fight territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in proto and enduring rivalries.

For the enduring rivalry category, politically relevant alliances generate a coefficient of 1.389 and are statistically significant at 0.019. Military buildups produce a coefficient of 2.105 and are statistically significant at 0.000. The 25% territory variable, used because of its better predictive value over the modal territory variable, produces a coefficient of 0.654 and is statistically significant at 0.018. Contiguity has a positive impact on the model, but is not statistically significant at 0.218, much like the results in the other models. Major power dyads generate a coefficient of 1.15, and this coefficient is statistically significant at 0.001.

For the proto rivalry category, military buildups generate a coefficient of 0.714 and are statistically significant at 0.006. Politically relevant alliances produce a coefficient of 0.496 and are statistically significant at 0.031. The twenty-five percent territory variable also produces a positive coefficient of 0.454 and is statistically significant at 0.004. Contiguity once again is not statically significant. Major powers have a similar impact at 1.13 and the factor is statistically significant with a value of 0.000.

One way to interpret the complete model is to look at the relative risk ratios. When compared to the base category of isolated conflict, politically relevant alliances have positive ratios of 1.64 for proto rivalry and 4.01 for enduring rivalry. Military buildups have a risk ratio of 2.04 for proto rivals and 8.21 for enduring rivalries. Territorial disputes have a ratio of 1.57 for proto rivalry and 1.9 for enduring rivalry.

Major power dyads also have high relative risk ratios in 3.09 for proto rivalry and 3.16 for enduring rivalry.

Table 28
Predicted Probabilities for Complete Rivalry Model
A. Military Buildup and Rivalry

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
MB = 0	0.788	0.179	0.032
MB = 1	0.555	0.259	0.185
Difference	-0.233	+0.08	+0.153

B. Alliance and Rivalry

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Ally = 0	0.8495	0.137	0.013
Ally = 1	0.7531	0.199	0.047
Difference	-0.096	+0.062	+0.034

C. Alliance and Twenty Five Percent Territory

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Ally = 0 + 25% Terr = 0	0.8687	0.1204	0.011
Ally = 1 + 25% Terr = 1	0.6875	0.2467	0.0659
Difference	-0.1812	+0.1263	+0.055

D. Military Buildup and Twenty Five Percent Territory

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
MB = 0 + 25% Terr = 0	0.814	0.159	0.026
MB = 1 + 25% Terr = 1	0.466	0.294	0.239
Difference	-0.348	+0.135	+0.213

E. Alliance, Military Buildup, and Twenty Five Percent Territory

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Ally = 0 + MB = 0 + 25% Terr = 0	0.8765	0.1143	0.0092
Ally = 1 + MB=1 + 25% Terr = 1	0.4259	0.2939	0.2802
Difference	-0.451	+0.179	+0.271

F. Alliance, Military Buildup, Twenty Five Percent Territory, and Major Powers

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Ally = 0 + MB = 0 + 25% Terr = 0 + Maj = 0	0.888	0.103	0.008
Ally = 1 + MB=1 + 25% Terr = 1 + Maj = 1	0.209	0.401	0.389
Difference	-0.679	+0.298	+0.381

The predicted probabilities also draw a similar picture when compared to the relative risk ratios. Tables A and B present results for military buildups and alliances if the values are set to one or zero for each observation. The results compare favorably to earlier models.

If the values for relevant alliance and twenty-five percent territory are set at one, the probabilities are 0.0659 for enduring rivalry, 0.2467 for proto rivalry, and 0.6875 for isolated conflicts (Table C). If the values are set to zero, isolated conflict has a predicted probability of 0.8687, a difference of 0.1812. Proto rivalry has a probability of 0.1204 and 0.011 for enduring rivalry. The probability for proto rivalry almost doubles when the factors are present, and close to five times an increase for enduring rivalry. It is important to note that the steps to rivalry theory predicts the onset of proto rivalry as well as or better than the onset of enduring rivalry. Tables A, B, and C demonstrate that the

probability of proto rivalry occurrence is higher than the probability of enduring rivalry according to the variables in the model. When territory is added as a variable in the predicted probability of the outcome, the model better explains the onset of enduring rivalry and not proto rivalry.

If the values for military buildup and twenty-five percent territory are set at one, the probabilities are 0.239 for enduring rivalry, 0.294 for proto rivalry, and 0.466 for isolated conflicts (Table D). If the values are set to zero, isolated conflict has a predicted probability of 0.814, a difference of 0.348. Proto rivalry has a probability of 0.159 and 0.026 for enduring rivalry.

The relationship is even stronger when the values are set to one for politically relevant alliances, military buildup, and twenty-five percent territory. For enduring rivalry, a positive observation results in a probability of 0.2802 and a zero observation results in a value of 0.0092. For proto rivalry, if all values are set to zero, the probability is 0.1143; if the values are set to one, the probability is 0.2939.

The final additive model shows a high probability for the combined factors of alliances, military buildups, twenty-five percent territory, and major powers.[78] For enduring rivalry, the probability of rivalry occurring is 0.389 if the values for the factors are set to one (Table F). For proto rivalry, the probability is also close in 0.401 for a rivalry to occur if the values for the factors are set to one.

[78] It should be noted that major powers are added as a control variable because major powers typically use power politics strategies (see Chapter 10 for an analysis of the major power rivalry subset). If the model is run without the major power variable, the results become stronger and the pvalues decline, indicating stronger statistical significance. Major power dyads are not driving the findings in this analysis and are kept in the model as a possibly important control factor.

Table 29
Complete Model, With Nuclear Weapons
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			**Enduring Rivalry**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Military Buildup	0.786	.260	0.003	2.269	.321	0.000
Alliance	0.346	.236	0.142	1.106	.603	0.066
25% Terr	0.499	.166	0.003	0.717	.280	0.010
Contiguity	0.198	.173	0.252	0.347	.282	0.219
Major Power	0.984	.214	0.000	0.950	.335	0.005
Nuclear Weapons	0.955	.193	0.000	1.559	.314	0.000
Constant	-2.22	.242	0.000	-4.789	.591	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category
Robust Standard Errors
Missing Values = 0 for Military Buildup
N = 1055
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -686.134

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Proto Rivalry		**Enduring Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
Military Buildup	2.19	0.003	9.67	0.000
Alliance	1.41	0.142	3.025	0.066
25% Terr	1.64	0.003	2.048	0.010
Contiguity	1.21	0.252	1.41	0.219
Nuclear Weapons	2.67	0.000	2.58	0.005
Major Power	2.60	0.000	4.75	0.000

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Table 29 presents the findings for the steps to rivalry model if nuclear weapons are added as a factor (hypothesis 9). Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate weapon,

usually for major powers, and are the foundation of realist deterrence theory. Nuclear weapons also result in an arms race in that each nation competes to build the most weapons in terms of both power and abundance. The data used here was gathered from Sample (2002).

The coefficient for nuclear weapons is 0.955 for proto rivalry and 1.559 for enduring rivalry. All other values are similar to the previous model. The relative risk ratio for nuclear weapons is 2.6 for proto rivalry and 4.75 for enduring rivalry.

Table 30
Predicted Probabilities for Complete Model, With Nuclear Weapons

Alliance, Military Buildup, Twenty Five Percent Territory, Major Powers, and Nuclear Weapons

	Isolated Conflict	Proto Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry
Ally = 0 + MB = 0 + 25% Terr = 0 + Maj = 0 + Nukes = 0	0.889	0.103	0.007
Ally = 1 + MB=1 + 25% Terr = 1 + Maj = 1 + Nukes = 1	0.086	0.358	0.555
Difference	-0.803	+0.255	+0.548

The additive impact of nuclear weapons can be gathered from Table 30. For enduring rivalry, the probability is 0.555 if the value for alliances, military buildups, twenty-five percent territory, major powers, and nuclear weapons is set at one. For proto rivalry, the probability is 0.358 if all the values are set to one.

The highest probability for enduring rivalry occurrence is achieved by adding nuclear weapons to the model. It seems that states that have nuclear weapons, are major powers, have outside alliances, participate in military buildups, and have a significant

amount of territorial disputes are likely to become enduring rivalries. It is also likely that the probability of rivalry occurrence will increase if such factors as democracy and state independence are added to the model. This, however, was not done at this time.

Table 31
Complete Rivalry Stages Model
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Stages

	Outcome					
	Intermediate Rivalry Stage			**Enduring Rivalry Stage**		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|z|
Military Buildup	0.800	.224	0.000	2.23	.289	0.000
Alliance	0.385	.188	0.041	1.065	.528	0.044
25% Terr	0.413	.136	0.003	0.505	.268	0.060
Constant	-1.96	.183	0.000	-4.48	.535	0.000

Early Stage is reference category
Robust Standard Errors
N = 1515
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -939.66

Relative Risk Ratios

	Outcome			
	Intermediate Rivalry		**Advanced Rivalry**	
Independent Variables	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|	Relative Risk Ratio	P>|z|
Military Buildup	2.23	0.000	9.30	0.000
Alliance	1.47	0.041	2.9	0.044
25% Terr	1.51	0.003	1.65	0.060

RRR = p(outcome)\p(base outcome)

Table 32
Predicted Probabilities for Complete Rivalry Stages Model
A. Military Buildup and Rivalry Stage

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
MB = 0	0.795	0.179	0.026
MB = 1	0.554	0.277	0.168
Difference	-0.241	+0.098	+0.142

B. Alliance and Rivalry Stage

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
Ally = 0	0.839	0.1470	0.0137
Ally = 1	0.766	0.1975	0.0364
Difference	-0.073	+0.0505	+0.0227

C. Territory and Rivalry Stage

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
25% Terr = 0	0.8066	0.1670	0.0264
25% Terr = 1	0.7315	0.2288	0.0397
Difference	-0.075	+0.0618	+0.013

D. Alliance and Military Buildup

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
Ally = 0 + MB = 0	0.8493	0.1392	0.0115
Ally = 1 + MB = 1	0.5255	0.2819	0.1926
Difference	-0.324	+0.143	+0.1811

E. Alliance and Territory

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
Ally = 0 + 25% = 0	0.858	0.1294	0.0117
Ally = 1 + 25% = 1	0.714	0.2391	0.0467
Difference	-0.144	+0.1097	+0.035

F. Military Buildup and Territory

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
25% = 0 + MB = 0	0.8192	0.1586	0.0222
25% = 1 + MB = 1	0.4832	0.3146	0.2021
Difference	-0.336	+0.156	+0.180

G. Alliance, Military Buildup, and Territory

	Early Stage	Intermediate	Advanced
MB = 0 + Ally = 0 + 25% Terr = 0	0.8680	0.1222	0.0098
MB = 1 + Ally = 1 + 25% Terr = 1	0.4542	0.3166	0.2292
Difference	-0.4138	+0.1944	+0.2194

Table 31 presents the complete rivalry model once again according to rivalry stages research design (see chapter four and six). The results here do not differ greatly from Table 27. The variables of mutual military buildups and relevant alliances are positive and statistically significant for both intermediate and advanced rivalry. The 25 percent territory variable is positive, but not statistically significant for advanced rivalry (the pvalue is 0.060, a little above the 0.05 cutoff point). The relative risk ratios for the variables here are slightly higher than in Table 27. For instance, the risk ratio for mutual military buildups is 2.23 for the intermediate rivalry stage. In Table 27, 2.04 is the risk ratio for the proto rivalry outcome.

Table 32 indicates that the predicted probabilities are lower values than those presented in Table 28 due to the absence of the control variables used in the other

model.[79] In combination, the variables of relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, and territorial disputes show that the probability of advanced rivalry is 0.2292 and 0.3166 for intermediate rivalry (Table 32, G). For Table 28, the non-process model, the predicted probability for alliances, military buildups, and territory are 0.294 for proto rivalry and 0.280 for enduring rivalry. Alliances, military buildups, and twenty-five percent territory all increase the probability of rivalry according to stages-process model.

Assessment

The first factor investigated in this chapter is territorial disputes. It is clear that dyads that have territorial disputes (specifically more than 25 percent of the disputes are territorial in nature) are more likely to become rivals. This finding holds no matter which dataset is employed to investigate the hypothesis. While not every dispute over which a dyad fights has to be territorial to make the dyad "dangerous," those dyads having a significant number of territorial disputes are likely to become rivals.

Politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups are probabilistic sufficient conditions for rivalry development. Each event makes the outcome of rivalry more likely to occur. This theory is additive in that the factors of territorial disputes, major power involvement, nuclear, mutual military buildups, and politically relevant alliances all combine to increase the probability of proto and enduring rivalry occurrence. Hypothesis seven, eight, and nine all fail to be falsified. The factors suggested in the steps to rivalry theory are probabilistic sufficient conditions for rivalry.

[79] Four "late" alliances were also dropped as positive observations since they occur after the existence of the last phase of rivalry in the dyad.

From this study, a few typical paths to rivalry can be observed. The path with the highest probability of rivalry occurrence involves the use of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, repeated territorial conflicts, and major power dyads. Adding nuclear capabilities to the equation also increases the probability of both proto and enduring rivalry.

A further exploration of the issue of nuclear weapons and rivalry must be conducted in order to garner any confidence in the results. At this point I do not know if the timing of the nuclear weapons acquisitions has an impact on the results. I also do not know if nuclear weapons were used to threaten a rival. These are important questions that will have to be investigated through case studies of the nuclear capable rivals.

Table 33
Paths to Rivalry: Rank Order of Predicted Probabilities

Enduring Rivalry:

.555	Alliance, Military Buildup, Territory, Major Powers, and Nuclear Weapons
.389	Alliance, Military Buildup, Territory, and Major Powers
.280	Alliance, Military Buildup, and Territory
.239	Military Buildup and Territory
.185	Military Buildup
.066	Alliance and Territory
.047	Alliance
.013	No Alliance

Proto Rivalry

.401	Alliance, Military Buildup, Territory, and Major Powers
.358	Alliance, Military Buildup, Territory, Major Powers, and Nuclear Weapons
.294	Military Buildup and Territory
.294	Alliance, Military Buildup, and Territory
.259	Military Buildup
.247	Alliance and Territory
.199	Alliance
.137	No Alliance

Taken from Tables 20 and 22

Table 33 presents the rank order probabilities of the occurrence of both enduring rivalry and proto rivalry. There is a 0.013 probability of an enduring rivalry if the pair of states does not have an alliance. This probability increases to 0.389 if they have a politically relevant alliance, a mutual military buildup, territorial disputes, and are major powers. The base probability for proto rivalry, if neither state has an outside alliance, is 0.137. This probability increases to 0.401 if the pair of states has an alliance, military buildup, territorial disputes, and major powers. These probabilities would increase if variables were added for newly independent states and democracy.

Which pairs of states follow the typical path of rivalry? Egypt and Israel represent typical rivals that have politically relevant alliances, military buildups, nuclear weapons, and territorial disputes.

For the third highest category, those states with alliances, military buildups, and territorial disputes, a multitude of pairs of states fit this path to rivalry. In Asia, China vs. Japan, China vs. India, India vs. Pakistan, and Thailand vs. Cambodia fit this category. For Europe, only Greece vs. Turkey fit the pattern. In Africa, Somalia vs. Ethiopia and Morocco vs. Algeria follow the typical path to rivalry. The Middle East has six enduring rivalries that fit the typical path towards rivalry development, including Iran vs. Iraq, Iraq vs. Israel, Iraq vs. Kuwait, Syria vs. Israel, Israel vs. Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan vs. Pakistan. There are no rivalries in North or South America that experience the typical path to rivalry; this is likely due the region's (except the United States) typical non-use of alliances to deter attack. Chapter ten will further investigate and note the rival dyads that include the jointly sufficient causal conditions of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, and political relevant alliances.

Conclusion

To this point, this project has found that states that use power politics foreign policy practices are more likely to become involved in rivalry if they have an initial militarized dispute. The steps to rivalry path is clear; politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, territorial disputes, major power dyads, and states that posses nuclear weapons are more likely to become rivals if these factors are present.

This work has presented rivalry as a process, and these stages of rivalry development need to be taken into account in any analysis of the formation of rivals. One cannot look at enduring rivals alone, but must also investigate the factors present in proto rivals and isolated conflicts. One must additionally consider the timing of factors that may influence the dependent variable. It is clear from this analysis that alliances are formed early in the life of a rivalry, and that mutual military buildups occur late in the life of enduring rivalries. There is also a significant amount of military buildups in isolated conflicts, but this can be partially accounted for by the variables associated with war occurrence.

I have argued that power politics strategies are dangerous precedents in international interactions. Those states that use power politics practices are likely to become dangerous rivals. While policy advice to this point is premature, states should avoid threatening actions because of the likelihood of those actions leading to the security dilemma and rivalry. Those states involved in rivalry are the most likely dyads to become involved in war, and to avoid war, one must avoid rivalry in the first place. The nature of repeated disputes places the population of rival states in a dangerous position.

In the future, research should focus on the specific cases constituting the proto and enduring rivals. In chapters nine and ten I will show through both a case study and fuzzy set (Ragin 2000) techniques the typical path towards rivalry. While large-N investigations are important to understand the relationship between each factor and rivalry, the case study approach can detail the accurate story of rivalry development.

CHAPTER IX

THE RIVAL ROAD TO WORLD WAR I

"You will be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees."
Kaiser Wilhelm to his troops in August 1914

Introduction

This chapter explains the story of rivalry development and explores the relationship between rivalry and war through an examination of the rivalries that led to the conflict in 1914. I will show how the quantitative variables introduced in prior chapters interacted to illustrate the development of rivalry, and later, war. Here I use the events surrounding the rise of World War I and the rivalries in existence during this time to explain how rivalry can be a causal mechanism for war and war expansion.

The title of this chapter suggests two things; one, the road to World War I was paved by the actions of rival nations. The study of rivalry can account for the hostile interactions of nation-states and thus, explain the actions and intentions of the states leading to the war. The rivalry research program can be employed to explain why global wars such as World War I occur, as well as who fights whom. The second thing this title suggests is that this explanation of World War I offers a rival explanation of the war. Here, I argue that war is not caused by either mobilization, Germany, Austria, the breakdown of the concert system, or the structural conditions of an anarchical system, but rather by the dynamics of the rivalry system in Europe in the early 1900's.

What are the causes of war? A frequent answer to this question is that the causes differ for each war. Each war has its own specific causes that are unique for each case. The goal of a scientific explanation for the onset of war is first to determine what patterns

might be present in the cases and then test the hypothesized patterns through evidence. Thus, the goal is not to find what is unique about war, but to show that general patterns can be delineated to explain how wars started. Exemplifying this intent, Vasquez's (1993) steps to war theory represents an attempt to explain the outbreak of war through the use of empirical variables outlining a common pattern or path to war.

The steps to war theory and the steps to rivalry theory duly suggest that the outbreak of conflict occurs through a predictable series of steps. The foreign policy choices states make can intensify crisis, start rivalries, and lead to war within rivalries. Those foreign policy choices typically take the form of power politics strategies. For this chapter, I will outline the conditions of ongoing rivalries before World War I. I then show how the variables suggested by the steps to rivalry theory contributed the to the escalation of the crisis in the summer of 1914. Through an analysis of the Anglo-German, Franco-German, Austrian-Italian, Russo-German, and Austrian-Serbian rivalries, I find that the conditions predicted by the steps to rivalry theory (the use of alliances, arms races, linkages, territorial disputes, and grand strategy) are all present and led to the enduring nature of these rivalries. A large-scale interstate war was destined to occur because of the pattern of rivalries present in Europe during the early 20th century, which constrained the choices and actions that were available to the great powers in 1914.

The Origins of World War I[80]

Paul Kennedy (1985, 37) notes, "As with most complex happenings, the First World War offers so much data that conclusions can be drawn from it to suit any a priori hypothesis which contemporary strategists and politicians wish to advance." While this remark trivializes a whole body of research on the origins of war and of World War I in particular, there is a point to be made. Most theories of world politics can account for World War I. The steps to rivalry and steps to war theories are no different. Each presents an explanation of World War I consistent with the theory's theoretical expectations. The key here is not to use the World War I case to confirm a theory, test a theory, or to derive a theory, but rather to use this example as an illustrative case study of the concepts and propositions laid out in chapter four. The World War I example is the most familiar case for historians and political scientists. Therefore, it is useful to explain this case with my steps to rivalry theory since most are familiar with the war. For convenience however, in this section first outlines the origins of World War I for those not familiar with the case.

There is an intense fascination with World War I as a case. This war marked a particular transformation in the course of warfare for the world and history in general. Joll (1992, 1) notes, "the experiences of the war, and especially of the trench warfare on the western front, have entered deeply into the language and imagery of the countries of western Europe and continue to haunt the imagination of writers and artists born years after the war ended." It was the first total war and eventually led to the destabilized

[80] The Albertini (Albertini and Magrini 1942; Albertini 1952) volumes are perhaps the most comprehensive books on the First World War. These books rely on extensive historical documents and serve as a source for other World War I reviews. Stevenson's (1997) short volume serves as an excellent review and sourcebook.

system that made the conditions ripe for the outbreak of World War II. This was an interstate war with many participating parties and a diverse set of causes.

The outbreak of the war can be traced to the conditions of Austria-Hungary before 1914 and its alliance ties with Germany. The immediate trigger was the July crisis of 1914, which involved the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, was assassinated by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo.

The initial pre-war crisis results from the aftermath of the assassination of Ferdinand. Serbia and Austria-Hungary were involved in a rivalry where Serbia had territorial desires on the Austrian Empire, and vice versa. The Serbians hoped that the empire would eventually disintegrate and form an addition of new territory, similar to what it achieved in the Bosnian crisis of 1913. Joll (1992, 10-11) notes, "Ever since 1903, when a new ruling dynasty had seized power in Serbia with the support of a group of intensely nationalist officers determined to expand Serbia's frontiers so as to include those Serbs still living under foreign rule, the Emperor Franz Joseph and his advisors had become increasingly worried by the attraction which Serbia could exercise over the Southern Slavs – Croats as well as Slavs – within the Monarchy."

The presence of nationalist elements in Serbia only heightened any potential crisis that would occur between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The immediate goal of the Austria-Hungarian Empire in the July crisis was to force Serbia to admit that nationalist elements were at work in Serbia and prevent the future acquisition of territorial gains. While Austria was willing to fight a localized war with Serbia for this goal, it did not

want to bring Serbia's ally Russia into the conflict. Austria felt that if it had Germany's support during the conflict, Russia would then be prevented from entering the war.

On July 5, Austria was assured that it would receive the backing of Germany in any conflict involving Serbia and Russia (Joll 1992, 12). On July 19, the Austria government approved an ultimatum that would be sent to Serbia. "The note demanded that Serbia should agree to a number of Austrian conditions including the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda in Serbia, the dissolution of officers and officials who were guilty of propaganda against Austria, the arrest of named officers suspected of aiding and abetting the conspirators who murdered the Archduke and the tightening up of controls on the Serbian-Austria-Hungarian border." (Joll 1992, 12)

The Serbians were also ordered to suppress further nationalist movements, and investigate and prosecute those who participated in the assassination of the Archduke. Germany supported Austria-Hungary's efforts to press their demands. The note was delivered to the Serbians on July 23, and they were given forty-eight hours to reply. The Serbians rejected the ultimatum, mainly because they could not comply with the request to root out and prosecute nationalists in the Serbian government and military. Such an action would likely bring down the Serbian government in response to negative popular opinion concerning the concessions made to Austria. Russia also supported Serbia in the rejection of the ultimatum.

