

Craft, Creativity, Computer Games: the Fusion of Play and Material Consciousness

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Abstract In a historical perspective, what is novel about computer games is that they are not pure games but cultural objects which allow the playful desires identified by Caillois to be fused with *craftsmanship*, the desire to do a job well for its own sake (Sennett). Play is often defined in opposition to work, for example by Huizinga and Caillois, but craftsmanship has two qualities which can be found in both. Firstly, craftsmanship entails creative attention to the material at hand pleasurable and patiently built up through rehearsal (cf. Sennett on “material consciousness”)—“creative” is used in a sense read from Bergson which is almost synonymous with “possibility-widening”. Secondly, craftsmanship entails the satisfaction of seeing the end result of one’s labours. Both qualities are essential to human well-being (Marx, Sennett, Smith).

Keywords Bergson · Caillois · Csikszentmihalyi · Computer games · Craftsmanship · Creativity · Games · Huizinga · Labour · Material consciousness · Marx · Play · Sennett · Simulation

1 Introduction

When pinpointing the unique characteristics of computer games, it can be a useful strategy to begin with the following three assumptions:

1. computer games *are* games,
2. games are objects which facilitate the activity of play, and
3. play is opposed to work.

The author can then move on to show how these assumptions jar with computer games. Jesper Juul, for example, describes computer games as a challenge to the “classic games model” (Juul 2005) thereby calling assumption number 1 into question. And Nick Yee observes that thanks to the elaborate “timing and layering of reward mechanisms in video games”, play can become work: “the purpose of all

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video games [is] to train a player to work harder while still enjoying it” (Yee 2006, p. 70). This, Yee tentatively suggests, “may reveal larger social trends in the blurring boundaries between work and play” (Yee 2006, p. 68).

This article questions all three assumptions by applying the concept of *craftsmanship* to the playing of computer games. I will argue that assumption number 1, that computer games are games, hides what is truly remarkable about computer games from the perspective of cultural history: that computer games are cultural objects which allow the fusion of two often opposed activities, work and play. The notion of craftsmanship helps towards revealing this and opens up a rather detailed account of the unique pleasure of playing computer games.

When I make claims about what kind of cultural objects computer games “are” and their “unique pleasures,” I do not wish to make claims about all objects which can be labelled computer games or all pleasures a player might take from them. A computer game might be a digital version of an existing game, such as chess, or it might enable the age-old thrill of a lottery, and I do certainly not want to insist that digital chess is not *really* a “computer game” or deny that it can be a pleasure to visit an online casino. I will, however, argue for the existence of a special kind of motivation or desire, namely craftsmanship, which leads to computer games rather than to a game of chess or a casino visit.

The article follows the following trajectory: I will first re-examine the conflict between work and play as embodied in the antagonistic relationship between *Homo faber* and Johan Huizinga's *Homo ludens*. Informed by Henri Bergson I will suggest that Huizinga reacted negatively to a very narrowly defined, almost caricatured *Homo faber*, and that a contemporary translation of *Homo faber* would be “man the creative” rather than “man the maker”. My Bergsonian understanding of *Homo faber* resonates with Richard Sennett's philosophy of craftsmanship which is then introduced in Section 3. Section 4 develops craftsmanship's relevance for understanding the motivation behind playing computer games. Having gathered enough theoretical resources I can then, in Section 5, revisit Roger Caillois's classical typology of playful pleasures and suggest that craftsmanship should be added to it.

Of the authors just mentioned, Sennett has had the most influence on the present text, giving it an outlook which can broadly be considered Marxist in as much as importance is given to the deep links between desire and labour, and to the human being's ability to shape itself through labour.