Russia partially mobilized its troops on July 26. On July 28, there was a formal declaration of war against Serbia. Britain had hoped for a major power conference that would stop any potential war. France and Italy agreed to participate while Russia and Austria agreed that the matter between them could be settled through direct negotiations.

On July 27, Germany formally rejected any resumption of a conference system and the issue was dead.

France's hesitancy to react to the situation at hand suggested to Germany and Austria that it was not willing to support Russia in any war. Up until the actual outbreak of war, Germany hoped that Britain would also remain neutral in the conflict. At the end of July, full mobilization of both Germany and Russia suggested the conflict could not be avoided. Efforts to prevent Russia from entering the conflict had failed, and with Russia came its ally, France.

Once mobilization occurred, little could be done to reverse the course of events due to Germany's Schieffen plan. This plan assumed that any conflict with Russia would also include France. To be able to meet the threats of both France and Russia, the German plan was to invade France through Belgium and force France to retire from the war early. Germany would then attack Russia with all its remaining forces. Once Germany decided to attack France through Belgium, there was little that could have been done to keep Britain out of the war. Britain was an ally of Belgium and relied on its seaports for commerce. It would not let Belgium's neutrality be attacked by Germany, and Britain thus entered the war.[81]

On August 1, Germany formally declared war on Russia. On August 3, Germany invaded Belgium and declared war on France. From this point, World War I had begun. At least nine million men died in combat (Small and Singer 1982, 89).

[81] Joll (1992, 26) notes, "Belgian neutrality had been guaranteed in 1839 by England, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia; and respect for Belgian neutrality had been reaffirmed at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 by both Prussia and France, while Britain had repeated that she accepted her responsibilities as a guarantor."

Rival Explanations of World War I

Many explanations of World War I point the blame solely on the actions of Germany (Fischer 1967; 1974; 1975).[82] The Treaty of Versailles in June of 1919 contained article 231 which stated, "Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to the Allied governments and their nationals imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." (Joll 1992, 1) It is suggested that German elites provoked a great power war to establish its position in the international system (Koch 1972; Copeland 2000; Levy 2003). Lebow (1984) also suggests that Germany identified a "window of opportunity" to launch conflict with Russia in 1914 in response to its own diminishing capabilities. While Germany did give Austria a "blank check" for diplomatic action and did support a localized war, Germany did not conceive of the plan to challenge Serbia in 1914 and therefore cannot be held accountable for the war, at least the local war between Austria and Serbia.

While Germany is typically blamed for the outbreak of World War I, a lot of blame can be placed on Austria since its actions actually started the local war that eventually led to the global war (Schroeder 2003).[83] Its declining power can be considered a motivating factor for the state to pursue military means to settle any issue at stake. As Williamson (Williamson 1991, 29) notes, "thus the Habsburgs, having already lost much, deliberately avoided losing still more." Forestalling the collapse of the

[82] The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties concluded on March 29, 1919, that "that war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable. Germany in agreement with Austria-Hungary deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war." (Albertini 1952, iv)

[83] Williamson (Williamson and Pastor 1983) states, "For over three decades, and well into the 1950s, Austria-Hungary occupied a prominent place in historical assessments of the crisis of July 1914. But with

Empire may have been the motive for Austria to desire a limited local war with Russia and, possibly, France. Considering this fact, it is still incorrect to assume that Austria wanted a global war with other major power joiners, including the United Kingdom. Both Austria and Germany desired a local war to settle the Serbian issue.

It is also suggested that the war and mobilization plans of states played an important role in the war. Tuchman (1962, 72) states that the "pull of military schedules dragged them (statesmen) forward." A.J.P. Taylor (1964, 15) suggests the German war plan, the Schlieffen Plan, was instrumental in the course of the war. While the Schieffen Plan was an important part of the initial attack plan of Germany, it was a plan fostered out of the rivalry and alliance commitments of the time. Mobilization is a symptom that war is about to begin, not a cause of war itself. A more accurate statement is that the rivalry and alliance commitments of each nation fostered the need for mobilization plans of the states, which then escalated tensions once the states mobilized.

The international system and anarchy is also a frequently cited cause of World War I (Dickinson 1926). Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (1979) both cite the lack of a central system of authority in the international system as a permissive cause of war. If no states' security is guaranteed by the system, then anarchy pervades the system and states act as self-interested actors. The main goal of states is to ensure their security and to do this, war becomes necessary in some cases. It is this lack of any central authority during World War I that some cite as the cause of the outbreak of the war.

Mearsheimer (2001, 334) notes that "there is no question that anarchy is a deep cause of war." For Mearsheimer, the distribution of power in the system before World

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the advent of Fritz Fischer and the Hamburg school, the Habsburg role faded. For many Vienna became only an enlarged version of Bucharest of Brussels, a pawn and virtual plaything of Germany's Weltpolitik."

War I made the outbreak of war almost inevitable.[84] During this period, Europe was divided into an unbalanced multipolar system. In this system, war is likely since power is distributed unequally and miscalculations are highly likely if the sides are not divided equally. It is in this context that states are "primed for the offensive." However, this interpretation in incorrect. Alliances and military buildups are a cause of rivalry and war, not a way to balance for peace (see the findings in chapter five, six, and eight). This chapter argues that it was the rivalry system in Europe that "made state's primed for the offensive." (Mearsheimer 2001)

Van Evera (1985) believes the cult of the offensive was responsible for World War I.[85] He notes (Van Evera 1985, 58-59), "Europeans increasingly believed that attackers would hold the advantage on the battlefield, and the wars would be short and decisive…This mindset helped to mold the offensive military doctrines which every European power adopted during the period 1892-1913." While each state did adopt offensive military doctrines in the form of grand strategic plans, the idea that they were offensive in nature is not new. Every plan of attack is offensive in nature if the goal is to attack. Grand strategic plans represent a sign that a pair of states is engaged in rivalry and rivalry as an underlying factor made the actions of 1914 follow a set path of events. Doctrines of offensive action result from rivalry, not from offensive plans.

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[84] Mearsheimer (2001, 215) writes, "It was, as noted, a calculated risk motivated in large part by Germany's desire to break its encirclement by the Triple Entente, prevent the growth of Russian power, and become Europe's hegemon." It must be stated once again that Germany did not desire a global war. It was concerned with Russia's power, felt it was better to go to war in 1914 than in 1920, but did not directly desire to fight a war with France or Russia.

[85] Synder (1984, 9) also believes that offensive strategies in themselves increase the likelihood that wars will be fought.

Stoessinger (1993, 2) suggests that "misperception, rather than conscious evil design, appears to have been the leading villain in the drama."[86] He suggests that the system of alliances as the principle cause of the war is "a mechanistic view that undervalues the psychological and personality considerations." (Stoessinger 1993, 2) If the Germans restrained their Austrian allies during the conflict, Stoessinger notes that historians would have had to accept that the alliance prevented the outbreak of the war. The problem is that this is not how the events occurred. The alliance between Germany and Austria prepared Austria to make its threats against Serbia, regardless of Russia's involvement. In this case, Stoessinger is incorrect; alliances were a cause of war, not the personalities of those who made the alliance agreements.

Schroeder (1994; Vasquez 2003) argues that the breakdown of the Concert of Europe (and the Congress of Vienna) represents a key enabling point on the road to World War I. By abandoning the concert system, the major powers were not able to discuss the issues leading up to World War I and keep the conflict localized. While the concert system was tried prior to the outbreak of the war, a concert system depends on the willingness of all the major states in the system to participate. Once Germany rejected the idea of a conference, any sort of counterfactual regarding a new concert of Europe is illogical and implausible.

Another typical explanation lies with the system of alliances in Europe and what is called the system of "old diplomacy." "Old diplomacy was blamed for making sinister secret international agreements which committed countries to war without the knowledge

[86] Holsti, North, and Brody (1968, 157) find the members of the Dual Alliance over-perceived the actions of the Triple Entente and the Triple Entente underestimated the actions of the Dual Alliance. They note, "This difference in perceiving the environment is consistent with the pronounced tendency of the Dual Alliance to respond at a higher level of violence than the Triple Entente.

of their citizens." (Joll 1992, 3) The role of alliances is central to my steps to war theory, therefore alliances as a variable in this case will be explained more fully in the following sections. Regarding the system of old diplomacy, it is also important to note that Wilson's famous fourteen points includes the clause, "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understanding of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in public view." (Wilson 1918, 39) The system of old diplomacy was a factor that led to war, but this factor relies on the dynamics of rivalry interactions.

Blaming the system of old diplomacy is a common reaction to what many saw as the secret room dealings of diplomats in the early 20th century. It is also a reaction and call for an increased role of public opinion in the foreign policy decision making of states. Scholars (Ray 1995) have found that democracies do not go to war with each other. It then stands to reason that if diplomacy was more democratic (included the opinions of the population) before World War I, the conflict could have been avoided. The fact is that no country really wanted to experience a world war in 1914. At most, Austria hoped for a localized preemptive war with Serbia to settle their territorial questions.[87] Even making diplomacy more participatory (including public opinion) before the war would not have changed the preferences of the actors; they would still have all desired a local war with few casualties (Levy 2003).

Counterfactual reasoning suggests that in the absence of an event, an outcome would not have occurred. Lebow (2000-2001, 592) argues, "that what made Europe ripe

[87] In this case, a preemptive war would be one to destroy and deal with the imminent threat that Serbia and Serbian nationalists pose to the Austria-Hungarian empire. A preventive war would be one that attack Serbia before its gains enough power to directly attack Austria-Hungary. This war was preemptive in that

for war was not the multitude of alleged causes, but rather the interactions among them…But Sarajevo was not just any provocation; it met a diverse set of political and psychological requirements that were essential for Austrian and German leaders to risk war." What was needed for World War I to occur was a catalyst, which happened to be the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.[88] Using counterfactual reasoning, it would then stand to conjecture that in the absence of the assassination, World War I would not have occurred.

While I do agree with Lebow (2000-2001, 592) in that "several more years of peace could have altered the strategic and domestic contexts of the great powers and made war less likely," this was unlikely unless the rivalries in Europe were terminated before another catalyst would arise. The rivalries in Europe were unlikely to be terminated without some sort of system to resolve the disputes, such as a concert system. Any sort of counterfactual regarding the termination of rivalries disintegrates since it does not meet the criteria of being historical plausible.

Levy (2003, 117) notes, "the primary causes of World War I were the underlying international and domestic forces which shaped the preferences of the great powers, the strategic and political constraints on their actions, and the informational asymmetries. The mismanagement of the crisis by political leaders was at most a secondary factor

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the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand convinced the Austrian empire that the nationalist elements within Serbia posed an imminent threat.

[88] While not directly related to this counterfactual, Archduke Ferdinand was a moderating influence within the Austrian Empire. There is some evidence to suggest that had he lived, he would have sought to avoid war. Williamson (Williamson and Pastor 1983, 7) notes, "So long as Archduke Franz Ferdinand lived, a braking device for peace existed." Mason (1997) notes that Ferdinand was associated with a policy of "trialism" in which the Southern Slavs would be brought into the Empire as a third federative unit along with the Germans and Magyars. Yet, recent research "has shown that trailism was only part of a tactical move to frighten the Magyars." (Mason 1997, 77) The point Lebow (2000-2001) makes is that the assassination itself led directly to global war and the counterfactual has no bearing on the survival of Ferdinand as a peacemaker within the Empire.

contributing to the outbreak of the war." I follow a similar line of reasoning. The choices states made prior to World War I were locked in by a system of rivalries that then determined the path and outcome of a regional conflict that could have involved any number of international actors.[89] While domestic variables are important in the study of conflict, here I focus on international factors such as alliances, arms races, linkages, and grand strategy as the factors the led up the outbreak of rivalries, and then, World War I.

Why Rivals?

The study of rivalry centers on the notion that conflict is not independent across time. The history of interactions for a pair of states is an important characteristic in the study of war and peace. The study of rivalry shifts the focus of analysis away from war as the dependent variable, to recurring conflict as the main unit of analysis. By doing this, we do not have to study what has already occurred (war), but what may be ongoing and preventable, repeated disputes.

A rivalry is a long-standing conflict with an enemy that is of a militarized nature. Rivalry must be long in duration and there must be a threat or actual use of force between the states during the history of conflict. Rivalry follows the same notions of protracted conflict, which are hostile interactions over long periods of time (Azar 1972; McClelland 1972; Brecher 1984).

Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993) define rivalries as repeated conflicts with a certain degree of competitiveness, connection of issues, and a long temporal domain. Diehl and

[89] Using the term system, I do not mean for this analysis to take the form of a systemic level investigation (Thompson 2003) of the hypothesis, but to take a dyadic approach that considers that dyadic rivals can become linked to other ongoing rivalries. This essay is also mainly concerned with how the rivalries in

Goertz (2000, 44-46) then go on to define an enduring rivalry as those pairs of nations with six MIDs within a period of 20 years. Proto-rivalries are those dyads that have up to five MIDs and fail to reach the enduring rivalry requirement in a 20-year period. Isolated conflicts are those disputes between dyads that involve one or two disputes and do not escalate to the proto or enduring stage (but they may escalate to war in a short period).

Vasquez (1993, 75-76) defines a rivalry as a relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other.

Thompson (2001) also identifies a population of dyads (174 rivals from 1816-1999) that are strategic rivalries. Thompson (1995, 217) states, "mutual identification of rivals as rivals is critical to the generation of the processes associated with rivalry behavior." Strategic rivalries must view the each other as enemies, be competitors, and must be independent states.

If rivalry considers the interactions among states a major factor of analysis, it stands to reason that the context and events within recurring crises need to be analyzed to determine why and when conflict will occur. Other chapters in this work focus on quantitative investigations of rivalry development. This chapter follows the case study method and process tracing to tell the story of rivalry development. Here I argue that the rivalries in Europe prior to World War I were already entrenched and then led to the outbreak of World War I by ensuring that any local war would become an international war involving all possible rivalry pairs in Europe.

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existence during the July crisis of 1914 came about and how the steps to rivalry theory can explain both their origins and escalation to war.

Steps to Rivalry Theory

The steps to rivalry theory presented in chapter three suggests that rivalry occurs through a series of steps. How disputes are handled once they occur leads to rivalry. If disputes are handled in a power politics fashion, rivalry is likely to develop.

The first step is always an initial dispute, usually of a territorial nature. Questions over territorial issues are the most war prone and the least easily divisible. When a dispute occurs that is territorial in nature, it usually takes the form of a zero-sum game where each side attempts to gain all of the territory in question. Compromise is unlikely to be achieved in this situation.

Once a territorial dispute occurs, how the dispute is handled from that point on determines the future of the conflict and whether or not it takes the form of an enduring, recurring conflict. Handling territorial disputes with power politics foreign policy practices typically leads states into rivalry and then into war. A typical foreign policy move is the use of alliances to prevent attacks by an enemy. Alliances upset the existing capability distribution and put fear in the target. In turn, the target, feeling its own security is threatened, responds in kind by forming its own alliance block. Once this move is made, the conflict spirals out of control.

Mutual military buildups or arms races are also typical power politics steps. Military buildups attempt to ensure one state's security by building up armaments in preparation for attack. Once one state builds up its military, the other opposing side is also likely to build up their own military capabilities in response to feeling their own security threatened by the raise in capabilities of the opposing side. Once this results,

either war or rivalry will occur. If war does not occur within the first few disputes in the conflict, rivalry will likely result (see chapter 5).

Two other conditions are important for the outbreak of rivalry and war. One is the existence of linkages to other conflicts. Chapter 7 found that the severity of conflict (which can include war) increases when a rivalry is linked to many other simultaneous disputes. These disputes are usually linked by the nature of their issues and signal the willingness to use force by a state. Multiple rivalries and their interactions serve to intensify rivalry and thus lead to war.

The other important condition laid out in the steps to rivalry theory is grand strategy. Like alliances and arms races, the formation of a grand strategic plan to counter an enemy is a way to ensure the security of a state.[90] The problem is that this may provoke an equal response in that the target then forms its own strategic plans. The action will embolden the state to launch military activities if they are of a planned and codified nature. The premise of standard operating procedures (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999) becomes important in that the military is prepared for the conflict and sees conflict as a likely outcome if it trains for such an operation. Once strategic plans become part of the mobilization plans of a state, there is little anyone can do to "stop the trains."

[90] In this chapter, grand strategic plans typically refer to the war plans of a state to counter an enemy. Grand strategy involves the security goals of state in the form of the war, economic, and social strategies of a state. This work is about the militarized nature of interstate rivalries and thus will be focused on the military plans within grand strategic visions. It might be useful in the future to explore grand strategy and rivalry from all aspects, including societal and economic plans.

Hypothesis and Independent Variables

The idea of rivalry as a cause of World War I is not new. In 1965, Quincy Wright alluded to the idea in his study of war. "The struggle for colonies, markets, and raw materials, precipitated in the 1870's, contributed to national rivalries, which, in accord with balance-of-power principles, organized the world into two great hostile groups and culminated in World War I." (Wright 1965, 1007) No one, excluding Thompson (2003), has investigated this idea since. I hypothesize that power politics strategies lead to rivalry and then to war.

As outlined in the above section, the steps to war theory suggests the outbreak of rivalry results from the additive combination of many different factors. Territorial disputes, alliances, arms races, linkages to other conflicts, and the preparation of grand strategy make rivalry likely. From this theory, we would expect hypothesis eight from chapter eight to be true. For this case, hypothesis eight is written as:

H8: Pairs of states that form relevant alliances against each other, participate in arms races, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become rivals.

To this hypothesis, we would also add the predictions based in hypotheses five and six.

H5: The severity level of a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in a rival dyad.

H6: States will develop a grand strategy to counter an identified rival early in the life of the conflict.

In combination, each of these factors (linkages and grand strategy) makes the outbreak of rivalry more likely. Hypothesis ten is then presented to account for each factor examined in the World War I case.

H10: Pairs of states that form relevant alliances against each other, participate in arms races, fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, participate in simultaneous rivalries, and develop a grand strategy are more likely to become rivals, and thus experience war.

This chapter will be an in-depth case study review of all relevant interstate rivalries that existed prior to World War I. Here I will use process tracing to outline the events before the rivalries and war to explain the causal impact of the variables suggested in the steps to rivalry theory. Chapter four discussed the research design choices for this chapter.

The first main independent variables in this chapter are relevant alliances, which are derived from the work of Senese and Vasquez (2002; 2003; 2003). Here, alliances are relevant if they include a major power or a minor state from the same region as the dyad under question. Alliance information is taken from correlates of war alliance version 3.0 (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). Mutual military buildups are taken from Sample (1996; 2002) to include both major and minor power military buildups.

The main dependent variable in this analysis is taken from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding of rivalry. They distinguish the most severe rivals, enduring rivals, who have had at least six disputes over a twenty-year period. The next category is proto rivalries, which include pairs of states with three or more disputes within a twenty-year time period. Isolated conflicts represent the non-rivalry category in that these dyads have between one or two militarized interstate disputes. In this chapter, I also use Thompson's (2001) strategic rivalry coding as a dependent variable. Here, the dependent variable is a binary outcome between strategic rivalry and no strategic rivalry. War is considered to have occurred if there were 1,000 battle deaths (Singer and Small 1972; Small and Singer 1982).

In this chapter, I also introduce grand strategy as an independent variable. A grand strategy is observed for a case if there are formalized military strategic plans to counter a state in existence at least 6 months before the outbreak of conflict or war. From chapter 7, the concept of rivalry linkages is utilized in this chapter. One rivalry is considered linked to another if one state is engaged in another rivalry during the same time-period as the first rivalry.

The Steps to Rivalry as an Explanation of Pre-World War I Rivalries

The sections to follow after a detailed outline of how the individual rivalries prior to World War I formed. I find that territorial disputes, alliances, arms races, individual military buildups, rivalry linkages, and the war plans of states lead to the development of each rivalry. I will first summarize the basic findings. This section will serve as a guide to the detailed discussion to follow.

Table 34
Rivalry and World War I

Relevant Rivalries – World War I Phase
United Kingdom and Germany
Germany and France
Germany and Russia
Austria-Hungary and Serbia
Austria-Hungary and Italy

Relevant Alliances
Germany and Austria (1879)
Germany, Austria, and Russia (1881-1887)
Germany, Austria, and Italy (1882)
France and Russia (1893)
United Kingdom and France (Entente 1904)
United Kingdom and Russia (Entente 1907)

Relevant Arms Races
United Kingdom and Germany (Naval)
Austria and Yugoslavia (Serbia)
Austria and France
Austria and Italy
Germany and Yugoslavia (Serbia)
Germany and Italy
Germany and France

Rivalry Linkages



War Plans and Grand Strategy
Germany against France and Russia, and also Britain
Austria against Russia and Serbia
Great Britain against Germany
France against Germany
Russia against Germany and Austria

Territorial Conflict in Rivalries
United Kingdom and Germany = Africa, Somoa, and island of Heligoland
Germany and France = Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine
Germany and Russia = none
Austria-Hungary and Serbia = Southern Slavic region, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Austria-Hungary and Italy = Trentino, Triest, Dalmatia, and Albania

Table 24 outlines the findings from this chapter. There are five rivalries discussed here: the United Kingdom versus Germany, Germany versus France, Germany versus Russia, Austria-Hungary versus Serbia, and Austria-Hungary versus Italy. Each rivalry has important implications for World War I and must be explained in light of this fact. Each rivalry eventually experienced a war; many experienced more than one war during the rivalry's duration.

Table 24 also details the relevant alliances and arms races prior to World War I. There are six relevant alliances, although the German, Austrian, and Russian alliance from 1881 to 1887 and the Germany, Austrian, and Italian alliance of 1882 had little direct impact on the rivalry relationships and the war. There are seven relevant arms races during the pre-war period. The United Kingdom was engaged in an important naval arms race with Germany, and Germany was engaged in arms race with Serbia, Italy, and France. Austria was also engaged in arms races with Serbia, France, and Italy.

The United Kingdom and German rivalry was mainly a positional rivalry. England was concerned with the threat that the German navy posed to its trading empire and the threat the German army posed to Belgium and the Netherlands, both important trading bases. Germany was concerned that its power was not duly recognized by England. It strove to be granted the respect it deserved as a great power. Each side recognized the threat that the other posed to its security.

Early conflicts were over territorial questions in the colonies in Africa and South Asia.[91] The arms race and alliance patterns prior to 1914 shifted the focus of Great Britain from its rivalries with France, Russia, and the Untied States to its principal rival, Germany. In 1904, the United Kingdom signed an entente with France. In 1907, the United Kingdom also signed an entente with Russia, leaving Germany and Austria as the only remaining potential major-power foes in Europe. The United Kingdom's naval arms race with Germany was an important event in the life of the rivalry. The naval race demonstrated the threat Germany could pose to the English Empire.

The Franco-German rivalry was a lingering rivalry from the efforts German unification and independence. Territorial questions, mainly in Alsace and Lorraine

escalated the rivalry. In 1893, France and Russia allied with each other and agreed to come to each side's aide in the event of an attack by Germany. In 1879, Germany and Austria allied with each other to counter the threat of Russia and France. This alliance commitment was renewed in 1881 when the alliance added Russia, and in 1882 when the alliance added Italy. As mentioned previously, Germany and France were engaged in an arms race. They were also racing to professionalize their military in order to present effective fighting forces against each other on the Western front.