2 *Homo ludens* and *Homo faber*

In Richard Sennett's words, “craftsmanship names an enduring, basic human impulse, the desire to do a job well for its own sake” (Sennett 2008, p. 9). The quote is taken from Sennett's 2008 book, “The Craftsman”, which offers a critique of the control and bureaucracy characterising the contemporary workplace. Sennett highlights the importance of satisfactory work conditions for overall well-being and points to the ancient figure of the craftsperson as a source of renewed respect for independent work aimed at high quality. To put it bluntly, the outlook of traditional craftspeople such as carpenters and silver smiths are put forward as inspiration for contemporary vocations such as nursing. Underlying Sennett's book on craftsmanship is a Marxist understanding

of labour as a process through which the human being shapes itself, although Sennett is not uncritical of Marx, neither in this nor other of his books on class and capitalism. It is also worth mentioning that Sennett's understanding of craftsmanship is informed by attempts at pursuing a professional career as a classical musician before turning to academia, a personal trajectory I happen to share with him.

Desire relates much more readily to play than to work, thus the quote—“craftsmanship names an enduring, basic human impulse, the desire to do a job well for its own sake” (Sennett 2008, p. 9)—does not seem to fit an understanding of work and play as mutually exclusive categories. Since Huizinga and after him Caillois took such an opposition for granted it will be useful to re-examine the reasons and contexts for their views, before drawing computer games into the discussion.

For a thorough understanding of Huizinga's *Homo ludens*, man the player, it is necessary to look at the other figures it was written in critical response to: *Homo sapiens* and *Homo faber*. “Homo Ludens” was published in 1938, at a time of economic depression and political instability. It seemed obvious to Huizinga and his contemporaries that *Homo sapiens*, man the wise, was an inaccurate label for humanity. Hence “modern fashion inclines to designate our species as *Homo Faber*: Man the Maker” (Huizinga 1949: xvi. [*Homo Faber* should have been spelled *Homo faber* to follow the standards of Linnaean taxonomy]).

“Man the maker” is a maker and user of tools but the first decades of the twentieth century had shaken humanity's trust in its own technology. If the nineteenth century's more optimistic attitude towards technology was sustained by the material advances of the Industrial Revolution and found expression in marvels of engineering such as the Crystal Palace (1851) and the Eiffel Tower (1889), techno-optimism was replaced with a more ambivalent attitude in light of catastrophic events such as the sinking of the “unsinkable” *Titanic* (1912), the horrors of the First World War's industrialised warfare (1914–1918), and the *Hindenburg* disaster (1937). In must have seemed timely then, when Huizinga offered *Homo ludens* as an alternative or at least a supplementary figure to *Homo faber* in the late 1930s.

Moving from the broad, historical backdrop to philosophy, Hannah Arendt has traced *Homo faber's* way into twentieth century philosophical discourse to Henri Bergson's 1907 “Creative Evolution” (Arendt 1958, p. 136, n. 1). Bergson's book was an attempt to find sensible *action* as the driving force behind evolution rather than the “insensible variations” of Darwinian theory (Bergson 2001, p. 61). A key concept in this project was the *élan vital*—the “vital impulse” in the original, English translation—described vaguely as “a tendency to act on inert matter” (Bergson 2001, p. 93). *Élan vital* evolves along the twin paths of intelligence and instinct, and Bergson finds intelligence most fully developed in humans, instinct most fully developed in insects. In the grand scheme of Bergsonian philosophy, our species is the pinnacle of a specific strand of *élan vital*, namely the drive towards intelligent action.

The difference between instinct and intelligence can be observed in their differing approaches to tools; here, it should be remembered that not only humans but also other animals use and to some extent manufacture tools. Instinctive use and manufacture of tools is efficiently organised, predictable, and aimed at *closing*. Intelligent manufacture and use of tools have the exact opposite characteristics: It is unorganised, and “it lays open to activity an unlimited field into which [the animal] is driven further and further, and made more and more free” (Bergson 2001, p. 137).

To highlight that “intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture” (Bergson 2001, p. 135; emphasis in the original), Bergson suggests our species should be renamed *Homo faber*, a creature defined by intelligence but not intelligence in the sense of “pure intellect”. *Homo faber's* intelligent *élan vital* is free action in the material world, aided by tools and constantly widening its field of possibilities. When *élan vital* meets matter in a human-intelligent way, technology, “artificial objects, especially tools to make tools”, happens; Bergson stresses the procedural nature of technology, how it goes on “indefinitely”. Today, in order to capture a sense of procedural materiality, we would probably use the word ‘creativity’ where Bergson uses ‘intelligence’: *creative action* is aided by tools and increases one's number of choices. A contemporary reader of Bergson could translate *Homo faber* as “man the creative” rather than “man the maker”.

When Huizinga pitted *Homo ludens* against *Homo faber* it was not specifically against Bergson's *Homo faber* but against the human being as maker, worker, creator, tool user. In doing so, he represented *Homo faber* in a narrow and pessimistic way. Bergson shows us a broader and much more optimistic way of understanding *Homo faber*, man the creative, which is useful for examining the craftsmanlike desire to play computer games.

3 Craftsmanship

Work is the opposite of play. This is Huizinga's position which Caillois adopts and defends vigorously when he says that professional sportsmen and actors are “not players but workers” because they are motivated to play by something outside the game, namely “prize, salary, or title” (Caillois 1961, p. 6). If, however, we think of sportsmen and actors not so much as workers but as craftspeople the opposition between work and play is softened. Where Caillois's worker only knows *external* motivation, it is exactly “the desire to do a job well *for its own sake*” which motivates Sennett's craftsperson (Sennett 2008, p. 9; my emphasis).

Sennett actually identifies craftsmanship as two intertwined and somewhat opposed desires. Firstly, craftsmanship is the desire to “do a job well” in the sense of reaching a good final result through skilful manipulation of a material. To put it into Marxist language, the craftsperson is allowed to *objectify* him- or herself. As Sean Sayers explains, “Marx conceives of labor as ‘formative’ activity, as activity through which human beings give form to materials and thus objectify themselves in the world” (Sayers 2007, p. 432). Marx finds objectification to be at the heart of humanity and is highly critical of the working conditions of factory production because it denies the worker the satisfaction of doing a job well and taking pride in the final results, a problem already noted by Adam Smith (2001). According to Marx, the factory worker is in fact “unproductive” in the sense of detached from and indifferent to the product: “these workers [are] unproductive as to the material result of their labour. In fact, of course, this ‘productive’ worker cares as much about the crappy shit he has to make as does the capitalist himself who employs him, and who also couldn't give a damn for the junk” (Marx 1973, p. 273). Whilst he does not find capitalism per se to be at fault for the ways in which contemporary working

conditions undermine craftsmanship, Sennett would surely agree with Marx' basic sentiment.

Although it leads to objectification, craftsmanship also demands “the temporary suspension of the desire for closure” (Sennett 2008, p. 221) and another kind of desire to develop. From time to time a true craftsperson delves into his or her craft by exploring possibilities and experimenting with materials rather than aiming at final form. Following Bergson this can be named a creative state of mind. A professional swimmer could, for example, be considered a craftsperson in two instances. Firstly, when he or she is motivated to swim not in order to win a prize but in order to produce a good result in itself, that is, swimming a certain distance at a low time. Secondly, when he or she is motivated to swim solely in order to swim well.

Like all craftsmanship, the ability to swim well is constituted by sophisticated motor skills acquired through rehearsal. Sennett argues that although “we might equate routine and boredom [...] sheer movement repeated becomes a pleasure in itself [...] when organized as looking ahead”. Based on Erin O'Connor's work Sennett specifies “looking ahead” as a kind of “corporeal anticipation”, of being “always one step ahead of the material” (Sennett 2008, p. 175). The craftsperson practises a fixed repertoire of bodily movements over and over again to fine-tune and confirm the relationship between bodily action and consequent reaction from the material. The swimmer takes stroke after stroke in the pool (material: water), the pianist plays scale after scale (material: sound), the glassblower goes through the same complicated swings and thrusts (material: glass)—and the computer game player fictionally shoots, jumps, runs, builds, drives, etc. over and over again (material: computer game).