The Russo-German rivalry was mainly characterized by positional (strategic) elements. Germany was concerned with the potential threat that Russia could pose to its security. Russia was concerned with the threat that Germany and its Austrian ally could pose to Serbia and other regional Slavic peoples. France and Russia allied against Germany in 1893. Germany and Austria-Hungary allied against France and Russia in 1879. While there was not an arms race as measured by Sample (2002), Russia was restructuring its forces and planned to complete its modernization of its military by 1917. Germany was experiencing an arms race with France, but did not have a direct arms race with Russia.

The Austrian-Serbian rivalry was characterized by substantial disagreements. Serbia exerted its power as a newly independent state and sought to unify the South Slavs under Serbian rule. The Austria-Hungarian Empire was declining and feared the threat that an emerging Serbia could pose to its territorial integrity. Although not directly involved in alliances, Serbia was protected by Russia, which was linked to the Slavic people through common ancestry. Austria was allied to Germany in 1879. There was a direct arms race between Serbia and Austria (and also Germany).

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[91] Early conflicts refer to coded militarized interstate disputes.

The final rivalry discussed is the Austro-Italian rivalry. This rivalry emerged over the unification of Italy and the territorial threat it posed to Austria (and the threat Austria posed to Italy). Italy initially allied with France to counter Austria during its independence movements. The independence issue was eventually settled with formation of the Italian Federation and territorial tributes to Italy from Austria by way of concessions to France. Austria and Italy experience a direct arms race. Although they were allied to each other, Italy would not fight on the Austrian side unless it was given territorial tributes.

Each rivalry escalated through the formation of war plans, an important part of a state's grand strategy. Germany developed a plan to attack both its rivals France and Russia simultaneously. It focused its efforts on the quick destruction of France, and then shifted towards a slower to mobilize Russian army. Germany also developed plans to provoke Britain into a continental war on the Western Front. Austria developed its own plans to attack both Russia and Serbia. Although it preferred to deal only with Serbia, it was prepared to support the Germans in their attack of Russia. Great Britain developed plans to counter an invasion of France by Germany. The plan provided for the landing of six divisions in France to tip the balance towards the French forces in a conflict against Germany. France, well aware of the German plans, countered with their own plans to attack Germany. One version of the plan had France attacking Germany though Belgium before the Germans could mobilize. Eventually the French focused on meeting the Germans at their border. Finally, Russia developed its own plans to attack both Germany and Austria, although these plans were developed late in the rivalry. This lateness of

planning was influenced by Russia's lack of military effectiveness and its recent defeat in the Russo-Japanese war.

Table 34 also details the direction of rivalry linkages. The central focus highlights the rivalry between Germany and the United Kingdom. This rivalry was linked to Germany's rivalries with Russia and France, Great Britain's allies. Germany's rivalries with France, Russia, and Great Britain were also linked to its ally Austria. Austria was involved in a rivalry with Serbia and Italy. The rivalry with Serbia directly concerned Russia, Serbia's supporter. Clearly, the rivalry patterns in pre-war Europe were deeply linked and cannot be understood without exploring their relationship to each other. The escalation of World War I is further more directly connected to the rivalry linkages in Europe.

This chapter shows that the steps to rivalry theory can explain the development of rivalries in pre-war Europe. Most rivalries formed and developed due to territorial questions (excluding the Russo-German rivalry), alliance agreements, arms races, grand strategic war plans, and linkages. The rest of the chapter details the sources of rivalry and depicts how they were deeply linked to each other, resulting in the expansion of World War I.

The Rivalries

Fischer (1979, ix) notes, "the First World War represents the high point of the age of imperialism, during which technical and economic developments led to increased rivalries between the European great powers, and also the Untied States and Japan."

While I do not believe that technical and economic developments led to rivalry, Europe in 1914 was deeply embedded with rivalries.

An international rivalry occurs when both (or three) states identify the opposing side as an enemy and orientate their strategy (political, military, or economic) towards the opposing other side. One of the unanswered questions in international relations remains to answer how international rivalries cause war. This work argues that power politics foreign policy practices are causes of rivalry and war.

Rivalries seem to have always been taken as a given in history. In reality, not all states have rivalries, and some rivalries are more deadly than others. I hypothesize that regional rivalries are more deadly than imperial or "secondary" rivalries. Rivalries with unanswered territorial questions are also more deadly than other rivalries. Finally, those rivalries born during arms buildups and the formation of rival alliance blocks lead a state (or a group of states) towards war.

For rivalry to be a cause of World War I, the rivalry had to come before the events, had to be correlated with the events, and must have had a non-spurious relationship with the outcome. Rivalry fits all these conditions. While rivalry is not a trigger for war, it does set the conditions by which the war will occur. Rivalry dictates who will fight whom and when, to answer Bremer's (2000) question.

Besides a standard definition, rivalry can be understood as a cause of World War I through the use of necessary, sufficient, and counterfactual condition of causal analysis. For rivalry to be a sufficient cause of war, each time rivalry occurs, war must follow. Diehl and Goertz (2000, 63) have found rivalry to be a probabilistically sufficient cause of war. Enduring rivals have a 0.59 probability of going to war.

For rivalry to be a necessary cause of war, each war that occurs must contain a rivalry between the original participants. For rivalry to be a counterfactual cause, the absence of the event (rivalry) would lead to the absence of war between the pair of states in question.[92] In this case, looking at only one event rivalry must be present in order to be considered a cause of World War I. With its absence, it would be clear that the war would not have occurred.

Regional Rivalries

Empirically, before World War I, the United Kingdom was involved in rivalries with Germany and Russia, Belgium was involved in a rivalry with Germany, and France was in a rivalry with Germany.[93] There are also essential rivalries between Germany and Russia, Austria and Serbia, and Austria-Hungary and Italy. Table 34 lists each rivalry analyzed in this chapter (as well as the relevant alliances, arms races, war plans, and linkages). Each rivalry was important in shaping the course of events leading up to the summer of 1914.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom had the most rivals in the pre- World War I years, maintaining rivalries with virtually every great power in Europe. At this time, the United Kingdom was the most powerful naval nation in the world and, one that also had an impressive land army. The concerns of the Empire dictated that the United Kingdom had disputes with every nation that also had colonial ambitions.

[92] This is also a sufficient causal statement.

Before the war, the United Kingdom settled its regional rivalries with France and Russia.[94] Close to home, these nations were not seen as long-term threats, but as potential allies. France and England had little to quarrel over on the continent. They had no outstanding territorial claims. France did not challenge the United Kingdom's mastery of the sea. The United Kingdom was in a similar position with Russia. It had no territorial concerns due to Russia's focus on its near borders and regional colonial regimes. Russia lost its ability to field a relevant navy during the Russo-Japanese war, so it did not pose a naval threat to the United Kingdom. The dangerous rivalry that remains is the Anglo-German rivalry.

The Anglo-German Rivalry

The Anglo-German rivalry was a significant rivalry in its impact on the war behavior of Europe and colonial issues. Germany sought to challenge the hegemonic position of the United Kingdom. Germany was a threat to the United Kingdom because it could challenge the United Kingdom's ability to openly trade on the seas, deliver an army to continental Europe, and could cut off communications with the rest of the United Kingdom's empire. It was because of these concerns that the United Kingdom put off any other concerns it had with other nations and feared the potential of Germany as a rising power.

Why a rivalry after 900 years of "special relationship" between the two states? The United Kingdom and Germany had strong cultural, economic, and familial ties. The rivalry began over lingering anger that resulted from the lack of Britain's recognition of

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[93] Identified by Diehl and Goertz (2001) and based on the criteria that there have been six militarized interstate disputes in a 20 year period.

Germany's raising capabilities. The United Kingdom did not give benefits due to Germany as a great power, yet they remained strong trading partners.

This rivalry was also characterized by an arms race and alliance ties during its early phases, along with territorial ambitions in the colonial areas. "German naval building and territorial ambitions by 1900 were strategic nightmares for Britain: they threatened the North Sea, Dover, and London directly and the security of the African Cape, the Mediterranean, and the land routes to India, now Britain's most important market." (Frederick 1999, 308)

The origins of rivalry began with a rapid decline in relations for the two states from 1890 until 1900. The breakdown of the Concert of Europe and the rise of a Prussian-based German state set the stage for rivalry to develop. By 1890, every vital interest at stake between the two states clashed. They fought over industrial commerce policies, finance, technology, transportation, and naval and military capabilities.

Before World War I, there were questions about Germany's colonial borders in Togo, Southern and Western Africa, and East Africa (Tanzania). Germany continually found France's (Great Britain's ally) occupation of Alsace-Lorraine problematic. The main issue between the United Kingdom and Germany was Germany's influence in Western Europe and its strategy of arms buildups in the naval arena.

The rivalry is what Thompson (2001) would characterize as positional in that the states were mainly concerned with global, strategic issues, but the rivalry also did have colonial territorial overtones during its early phases. Early clashes and militarized disputes (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996) were in relation to Germany's colonial ambitions in Africa and the Pacific. The first MID was over the territory of Somoa. In 1890, the

[94] It also settled its rivalry with the United States (Thompson 1998).

United Kingdom ceded the island of Heligoland to the Germany for concessions in Africa. Once World War I ended, Germany lost is colonial territory and the rivalry was no longer of a territorial nature.

Thompson (1995) notes that principal rivalries are the most dangerous types of rivals. "One obvious way to operationalize enduring rivalries is through the examination of key decision maker's own observations about who they thought their principal enemies and opponents were." (Thompson 1995) The first question is who the decision-maker's perceived to be their principal opponents. The second question concerns whether decision makers regard their principal opponents as competitors, only external threats, or even, more simply, as persistent sources of problems." (Thompson 1995, 201) In this case, Germany and Great Britain are principal rivals.[95] The United Kingdom ended its rivalry with America in 1895. Germany did still have a rivalry with France that also could have be considered principal, but France did not challenge Britain's rule of the seas as Germany did.

The arms competition between Britain and Germany was the most significant early arms race before 1914. In 1898, Germany began the construction of a high seas fleet. Admiral Von Tirpitz based his plans on countering the British threat to the colonial empire. The naval arms races forced Britain to realize Germany as its main competitor leading to the 1904 and 1907 alliance ententes with France and Russia.

The competition between the two states led to a constant program of arms production and military buildups. If one side were to stop building armaments, they would lose important sectors of the economy and create huge unemployment problems. Once the race started, the states were dependent on its perpetual continuation. The two

states tried to come to some sort of agreement on a reduction of battleship production (Naval holiday with a ratio of 4:3 or 3:2 in favor of Great Britain), but they were never able to settle the issue. The ongoing arms race was a constant source of conflict for the British Empire and its trading relations with other nations.

Michael Howard (1984) rightly contended that the British-German naval race of early 1900's did not cause the rivalry between the two powers. "The naval competition provided a very accurate indication and measurement of political rivalries and tensions, but it did not cause them; nor could it have been abated unless the rivalries themselves had been abandoned." (Howard 1984, 19) This work, on the other hand, contends that the arms races did push the rivalry's development into the enduring stage. It also ensured that Germany and the United Kingdom would become principal rivalries. Any conflict involving one state of the European continent was destined to interest the other state.

While arms races may be only a probabilistic sufficient condition for rivalry (see chapter five), the concepts are linked together through escalation. Some form of conflict of interest has to trigger an arms race in the first place, but once the conflict of interest is becomes ongoing, an arms race can cause the escalation of hostilities that may manifest in enduring rivalry status or war. Howard (1984) also contends that arms buildups cannot end until the rivalry ends. This view is a little extreme in that a state may lose the ability to produce massive amounts of arms required to sustain a military buildup. It still remains that as long as a principal rivalry is ongoing, the military force structure of the nation will be orientated towards that rivalry.

The most dangerous rivalries are those that perpetuate the realist myth of power politics. A state feels threatened by another and attempts to build its own external and

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[95] This is my view of the rivalry.

internal power through power politics foreign policies. The opposing state, seeing these increases in measurable, power resorts to increases in its own power. It is during these escalating spirals of hostility that a dispute arises between rivals, having little chance of successful mediation.

It should be noted that rivalries are not born out of power considerations, but out of the issues that bring about confrontation. On a local level, that issue is usually territorial claims. On an international level, the issue is generally the leadership of the system and access to trading partners. It is the power considerations, through armament levels, that led states previously in rivalry to escalate to the most severe form of rivalry.

In the case of the Anglo-Germany rivalry, all of these elements were present. Schroeder (2003, 10) writes, "Again the consensus response is that Germany had largely created this perilous situation for itself by the aggressive world policy it had followed since Bismarck's fall in 1890. Its naval race with Britain, its restless quest for colonies, bases, and spheres of influence around the globe, and its frequent resort to bullying and threats, all designed to give Germany hegemony over Europe and a world position competitive with those of Britain, Russia, and the United States, provoked the alliances, ententes, and armaments races, first at sea and then on land, which made Germans now feel encircled and threatened." There first was a series of territorial disputes at question. A naval arms race set off a particular conflict spiral between the nations. Alliance blocks were formed that confirmed that rivalry would escalate any local war into a multiparty interstate war. It was also linked to other ongoing rivalries during the time period in question. All these factors combined to ensure that the rivalry between Germany and the United Kingdom would become enduring and eventually result in war for both parties.

The Franco-German Rivalry

Besides the rivalry with the United Kingdom, France also had an ongoing rivalry with Germany. This rivalry was potentially the most deadly because France wanted to regain its lost territories of Alsace-Lorraine. Any war that Germany undertook would threaten its western border because France would likely join in to regain its territory. Germany would face the possibility of a two front war between France and the United Kingdom on one side and Russia on the other. Germany's best option was to quickly destroy the threat of France and then deal with the eastern threat of Russia.

The threat of France to Germany was ripe for the use of grand strategy. Germany developed the Schieffen plan in 1905, which "provided for the concentration of the main German forces on the French front, the passage through Belgium, and a huge wheeling movement to encircle Paris." (Langer 1952, 913)

Territorial integrity was a constant source of disagreement between France and Germany (and earlier Prussia). The two great powers have always shared a border with no "buffer" region. In the 1830's, disputes revolved around questions of Belgium's independence. In exchange for neutrality in a conflict between Prussia and Austria, France expected to be compensated by territorial acquisitions. Hensel (1998, 99) notes, "The rapid Prussian victory dashed these expectations, at which point France considered mobilizing along the Rhine and threatening armed intervention, as Prussia has done to prevent France from achieving its goals in 1859. The idea of armed intervention was rejected, and France instead demanded compensation for its neutrality in the form of territory along the left bank of the Rhine, the 1814 frontier, Luxembourg, or Belgium."

As Hensel (1998) suggests, the Luxembourg crisis in the winter of 1866-1867 was an important turning point for the rivalry. The crisis was a result of Napoleon's efforts to acquire Luxembourg (protected by Prussia) from the King of the Netherlands (Langer 1952). France's failures to reduce nationalist fears in Germany led to the development of the crisis. An international conference was held in London from May 7 through 11th. It was agreed that Prussia would abandon its garrison in Luxembourg, and the territory's independence would be guaranteed by the great powers. France failed in its efforts to gain territory. Langer (1952, 687) notes, "this settlement was a profound humiliation for Napoleon, who henceforth looked upon a final reckoning with Prussia as inevitable, reorganized his army and initiated negotiations for an alliance with Austria and Italy." Although it did not ally with Austria, France eventually allied with Russia and signed a neutrality pact with Great Britain. It was at this point that the modern rivalry truly began, with the reorientation of the strategic plans in France and the use of alliances to manage any potential conflict between the two nations.

France, determined to humiliate Prussia, engaged in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1871, which it lost. The war resulted in both the unification of north and south Germany and the proclamation of William I as the German Emperor. The Alsace-Lorraine territory was annexed, thus designated *Reichsland* and made common property of all German states (Langer 1952, 689). As Thompson (2003, 7) notes, "If Wilhelm I had not annexed Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War, there might have been no Franco-German rivalry." The dissatisfaction that resulted from the loss in 1871 resulted in a long-standing rivalry between France and the new German state.

Alliances were key to the rivalry between France and Germany. Langer (1952, 101) notes, "Bismarck's foreign policy after the Franco-Prussian war was aimed primarily at securing Germany's position in Europe without entering into another war. He pursued this through a number of complex alliances, including the Three Emperor's League of Germany, Austria, and Russia (1881-87), the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria in 1879, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1882." While the alliance patterns changed between 1870 and 1914, one partner remained the same, Austria. This was a result of the system of rivalries in Europe. Austria was the only major power (beside possibly Italy) that did not have any outstanding issues with Germany.

Arms buildups are not simply a material process. Force modernization was an important part of the process. Each state was aware of the potential divisions it would face and reorganized constantly to face threats. Terms of service were an important issue for internal politics. Civilians understandably did not want conscription and resisted long terms of service. Military planners wanted the troops they had on the field as long as possible. Constant reorientation would mean constant training and reorganization. On the land, the German army was seen as the most effective before 1914. The army's belief that it could engage reservists in the early days of the war led to its plan to attack France through Belgium due to the need for a wide battlefield for operations. The arms buildups both prepared the military and society for war.

Along with preparing a state for war, arms buildups also rallied the economies. The effects of arms buildups were too wide reaching to stop immediately. Before World War I, Europe was involved in something of a industrial arms complex where the

manufactures of weapons were necessary allies in the war plans of nations. While the manufactures did not cause war to break out for a need for profit, they did ready the states for war by advancing technology, arming the military, and mobilizing the economy. The arms buildups in 1912-14 allowed the European powers to be able to pursue a process of militarized diplomacy where any threat made could be backed up with hostile actions. This pattern of force modernization and militarized diplomacy applies to the Franco-German rivalry.

This case follows a typical pattern. Early conflicts were of a territorial nature. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the defeat in the Franco-Prussia war entered the rivalry into a new stage with the new German state. Once this occurred, Germany and France both sought to enhance their security through alliances and military buildups. France allied with Russia and ended colonial conflicts with the United Kingdom. In the meantime, Germany fostered a strong connection with Austria. The result of this course of events was manifested as an enduring rivalry and war once again in 1914.

The Austro-Italian Rivalry

Analysis of the rivalry between Italy and Austria seems like a perfect example of history done by hindsight. Italy did not live up to its alliance commitments during 1914 and historians tend to revisit why this happened. It is through the analysis of rivalry, and specifically, the Austro-Italian rivalry, that one can see why Italy did not join the war on the side of the central powers.

The origins of the Austria-Italian rivalry can be traced to the Italian War of Independence, 1848-49. Austria's victory in the conflict convinced the Italian republics

that they would need to find outside support to prevent Austria from intervening in Italian unification efforts. In 1858, France and Piedmont allied to counter Austria. Italy was to be unified under a federation of four states, the Upper Italian Kingdom, the Kingdom of Central Italy, Rome, and the Kingdom of Naples. In exchange for their support, the French received the territories of Nice and Savoy. The conflict continued until 1866 when the treaty of Vienna was signed on October 12 (Langer 1952, 659). Venetia was ceded to Italy after Austria granted the territory to France. Lingering issues resulting from the Italian-Austrian wars led to a continued rivalry.

Relations remained strained with Austria due to irredentalist claims in Trentino, Triest, and Dalmatia. The relations between the states also conflicted over the course of Albania (Joll 1992, 32). Italy had as recently as 1912 renewed its alliance commitments with Germany and Austria, but the rivalry still lingered. Stevenson (1996) details the ongoing arms race between the states. The alliance ties between Austria and Italy had nothing to do with their ongoing rivalry, but represented a German effort to gather support against France and Russia. The alliance here is spurious to the overall resulting rivalry. The rivalry had already begun once Italy joined the triple Entente, and that behavior is explained by the power considerations of Europe and the diplomatic effort to balance nations, regardless of interests.

Although there was an ongoing rivalry between Austria and Italy, there was no indication that either was prepared to go to war with the other again. Joll (1992) points out that internal Italian public opinion would not allow Italy to fight on the side of Austria in any war. The only certainty was that the Italians would not fight alongside the Austrian's unless granted territorial tributes. Italy did not join the war on the Austria-

German side because it did not feel that the alliance treaty obligated it to do so if Germany and Austria were the aggressors in the conflict. Italy was prepared to join the fight if it was given territorial compensation by Austria, but it eventually switched sides and joined with the Triple Entente after World War I had begun.

The Russo-German Rivalry

As Thompson (2003, 20) notes, "the rivalries linking Germany to France, Russia, and Britain formed a quadrilateral set."[96] Germany refused to settle its rivalries as Great Britain did prior to the 1900's. This then set up a situation where Germany had ongoing rivalries with three major states at one time and thus had to settle on strategic plans to deal with each and avoid the destruction of the German state if war was to come.

While Germany was the rising power in Europe before the war, Russia had the most potential power available. Russia was the biggest landmass and had the greatest number of people to draw on for war. Despite this potential, Russia had little actual power. It had recently suffered the humiliation of losing to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, and had also given way to Germany during the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. Germany feared the potential of Russia, but it had little to worry about before World War I. Russia had no aggressive ambitions towards Germany on any issues directly between the nations. Poland served as a buffer region to delineate the two states. This formed a rivalry because both sides feared the threat of the other, but it did not arise

[96] Alternatively, what I would call it a complex rivalry, see chapter seven.

due to territorial or policy questions.[97] This rivalry is rather what Thompson would call a global positional rivalry (Thompson 2001).

Land based arms buildups had a significant effect on the ability of the belligerents to enter the war in the first place. Russian capabilities were the key to the arms buildups in European land armies. Before 1914, Russia was not prepared to risk war with Germany to support Serbia. After defeat during the Russo-Japanese war, Russia needed to rebuild both its army and navy. Until 1910, the navy was given priority. During 1910, the army embarked on a restructuring plan aiming at creating an offensive force capable of attacking Germany and Austria. By 1914, Russia had completed an expensive process of railroad modernization on its borders with Germany and Austria, which led it to attack the two nations quicker in 1914. Schroeder (2003, 10) notes, "Russia's announced plans for military expansion, scheduled for completion by 1917, would make the German army decisively inferior to its enemies' in number, just as the German navy already was, so that Germany would be critically vulnerable on land as well as sea." Russia was catching up to Germany militarily and would soon be able to challenge Germany's land based dominance in Europe.

The Serbian-Austrian Rivalry[98]

The origins of the Austrian-Serbian rivalry can be attributed to the rise in power of the Serbian state and the declining nature of the Austrian empire. The antagonism of the Serbian threat placed tracts of territory in the Austrian Empire in real danger of

[97] Although the rivalry did become deeply linked with the Austrian-Serbian rivalry, which also involved Russia on the Serbian side.
[98] Austrian refers to the Austrian-Hungarian empire in this chapter.

annexation by Serbia.[99] "The treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878) made Serbia completely independent, but Serbia received but slight increase of territory and the coveted provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austria." (Langer 1952, 714)[100] Williamson (1991, 8) also notes, "Magyar ambitions from time to time included the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina-Dalmatia into a greater Hungary. This prospect naturally alarmed the South Slavs and troubled Vienna." The tough policies of the Hungarians towards the Serbs and Croats within the Austrian empire promoted talk of Slavic unity (Williamson 1991, 25). Pleterski (2002, 119-120) notes an important editorial entitled the "Southern Slav Question" in a Vienna newspaper. It reads,

> "Recently a great political problem has re-arisen, which since the foundation of the dualist form of government seemed to be settled, namely the southern Slav question…Here there is developing a powerful group of peoples which will one day inevitably break up the dualist state, for if their four million ever begin to act under a united leadership, it could be even more threatening to the state as a whole the Bohemian quarrel ever was for the Austrian half…But behind our southern Slavs stands the peoples of the Balkans, incessantly restless and insatiable." (Pleterski 2002, 119-120)[101]

Albertini notes, "When the First World War broke out in 1914, a general conflagration had been several times averted in the course of the eight preceding years: in 1906 during the Algeciras Conference; in 1908-9 after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; in 1911 as a result of the Agadir coup; in 1912-13 during the Balkan wars and their aftermath; at the turn of the year 1913-14 in connexion (sic) with the Liman von Sanders mission to Turkey. Though they subsided peacefully, all these crises, far from easing, had aggravated the existing conflicts, among which the relationship between Austria and Serbia was that most fraught with danger." (Albertini 1952, 1) It was the

[99] It was not the other way around as some assume, Austria had no ambitions on Serbian territory (Van Evera 1999).
[100] Austria desired the territories to protect naval installations in Dalmatia (Williamson 1991, 27).

serial nature of these repeated crises between Austria and Serbia, initiated by the Southern Slav question, which directly led to, what was hoped would be a local war. Serbian realpolitik tactics (escalatory bargaining) were encouraged by the support of its benefactor, Russia. The two nations were on the brink of war on three occasions prior to 1914. "Yet historians have often slighted this independence and determination, in part because of the dichotomy between long and short term causes, in part because of their fixation on Berlin, and in part because of their failure to appreciate how close Vienna had already come to war during the twenty months preceding Sarajevo." (Williamson 1983, 10) It was here that the context was set. There were a series of crises involving Serbia and Austria, which signified the onset of rivalry and eventually led to war.

For a few years, the relationship between Serbia and Austria was amicable. In 1881, Serbia completed a secret treaty with Austria were Austria was "practically" given a protectorate over Serbia (Langer 1952, 715). The Serbs were saved from absolute defeat in the war with Bulgaria by the intervention of Austria. The "pig war" between 1905 and 1907, a conflict over tariff policies, raised the tensions between the two states (Langer 1952, 715). "Most important was the so-called pig war which probably did more than anything else to turn Serbia into an irreconcilable enemy of the Empire. The latter had traditionally taken over 80 per cent of Serbia's exports (mainly livestock), but when Serbia placed a large munitions order with a French firm, instead of with Skoda in Bohemia, Austria retaliated by closing the frontier to Serbian livestock." (Mason 1997, 74) While "pig war" may not have started the rivalry, it did end Serbia's economic dependence on the Austrian Empire.

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[101] This editorial notes four million Slavs within the Austrian Empire. Mason (1997, 73) notes that there were 7.3 million South Slavs within the Monarchy and 3.3 million outside the Empire.

Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 led to a period of tension and, then, the Balkan Wars. Langer (1952, 715) notes, "Serbia was obliged to back down, but the crisis left a legacy of hate." Austria successfully blocked efforts of Serbian expansion, but also resulted in the "marked growth of Yugoslav agitation and the revival of Slavic activity within the monarchy." (Langer 1952, 695) Schroeder (2003, 12) notes, "Meanwhile Austria-Hungary's worst rivals and enemies, Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro, had emerged from the Balkan Wars stronger, more confident, and more hostile, and Russia, aided by its ally France, seemed poised to consolidate its dominance over the entire region by reviving and expanding the Balkan League that it had sponsored in 1912." Serbian policy after this time focused on stirring up the nationalist sentiments in its own population and of Serbs within Austria (Williamson 1991, 27). "The removal of the two provinces from the Dual Monarchy became an avowed goal of many Serbo-Croatian intellectuals and political leaders. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy soon saw itself engaged in a campaign to protect its share of the spoils of the Ottoman empire." (Williamson 1991, 28)

For the Serbian-Austrian rivalry, it is important to note the linkage with Russia. Russia was the protector of Serbia. "Pan-Slavism was less threatening to the Dual Monarchy than Russia's moral and tangible support of South Slav activities inside the Habsburg monarchy. For the Russians did encourage Serbian propaganda for a greater Serbia or a Yugoslav state that could only come at the Habsburg expense." (Williamson 1991, 116) The tension arising after Serbian-Bulgarian war in 1885, led to the non-renewal of the Triple Emperor's alliance between Austria, Germany, and Russia (and also

the renewal of the Triple Alliance with Italy and Germany). Russia also recently failed in the Russo-Japanese war. Therefore, Russia could not afford another loss of prestige.

Thompson (2003, 19) also notes, "the course of Serbian-Turkish rivalry (and those involving Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey as well) seems to have indirectly escalated tensions in the Austria-Serbian rivalry." While Serbia lacked formal alliances, it did sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Greece in 1913.

The Serbia-Austria rivalry was ripe for conflict by 1914. This rivalry, born out of the independence movement in Serbia, was punctuated by the territorial claims both nations had on Bosnia and Herzegovina. "On the other hand, informed Habsburg observers worried about the future Serbia acting as a kind of Italian Piedmont, as an attractive alternative to the South Slavs living within the monarchy…No one wanted those two provinces (Bosnia-Herzegovina), however troublesome, to be snatched away by a new Piedmont or a revived Ottoman empire (Williamson 1991, 8). The declining power of Austria and the growing power of Serbia collided into a rivalry that experienced repeated crises up until 1914. Though power alone cannot account for rivalry, it is how power is handled that matters in this case.

Imperial Rivalries

The Colonial era was ending before World War I.[102] Almost every territory available had been colonized. The problem now lay in conflicts between colonies controlled by other states. Imperial rivalries broke out over competition to control

[102] Choucri and North (1975) suggest that "lateral pressure" resulted in the colonial expansion of the European powers. Lateral pressure is the desire for external territorial in response to the constraints posed by a congested population. They argue that war results when internal pressure for expansion increases and the state is a dissatisfied power.

potential colonial territories and trading spheres. States now needed to safeguard their frontiers in response to new colonial threats.

Britain and Russia have maintained an imperial rivalry since the early 1800s, and both have had competing interests primarily in Asia. To settle their outstanding colonial rivalries, Britain and Russia signed the *Treaty of St. Petersburg* in 1907. The treaty divided Persia, the center of the ongoing rivalry, into formal spheres of influence. "British efforts from 1890 on to reach an agreement with Russia over the Middle East culminating in their 1907 convention on Persia and Central Asia, were designed to prevent German penetration of this region – an aim Russia shared." (Schroeder 2003, 34) Britain and France also maintained an imperial rivalry until the entente of 1904. The entente settled territorial questions between the two nations over the fate of Morocco and Egypt. "The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale in 1904 was intended to keep Germany from interfering with exclusive British and French control in Egypt and Morocco." (Schroeder 2003, 34)

France and Germany's regional rivalry also extended into colonial disputes. In the 1840's, the French were involved in disputes over the 2nd Syrian war. The 1st and 2nd Moroccan crises represented attempts by Germany to limit French influence in Morocco. The French were successful, leading to increased regional tensions. France's repeated diplomatic victories contributed to its regional rivalry with Germany, but Germany was not prepared to fight France over colonial issues.

By about 1900, the idea of conflict with another European Great Power over colonial issues had diminished.[103] The most important threat now lay in the continental interactions of the nations. Old territorial claims resurfaced in Europe. The empires of Austria and the Ottoman Empire were collapsing, adding new territorial concerns. It was only a matter of time before continental pressures pushed the regional rivalries to the forefront of European relations.

Principal Rivalries

Regional rivalry will always trump imperial rivalry. When a state becomes a world power and builds influence throughout the world, it will always spur up imperial rivalries. Yet, imperial rivalries are of little importance when the home front is threatened. Britain saw Belgium's neutrality as an important part of its regional obligations, part of its "vital interest." Britain was to guarantee Belgium neutrality, and that was the most important issue close to home. (Joll 1992:26)

Britain was also concerned with the raising naval power of Germany, which would threaten its control of seas throughout the world and close at home. States can maintain many rivalries at once, each linking to others and increasing the severity of conflict between the dyad (see chapter seven), yet one will always take priority over the others. Before the outbreak of war, Britain was in a principal rivalry with Germany, France with Germany, and Russia with Austria. It was at this point that these rivalries trumped all other ongoing concerns and led to a spiral of war between rival alliance blocks.

[103] To be specific, 1904 is an important turning point. Britain and France settled their outstanding colonial issue. In addition, by 1904, the British government began to realize the threat that the Germany navy posed

The July crisis brought up a dispute between Austria and Serbia. Russia intervened on the side of Serbia while Germany sided with Austria. France then sided with Russia as dictated by their defense pact. Germany then attacked its rival France through Belgium, which lead to the entry of Britain. It was not the imperial concerns of nations that brought about World War I, but the principal regional rivalries that sparked the world war.

Arms Races[104]

This project has argued that arms races are destabilizing forces that increase the probability of both war and rivalry. World War I serves as a perfect example of this empirical proposition. Herrmann (1996, 6) notes, "The process tended to create perceptions that windows of opportunity for successfully fighting a war were closing, due to the belief that a rivalry could draw upon immense resources in the future while one's own side was approaching the limits of its capacity." Arms races in Europe suggested a rise in the capabilities of one state would threaten the national security of another state.

That there were a system of rivalries prior to World War I would almost by empirical fact (see chapter 5), necessitate that there are multiple arms races occurring prior to the war. Kennedy (1985, 7) finds, "Between 1900 and 1914, military expenditures more than doubled in Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary and almost doubled in Italy, with the largest rises occurring after 1910." Stevenson (1996) terms the armaments pattern for the period from 1912 until 1914 the "great acceleration."

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to the British Empire (Joll 1992).

[104] Richardson (1960, 77-108) provides an early and useful mathematical examination of the arms races prior to World War I.

Using Sample's (2002) mutual military buildup data, there were fourteen ongoing mutual military buildups in Europe prior to 1914.[105] Austria had arms races with Belgium, Portugal, Yugoslavia, France and Italy. Germany had buildups with Belgium, Yugoslavia, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, and France. Holland also had military buildups with the United Kingdom and Russia. While some of these military buildups were not directional (it is unlikely that Portugal was arming against the Central powers, but internally balancing against the pace of the rest of Europe) and therefore do not necessarily represent states preparing for war, it is still clear that there were a significant amount of mutual military buildups present by 1914. The majority of these were associated with rivalries, and this suggests that they were probabilistic sufficient conditions for rivalry in the early 1900s.

Central to the arms race dynamics was the naval arms race between Germany and the United Kingdom, which had important implications for the Anglo-German rivalry (Kennedy 1976; Kennedy 1980). The desires of the German's to contest the British mastery of the seas reoriented the nation's focus back towards Europe and the regional rivalries in the area. By 1907, Britain had ended all its other ongoing rivalries to focus on the threat presented by Germany. This event was precipitated by the ongoing naval arms race.

Herrmann (1996, 3) notes, "the naval race between Germany and Great Britain was very much in the public eye during the same period, but in some respects it was less important than the development of armies. Fleets were far less vital to the security of continental powers than land forces were." While I would not diminish the importance of the naval arms race, the dynamics of the land based force structures in Europe were an

[105] This index is based on Horn's (1987) specifications, not Diehl's (1983).

important factor in the development of rivalries. Russia was experiencing ongoing modernization of its armed forces. In response to its diminished capabilities in Europe and the loss of the Russo-Japanese war, the Russians were expected to completely modernize and revitalize their forces by 1917. In addition, France and Germany were reorganizing their forces, mainly in a shift to professional armies that would not rely on reserve forces for troops during a war.

What first explains the arms races? Common explanations suggest that internal pressures and technological change result in arms racing behavior. Stevenson (1996, 13) writes, "we are left with the action-reaction model, but this fails to explain how a competitive escalation was triggered in the first place. This study will argue that internal pressures and technological change both contributed, but that the international crisis of the pre-war decade, long emphasized in diplomatic accounts of the origins of the war, were the essential destabilizing factor." That international crises define rivalry under the Diehl and Goertz (2000) operationalization of the term suggests that rivalries led to the armament patterns in Europe. Those armaments patterns consequently led to the war through their destabilizing nature and idea that "windows of opportunity" were presenting themselves.

As was found in chapter 6, the arms races in Europe do not occur early in the life of the rivalries. What they do indicate is the development of severe rivalry and the reorientation of goals in the face of dangerous adversaries. By 1900, rivalries involving every major power in Europe had already begun. As Herrmann (1996) notes, "Where perceptions of military strength were concerned, however, Europe underwent a radical change between 1904 and 1914." The arms races after 1905 shifted the focus of the

rivalries towards the demands that a continental war would place on their armies. Through this fact, the arms races intensified and eventually led to war. Chapter 6 found, empirically, that if a rivalry dyad experiences an early arms race (during the first two disputes), it is likely to engage in war, and the facts presented in this case study support this finding.

Alliances

Alliances are commonly assumed to promote the balance of power. Joll (1992, 45) notes, "the theory, if that is not too grand a term, by which contemporaries justified the alliance system was that it would maintain the balance of power…Many statesmen and diplomats believed that the maintenance of the balance of power would itself prevent war by deterring an aggressor." As we now know from empirical analysis (Senese and Vasquez 2001; 2001; Vasquez 2001; Senese and Vasquez 2002; Vasquez 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2003; Senese and Vasquez 2003), alliances are conversely a step to war, not a step towards peace. The alliance system in 1914 was initially a cause of the rivalries existence, which later then led to the war.

The central alliances involved in the crisis of 1914 were the German-Austrian treaty of 1879 and the Franco-Russian alliance of 1893. Each alliance was a defense pact that obligated each state to come to the others aid if attacked. Italy joined the German-Austrian alliance in 1882.

Germany initially allied with Austria to prevent Russia from attacking Germany. This alliance, also called a restraining alliance, entailed that Germany could moderate Austrian policy in the Balkans. Joll (1992, 46) notes, "Bismarck always regarded the

alliance as a means of restraining Austrian policy in the Balkans and of avoiding a situation in which Germany would be drawn by Austria into a war with Russia to defend Austro-Hungarian interests in south-east Europe." For Austria, the alliance was a way to guarantee the stability of the Empire. Germany was essentially the only ally Austria had, and Germany needed to maintain friendly ties to ensure its survival as a state.

Rapprochement between Russia and France was undertaken to ensure that France would have an ally against Germany if attacked and Russia would have ally against Austria if attacked. The alliances were a way of dealing with Germany's principal rivalries as well as a way to maintain security. As Joll (1992, 47) notes, "the essential part of the German-Austrian alliance was in fact an agreement that if either were attacked by Russia, each would support the other with the whole strength of their empires."

In addition to formal alliances, Britain signed ententes with France in 1904 and Russia in 1907.[106] The ententes settled colonial disputes between the countries and did not call for specific action in case of attack. They only called for consultation if hostilities broke out. While England did make plans to land troops in France in the case of invasion, they were never obligated to do so by the entente agreement. In 1912, France and England also made plans for naval cooperation in the case of war. The Triple Entente did not require England to side with anyone during war and should not be taken as a permanent alignment as some historians mistakenly infer. The Entente only outlined British policy at the time and could be changed if new policies were devised.

The alliance systems before World War I were locked-in due to the rivalry relationships between the states in Europe. Italy is thought of as an unreliable partner in

[106] Williamson (1969) details the entente cordiale between Britain and France as well as the war plans between the two nations.

the German-Austrian alliance, but Italy believed it was not obligated to participate in the war if Germany and Austria were the aggressors. The treaties were formal documents that did obligate states to take certain actions if attacked, and states would lose credibility if they did not commit to their formal alignments (Leeds, Long et al. 2000). States would also lose allies in potential future international disputes if they did not support their ally in the time of crises.

In case of the Austrian-German alliance, it was important that Germany honor its alliance commitments to Austria. Germany's role in the alliance was to manage the foreign policy of Austria. While it did not desire war in this case, it was important to the Germans that they support their alliance partner in this case. Joll (1992, 13) notes, "at the same time Jagow, the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, while realizing Austria's internal weakness, thought that Germany must support their ally at all costs if Austria was to survive as a Great power and be an effective partner in the alliance." Austria was the only reliable ally Germany had left and it was in Germany's interest to keep its ally as a power in Europe. Failure to support Austria during the war would have isolated Germany against all the other great powers in Europe.

The Franco-Russian and German-Austrian alliances also were deeply committed into the state's military plans. If Russia were attacked, France would have a certain amount of time to respond to the aggression. This was done in the event of an attack by the German-Austrian alliance that a two front war would be started to relieve pressure on the side initially attacked. Germany committed to attacking France if Austria was attacked by Russia. German plans called for an immediate attack on France through Belgium with regular and mobilized reserve troops.

Each alliance outlined led to specific rivalries, which in turn escalated tensions once disputes began. These alliances formed early and helped the states' lock into enduring rivalries. Ultimately, through the system of alliances, rivalry patterns began to emerge.

War Plans and Grand Strategy in Rivalry

Grand strategy is a term used to signify the war plans of states in response to potential or actual rivals. Grand strategy encompasses the overall political, economic, and military aims of nations in order to preserve their security and long-term interests (Kennedy 1991). Here, the "peacetime" military strategies of the states involved in World War I are analyzed for their connection to the development of rivalries in Europe prior to the war. While the economic, political, and societal plans of a state are important aspects of grand strategy, this work is concerned with the militarized nature of conflict within rivalries.

Van Evera (1985; 1999) suggests that all the nations of Europe prior to the outbreak of World War I relied on offensive military doctrines. While this may be true, every military strategy that features an attack is an offensive doctrine. What instead matters is that the doctrines existed in the first place and were initiated due to the rivalry dynamics in Europe at the time.

The only reason the war plans were codified is that the nations of Europe had reason to worry about the intentions of their rivals and therefore set upon formal plans for military operations against a rival state.[107] As Kennedy (1979) notes, the lack of study on

[107] This is not to suggest that all the war plans and grand strategies of the nations exhibits an inherent characteristic of strategic cohesion. In fact, most plans were revised by general staffs and domestic politics.

the "comparative element" of grand strategic plans leads one to place the blame of the war on a single nation (Germany). "Each of the war plans, it is worth noting, reflected the respective power's assumptions about what its political, diplomatic, economic, and moral interests were." (Kennedy 1979, 18) From this analysis, it becomes clear that each nation engaged in rivalry by 1914 had grand strategic plans to counter its rival and these plans escalated the rivalries prior to the war.

Germany

Germany's overall grand strategy combines elements of realist doctrine and hegemonic, positional ambitions. Perceiving a naval imbalance, German war plans maintained a strong commitment to the use of overwhelming force on the ground in Europe (Snyder 1984). Schroeder (2003) writes, "behind Germany's various restless impulses and efforts to make gains lay the program and goals of Weltpolitik. This meant essentially trying to maintain the state's security in continental Europe (which, given Germany's central location, required at least half-hegemony there) while simultaneously achieving world power and position in terms of colonies, bases, markets, sea power, and alliances that would enable it successfully to compete with Britain, Russia, and the United States in the twentieth century."

In 1887, the General Staff argued that, "an offensive capability would be needed to launch preventive war against one or both potential enemies." (Snyder 1984, 23) The navy devised a plan in 1897 to invade Holland and Belgium in order to provoke England into attacking Germany on the continent, where they would likely be defeated by the

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Here, the analysis is focused on what the strategic plans were and why they were focused on rival adversaries.

superior German land force (Steinberg 1979). Kennedy (1979, 9) notes, "the astonishing part of this scheme, as he rightly remarks, is not the detailed logistical and technical discussion over its feasibility, but the nonchalance with which the neutrality of both Belgium and Holland were tossed aside. The disregard for the rights of neutral neighbors, the bland assumption that a state's politicians and diplomats served the military rather than converse, and the ideology of Realpolitik which is present in every paragraph of this German plan, should remind us once again of the interpenetration and indivisibility of military and political factors in this matter of war planning."

As early as 1891, a plan was suggested that would engage France through movements in Belgium (Steinberg 1979, 162). Kennedy (1979, 171) also notes early discord and plans against England. In 1897, the Germans faced daunting prospects in any naval confrontation with Great Britain. "Admitting that in existing circumstances a lasting success against the Royal Navy was impossible, Knorr nevertheless argued (to the Kaiser) that energetic action by the German fleet was the better of the two courses open to them. Since Britain's aim would be the naval and commercial destruction of Germany, she would send forces to the German coast as soon after the outbreak of war as possible, but waiting for her in a defensive position would offer few benefits." (Kennedy 1979, 174) It matters little what shape the war plans were to take, only that the plans were focused on their principal adversary and rival, Great Britain. Offensive or defensive, the plans still engaged Britain and sought to destroy its ability to influence the dynamics of a land battle in Europe and/or its ability to successfully blockade hostile European nations from much needed supplies.

In 1878, the elder Moltke outlined a strategy for a two front war by attacking Russia first and then focusing on France (Turner 1979). Count von Schlieffen became the Chief of the German General Staff in 1891 and took over the strategic planning for the army. In 1897, Schlieffen drafted a memorandum that advocated an attack on France through Belgium.

The final war aims of Germany were codified in the Schieffen plan in 1905.[108] This plan dictated that Germany would have to fight a two front war in Europe due to the alliance commitments of France and Russia. To achieve victory, the Germans sought to use a strong force (four fifths of their army) to attack France through Belgium.[109] Once France retired from the war, the remaining forces would be shifted towards Russia. It was assumed that Russia would be slow to mobilize their forces and that the British fleet could be defeated in five days (Kennedy 1979, 175). Snyder (1984, 20) notes, "Every junior General Staff officer, some of whom were avowedly expansionist, were primarily concerned with the threat to German security posed by the encircling Entente. In their view, offense was the best defense." Therefore, Germany was not focused on conquest, but on a quick military victory against its regional rival, France.

Austria

As mentioned previously, Germany created the Schlieffen plan to attack both Russia and France. The two central powers, Germany and Austria, had not combined

[108] That the Schlieffen plan may have been a "pipe dream" in consequential. Herwig (1994, 261) notes, "It was criminal to commit the nation to a two front operational gamble with the full knowledge that the requisite forces did not exist and that, given the mood of the Reichstag and War Ministry, they were not likely to materialize in the near future." The fact is that the nation was committed to the plan, regardless of its capabilities.

[109] The younger Moltke abandoned the plan to attack through Holland in addition to Belgium (Turner 1979).

military plans or coordinated strategies, suggesting that Germany did not expect to rely on Austria during wartime. Herwig (1994, 258) notes, "Schlieffen had grave misgivings about the efficiency of Habsburg forces. He so distrusted Vienna's top military leadership that after 1896-97 he limited contacts to annual festive greetings."

Germany hoped that Austria would engage Russia early in the war, while the Austrians were focused on destroying their rival, Serbia, early (Stone 1979). "Thus both Berlin and Vienna were interested in their ally's taking the offensive against their common enemy in the east whilst each secured a quick victory over a third power." (Kennedy 1979, 9) Little strategic cooperation hindered the development of the cohesive strategic plan between Germany and Austria.

The Austrians had two strategic plans prior to 1914. One, Plan R (for Russia), "involved total mobilization, with Habsburg armies on the offensive in Galicia, on the defensive in the south, and helped by a small German offensive from East Prussia against the Russians." (Williamson 1983, 15) The alternative plan was Plan B, so named for the Balkans. This plan would be put to use if Russia did not enter the war. Here the major offensive force would focus on Serbia and Montenegro. Austria hoped that only Plan B would need to be used, but the Austrian's were prepared for either eventuality.