It is illuminating to compare the practising craftsperson's state of mind to *flow* as defined by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990); the concept has gained some popularity in game studies, see for example Salen and Zimmerman 2004. What Sennett describes is related to flow but there is an important difference between Sennett's craftsperson and Csikszentmihalyi's practitioner. In Csikszentmihalyi's account, flow becomes possible when the practitioner meets challenges appropriate to his or her level of skill. The task at hand does not trigger frustration by being too difficult and does not trigger boredom by being too easy. Then, as the practitioner gradually masters the activity, mastery leads to boredom and the state of flow breaks down, only to be restored when new challenges are introduced. Thus “every flow experience” Csikszentmihalyi has studied includes a “sense of discovery” as the practitioner is pushed “to higher levels of performance” and “previously undreamed-of states of consciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, p. 74).

In contrast, Sennett's craftsperson finds pleasure in practice. The rhythmical confirmation and fine-tuning of skill is pleasurable, even after thousands of hours of practice during which the desire for closure has been temporarily suspended. Sennett compares the practising craftsperson to a novice archer who follows his Zen master's advice, “Don't try to hit the target!” (Sennett 2008, p. 214), advice which goes squarely against Csikszentmihalyi's advice for obtaining flow: have a clear goal in mind (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, pp. 54–58).

Closer scrutiny resolves the conflict between the two accounts. When explaining how “clear goals and feedback” are preconditions for obtaining flow, Csikszentmihalyi's examples include that of a “tennis player [who] always know what she has to do: return the ball into the opponent's court”. He also mentions a mountain climber: “The climber

inching up a vertical wall of rock has a very simply goal in mind: to complete the climb without falling. Every second, hour after hour, he receives information that he is meeting that basic goal” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, p. 54).

Csikszentmihalyi does not state “winning the match” as the tennis player’s goal or “reaching the top of the mountain” as the climber’s goal. He is not pointing to macro-goals triggering a sense of closure but explaining how meeting a vast number of micro-goals so minute that they can hardly be called “goals”—each successful returning of the tennis ball, each successful “inching” up the mountain side—triggers a continuous, pleasurable sense of flow. Although they disagree somewhat over the mental effect of mastery, the two authors are in fact describing the same engaged activity focused on the micro-level of doing a job well for its own sake.

When looking at computer games through the lens of craftsmanship, it is striking how they offer their players satisfaction on various levels, including the micro-level of motor skill. A player of an interactive drama such as *Heavy Rain* (Quantic Dream, 2010) can find macro-level, narrative closure by determining the identity of the drama’s villain. The satisfaction of achieving meso-level goals can be triggered by getting past an end-of-level boss in a *Ninja Gaiden* game (Tecmo, 1988–2012) or finishing a quest chain in *World of Warcraft* (Blizzard, 2004). But computer games also offer the micro-level pleasure of craftsmanship, of practising, of acquiring and maintaining motor skills, of playing the game well for its own sake. It can be played well “for its own sake” not just in the sense of lacking external reward as motivation but also in the sense of being temporarily without goal. This is not quite sport and not quite work but craft, and it is something found almost exclusively in *computer games* as opposed to other types of games.

4 Material Consciousness and Play

Sennett is dismissive of “creativity” because it comes with “too much Romantic baggage” (Sennett 2008, p. 290) but he certainly describes craftsmanship in terms suggestive of creativity: “all [the craftsperson’s] efforts to do good-quality work depend on curiosity about the material at hand” (Sennett 2008, p. 120). Action directed towards a material in a curious manner dismissive of closure is exactly creative in the Bergsonian sense. In the case of computer games, however, the “material at hand” is a rather special one which needs to be specified.