While Russia was Austria's most dangerous foe, it instead focused its energies on the more immediate rival, Serbia. It would have been logical for Austria to combine with Germany to first attack Russia and end that front, rather than attack Serbia. It is the rivalry with Serbia that led Austria to strike first and with maximum force at the lesser power. A combined strategic maneuver with Germany would have served the long-term interests of the Austrian Empire better than a local attack against Serbia.

Great Britain

Great Britain once possessed overwhelming maritime hegemony across the world. By 1890, however, Britain was no longer the predominate power (Gooch 1994). The concerns Germany raised about their strategic capabilities forced the state to "question, challenge, and modify their strategic presumptions." (Gooch 1994, 278) Germany forced Great Britain to devise an intervention strategy for a continental war. "The issue (Germany) sparked an open contest between sea power and land power advocates that ended with a significant shift of the center of British strategy from the navy to the army." (Gooch 1994, 281)

In 1900, Britain concluded that Germany would be Britain's most likely opponent in any conflict, and then sought to devise a plan to counter that threat.[110] This was the beginning of the "continental commitment of the British forces (Kennedy 1979; McDermott 1979).[111] "In the space of twelve years an intense competition between rival strategies developed, and only the existence of the Committee of Imperial Defense allowed something approaching resolution." (Gooch 1994, 290) It was determined in 1911, that Belgium could not face the German threat alone. An expeditionary force of six divisions would fight alongside the Belgian army to attack Germany. It was also concluded that Britain should be able to help France and that "close cooperation with the French field armies might be the most effective way of protecting Belgium." (Gooch

[110] McDermott (1979) believes that establishment of the General Staff and War Office in 1904 led to the refocus of the strategic plans towards Germany. This view ignores the geo-political realities of the time. By 1904, England has already shifted its focus towards the German threat.
[111] Haggie (1979) notes that Royal Navy was incapable of producing a plan that focused on the naval operations, rather than land based operations, of Britain prior to the war.

1994, 295) Six divisions would tip the balance of the forces towards the French and British side.[112]

While the final plan to face Germany on the continent was not enshrined until 1911, it was considered early in the rivalry by the Generals. By 1900, the debate within Britain had begun concentrating on how to fight the German threat. This early adoption of a strategy (a general strategy without specific plans) contributed to the rivalry between Germany and Britain and reinforced Britain's commitment to support its allies France and Belgium.

France

The general goal of any action against Germany after 1890 aimed to reclaim the territories of Alsace and Lorraine. Kennedy (1979, 4) writes, "the French General staff, thirsting to regain Alsace-Lorraine, was only with difficulty restrained from invading Belgium itself as a flank move against Germany if war broke out." This strategic option proved that Germany's fears of an attack by France, regardless of the situation of war at the time, would occur. It was only because the action by France would shape it as the aggressor did the state decide to abandon those plans. Becoming the aggressor nation would remove England as a potential ally in any continental war.

The initial debate over the French strategy to counter Germany mainly focused on the use of offensive versus defensive plans. "In later decades of the nineteenth century, the former had been preferred in view of Frances's inferiority to Germany in terms of

[112] Williamson (1979, 150) relates this story, "In 1909 Henry Wilson asked Foch, "What would you say was the smallest British military force that would be of any practical assistance to you in the event of a contest such as we have been considering?" "One single private soldier," responded Foch on the instant, "and we would take good care that he was killed."

numbers and mobility; but the rise of the idea of an *offensive a outrance*, based upon the belief that the morale factor was all-important, soon had its effect upon the higher ranks of the French army." (Kennedy 1979, 7) Therefore, France shifted to an offensive strategy to counter Germany since a purely defensive stance would decrease the morale of the troops as well as that of the home front.

Plan XVII was revised in 1911. This plan focused the French efforts on a forward movement into the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (Williamson 1979). It was understood that Belgium could not be used for maneuvers since such would violate the neutrality of the nation and forestall any aide from Britain. The grand strategy of France was thus focused on Germany and reclaiming its lost territories, not on any other threats whether regional or colonial.

Russia

In 1910, early Russian war plans concentrated on the defensive nature of the conflict. After the Agadir crisis in 1911, Russia revised its war plans to take more of an offensive stance at the urging of France (Turner 1979). Snyder (1984, 17) notes, "the General Staff in St. Petersburg, emphasizing their strategic aim of preventing a collapse of the French army, placed the highest priority on an early attack on Germany's rear. However, local commanders in Kiev sought to divert forces for their own offensive, against Austria."

These new offensive plans were both a reaction to increased commitment to Russia's alliance with France and the threat Germany posed to Russia. Plans against

Russia were less immediate since its was assumed Russia posed little imminent danger to Austria or Germany because of the length of time it would take to mobilize its army.

Russia does not seem to fit the typical pattern of the European great powers prior to 1914. The rivalries that involved Russia focused on the potential threat Russia would pose to Germany and Austria. Both sides feared the other, but Russia had little incentive to attack Germany or Austria unless first attacked (or if Russia's near abroad was attacked, i.e. Serbia). Russia could pose very little actual threat until it completed its force modernization efforts in 1917. It is here that the grand strategic plans of the rivals focused on Russia as a target and not on Russia's plans for conquest or territorial gains against its rivals. Russia's main goals were to divert some of the attention on Germany away from France and to protect Serbia from collapse. If war had been avoided until at least 1920 (and the Russia Empire had withstood any internal challenges), it is likely that the state would have developed a typical grand strategy to counter its rivals. The fact is that Russia was not ready for a global war in 1914.

Assessment of Grand Strategy in the 1900's

Herrmann (1996, 4) suggests, "on land, the codification of interlocking mobilization and war plans with a strong emphasis on the offensive were a destabilizing element in crisis decision making." That military plans of the great powers were destabilizing in nature is not an important fact. Of importance was their connection to the rivalry system in Europe at the time. Primarily because these plans were connected to rivalries and increased threat perceptions within rivalries, they became destabilizing factors. Decision-makers within France and Russia were well aware of the German war

plans. These plans then served to intensify the rivalries and lock-in the choices that states had available in 1914, furthermore, the mobilization patterns that states adopted were dictated by the war plans of opposing states. Germany could delay mobilization, but had little incentive to do so since its war plan focused on the rapid deployment of forces to Belgium and France to destroy the threat posed on the Western Front.

Grand strategy is an empty concept without a rivalry. There is no focus to the plans without a rivalry. Here, I have disclosed grand strategic plans by Germany against France, Russia, and England; by Austria against Serbia and Russia; by England against Germany, by France against Germany and Austria-Hungary; and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Under the rivalry system in Europe, the grand strategic plans of states intensified rivalries and consequently outlined the ability of war to spread once it erupted between Austria and Serbia.

Rivalry Linkages in Europe

Prior to World War I, the system of rivalries in Europe were deeply linked through interactions. Each rivalry affected another ongoing rivalry, and thus dictated alliance and arms race patterns. Great Britain, France, and Russia were linked by a common enemy in Germany. Each country ended its rivalries with the other and focused on the most immediate threat, Germany. This strategic threat dictated war plans and was connected to the Triple Entente.

The Triple Entente led Germany to an increased perception of its encirclement by Russia, France, and Great Britain. Germany thus increased its alliance ties to Austria, as Austria was the only major power still not engaged in a rivalry with Germany. Both

Austria and Germany found a common enemy in Russia. While Austria had few direct contentious issues with Great Britain and France, it could not divorce the two states from its own political considerations due to alliance ties and the animosity Germany felt towards the two nations.

Once war broke out between Austria and Serbia, little could be done to unlink the system of rivalries. Germany entered the war on the side of Austria when Russia mobilized in support of Serbia. France then entered the conflict due to animosity towards Germany and its alliance commitments with Russia. Germany, seeking to strike first and remove France from the conflict, violated the neutrality of Belgium and brought in its rival, Britain. The deeply coupled system of rivalries in Europe could not have experienced a limited war as Austria and Germany had wished. By necessity, the linked rivalries dictated at least a regional war involving the system of rivalries that included France, Britain, Russia, Austria, Germany, and Serbia. As the quote in the introduction of the chapter suggests, Germany was naïve to believe that the "troops could have been home before the leaves have fallen from the trees."

Conclusion and Assessment

The goal of this chapter was not to prove other explanations for World War I wrong, but to offer an alternative theory that could incorporate important elements of each proposed theory. With the steps to rivalry theory, I explain the onset of rivalries with the variables of alliance commitments, arms races, territorial disputes, grand strategic plans, and rivalry linkages. This theory then incorporates notions of German guilt for the war (Fischer 1967; 1974; 1975), Austrian guilt (Williamson 1983;

Williamson 1991), grand strategy (Kennedy 1979), rivalry linkages (Thompson 2003), and finally the role of alliances and arms races (Stevenson 1988; Joll 1992; Stevenson 1996). It is hoped that this effort represents an advancement of the cumulation of knowledge about the origins of World War I that incorporates a cohesive theory of rivalry. This case demonstrates the explanatory power of the steps to rivalry theory. I feel that the theory accurately considers important elements regarding the origins of World War I.[113]

Was the area of Serbia a powder keg ready to off in 1914? In this chapter, I have argued that it was not the area of Serbia or the spark of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that led to the war, but the system of rivalries that allowed the war to take the form that it did. Without the rivalries preceding World War I, Austria would not have felt the need to militarily challenge Serbia in the first place. Rather, its rivalry with Serbia ensured that it would take any issue between the nations seriously. As Thompson (2003, 9) contends, "rivalries offer exceptional clues to who is more likely to fight whom because rivals have already pre-selected one another as their most likely enemies and sources of threat." World War I resulted not from power considerations (Copeland 2000) or windows of opportunity (Lebow 1984), but out of the real strategic limitations in Europe as dictated by existing rivalries, which then escalated a local war into a "world" war.

World War I began as a dyadic war between Austria and Serbia, and the rivalry system served as the causal mechanism for the war's contagion through the linkage of

[113] Although it is admitted that domestic factors have been overlooked. Due to the limitations of data, domestic factors were not incorporated into the steps to rivalry theory. One could see though how notions of the hard-liner in the power (Vasquez 1993) can be incorporated into this theory and explanation of

multiple simultaneous rivalries. Grievances manifested themselves in long standing rivalries between nations. The rivalry between the United Kingdom and Germany was the most important in orientating rivalry during this period in that it set off a pattern of arms races and cemented the system of alliances before 1914. As Schroeder (2003) notes, rivalry, the maintenance of peaceful relations, and set rules of the game were essential for maintaining peace in Europe. "Since their rivals shared their assumptions regarding the nature, rules, and stakes of the combined European-world politics game and were therefore equally determined to maintain their favorable positions or improve them, any German-Austria-Hungarian initiative to reverse the existing trends of the game was almost certain to meet strong resistance and produce a direct collision between the two sides." (Schroeder 2003, 47)

The rivalry between Serbia and Austria over territorial questions created the initial trigger for the war. Russia's commitment to Serbia led it to support the Serbs during the conflict. Germany's rivalry with Russia and its alliance with Austria led it to back Austria in the conflict and oppose Russia. Germany's other ongoing rivalry with France led to the war plans that determined that it would attack France prior to attacking Russia to take out the first rival and avoid a long-term two-front war. Britain's commitment to Belgium, its alliance with France and Russia, and its ongoing rivalry with Germany meant that Britain could not remain neutral during the conflict. Through this system, rivalry interactions led to the world war to occur in 1914.

As Joll (1992, 7) notes, "many people in the 1920s blamed the international system, the existence of rival alliances and the evil influence of old diplomacy, and this

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World War I. In the future, a new large-N test of this hypothesis could be incorporated into the theory and the explanation of World War I.

indeed set the scene within which the crisis developed. Once it started, the freedom of action of the civilian ministers was limited, often more than they realized, by the strategic plans and decisions of the general staffs and the admiralties, and these in turn were linked to the vast arms programs which were a feature of the period immediately preceding the war." This idea is precisely the point of this case study. The system of rivalries made the outcome of war almost inevitable. Once Austria decided to send its ultimatum to Serbia and start a localized war, there was little chance that this war could ever remain local. The system of rivalries, with its connection to alliances, arms races, military buildups, linkages to other conflict, and grand strategy almost made the outcome inevitable. All that was needed was a trigger, and that trigger came as the Austrian demands on Serbia in July 1914. It is not accurate to place the blame of World War I on one state (either Germany or Austria-Hungary), but on the whole system of rivalries prior to the war. If those rivalries had been maintained or managed with some sort of major power conference system, the war could have been avoided, but as was pointed out earlier, this counterfactual is illogical in that the resumption of the concert system in 1914 was not an acceptable option to Germany.

Rivalries are a cause of World War I. Rivalries dictated the alliance system before World War I. What then proceeded is that the alliance system dictated who would attack whom and who would mobilize against whom. It was not mobilization itself that caused the war, but it is what mobilization triggered in regards to alliance commitments that matters.

What matters in the international system is who is in a rivalry with whom and how such actors respond to their rivalries. If the rivalries dictated a belligerent response

as accorded by realist folklore, they will proceed to war. The rivalry system before World War I followed a traditional path of realist response. The states in rivalry formed alliances and participated in power politics tactics. Although not part of the steps to rivalry theory, it is also evident that the domestic political situation was dominated by hard-liners.

Rivalry is the situation in which states place themselves in if they are relatively equal and cannot settle disagreements, particularly over territorial questions. The outcome manifests as war when and if power politics foreign policy practices are used. Both rivalry and power politics are necessary for war of relative equals, especially in multiparty wars like World War I. One other finding of note regards the distinction between regional and colonial rivalries. Colonial rivalries are of little importance when regional rivalries show evidence of possible escalation to war, for regional rivalries are the ones that matter for states and trump the concerns of colonial ambitions. States must strive to protect the homeland and, therefore, regional rivalries are more war prone than rivalries that do not take place in the region of the pair of states.

While rivalry may lead one down a path towards war, the outcome is not predetermined. It did not matter what the spark was that lead to World War I, all that was needed was a spark in the first place. World War I could have been avoided if rivalries were managed before the outbreak of war.

CHAPTER X

QUALITATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RIVALRY FORMATION: ENDURING RIVALRY AND THE "FUZZY SET" METHOD

Introduction

The majority of the research in this project has been focused on Large-N quantitative tests of the steps to rivalry theory that explain the development and escalation of rival dyads. Chapters five through eight examined the impact of various factors on the probability of rivalry development. Chapter nine switched efforts to a qualitative case study that found that the steps to rivalry theory could explain the formation of the pre-World War I rivalries.

This chapter will be concerned with a qualitative interpretation of rivalry formation using the qualitative comparative/fuzzy set method (Ragin 2000). This method is suited for the analysis of a medium or small number of cases using an exhaustive qualitative technique. This chapter will conduct a deep case analysis of the 63 enduring rivalries in the Diehl and Goertz dataset (Diehl and Goertz 2000). This analysis will shed further light on the probabilistic necessary and sufficient conditions of rivalry and allude to any multi-causal connections in the data.

The Qualitative Comparative Method and Fuzzy Sets

Charles Ragin's (1987; Ragin and Becker 1992; Ragin 1994; Ragin 2000) research into qualitative research methods has provided important methodological tools for both sociologists and political scientists. He seeks to combine the techniques of

those that analyze cases, or qualitative and intensive research strategies, with those that use quantitative large-N, variable orientated strategies. Ragin argues that conventional statistical techniques do not really apply to the data social scientists use. Researchers can only look at additive phenomena and not multi-causal events. While I do not agree with Ragin's critique of existing statistical techniques, the method he suggests, the qualitative comparative method and the fuzzy set method, may be a useful tool for the analysis of a medium number of cases.

Why the Qualitative Comparative/Fuzzy Set Method?[114]

The main reason to use the qualitative comparative or the fuzzy set method is that we do not have to modify our data or statistical techniques to reflect controls in the data, but only have to test the theoretical propositions in our theories. Ragin (2000, 5) argues that most researchers assume their cases are homogeneous, and efforts should really be focused on explaining the heterogeneity in our cases. It is what sets each case apart from the others, or case diversity, that should be the focus of our research. These techniques are easy to produce in a small number of cases. Ragin's method makes these strategies applicable to a medium number of cases (between 4 and 100). Conventional statistical techniques cannot correctly analyze a medium number of cases (above 200 cases is considered appropriate for logistical analysis) (Long 1997).

The diversity-orientated approach solves the problem for researchers who are looking for a method to analyze more than four cases and less than 100. This method allows for the in-depth investigation of relationships for sets of data that include more than four cases. Before the adoption of this method, it would be difficult to undertake a

qualitative investigation in the factors that promote rivalry in all 63 enduring rivalry cases.

Ragin (2000, 5) notes, "In a nutshell, diversity orientated research attends to heterogeneity and difference, especially to differences in kind, using a configurational approach to social phenomena – viewing cases as specific configurations of aspects and features. This approach searches for heterogeneity within given or preconstituted populations and conceives of difference in terms of kinds and types of cases, replacing the conventional view of difference as variation."

In quantitative studies, causal associations are usually understood through correlations and the additive effects of independent variables. In the comparative method, causal association is understood through multiple conjecture causality. "Causal conditions do not compete with each other, as they do in correlational research; they combine." (Ragin 2000, 33) Causation is a complex phenomenon. Conventional statistical techniques require precise data specifications to analyze the multiple conjunction causation patterns in our analysis. There is no such requirement in the qualitative comparative/fuzzy set method.[115]

The fuzzy set method is a new addition to qualitative comparative method previously explored in Ragin's (1987) *The Comparative Method*. This approach allows for degrees of memberships for cases. Variation may exist within cases. The qualitative comparative method first relied on binary or dichotomous data for each case (Ragin

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[114] This type of research is sometimes called the Boolean approach.

[115] An important negative aspect of the fuzzy set method is ability to "data mine" your analysis. No prior hypotheses are needed to test all possible pairs of jointly sufficient causal conditions. It is the responsibility of the researcher to first develop a theory that would suggest sufficient causes and then test that theory using the method. It would be irresponsible to first test the data and then derive a theory from the findings.

1997). Now the cases can constitute variables to measure how "fully in" a case is regarding a variable.[116] "A fuzzy set, by contrast, permits membership in the interval between 0 and 1 while retaining the two qualitative states of full membership and full non-membership." (Ragin 2000) For instance, I could hypothesize that alliances increase the probability of rivalry development. In logitiscal regression, this independent variable takes a binary, or dummy, form. With the fuzzy set method, I can investigate types of alliances and probability of rivalry. A pair of states that each has outside alliances could be given a score of 1 on the alliance variable. A pair of states that only has one outside alliance could then be given a score of 0.5 to account for the lessor probability that the alliance will affect the rivalry outcome.

The fuzzy set method does not merely transform a binary variable into a continuous variable. Ragin (2000, 6) notes, "A fuzzy set is much more than a continuous variable because it is much more heavily infused with theoretical and substantive knowledge. Fuzzy variables are infused with both qualitative knowledge regarding the case and quantitative aspects regarding the coding of the indicator. Despite the adjective "fuzzy," compared with the conventional variable, a fuzzy set is more empirically grounded and more precise." There is nothing really "fuzzy" about the fuzzy set method; rather, fuzzy sets rely on the ability of the researcher to have a deep understanding of each case and thus impart that knowledge into the construction of a "fuzzy" indicator between 0 and 1.

The fuzzy set method also allows the investigation of set relationships. Ragin (2000, 50) notes, "Sometimes populations contain subgroups that are so distinct that they

[116] It is important to remember that any "fuzzy" variable is subjective. It is coded by the researcher based on their knowledge of the case. This measure could be un-replicateable in some situations. Here I have

should be treated as analytically separate populations, not as members of the same population." There are many roads to rivalry, but this project investigates the power politics road to rivalry. There may be other roads to rivalry or different sets within the power politics road. For example, those states that engage in military buildups may behave much differently than states that only engage in alliance formation behavior. It may also be that those states that include major powers may also perform differently than minor power dyads. These types of set relationships can be investigated through the fuzzy set method.

The fuzzy set or qualitative comparative method can also be used to understand probabilistic necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions involve cases in which each time the outcome is observed, the cause is present. Sufficient conditions are cases in which each time the cause is observed, the outcome is also always present. Understood as complex causation, necessary and sufficient conditions require the combination of causes be observed for the outcome (necessary), and each combination results in the outcome (sufficient).

Necessary and sufficient causes can also be understood to be probabilistic. The requirement that necessary and sufficient causes be absolute in the data is a strict requirement that most social science data cannot meet. Ragin (2000, 109) argues, "The procedures outlined in the previous sections for assessing necessity and sufficiency, therefore, must be modified to take these troubling aspects of social data – error, chance, randomness, and other factors – into account. In short, these common data and evidence problems provide a very strong motivation to employ analytic techniques that make some use of probability theory, especially techniques that address the problem of drawing

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laid out clear coding rules for my "fuzzy" variables that would lead them to be easily replicated by others.

inferences from imperfect evidence." This is not to suggest that the rivalry data and independent variables are flawed, but that in the analysis of social events, the causes are not always uniform and predictable for all cases.

Table 1 outlines the cutoff points used earlier in chapter five to analyze probabilistic necessary and sufficient conditions. These cut-off points will be utilized in this chapter. "In short, it is possible to assess the quasi-sufficiency of causal combinations using linguistic qualifiers such as "more often than not" (.5), "usually" (.65), and "almost always" (.80)." (Ragin 2000, 109)

Necessary conditions entail the analysis of outcomes. A condition is necessary if all the examples of the outcome category display a particular common feature. Ragin finds that this type of research is an important aspect of the qualitative comparative method. "The emphasis on outcome-oriented analysis argues that researchers should begin their research by focusing on the best and clearest examples of whatever outcome they are interested in." (Ragin 2000, 41) Geddes (1990) and Dion (1998) also explore this aspect of qualitative research.

Chan (2003) undertakes one of the few qualitative comparative investigations in international relations research. He (Chan 2003, 57-58) notes, "Although the Boolean approach has its own limitations, it is more suitable for situations with a relatively small number of cases and variables and when concerns for context sensitivity and causal substitutability are more germane…It provides a way of testing all possible causal combinations and, by way of logical deduction, eliminates irrelevant factors and differentiates the status of relevant ones as necessary, sufficient, or both for the realization of the outcome of interest." In examining the causes of war termination, he

finds that “massive and intense fighting at the outset of the war has been nearly a necessary though insufficient conditions for a quick cease-fire.” (Chan 2003, 49)

At a recent qualitative methods seminar a student asked if the fuzzy set method was really a quantitative method and not a qualitative method. The fuzzy set method relies on both the advances made in statistical techniques and the comparative method. While it produces results in the form of numbers through data, this does not mean that the method is not qualitative. Qualitative methods involve the deep analysis of cases. Analysts are expected to know the details of their data. It is in this way that the fuzzy set method is qualitative. The data is not given, but produced by the researcher who understands the details of each case.

In summary, the qualitative comparative or fuzzy set method allows for the study of diversity in the cases. We are not concerned with what is common for the cases, but with what aspects of the cases are different. The method allows for the investigation of multiple conjuncture causality for a medium number of cases. The researcher must be well familiar with each case and be able to make judgements about the values associated with each independent variable. In the fuzzy set method, the values of the independent variable do not need to be dichotomous, but could take a value between 0 and 1, depending on how “fully in” a case is. This method will allow for a new test of the steps to rivalry theory on the 63 enduring rivalry cases (Diehl and Goertz 2000).

Why Use Qualitative Comparative/Fuzzy Set Method?

- **Interested in the Study of Diversity**
- **Use of Probabilistic Sufficient and Necessary Conditions**
- **Statistical Tests for Probabilistic Sufficient and Necessary Conditions**
- **Have Medium Number of Cases**
- **Interested in Complex Causation**
- **Use "Fuzzy" Indicators**
- **Interested in Set Relationships**
- **Research Goals Focused on Outcomes**

Hypotheses

It is important to remember that the qualitative comparative method relies on a deductive theoretical perspective. Without a theory, efforts to find necessary and sufficient conditions of events in our data become examples of data mining. To first undertake an analysis of the data with the qualitative comparative method, there must first be a strong theory to guide the investigation.

Chapter three outlined the steps to rivalry theory. This theory finds that the development of rivalry occurs through a series of steps that increase the probability that rivalry will result. Namely, power politics steps increase the likelihood that rivalries will form.

There are a few relevant hypotheses that were used in previous analysis that will be extended here. Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 are in regard to the sufficient conditions of enduring rivalries. Politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups are factors that should increase the probability that rivalry will develop. Chapter five found support for both hypotheses by testing the proposition on the 1166 unique rivalry cases. Here, I will test the proposition on the 63 enduring rivalry cases using the fuzzy set method.

Sufficient Conditions

H1.1: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in enduring rivalries.

H1.2: Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in enduring rivalries.

Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.3 regard the necessary conditions of enduring rivalry. Politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups should both be necessary conditions for enduring rivalry. Chapter five found that hypothesis 2.1 cannot be falsified. Hypothesis 2.3 was falsified in the previous analysis, mutual military buildups are not necessary conditions of rivalry. These hypotheses will again be tested using the qualitative comparative method.

Necessary Conditions

H2.1: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.

H2.3: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.

Hypothesis seven regards an independent variable that should increase the probability of rivalry occurrence. Chapter eight found that territorial disputes increase the probability of rivalry formation, and this proposition will again be tested in this analysis.

H7: Pairs of states that experience militarized conflict over a significant number of territorial disputes are more likely to experience rivalry.

As mentioned previously, the qualitative comparative method does not require theories that suggest single causes, but can investigate theories with multiple hypothesized causes. In statistical analysis, this can be done either through additive probabilities (see chapter eight) or interaction effects. With the dichotomous independent variables in this analysis, it is not useful to investigate interactive effects. The qualitative comparative method is better suited for this investigation.

Hypothesis eleven (the final hypothesis in this dissertation) suggests a multi-causal theory of rivalry development. There are a variety of ways the proposed independent variables interact and/or combine to reach a certain outcome. The qualitative comparative method and the software designed to undertake these operations will suggest which types of causal connections can be made (Drass and Ragin 1992; 1999). To start, this analysis suggests that the factors of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, multiple simultaneous rivalries, and territorial disputes combine to produce the enduring rivalry result.

H11: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, participate in multiple simultaneous rivalries, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in enduring rivalries.

Research Design: Variables and Case Selection

Enduring Rivals

The first step in testing the hypotheses identified above involves producing a population of rivalry cases for the outcome variable. Rivalry cases are identified by participation in a certain number of militarized interstate disputes. Militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are defined as "united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996, 163). The intensity scale ranges from threats, to use of force to war. Gochman and Maoz (1984) define MIDs as those disputes that involve independent nations and that must be explicit, government sanctioned events.

According to Goertz and Diehl (1992 and 1993), the rivalry population will include isolated conflicts (1-2 disputes), proto-rivalries (3-5 disputes), and enduring rivalries (6+ disputes in 20 years). Diehl and Goertz (2000) identify and produce a dataset that accounts for all types of rivalry and the militarized disputes that correspond with each rivalry.[117] Here I will focus on the characteristics of the enduring rivalry category. **Appendix 2** lists all 63 enduring rivalries used in this analysis. This study will be primarily concerned with testing the necessary and sufficient conditions of enduring rivalries and how each condition can have an impact on the development of conflict within the rivalry.

There is a potential problem with the "fuzzy set" method that researchers should be aware of. To test a sufficient proposition, there must be a subset within the outcome variable. Without a subset, the analysis is a necessary condition analysis, but the output of the program identifies the results as a sufficient condition test. For there to be a sufficient condition test, the method must explore the proportion of the outcome sample that meets the jointly sufficient requirements of the subset. For example, the samples explored here are the 63 enduring rival dyads, and a subset within this outcome is the major power enduring rivalries. A sufficient condition test would explore the cases within the total sample that meet the jointly sufficient conditions, and then analyze the proportion of those cases that are within the subset. If the conditions meet the 0.50 cutoff point, the program then tests the statistical significance of that proportion against the larger sample.

[117] Available at http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/faculty/diehl.html.

The Independent Variables

The first independent variable is politically relevant alliances (Senese and Vasquez 2003). Politically relevant alliances are those alliances that include either a major power or a minor power in the same region. This specification of alliances provides for the control of spurious alliances; thus, alliances that cannot affect the outcome or initiation of conflict are excluded from the analysis.

Mutual military buildups, as a variable, are taken from Sample's specification (Sample 2002). A buildup has to include an increase in military expenditures for both sides in the dyad. Minor and major power status states are included.

Territorial conflict is also measured in this analysis. As found in chapter 8, territorial disputes increase the probability that rivalry will form. If the dyad has at least twenty five percent of its disputes over territorial revisionist claims (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996), the dyad was given a positive observation for the variable.

Two variables in this analysis are "fuzzy," the first being a linkage variable.[118] In chapter 7, I found that an increase in the number of rivalry linkages results in an increased severity level for the rival dyad. For the enduring rivalry dyads, there are between 3 and 129 linkages for each rival dyad. I divided this indicator into a fuzzy indicator. Those rivals with between 3 and 20 linkages (19 cases) are given a score of .33 (or "more or less out"). Those rivals with between 21 and 46 linkages (20 cases) are given a score of .67, indicating the case is "more or less in" according to Ragin (2000, 156). Finally, those rivals with between 48 and 129 linkages (19 cases) are given a score

[118] As indicated in chapter 7, a rivalry linkage is any rivalry that is ongoing during the duration of a rivalry. For example, if the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a rivalry and the United States has an ongoing rivalry with China, that rivalry is linked. The linkage variable measures the number of simultaneous conflicts a rivalry dyad engages in during its lifetime.

of 1.0. These cases are fully in for the variable. A “fuzzy” indicator can take any value the researcher decides is appropriate. It should also be noted that this type of variable differs from a continuous variable in that only those cases coded as one are fully in.

The second fuzzy variable was developed for politically relevant alliances. The alliance index represents a value between zero and four. The variable is given a code of zero if there is no alliance, one if one side has an outside alliance, two if both sides have an outside alliance, three if the sides are allied to each other, and four if the sides are allied to each other and both have outside alliances. If one side has an outside alliance, the fuzzy score for the indicator is 0.50, not fully in and nor fully out. If both sides have an outside alliance (or are allied to each and both sides have outside alliances), the indicator is given a score of 1, or fully in. If there was no alliance or the dyad was allied to each other, the indicator was given a score of zero. If the dyad was allied to each other and at least one side had an outside alliance, it was coded as one.

Set Relationships

As mentioned previously, an important advantage of the fuzzy set method is the method’s ability to delineate set relationships or group memberships. In this analysis, there will be five distinct sets or groups that will be analyzed for necessary and sufficient conditions. The first set is made up of severe rivalries.

In their analysis of enduring rivalries, Diehl and Goertz (2000, 60) divide the category into two groups, those with between 6 and 13 disputes and those with more than 13 disputes. The probability of war for rivalries with more than 13 disputes is 0.63. There are 27 rivalries with more than 13 disputes, and of those cases, there are 29 wars observed. There are 79 interstate wars in the dataset. Therefore, two percent of the

rivalry population (those with more than 13 disputes) observes 37 percent of the wars in the data. In this analysis, the first set relationship testing the steps to rivalry theory is the severe rivalries with more than 13 disputes.

Thompson (1995) was an early critic of the Diehl and Goertz rivalry dataset. Thompson's (2001) coding of rivalry depends on historical sources and seeks to identify if the opposing sides considered the other side rivals. In this analysis, Thompson's (2001) coding of strategic rivalries will be another set within the enduring rivalry category.[119] For instance, the United States and Peru enduring rivalry is not really a rivalry of equal powers, where each side considered the other a threat. While it did meet the militarized incident requirement, there is no history of equal animosity within the dyad. Forty-six of the sixty-three enduring rivalries meet Thompson's (2001) coding criteria. I will then investigate the characteristics of the strategic rivalry set within the enduring rivalry category.

The final three sets will consist of status types of the rivalry dyads. There are three possible types: major-major, minor-minor, and mixed. In this analysis, I will perform tests on each of the three rivalry sets within the data. There are eleven major power rival dyads, there are 19 minor power rivalry dyads, and 33 mixed status dyads. It may be that different status types have different necessary and sufficient conditions. This analysis will test this proposition to determine the relevant combinations of variables that are jointly sufficient for each status type.

[119] I do not use the Thompson strategic rivals as the initial case selection device because I am concerned with the militarized, and thus dangerous rivalries identified by Diehl and Goertz (2000). I think it is useful to compare results with the Thompson cases, but I mainly rely on those cases selected by the militarized dispute density method.

Results[120]

Necessary Conditions of Enduring Rivalry

Chapter five found support for the proposition that politically relevant alliances are a necessary condition of rivalry, hypothesis 2.1. This chapter also finds support for that proposition. Politically relevant alliances are quasi-necessary conditions for enduring rivalry (Table 35). Sixty of the sixty-three enduring rivalry cases include politically relevant alliances, a proportion of 0.95, which is well above the 0.80 cut off established (see Table 1). It can therefore be said that politically relevant alliances are "almost always necessary" conditions of enduring rivalries.

Table 35
Results for Analysis of Necessity for Enduring Rivalries with Relevant Alliances
N= 63
Test Proportion: 0.80
*p<0.05

Casual Condition	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	Z	P
Territory	33	0.52		
Mut. Mil. Buildup	25	0.40		
Linkages	20	0.32		
Relevant Alliance	60	0.95	2.87	0.002

The pvalue for the relationship between alliances and enduring rivalry is 0.002, indicating that the relationship is not random.[121] We can have some confidence that the results explain a large proportion of the enduring rivalry category. The "fuzzy" alliance variable also works well with the enduring rivalry category, per Table 36. The proportion

[120] The results in this chapter were obtained using QCA 3.0 and FS/OCA 1.0 software that can be obtained from www.nwu.edu/sociology.

for the fuzzy alliance variable and enduring rivalry is 0.62, above the 0.50 cutoff. A majority of enduring rivalries have a positive observations for the fuzzy alliance variable. It can then be said that the fuzzy alliance variable indicates a "more often than not" necessary condition of enduring rivalry. The pvalue for the relationship between "fuzzy" alliances and enduring is 0.039, which falls below the conventional 0.05 cutoff point.

Table 36
Results for Analysis of Necessity for Enduring Rivalries with Fuzzy Alliances
N= 63
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.05

Casual Condition	**# Cases**	**Proportion of Cases**	**Z**	**P**
Territory	33	0.52	0.025	0.401
Mut. Mil. Buildup	25	0.40		
Linkages	20	0.32		
Fuzzy Alliance	39	0.62	1.76	0.039

If the test proportion is set to 0.50, it can also be said that territorial disputes (in this case, more than 25 percent territorial disputes) represent a necessary condition of enduring rivalry (Table 36). Thirty-three of the sixty-three enduring rivalries have at least 25 percent of their disputes over territorial issues. The variable is above the 0.52 cutoff point, but is not statistically significant at 0.401.

To this point, hypothesis 2.1 cannot be falsified. Relevant (and fuzzy) alliances are necessary conditions of enduring rivalry. The mutual military buildup measure does not indicate that the variable is a necessary condition of enduring rivalry (see Table 35

[121] In the fuzzy set method, the Hays Z value assess the difference between an observed population and a population proportion (Ragin, 2000: 11). The pvalue is then calculated using the z value, depending on the desired benchmark pvalue of either .10 or .05.

and 36). Only 25 of the 63 enduring rivalries have mutual military buildups. Hypothesis 2.3 is therefore falsified.

Sufficient Conditions of Enduring Rivalry

Table 37 presents the results for the test of joint necessity for the variables in the steps to rivalry model.[122] Hypothesis eleven suggests that if a pair of states form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, participate in multiple simultaneous rivalries, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, they will be more likely to become enduring rivals. These conditions become jointly sufficient in the qualitative comparative method. The method investigates which conditions in combination are sufficient for the outcome. The method produces a subset that includes each case meeting the complex causal outcome, and then evaluates sufficiency based on that subset. Ragin (2000, 233) indicates, "It is important to note that the evaluation of sufficiency just described also can be seen as a test of whether cases displaying the causal combinations form a subset of the cases displaying the outcome." The analysis seems like an extension of a necessary condition test of the hypothesis, but it really evaluates the subset of cases that meet the proposed conditions. It is how the method analyzes the subset of cases that makes this test a sufficient condition test. The analysis in Table 37 does not look at a subset of enduring rivals, so I call this test a "joint necessary condition" test rather than a joint sufficient condition test.

[122] As noted earlier, the output for this test assumes that this is a sufficient condition test, but when there is no subset within the outcome, the analysis really is a joint necessary condition analysis.

Table 37
Results for Analysis of Joint Necessity for Enduring Rivalries with Relevant Alliances
N= 63
Test Proportion: 0.65
*p<0.05

Casual Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Territory + Alliance	31	1.00	0.5
MMB + Alliance	24	1.00	0.00
Link +Alliance	60	1.00	0.5
Terr + MMB + Alliance	17	1.00	0.001
Terr + Link + Alliance	31	1.00	0.5
MMB + Link + Alliance	24	1.00	0.00
Terr + MMB + Link + Alliance	17	1.00	0.001

MMB = Mutual Military Buildup

For this test, the proportions in Table 37 are all 1.0 because each jointly necessary condition listed has positive observations for each enduring rivalry. For example, the causal combination of territorial disputes and politically relevant alliances has a proportion of 1.0, meaning that each of the 31 cases that have this causal combination are enduring rivalries. Another way to phrase the relationship is that 31 of the enduring rivalry cases have territorial disputes and politically relevant alliances. In this way, the test in Table 37 can be seen as a jointly necessary condition test. In the evaluation of set relationship sufficiency within the enduring rivalry category, the proportions will vary according to the subset.

Table 37 indicates which conditions are jointly necessary for rivalry. There are seven possible causal combinations from which the qualitative comparative method finds a significant proportion of the positive outcomes, or enduring rivalries. Of those seven causal combinations, four of them are jointly sufficient and statistically significant.

The combination of mutual military buildups and politically relevant alliances were present for 24 of the 63 enduring rivalry cases, meaning that 24 enduring rivals exhibit this causal combination. The pvalue for this relationship is 0.00, indicating statistical significance. The analysis also indicates that the causal combination of mutual military buildups, politically relevant alliances, and rivalry linkages is jointly necessary for 24 cases. The pvalue for this relationship is 0.00.

Of interest is the causal combination of politically relevant alliances, territorial disputes, and mutual military buildups. These factors are jointly necessary for 24 cases. The pvalue is 0.001, indicating that the relationship is not random. There are also 17 cases where the causal combination of politically relevant alliances, territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, and rivalry linkages are jointly sufficient factors for enduring rivalry. The pvalue for this relationship is 0.001. The number of cases that meet the rivalry linkage causal condition does not vary. All cases that include the combination of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, and politically relevant alliances also include rivalry linkages as a positive factor.

Table 38
Rivalry Cases that are Jointly Necessary
Factors include: territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and relevant alliances (17 cases)

Iraq and Kuwait
Egypt and Israel
Syria and Israel
Israel and Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan and Pakistan
China and Japan
China and India
India and Pakistan
Thailand and Cambodia
Belgium and Germany
France and Germany
France and Turkey
Greece and Turkey
Somalia and Ethiopia
Morocco and Algeria
Iran and Iraq
Iraq and Israel

Table 37 indicates that, taken together, the factors of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances are jointly necessary for enduring rivalry in 17 cases. Table 38 lists these cases. Of note is the prevalence of Middle Eastern rivalries that meet these causal conditions.

Table 39
Results for Analysis of Joint Necessity for Enduring Rivalries with Fuzzy Alliances
N= 63
Test Proportion: 0.80
*p<0.05

Casual Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Territory + Fuzz-Ally	31	1.00	0.5
MMB + Fuzz-Ally	24	1.00	0.005
Terr + MMB	18	1.00	0.018
Link + Fuzz-Ally	60	1.00	0.5
Terr + Link	33	1.00	0.5
MMB + Link	25	1.00	0.004
Fuzz-Ally + Terr + MMB	17	1.00	0.023
Fuzz-Ally + Terr + Link	31	1.00	0.5
Fuzz-Ally + MMB + Link	24	1.00	0.005
Terr + MMB + Link	18	1.00	0.018
Fuzz-Ally + Terr + MMB + Link	17	1.00	0.023

Table 39 presents a similar analysis when compared to Table 37. Table 39 replaces the relevant alliance variable with a "fuzzy" alliance variable.[123] This variable accounts for the increased relevance of pairs of states that both have outside alliance commitments. The results are similar to Table 37 and do not deviate notably. For example, the jointly necessary combination of alliances, territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, and linkages accounts for the same 17 cases identified in Table 38. Table 39 does indicate that eleven causal combinations are jointly necessary for enduring rivalry. Of those eleven combinations, seven are statistically significant (only four are in Table 37). In Table 39, the causal combinations of territorial disputes and mutual military buildups; mutual military buildups and linkages; and territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, and linkages are each jointly necessary for enduring rivalry.

Set Relationships

Severe Rivalries

Severe rivalries are those rivalries that have more than 13 disputes during their lifetime. These rivals are more likely to go to war and could be an important subset of the enduring rivalry category. Table 40 conducts a sufficient condition analysis on the severe rivalry subset. This test is truly a sufficient condition test in that the method analyzes how many of the cases in the subset include conditions that make the outcome (severe rivalries) jointly sufficient for the subset. In this subset, four different causal combinations can result in severe rivalry. Each is statistically significant.

Table 40
Results for Analysis of Sufficiency for Enduring Rivalries: Severe Rivalry Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 27 (42.9% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases
MMB + Alliance	24	0.50
Terr + MMB + Alliance	17	0.529
MMB + Link + Alliance	24	0.50
Terr + MMB + Link + Alliance	17	0.529

Mutual military buildups and politically relevant alliances account for 24 jointly sufficient cases in the enduring rivalry category. Looking at the severe rivalry subset, 12 of these cases result in a dangerous rivalry with more than 13 disputes. We also note that mutual military buildups, rivalry linkages, and politically relevant alliances are jointly

[123] A separate analysis was run for the "fuzzy" alliance variable because it would be inappropriate to have

sufficient for the same 12 cases of severe rivalry. Jointly, these factors account for 12 of the 27 severe rivalries. The proportion for these cases is 0.50, indicating that jointly; these factors "more often than not" result in severe rivalry.

Of interest is the causal combination of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, and alliances. Together, these factors account for 17 of the enduring rivalries. In the severe rivalry subset, jointly, these factors account for 9 rivalries (0.529 of 17 cases). The same cases are also jointly sufficient combinations if the linkage factor is added. Table 41 lists these cases. These nine cases result in the most severe enduring rivalries and follow the typical path outlined in the steps to rivalry theory.

Table 41
Rivalry Cases that are Jointly Sufficient for Severe Rivalries
Factors include: territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and relevant alliances (9 cases)

Greece and Turkey
Somalia and Ethiopia
Iran and Iraq
Egypt and Israel
Syria and Israel
China and Japan
China and India
India and Pakistan
Thailand and Cambodia

Thompson Rivalries

The next important subset analyzed is the Thompson (2001) strategic rivalries. Of the 63 enduring rivalries, 46 are coded as strategic under Thompson's (2001) coding rules. This indicates that these rivalries recognize the other as a rivalry and are militarized in nature (more than six disputes).

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two independent variables that measure the same factor, alliance commitments.

Table 42
Results for Analysis of Necessity for Enduring Rivalries: Strategic Rivalry Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 46 (73% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Condition	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	Z	P
Territory	28	0.61	1.33	0.092
Mut. Mil. Buildup	20	0.43		
Linkages	16	0.35		
Alliance	43	0.93	5.75	0.000

Interestingly, within the strategic rivalry subset, territorial disputes become statistically significant necessary conditions of strategic rivalry. Table 42 shows that the proportion of cases is 0.61, indicating that 28 of 46 strategic rivals in the data have fought over a significant amount of territorial disputes. The pvalue for this relationship is 0.092, which is statistically significant below the 0.10 level. Alliances are also a necessary condition; 43 of the 46 cases exhibit politically relevant alliances. This factor is statistically significant at 0.000.

Table 43
Results for Analysis of Sufficiency for Enduring Rivalries: Strategic Rivalry Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 46 (73% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Terr + MMB + Alliance	17	0.765	0.025
Terr + Link + Alliance	31	0.839	0.5
Terr + MMB + Link + Alliance	17	0.765	0.025

Table 43 displays the three jointly sufficient causal combinations for strategic rivalry. Of interest are the statistically significant factors of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, alliances, and rivalry linkages. Thirteen of the 17 cases of strategic rivalry meet this condition in the data, indicating a proportion of 0.765. It can then be said that the causal combination of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances are "usually sufficient" conditions for strategic rivalry.

Table 44
Rivalry Cases that are Jointly Sufficient for Strategic Rivalries
Factors include: territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and relevant alliances (13 cases)
Iraq and Kuwait
Egypt and Israel
Syria and Israel
Afghanistan and Pakistan
China and Japan
China and India
India and Pakistan
France and Germany
Greece and Turkey
Somalia and Ethiopia
Morocco and Algeria
Iran and Iraq
Iraq and Israel

Table 44 identifies the 13 strategic rivalries that follow the steps to rivalry path. This table is similar to Table 38, but drops the rivalries that are not strategic, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Cambodia, Belgium and Germany, and France and Turkey.

Major Power Rivalries

There are eleven major-major enduring rival dyads. Table 45 indicates that two necessary conditions are relevant for this subset of rivals. First, alliances are a necessary

condition of enduring rivalry. All eleven cases exhibit relevant alliance formation. Each eleven cases also have rivalry linkages. It seems that major power rivals are constantly involved in other ongoing disputes. A high amount of rivalry linkages (as measured by the "fuzzy" linkage variable) is a necessary condition of enduring rivalry. Both the linkage and alliance conditions are statistically significant. Mutual military buildups pass the 0.50 cutoff at 0.55, but the variable is not statistically significant.

Table 45
Results for Analysis of Necessity for Enduring Rivalries: Major Power Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 11 (17.5% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Condition	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Territory	5	0.45	0.50
Mut. Mil. Buildup	6	0.55	0.50
Linkages	11	1.0	0.000
Alliance	11	1.0	0.000

Table 46 shows that there are four statistically significant jointly sufficient conditions of major power enduring rivalries. Relevant is the inclusive causal combination of mutual military buildups and alliances as factors. Those major power enduring rivalries that have mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances are likely to become enduring rivalries. The proportion for this factor is 0.571, meaning that six of the eleven major power enduring rivalries exhibited these factors. Table 47 lists these cases. In major power enduring rivalries, territorial disputes are not sufficient conditions of the outcome. This subset seems to have one less jointly sufficient causal factor.