When the glassblower crafts, it seems obvious that the material at hand is glass. The glassblower cannot actually touch the molten glass yet glass is the material, this is where the craftsman’s focused attention is as he or she works with tongs, hammers and pipes. A pianist cannot touch his or her material either. The material of sound is manipulated indirectly, using a very sophisticated tool: the piano. When the pianist imagines sound, the piano inevitably comes to mind as well. It is meaningless for the performing instrumentalist to distinguish between instrument, manipulations of the instrument and produced sound. The state of mind in which material, skill and final result is indistinguishable to the craftsperson is labelled “material consciousness” by Sennett (2008, p. 119) who “[makes] a very simple proposal about this engaged material consciousness: we become particularly interested in the things we can change” (Sennett 2008, p. 120).

Computers are perfect machines for upholding simulations which react to user input, including games which react to player input. The computer game player's "material at hand" can be named *simulation*—obviously not as sensuous a material as clay, glass, wood or water, yet the desire to play computer games can be understood through comparison with other kinds of craftsmanship. Since "simulation" has found frequent use in game studies a bit of clarification is in order.

Simulation is understood here as the concrete material experienced and manipulated by players by means of tools such as keyboards and plastic guitars or in more direct, bodily ways through devices such as the Microsoft Kinect or Lenovo's iSec. Several game scholars find it uniquely characteristic of computer games that they trigger a split in the players attention between what is immediately accessible through perception and something which is not. That "something" which is not directly perceptible has, for example, been referred to as "the underlying formal structure" (Klevjer 2006, p. 103), the "software" (Friedman 1994), and the "rules" (Juul 2005). Following this mode of thought, the simulation is something *signified* in a semiotic sense: a complex, mental concept built through sustained engagement but not accessible directly through the senses. This makes sense when discussing certain computer games, for example a digital version of chess. The board and game pieces of digital chess are props in the player's effort towards upholding the simulation—in the sense of the current, tactical situation and the rules governing it—in his or her mind. The board and game pieces of digital chess do not, however, constitute a material of the malleable kind which allow for material consciousness. One cannot move a chess piece in a skilful manner. A move in chess has an abstract, non-sensuous quality.

From the perspective of craftsmanship simulation is not an abstract signified but a concrete material which can be changed by players. *The Sims 2* (Maxis, 2004), for example, present players with malleable material which can be engaged with in a dedicated and patient manner potentially leading to material consciousness. Hanna Wirman has suggested that the practice of *skinning*—that is, to create new or to alter existing game content—in *The Sims 2* "is not a meta-activity or an addition to gameplay, but a form of play itself" (Wirman 2011, p. 256). From the viewpoint of craftsmanship skinning is indeed *typical* of computer game play since it allows for material consciousness and therefore exemplifies a desire exclusive to computer games.

To sum up, the computer game takes a special place in cultural history by allowing the fusion of play and material consciousness. This phenomenon will now be explored through a revisiting of Caillois's classical typology of desires.

5 Caillois's Typology of Desires Revisited

Despite its status in game studies, Caillois's "Man, Play, and Games" (1961) is seldom read in the spirit in which it was written. The famous typology—*âgon* (competition), *alea* (chance), *mimicry* (role playing), *ilinx* (vertigo, loss of self control)—is referred to as a typology of games or game aspects but Caillois clearly intended it as more than that, namely as a typology of desires. "Man, Play, and Games" is characterised by words such as *contagion*, *desire*, *drive*, *impulse*, *instinct*, *passion*, *pleasure*, *psychological attitude* and *state of mind*. In the spirit of Huizinga,

who supplies the theoretical foundation for “Man, Play, and Games”, Caillois not merely examines various types of games but also the basic, human impulses behind playing them. One such desire, the agonistic desire to compete, used to find violent and deadly expression in wars and duels but civilised societies no longer accept such behaviour. As a replacement, the playing of agonistic games allows *âgon* to find an outlet in acceptably tamed, diluted forms.