Table 46
Results for Analysis of Sufficiency for Enduring Rivalries: Major Power Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 11 (17.5% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases
MMB	11	0.571
MMB + Link	11	0.571
MMB + Alliance	11	0.571
MMB + Link + Alliance	11	0.571

Table 47
Rivalry Cases that are Jointly Sufficient for Major Power Rivalries
Factors include: mutual military buildups, linkages, and relevant alliances (6 cases)
USA and USSR
France and Germany (1830-1887 and 1946-1986)
Germany and Italy
USSR and Japan
China and Japan

Minor Power Rivalries

Table 48 finds that there are two possible necessary conditions of minor power enduring rivalries. Once again, politically relevant alliances are a necessary condition of minor power rivalries. Thirty of the thirty-three cases meet this necessary condition for a proportion of 0.91. This condition is statistically significant. It is interesting to note that the three enduring rivalries without politically relevant alliances are minor power enduring rivalries. Those rivalries are Mexico and USA, Ecuador and Peru, and Chile and Argentina.

Table 48
Results for Analysis of Necessity for Enduring Rivalries: Minor Power Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 33 (52.4% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Condition	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	Z	P
Territory	20	0.61	1.04	0.148
Mut. Mil. Buildup	15	0.45		
Linkages	3	0.09		
Alliance	30	0.91	4.53	0.000

There is only one jointly sufficient causal combination that is statistically significant, which is shown in Table 49. The combination of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances are jointly sufficient for twelve enduring rivalry cases for a proportion of 0.706. It can be said for minor power enduring rivalries that the combination is "usually" sufficient.

Table 49
Results for Analysis of Sufficiency for Enduring Rivalries: Minor Power Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 33 (52.4% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Terr + MMB + Link + Alliance	17	0.706	0.072

Table 50 indicates which minor power enduring rivalries follow the steps to rivalry pattern. Twelve cases meet the jointly sufficient causal combination of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances. This table is similar to Table 38, but Table 50 does not include any major power states as rivals.

Table 50
Rivalry Cases that are Jointly Sufficient for Minor Power Rivalries
Factors include: territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and relevant alliances (12 cases)
Iraq and Kuwait
Egypt and Israel
Syria and Israel
Israel and Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan and Pakistan
India and Pakistan
Thailand and Cambodia
Greece and Turkey
Somalia and Ethiopia
Morocco and Algeria
Iran and Iraq
Iraq and Israel

Mixed Status Rivalries

This analysis does not indicate any distinctly different causal paths for mixed status enduring rivalries. Politically relevant alliances are again quasi-necessary conditions for the rivalry subset (see Table 51). All nineteen mixed status enduring rivalries have politically relevant alliances. There were no causal combinations that met the minimum jointly sufficient cutoff point of 0.50. No factors in combination can account for the mixed status enduring rivalries.

Table 51
Results for Analysis of Necessity for Enduring Rivalries: Mixed Dyads Subset
N= 63 Outcome = 19 (30.2% of Total)
Test Proportion: 0.50
*p<0.10

Casual Condition	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Territory	8	0.42	
Mut. Mil. Buildup	4	0.21	
Linkages	6	0.32	
Alliance	19	1.0	0.000

Assessment

This analysis has found support for findings from the large-N statistical chapters and also suggests which causal conditions are jointly sufficient for enduring rivalry. Politically relevant alliances are necessary conditions for enduring rivalry. Using the cutoff points established (Table 1), politically relevant alliances are "almost always necessary" conditions of enduring rivalry. This chapter found no support for the hypothesis that mutual military buildups are quasi-necessary conditions of enduring rivalry, affirming the similar finding in Chapter 5.

For the entire enduring rivalry population, it was found (see Table 37) that the factors of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances are jointly necessary. Table 38 lists these important rivalries that follow the steps to rivalry pattern.

An advantage of the qualitative comparative method is the ability to analyze subset relationships. Severe rivalries (those with more than 13 disputes) exhibit a similar causal path when compared to the entire enduring rivalry population. The factors of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, territorial disputes, and rivalry linkages are jointly sufficient conditions of severe rivalries.

This analysis also conducted tests of the strategic rivalry subset of cases. For strategic rivalries, territorial conflict becomes a quasi-necessary condition of rivalry. It can be said that "more often than not" territorial disputes are a necessary condition of strategic rivalry. Jointly, the factors of territorial disputes, mutual military buildups, linkages, and politically relevant alliances are "usually" sufficient conditions of strategic rivalry.

Looking at the various status subsets of enduring rivalries suggests that there may be different paths to rivalry for different types of states. For major powers, politically relevant alliances and rivalry linkages are both always necessary conditions for enduring rivalry. Jointly, the conditions of mutual military buildups, politically relevant alliances, and rivalry linkages are quasi-sufficient conditions of major power enduring rivalry. Territorial disputes are not a characteristic of major power enduring rivalries.

It is interesting to note that politically relevant alliances are also necessary conditions of minor power enduring rivalry, but the three negative cases are found in this subset. The rivalries of Mexico and the US, Ecuador and Peru, and Chile and Argentina do not have alliances against each other. In combination, the factors of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, territorial disputes, and rivalry linkages are "usually" jointly sufficient conditions for minor power enduring rivalries. No factors in combination are jointly sufficient for mixed power status rival dyads.

Conclusion

The qualitative comparative method suggested by Ragin (2000) is a method appropriate for the examination of a medium number of cases. This research has been focused on the outcome of the 63 enduring rivalries. Here, the interest lies in the analysis of the conditions that are relevant for only the enduring rivalry dyads.

This chapter found support for the proposition that politically relevant alliances (and sometimes rivalry linkages and territorial disputes) are quasi-necessary conditions of enduring rivalry. In combination, the factors of mutual military buildups, politically

relevant alliances, rivalry linkages, and territorial disputes are jointly sufficient conditions of enduring rivalries.

Previous empirical chapters have alluded to the conditions important for the development of rival dyads. The qualitative comparative method allowed for the examination of these conditions in combination. The steps to rivalry theory is a causally complex theory, and there are jointly sufficient conditions that work together to push states down the path of rivalry.

Future research might also incorporate other rivalry conditions, such as state independence and political shocks (Goertz and Diehl 1995) into the analysis. It would also be useful to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions for the absence of enduring rivalry. For example, are the factors of trade interdependence, joint democracy, and IGO membership jointly sufficient for the absence of enduring rivalry outcomes?

This analysis shows that the qualitative comparative method is a useful tool for those researchers interested in exploring the causal conditions found in a medium number of cases. With support of large-N tests and single case studies, the qualitative comparative method helps illustrate the complete picture of rivalry development. Other chapters have found which conditions increase the probability of rivalry development, and this chapter additionally indicates which factors are jointly sufficient for the rivalry outcome.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RIVALRY NOW?

Introduction

Rivalry is a deadly state of nature for those dyads involved in proto and enduring (Diehl and Goertz 2000) or strategic rivalries (Thompson 2001). Rivals are more likely to experience war than any other type of dyad. In this project, I have focused on outlining the nature of rivalry development. Through the use of power politics foreign policy strategies, pairs of states will be likely to become severe rivals (either proto and enduring or strategic). Large-n quantitative tests (chapters five through eight), a qualitative case study (chapter nine), and a medium-n qualitative test (chapter 10) all support this finding.

This final chapter will first summarize the steps to rivalry theory and indicate how it differs from the steps to war theory, and will then add the findings from this project to what is known about rivalry after completion of this study. A review of every hypothesis presented in this project will indicate whether or not the propositions were falsified. I will then discuss how the findings in this project relate to policy and current militarized conflict. Finally, I suggest the additional tasks needed to be preformed in order to move towards the cumulation of knowledge in the rivalry research program.

The Steps to Rivalry

Summary of the Steps to Rivalry

The steps to rivalry theory predicts that the onset of rivalry will occur through a series of steps. These steps usually take the form of power politics foreign policy strategies. States rely on a version of the realist folklore to deal with potential enemies. Once threatened, states react the way realist folklore tells them how, with force and militarized threats. The use of force and militarized threats pushes states towards rivalry. There are a series of factors that signify that this dynamic is an ongoing process.

The first factor is territorial disputes. Territorial disputes are the most conflict prone type of issue (Vasquez 1993; Hensel 2001; Vasquez and Henehan 2001). For international politics, issues matter (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981). In rivalry, territorial issues are the most salient types of issues. Territorial issues become symbolic and indivisible. An early territorial dispute is a sure course for rivalry. Each side seeks to deny any gain towards the enemy, no matter how much such a policy will negatively impact their own state.

Once an initial issue arises, states must determine how they will handle the relationship with a potential rival. By not responding with militarized force, pairs of states are not likely to become rivals (Hensel and Diehl 1994). Using power politics strategies, however, increases the likelihood that states will become rivals due to the security dilemma. When one state increases its security through alliances and military buildups, the opposing state perceives a decline in their own security. That state then responds in kind, and the situation develops into a zero sum game that dictates the course of the rivalry relationship.

Alliances are a typical response to threatening situation. A state will try to find alliance partners to ensure its security. Alliance formation in turn provokes an equal response in the other state. These moves signal a change in relations for the pair of states. Once this move is made, repeated disputes and rivalry become likely. Alliances should generally occur early in the life of a rivalry, and in increasing the capabilities of one side of the rivalry, they make recurring disputes more likely. The threatening nature of alliances and other power politics strategies increase the likelihood that historic animosity will develop and a long-standing conflict between the two states will result. How a dispute is handled early in its development determines the probability of rivalry occurrence. Using power politics increases the salience of disputes between a rival pair, and leads to their recurring nature.

Military buildups are the next likely response to a threatening enemy. States buildup their military to increase their capabilities. This can provoke an equal response in the other state, leading to an arms race. Arms races also signify that a pair of states is involved a rivalry and thus likely to fight a war.

It is also likely that states will participate in multiple simultaneous conflicts during the life of a rivalry. States do not decrease their outside commitments, but rather increase them during a rivalry. These rivalry linkages serve to show commitment, and result in an increase in severity for conflict within a rivalry. When rivalries become deeply linked, any regional war will likely spread to other rival pairs (Chapter nine).

The final step concerns the formation of grand strategic plans. Once a state details the military, economic, social, and diplomatic response towards a potential enemy, those states will then become rivals. This situation only occurs in rivalry. It would

suggest that the types of plans with which a state has to deal with its rival do not matter, only that there are plans to deal with this persistent enemy exist. The most obvious grand strategic plan involves the war plans to deal with a rival. Other types of strategies can be used, but we know very little about their impact on a large number of cases.

In combination, these steps delineate the road to rivalry. Pairs of states that form alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, fight a significant amount of territorial disputes, and have extensive rivalry linkages are likely to become enduring or strategic rivals. Each step increases the probability that rivalry will occur; furthermore, states can do little to avoid a rivalry outcome once the steps to rivalry process is started.

The Difference between the Steps to War and the Steps to Rivalry

It should now be clear that while the steps to war theory (Vasquez 1993) was used as the backbone of the steps to rivalry theory, both are distinct theories that suggest different outcomes. The steps to war theory predicts the outbreak of war. Overall, the steps to rivalry theory changes the outcome variable of interest. This project was concerned with the onset of rivalry or recurring disputes. The theory takes what is known from the steps to war theory and predicts that these events can explain the rise of deadly rivalries. It also includes new factors to paint a clear picture of rivalry formation. Chapter 9, on the pre-World War I rivalries, shows that the theory can explain the onset of each European rivalry, and then explains how the rivalries interact to lead to World War I. The steps to rivalry theory represents a significant theoretical advance for the study of the causes of rivalry conflict. The steps to rivalry theory takes what is known

about one outcome, war, and extends it to a new outcome, rivalry, also adding new factors relevant to rivalry. This new theory has extensive predictive and explanatory power.

While the steps to war theory has stood up quite well to empirical tests (Vasquez 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2001; 2001; Vasquez 2001; Vasquez and Gibler 2001; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Vasquez and Senese 2001; Senese and Vasquez 2002; Vasquez 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2003), there are limitations. The domain of the steps to war theory was developed to explain the actions of states that were of equal status. It does not purport to explain when war will occur in mixed dyads. The alliance aspect of the steps to war theory also does not appear to work in the post-1945 era. This suggests that the dynamics of war and alliances do not hold across all periods of time.

An advantage of the steps to rivalry theory is that it predicts a rivalry outcome for all types of states through all eras; the steps to rivalry do not change after 1945. Essentially, the factors suggested here are consistent throughout time. Although this might change with the coding of the post-Cold War rivalries, I do not believe that it is likely that the results will differ.[124] The main effect of the addition of the post-Cold War rivalries will be the increased instance of African interstate rivalries and their use of power politics to settle issues, especially of a territorial nature (Ethiopia-Eritrea and Cameron-Nigeria are examples of emerging rivalry pairs).

Major power dyads are more likely to participate in alliances and arms races, but this effect is not dramatic. Minor and mixed power dyads are also likely to use these

[124] MID 3.0 is set to be released in the summer of 2003. This dataset will extend the militarized interstate dispute dataset into 2001.

strategies and end in rivalry. The steps to rivalry theory predicts the onset of rivalries of equal power and also asymmetric rivalries.

The steps to rivalry theory also combines the factors of rivalry linkages and grand strategy into the theory. Rivalry linkages increase the probability of rivalry and they also increase the severity of conflict within a rival dyad (chapter seven). Grand strategies are also likely within rival dyads. These policies can only develop in a rivalry situation.

What Do We Know About Rivalry Now?

Chapter two presented the state of knowledge regarding rivalry to this point. It is known that democracies are not likely to become rivals, whereas newly independent states are likely to become involved in a rivalry. Territorial disputes increase the probability of rivalry, and escalating realpolitik bargaining demands also drive pairs of states towards rivalry. It is also noted that rivals are dissatisfied with the state of relations within the dyad. A militarized response to an initial dispute is likely to lead to rivalry. It is also known that a stalemate outcome during a rivalry will likely make the rivalry endure.

In explaining the origins of rivalries, the steps to rivalry theory is more precise than Diehl and Goertz's (2000) political shocks explanation. This theory also builds on Hensel's (1996) model of evolutionary development within rivalries. Chapter five has found that politically relevant alliances are both probabilistic necessary and sufficient conditions of rivalry. Relevant alliances are "almost always" sufficient conditions of enduring rivalry. Mutual military buildups are probabilistic sufficient conditions of rivalry, but they are not necessary conditions under any statistical test. Some mutual

military buildups are observed in pairs of states with few disputes (one or two). It is likely that these mutual military buildups drive the pair of states to war, settling any outstanding issues and preventing the occurrence of rivalry.

In relation to the timing of events, relevant alliances are likely observed early in the life of a rivalry. There is no consistent pattern for mutual military buildups. They are likely symptoms of some rivalries and drive other pairs of states toward rivalry. In combination, if a dyad has an early alliance and mutual military buildup, the probability of war increases. This shows that early power politics moves are likely to lead to rivalry in the first place, and then later increase the probability of war in the dyad.

This analysis also found that rivalry linkages are an important factor that both increase the probability of rivalry and increase the severity of conflict (as measured by the basic rivalry level) in the rival dyad. Looking at World War I (chapter nine), rivalry linkages connected each important rivalry and ultimately led to the expansion of the war. An analysis of the pre-World War I rivalries also demonstrated that grand strategic plans were in operation for each rivalry.

Chapter eight found that territorial disputes increase the probability of rivalry outcomes. In combination, the factors of relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, and territorial disputes increase the probability of both proto and enduring rivalry. Nuclear weapons are also an additive factor that increases the probability of rivalry, but this factor needs to be investigated further in the future.

Using the qualitative comparative method, this study found that relevant alliances are probabilistic necessary conditions of rivalry. In combination, the factors of alliances, mutual military buildups, territorial disputes, and rivalry linkages are jointly sufficient for

enduring rivalries (particularly severe and strategic enduring rivalries). Each of these factors can now be added to what we know about rivalry to this point. The table below lists the factors that are now known to be associated with rivalry.

<u>Factors Associated with Rivalry Development including the Steps to Rivalry</u>

1. **Absence of a Democratic Dyad (Hensel, Goertz et al. 2000)**
2. **Participation of Newly Independent States (Goertz and Diehl 1995; DiCicco 2002)**
3. **Territorial Disputes (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001)**
4. **Escalating Bargaining Demands (Hensel 1996; Leng 2000)**
5. **Rival Dyads are Dissatisfied Powers (Maoz and Mor 2002)**
6. **Militarized Response to Initial Dispute (Hensel and Diehl 1994).**
7. **Stalemate Outcomes during a Rivalry are likely to Make Rivalries "Endure." (Goertz, Jones et al. 2003)**
8. **Politically Relevant Alliances are Probabilistic Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Rivalry. (Chapter 5 and 10)**
9. **Mutual Military Buildups are Probabilistic Sufficient Conditions of Rivalry. (Chapter 5)**
10. **Politically Relevant Alliances Occur early in the Life of a Rivalry. (Chapter 6)**
11. **Rivalry Linkages both Increase the Severity of Conflict within a Rivalry and Increase the Likelihood of Rivalry. (Chapter 7)**
12. **In Combination, the Factors of Relevant Alliances, Mutual Military Buildups, Territorial Disputes, and Rivalry Linkages Increase the Probability of Rivalry. (Chapter 8 and 10)**
13. **Each European Pre-World War I Rivalry Formed Grand Strategic Plans to Counter a Rival. (Chapter 9)**

Referring back to the hypotheses tested in this project, Table 52 lists each hypothesis and whether or not it was falsified through either a statistical test or the qualitative method.

Table 52
Hypotheses Tested

H1.1: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
Not Falsified
H1.2: Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
Not Falsified
H2.1: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
Not Falsified
H2.2: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
Not Falsified
H2.3: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
Falsified, mutual military buildups are not necessary conditions of enduring rivalry.
H2.4: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
Falsified, mutual military buildups are necessary conditions of proto rivalry.
H3.1: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
Not Falsified
H3.2: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
Falsified, the pattern is not consistent. Some mutual military buildups occur early in the rivalry, others late in the life of a rivalry.
H3.3: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage).
Not Falsified
H3.4: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage)
Falsified, once again, the pattern is not consistent.
H4.1 Dyads that form politically relevant alliances early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.
Not Falsified
H4.2 Dyads that participate in mutual military buildups early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.
Not Falsified
H5.1: The severity level of a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in a rival dyad.
Not Falsified
H5.2: The probability of strategic rivalry increases according to the number simultaneous disputes a dyad is engaged in.
Not Falsified

H5.3: The probability of proto and enduring rivalry involvement increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in the dyad.
Not Falsified
H6: Pairs of states will develop a grand strategy to counter an identified rival early in the life of the conflict.
Not Falsified
H7: Pairs of states that experience militarized conflict over a significant number of territorial disputes are more likely to experience rivalry.
Not Falsified
H8: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
Not Falsified
H9: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, and posses nuclear weapons are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
Not Falsified
H10: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in arms races, fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, participate in simultaneous rivalries, and develop a grand strategy are more likely to become rivals, and thus experience war.
Not Falsified
H11: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, participate in multiple simultaneous rivalries, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in enduring rivalries.
Not Falsified

Policy Relevance

I began this project believing that the study of rivalry would have little impact on the dynamics of contemporary conflicts (i.e. the War in Afghanistan and Iraq). At least a study of the beginnings and escalation of rivalry would seem to be of no interest to policy makers. While a study investigating the end of rivalry would be of particular notice to conflict resolution researchers, this work has been focused on the origins of repeated crises. However, my views have changed and I now see how the contemporary war on terrorism (Afghanistan and Iraq) can be seen as the initiation of unequal status rivalries. In the past, terrorist threats from rogue nations were not seen as an immediate national security risk for the United States. After 9/11, the national security strategy of the United States has shifted to confront the potential threat of rogue nations to the national interests of the United States.

This project shows that realist policies lead a state down a path to rivalry, which is the most deadly form of relations between states. The relations between a rivalry pair are always contentious and always dangerous. A major change for the post 9/11 world is that small states are now seen as legitimate threats to the national interest of the Untied States. The relevant policy advice would be to ignore the tendency of a realist response to potential rivals.

Iraq and the United States: An Emerging Rivalry

In the opening of the National Security Strategy document, President Bush notes, "The events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose

a great danger to our national interests as strong states." (White House 2002) To connect the theory of this dissertation to a current case study, it might be useful to explore the relationship between the United States, a strong state, and Iraq, a weak state. According to the data used for this project, the rivalry is at the proto-stage, but with the introduction of the MID dataset version 3.0, Iraq and the United States will surely move into the enduring rivalry group.

The US-Iraq rivalry does represent the full failure of diplomatic means to avert war and shows the path that power politics foreign policy tactics can take in contemporary situations. In this case, there were relevant alliances, military buildups, and hard-liners in power. This rivalry is also linked to other ongoing and terminated rivalries (Iraq and Kuwait and Iraq and the U.K.), and additionally consists of elements of grand strategy (the national security strategy of the United States). In this case, diplomacy was tried and it failed, mainly due to the use of power politics.

One element present in this case was a military buildup. This factor does not take the conventional arms race pattern, but does show how the buildup of military force can influence the course of events. The New York Times reports, "this misunderstanding, many say, was compounded by the fact that the entire process of trying to avert war through inspections and negotiations was undercut by the military buildup that the United States said was necessary to force Iraq to comply – a buildup that the Untied States argued could not be reversed without the United States losing face." (Weisman 2003, 2)

Here a military buildup represents the United State's buildup of forces in and around Iraq before March 2003. Since troops were already in place, this move placed the United States in a likely position to use force it was very likely that force would be used.

It also represented a realpolitik bargaining tactic in which the threat of force became eminent as the troops were literally massing at the borders of Iraq. Once this step was made, little could be done to end the rivalry or avert war without the United States presidential administration losing creditability.

The role of alliances serves as another prominent step to rivalry and war in this case. While Iraq has no formal military alliances, the Untied States is engaged in many relevant alliances during this time-period, the most relevant being its NATO alliance with Great Britain. Some might see Great Britain's role in the conflict as a restraining voice against what the rest of Europe sees as American imperialism. Great Britain's actual effect on the conflict, however, is to embolden the United States to act with support of the "collation of the willing." With the support of Great Britain (and also Spain and others), it cannot be said that the Untied States is acting unilaterally. Rather, it is acting in cooperation with and support of a few of their alliance partners. While the Untied States could have gone on its course of war alone, this point is moot since Great Britain was involved in the conflict from the beginning.

In relation to alliances and the United Kingdom, the U.K. also had an enduring rivalry with Iraq as of 1992 (Diehl and Goertz 2000). This rivalry then becomes linked to the Iraq-United States rivalry. The rivalry is also linked through other ongoing conflicts such as the rivalries between Israel and other Arab nations. In addition, Iraq and Kuwait are engaged in an enduring rivalry. The rivalry was founded on the territorial issues between Iraq and Kuwait. So while the Untied States does not desire territory in Iraq, this is an example of a linked issue (Vasquez 1983) and a linked rivalry that influences the course of the United States-Iraq rivalry.

There are also elements of grand strategy active in this case. One element is the quest to democratize authoritarian governments. The New York Times notes "Mr. Bush's efforts to paint a grand vision of democracy in the Arab world." (Weisman 2003, 2) Here, the grand strategy for America represents an effort to counter those governments opposed to the policies of the United States and disrespectful of democratic values.

The other element of grand strategy results from the Bush administration's "National Security Strategy" document released in September 2002. This document outlines the vision of American foreign policy in the future and makes the action of preemptive attack a doctrine of action. In no other case is the notion of preemptive attack more relevant than in Iraq. While Iraq has not directly threatened the national security interests of the United States, it does represent a potential threat to the nation, and thus must be dealt with preemptively. The American "National Security Strategy" is little more than a justification and plan to attack Iraq before it is capable of attacking the interests of Untied States.

The situation of hard-liners in power proves another element at work consistent with the steps to war theory (Vasquez 1993). While domestic attributes were not a part of theoretical underpinnings of this project, it is an important aspect that needs to be explored in the future. The problem is that there is little data or hard evidence about the foreign policy preferences of each member of government. In this case, it is clear that hard-liners were at work in both governments.

In the United States government, the dividing line between hawks and doves is apparent. Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, is the dove in this case since he advocated

using the United Nations to disarm Iraq and consistently tried diplomatic efforts to quell the dispute. On the other side was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Vice President Dick Cheney, and President Bush. Each of these members supported the use of force in Iraq, regardless of disarmament. While the hard-liners did concede some points to Colin Powell (the use of UN resolutions), the ultimate failure of diplomacy can be pointed to the hard-line stance of the administration. Placing the burden of proof on Iraq and not on the United States left little area for compromise since Iraq operated under the same hard-line stance. This rivalry and its enduring quality developed from the interaction between two hard-line governments.

With hard-liners usually comes bullying and realpolitik tactics. The central focus of this project has been to demonstrate how realpolitik tactics can lead to rivalry. This is the case here, where the demands placed on Iraq only increase as time goes by. The Iraq and United States rivalry shows how the steps to rivalry can explain the course of contemporary rivalries. While some variables are missing in this case, the additive quality of each remaining factor, territorial disputes, linkages, alliances, and military buildups, would predict that rivalry would develop in this case.

Further Tasks and Caveats

This project has found that power politics strategies increase the probability of rivalry. There are few areas in which the steps to rivalry theory failed, and a few further tasks that need to be completed in the future.

The main negative finding in this dissertation remains that mutual military buildups are not necessary conditions of rivalry, and furthermore, they do not occur early in the life of a rivalry. It is likely that mutual military buildups are sometimes symptoms of rivalry, rather than factors that promote the development of rivalry. Nonetheless, mutual military buildups are probabilistic sufficient conditions of rivalry. They are also jointly sufficient conditions for some rivalry outcomes.

This finding should point out one thing; namely that mutual military buildups do not occur solely in rivalries. There are a significant amount of mutual military buildups cases that occur in dyads that have had few disputes. What likely happens is that the early use of mutual military buildups leads to war. Chapter six found support for this hypothesis. A future task would be to recalculate the mutual military buildup measure into a monadic variable. I believe if one side builds up its military, rivalry will likely result. The opposing side might not need to respond in kind (it could be a major power that has enough weapons, not requiring a buildup), or the increase in military weapons procurement might not meet the criteria for a mutual military buildup. Chapter nine also shows that force modernization, not measured in the military buildup index, is likely to increase tensions within a rival dyad. This factor needs to be investigated more fully in dyads that do not observe mutual military buildups. The theory may still be correct, but the variable used in these statistical tests may be mispecified.

Selection effects are a possible problem with the analysis in this work.[125] There may be factors that lead to initial disputes that also lead to rivalry. It may be necessary to investigate the early foundations of the disputes within a rivalry to determine the true

[125] See Reed's (2002) special issue of International Interactions for a review of the selection effects critique.

impact of the steps to rivalry theory. As stated in chapter one, I believe this work to follow the islands of theory process. There are distinct branches of international relations investigations. I delineated between the explanation of war, recurring disputes, and the rise of initial disputes. This work has been focused on explaining why, after an initial military conflict, some states become involved in rivalry and others settle their issues without engaging in conflict again.

While I do not believe that selection effects will be a factor in the analysis of recurring disputes, it is still necessary to investigate the potential problem to convince critics of the accuracy of the steps to rivalry theory. The final test of my general theory of rivalry would be to perform a selection effects test on the model. I assume that the factors leading a dyad to enter into conflict and enter into recurring conflict might be different. It might also be useful to compare the model of rivalry formation against a selection model using war as one dependent variable and rivalry as the other. Does war occur because of recurring disputes and escalation across those disputes, or is war a result of the factors that promote the development of rivalries? I feel that the both factors leading to rivalry and those leading to war will be similar, but Lemke and Reed (2001) have found otherwise.

This work was primarily concerned with how initial conflicts later become enduring rivalries. The theory outlined here poses that a pair of states who handle conflict in a realpolitik fashion will become rivals. How bargaining is handled within the context of a dispute is important in finding how isolated conflicts develop into rivalries. The first step for each analysis produced in this dissertation was the observance of the

militarized interstate dispute. It is predicted that once a militarized interstate dispute occurs, those handled in a power politics fashion will become rivals.

There is likely no selection process at work in rivalry. Critics should support their arguments with evidence, rather than conjecture. In any case, any potential selection effects problem cannot be evaluated at this time because the data are not set up for this test. We must first collect data for the independent variables (relevant alliances and mutual military buildups) for those pairs of states never having a militarized dispute. Although it does not appear a selection process is at work here, the factor still needs to be investigated in the future once there is data to test the proposition.

The second aspect that the steps to rivalry theory and statistical tests in this project have left out is the dynamics of domestic politics in rivalry. What factors internally lead to rivalry? Do hard-liners in power also increase the probability of rivalry? A future project should investigate the impact of domestic politics on the dynamics of rivalry onset. The first level in a two level game, the domestic level, may have an important impact on the formation of rivalries. This factor was not ignored, but will be investigated in the future. Once completed, the steps to rivalry theory can be a two-stage theory, where there is a prediction on the domestic level that interacts with the international level.

This work has also neglected the factors of international conflict (or civil war) and non-state actors. It may be that internal factors promote or limit the ability of states to engage in rivalries. The first step to test this proposition would be the creation of an ethnic rivalry dataset. It would then be useful to test the impact of ethnic rivalries on the

dynamics of interstate rivalries. Once a non-state actor dataset is created, it would also be useful to examine the impact of these actors on the dynamics of interstate rivalry.

The next steps for the rivalry research program involve two factors, grand strategy and complex rivalries. This theory suggests that grand strategy will increase the probability of rivalry. There is currently no dataset that codes the onset of grand strategic plans. This will have to be created to test the generalizability of the proposition. Statistical tests can then be preformed testing the impact of the factor on the probability of rivalry. It would also be useful to examine the factor in cases besides the pre-World War I cases. Once this is done, it will be more evident that this aspect of the steps to rivalry theory is generalizable.

The other task involves complex rivalries. Chapter 7 alluded to the need for a new dataset measuring complex rivalries, or those rivalries with more than two participants. Rivalry linkages measure the impact of simultaneous conflict on the severity of rivalry. It may be that complex rivalries are the most severe rivalries in that they experience more fatalities, last longer, and experience more war than enduring rivals. The next step is to create a complex rival dataset that identifies who these rivals are and then tests this dataset to find the probability of war, number of fatalities, and duration of the rivalries that are complex in nature.

Conclusion

This project was concerned with determining what factors distinguish isolated conflicts from proto and enduring (or strategic) rivalries. Vasquez (1993) contends that the traditional realist notions of foreign policy practices have led to war, not peace. The

original query of this project purported to determine if proto and enduring rival dyads exhibited different foreign policy practices when confronted with an ongoing dispute. Ultimately, I believe the use of power politics is associated with severe manifestations of *war and rivalry*.

The research presented here has found that states that use power politics foreign policy practices are more likely to become involved in rivalry if they have an initial militarized dispute. The steps to rivalry path is clear; relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, simultaneous disputes, territorial disputes, major power dyads, and states that posses nuclear weapons are more likely to become rivals once these factors are present.

Rivalry herein has been presented as a process. The stages of rivalry development need to be taken into account in any analysis of formation of rivals. One cannot look at enduring rivals alone, but must also investigate the factors present in proto rivals and isolated conflicts (as well as strategic rivalries). One must also consider the timing of factors that may influence the dependent variable. It is clear from the analysis that alliances are formed early in the life of a rivalry. It is also clear that mutual military buildups sometimes occur late in the life of enduring rivalries. There are also a significant amount of military buildups in isolated conflicts, but this can be partially accounted for by war occurrence in those dyads.

I have argued that power politics strategies are dangerous precedents in international interactions. Those pairs of states that use power politics practices against each other are likely to become dangerous rivals. While policy advice to this point is premature, states should avoid threatening actions in that they are likely to lead to the security dilemma and rivalry. Those states that are involved in rivalry are the most likely

dyads to become involved in war. According to the research presented here, to avoid war, one must avoid rivalry in the first place. Suppressing the urge to use power politics to respond to threatening situations is the path towards non-violent conflict in the international system.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

Chapter Five
H1.1: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.
H1.2: Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

H2.1: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.2: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances.
H2.3: Pairs of states that are enduring rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.
H2.4: Pairs of states that are proto-rivals are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups.

Chapter Six
H3.1: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.2: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in an enduring rivalry, it should be formed early in the life of the rivalry (isolated or proto stage).
H3.3: When a relevant alliance is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage).
H3.4: When a mutual military buildup is exhibited in a proto rivalry, it should be formed early in the rivalry (isolated stage)

Chapter Six
H4.1 Dyads that form politically relevant alliances early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.
H4.2 Dyads that participate in mutual military buildups early in the life of a rivalry are likely to experience war.

Chapter Seven
H5.1: The severity level of a rivalry increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in a rival dyad.
H5.2: The probability of strategic rivalry increases according to the number simultaneous disputes a dyad is engaged in.
H5.3: The probability of proto and enduring rivalry involvement increases according to the number of simultaneous rivalries observed in the dyad.

Chapter Nine
H6: Pairs of states will develop a grand strategy to counter an identified rival early in the life of the conflict.

Chapter Eight
H7: Pairs of states that experience militarized conflict over a significant number of territorial disputes are more likely to experience rivalry.

H8: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

H9: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, and posses nuclear weapons are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

Chapter Nine
H10: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in arms races, fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes, participate in simultaneous rivalries, and develop a grand strategy are more likely to become rivals, and thus experience war.

Chapter Ten
H11: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, participate in multiple simultaneous rivalries, and fight over a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in enduring rivalries.

APPENDIX B

ENDURING RIVALRIES, 1816-1992 (DIEHL AND GOERTZ 2000)

Side_A	Side_B	Start	End	Disputes	Duration
USA	Cuba	1959	1990	15	31
USA	Mexico	1836	1893	17	57
USA	Peru	1955	1992	6	37
USA	Ecuador	1952	1981	8	28
USA	UK	1837	1861	8	24
USA	Spain	1850	1875	10	25
USA	USSR	1946	1986	53	40
USA	China	1949	1972	24	23
USA	North Korea	1950	1985	18	35
Honduras	Nicaragua	1907	1929	6	22
Ecuador	Peru	1891	1955	21	64
Brazil	UK	1838	1863	6	24
Chile	Argentina	1873	1909	10	36
Chile	Argentina	1952	1984	17	32
UK	Germany	1887	1921	7	34
UK	Russia	1876	1923	17	47
UK	USSR	1939	1985	18	46
UK	Turkey	1895	1934	10	39
UK	Iraq	1958	1992	10	34
Belgium	Germany	1914	1940	8	26
France	Germany	1911	1945	9	34
France	Germany	1830	1887	12	57
France	Turkey	1897	1938	11	41
France	China	1870	1900	6	30
Spain	Morocco	1957	1980	8	23
Germany	Italy	1914	1945	7	31
Italy	Yugoslavia	1923	1956	8	33
Italy	Ethiopia	1923	1943	6	20
Italy	Turkey	1880	1924	14	44
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	1913	1952	8	39
Greece	Bulgaria	1914	1952	9	38
Greece	Turkey	1958	1989	14	30
Greece	Turkey	1866	1925	17	59
Cyprus	Turkey	1965	1988	7	24
USSR	Norway	1956	1987	9	32
USSR	Iran	1908	1987	18	80
Russia	Turkey	1876	1921	12	45
USSR	China	1862	1986	50	124
USSR	Japan	1895	1984	43	90
Congo	Zaire	1963	1987	7	23
Uganda	Kenya	1965	1989	6	24

Somalia	Ethiopia	1960	1985	16	25
Ethiopia	Sudan	1967	1988	8	21
Morocco	Algeria	1962	1984	6	22
Iran	Iraq	1953	1992	20	40
Iraq	Israel	1967	1991	6	24
Iraq	Kuwait	1961	1992	9	31
Egypt	Israel	1948	1989	36	41
Syria	Jordan	1949	1991	9	41
Syria	Israel	1948	1986	45	38
Jordan	Israel	1948	1973	13	25
Israel	Saudi Arabia	1957	1981	6	24
Saudi Arabia	North Yemen	1962	1984	6	21
Afghanistan	Pakistan	1949	1989	11	40
China	South Korea	1950	1987	9	37
China	Japan	1873	1958	34	85
China	India	1950	1987	22	37
North Korea	South Korea	1949	1992	20	43
South Korea	Japan	1953	1982	15	29
India	Pakistan	1947	1991	40	44
Thailand	Cambodia	1953	1987	14	34
Thailand	Laos	1960	1988	13	27
Thailand	North Vietnam	1961	1989	6	28

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Figure 2


USA - Russia(USSR) (1947-1989)
USA
Russia
Level of hostility
Year
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
Arms race 1953 D
Arms race 1955 D
1945 USSR - CHN & YUG & POL Def.
1948 USSR - RUM & HUN & BUL & FIN Def.
1949 USA - NATO pact state Def.
1952 USA - Japan Def.
1953 USA - ROK Ent.
1954 USA - TAW Def. & USA - SEATO pact state
1955 USSR-Warzaw pact state Def.
1958 USA enter UKG/IRN/IRQ/PAK/YUR Ent. of 1955
1959 USA - IRN Ent.
1964 USSR - GDR Def.
1970 USA - SPN Def.

Figure 3


USA - China (1949-1974)
USA
China
Level of hostility
0
1
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Proto rivalry start
Arms race 1951 D
Arms race 1953 D
Enduring rivalry start
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1949 USA - NATO pact state Def.
1951 USA - PHI & AUS/NEW Def.
1952 USA - Japan Def.
1953 USA - South Korea Ent.
1954 USA - Rep. of China Def. & USA - SEATO pact state Def.
1958 USA enter UKG/IRN/IRQ/PAK/YUR Ent. of 1955
1960 China-Burma & Cambodia & Afghanistan N/n
1961 China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Def.

Figure 4


United Kingdom - Germany(Prussia) (1887-1922)
United Kingdom
Germany
Level of hostility
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
Arms race 1919 D
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
Year
1887 United Kingdom - Italy/Austria-Hungary Entete
1887 Germany - Russia Neutrality/non-aggression
1902United Kingdom - Japan Defense pact
1905 Germany - Russia Defense pact
1907 United Kingdom - FRN/SPN Entete
1912 United Kingdom - France Entete
1914 Germany - Turkey Defence pact
1915 GMY - AUH/BUL Def.
1915 UKG - FRN/ITA/RUS Def.
1916 UKG - FRN/ITA/ RUM/RUS Def.
1921 UKG - USA FRN/JPN Ent.

Figure 5


United Kingdom - Russia(USSR) (1940-1985)
United Kingdom
Russia
Level of hostility
Year
Enduring rivalry start
Proto rivalry start
Arms race 1953 D
Arms race 1955 D
USSR-GMY N/n
USSR - FIN N/n
USSR -YUG& JPN N/n
USSR - United Kingdom Def.
USSR - UKG/IRN Def.
USSR - FRN Def.
USSR - CHN & YUG & POL Def.
UKG - FRN Def.
UKG - FRN/NTH/BEL/LUX Def.
UKG - NATO pact state Def.
USSR - RUM & HUN & BUL & FIN Def.
UKG - SEATO pact state Def.
USSR-Warzaw pact state Def.
UKG - TUR/IRQ/IRN/PAK Ent.
USA enter 1955 Ent.
USSR - GDR Def.

Figure 6


Russia(USSR) - Japan (1895-1984)
Russia
Japan
Level of hostility
Year
Arms race 1920 D
Enduring rivalry start
Proto rivalry start
Arms race 1935 D
Arms race 1936 D
Arms race 1938 D&H
Arms race 1939 D&H
Arms race 1941 D&H
Arms race 1963 D
Arms race 1965 H
Arms race 1969 D
1896 RUS-CHN Def.
1894 JPN - KOR Def.
1902 JPN - UKG Def.
1905 RUS-GMY Def.
1908 JPN - USA Ent.
1910 RUS-JPN Ent.
1916 JPN - RUS Def.
1921 JPN - USA/UKG/FRN Ent.
1935 USSR-FRN/CZE Def.
1936 USSR-MON Def.
1936 JPN - GMY Ent.
1937 USSR-China N/n
1937USSR-UKG/FRN/RUM/
TUR/EGY/YUG/GRC Def.
1939 USSR-GMY N/n
1940 JPN - GMY/ITA/HUN/RUM Def.
1941 JPN - CHN N/n
1941 USSR - UKG Def.
1942 JPN - USSR N/n
1942 USSR - UKG/IRN Def.
1944 USSR - FRN Def.
1945 USSR - CHN Def.
1952 JPN - USA Def.
1955 USSR-Warzaw pact state Def.
1961 USSR - PRK Def.
1978 USSR -
DRV Ent.

Figure 7


Russia(USSR) - China (1862-1986)
Russia
China
Level of hostility
Year
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
Arms race 1962 D
1873 RUS-AUH/GMY
1877 RUS-AUH N/n
1881 RUS-AUH/GMY N/n
1891 RUS-FRN Ent.
1893 RUS-FRN Def
1896 RUS-CHN Def.
1905 RUS-GMY Def.
1910 RUS-JPN Ent.
1935 USSR-FRN/CZE Def.
1936 USSR-MON Def.
1937 USSR-China N/n
1937USSR-UKG/FRN/RUM/
TUR/EGY/YUG/GRC Def.
1939 USSR-GMY N/n
1941 USSR - UKG Def.
1941 CHN - JPN N/n
1942 USSR - UKG/IRN Def.
1944 USSR - FRN Def.
1945 China - USSR
1955 USSR-Warzaw pact state
1960 CHN - AFG N/n
1961 CHN -PRK
& USSR - PRK
1978 USSR
DRV Ent.

Figure 8


Germany - Italy (1914-1943)
Germany
Italy
Level of hostility
0
1
2
3
4
5
Year
1909
1911
1913
1915
1917
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933
1935
1937
1939
1941
1943
1945
1947
Arms race 1914 D&H
Arms race 1915 D&H
Proto rivalry start
Arms race 1934 D
Arms race 1939
Enduring rivalry start
GMY - TUR Def.
ITA - UKG/FRN/RUS Def.
GMY - AUH/BUL Def.
ITA - UKG/FRN/RUS/RUM Def.
ITA - YUG N/n
ITA - CZE Ent.
GMY - ITA/UKG/BEL/FRN Def.
GMY - USR N/n
ITA - SPN N/n
ITA - RUM&ALB Ent.
ITA - ALB Def.
ITA - USR N/n
ITA - ETH&TUR&GRC N/n
GMY - POL N/n
ITA - AUS/HUN Ent.
ITA - FRA N/n
GMY - ITA&JPN Ent.
ITA - YUG N/n
ITA enter GMY-JPN Ent.
GMY - FRN Ent.
SPN/HUN enter GMY-JPN Ent.
GMY - DEN&EST&LAT&USR N/n
GMY - ITA Def.
GMY - ITA/JPN/HUN/RUM Def.
BUL enter 1940 Def.
GMY - TUR

Figure 9


France - Germany(Prussia) (1830-1887)
France
Germany
Level of hostility
Year
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
Arms race 1871 D&H
GMY - AUH/RUS/TUR/UKG Def.
FRA - SPN/POR/UKG Def.
GMY - AUH/RUS Def.
FRA - TUR/UKG/GMY Def.
ITA enter 1854 Def.
FRA - UKG/SWD Def.
FRA - RUS N/n
FRA - ITA Def.
FRA - SPN/UKG Def.
GMY - RUS Def.
FRA - AUH N/n
GMY - ITA Def.
FRA - UKG Def.
GMY - UKG Def.
GMY - AUH Def.
GMY - AUH/RUS Ent.
GMY - AUH/RUS N/n
GMY - AUH/ITA Def.
GMY - AUH/RUM Def.
GMY - RUS N/n

Figure 10


France - Germany (1911-1944)
France
Germany
Level of hostility
Year
Arms race 1914 D&H
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
Arms race 1936 D
FRN-UKG Ent.
GMY - TUR Def.
GMY - AUH/BUL Def.
FRN-UKG/ITA/RUS Def.
FRN-UKG/ITA/RUM/RUS Def.
FRN-BEL Def.
FRN-POL Def.
FRN-USA/UKG/JPN Ent.
GMY - FRN/ITA/UKG/BEL Def.
FRN - CZE Ent.
FRN - POL Def.
GMY - USR N/n
FRN-RUM N/n
FRN-YUG N/n
FRN-USR Def.
FRN-ITA Ent.
GMY - POL N/n
FRN - USSR Def.
FRN - ITA Ent.
GMY - ITA&JPN Ent.
ITA enter GMY-JPN Ent.
FRN-UKG/YUG/GRC/
BUL/RUM/USR/
TUR/EGY Def.
GMY - FRN Ent.
GMY - ITA Def.
GMY - DEN&EST&LAT&USR N/n
SPN/HUN enter GMY-JPN Ent.
FRN - TUR & UKG/TUR Def.
GMY - ITA/JPN/HUN/RUM Def.
BUL enter 1940 Def.
GMY - TUR
FRN - USR Def.

Figure 11


China - Japan (1873-1958)
China
Japan
Level og hostility
Year
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
Arms race 1934 D
Arms race 1935 D
Arms race 1936 D
Arms race 1937 H
Arms race 1941 D
JPN - KOR Def.
CHN - RUS Def.
JPN - UKG Def.
JPN - USA Ent.
JPN - RUS Ent.
JPN - RUS Def.
JPN - USA/UKG/FRN Ent.
JPN - GMY Ent.
CHN - USR N-n
JPN - THI N/n
JPN - GMY/ITA/HUN/RUM Def.
JPN - THI Def.
JPN - USR N/n
CHN - USR Def.
JPN - USA Def.

Figure 12


United Kingdom - Russia (1876-1923)
United Kingdom
Russia
Level of hostility
Year
Proto rivalry start
Enduring rivalry start
RUS - AUH N/n
UKG - TUR Def.
RUS - AUH/GMY N/n
UKG - ITA/AUH Ent.
RUS - FRN Ent.
RUS - FRN Def.
UKG - JPN Def.
RUS - CHN Def.
RUS - AUH N/n
RUS - GMY Def.
UKG - FRN/SPN Ent.
RUS - ITA Ent.
RUS - JPN Ent.
UKG - FRN Ent.
RUS - RUM Def.
RUS - ITA Def.
UKG - FRN/ITA/RUS Def.
RUS - JPN Def.
RUS - UKG/FRN/ITA/RUM Def.
UKG -USA/
FRN/JPN Ent.