If, for example, the motivations for playing *World of Warcraft* is considered through Caillois's typology something along the following lines emerges:

Âgon—competitive drive: Who reaches level x first? Who kills whom in PvP (player versus player) mode?

Alea—the thrill of chance: Who wins the lottery, that is, who gets the good loot in a raid?

Mimicry—the desire to play another role than oneself, or to lose oneself, by using the avatar as a focus for role playing; and

Ilinx—as seen in excessive or addicted gaming.

Craftsmanship falls outside the four categories. That is, to my mind, a significant problem which stems directly from Caillois's method. Rather than setting out with a set of primal desires which are then found reflected in games, Caillois surveys the cultural landscape of the times, the late 1950s, and then bases his typology on his observations. Computer games were obviously not part of the cultural landscape to which Caillois had access. He does, however, see something like craftsmanship in the hobby of building scale models, a phenomenon he labels “construction games” (Caillois 1961, p. 30) and then places as a sub-category of mimicry. Understood through the lens of craftsmanship computer games could be labelled construction games as well but whereas the building of scale airplane and cars remains a niche phenomenon the playing of computer games is much more pervasive today. It does not suffice, in today's cultural landscape, to subsume construction under mimicry. It is more accurate to acknowledge craftsmanship as a separate kind of desire which runs as deep and strong as *âgon*, *alea*, *mimicry* and *ilinx*.

Mirroring Caillois's approach, I will end with a consideration of how craftsmanship relates to the four playful desires described by Caillois.

Craftsmanship—mimicry is a strong fusion underlying many of the most popular computer games today such as role playing games and MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games). These games offer their player what James Paul Gee coins *projective identity*. To have a projective identity means to “[project] one's values and desires onto the virtual character”, a phenomenon which falls under mimicry, but it also means “seeing the virtual character as one's own project in the making” (Gee 2003, p. 55). This latter aspect falls under craftsmanship. In role playing games and MMORPGs a character is patiently crafted through a range of activities including the killing of monsters, the harvesting of resources, participating in group activities etc. These activities can have other aspects, for example narrative and social aspects, but they are fused with the craft project of building a character, or in Marxist terms with objectification into the game world.

There might even be an element of explicit, in-game, virtual craftsmanship to such a project, for example the elaborate crafting system of *EverQuest II* (Sony Online Entertainment, 2004) or the more rudimentary crafting system of *World of Warcraft*. Some of the most popular games hosted on social media platform *Facebook* are

essentially crafting simulators. *FarmVille* (Zynga, 2009) is a very basic farming simulation which allows players to grow crops and build structures thematically related to farming. *CastleVille* (Zynga Dallas, 2011) combines the crafting elements known from MMORPGs—characters can dabble in glassblowing, blacksmithing, clockmaking etc.—with the opportunity to build castles. *CastleVille* even features Martha Stewart as a quest giver who leads the player towards tasks such as harvesting wheat and “crafting” lemonade. A real-life champion of high-quality craftsmanship in gardening, cooking and other domestic areas, Stewart fits *CastleVille* perfectly. Although Sennett and Stewart are strange bedfellows they both fight against indifference to quality and promote the pleasure of making things.

Craftsmanship—âgon. Sometimes, if not often, competition in computer games only superficially resembles âgon. In the sense intended by Caillois, âgon is a pure test of skill. All efforts are made to give players the exact same starting conditions: duellers are given the same type of guns, cyclists the same restrictions on drug use. However, in competitive computer games the winner of a competition is often the player who has crafted the best character. What determines the outcome of the competition is not so much which skills but which tools the combatants bring to the fight. The avatar-based battle between two players becomes a moment where the quality of two crafting projects are compared rather than a battle of pure skill.

Another kind of competition in computer games can be found in the *show and tell* sessions held in *Second Life* (Linden, 2003) by self-proclaimed ‘builders’. A builder is a user who has reached a high level of skill in using the design tools of *Second Life*. In a show and tell session builders take turns presenting their creations—ranging from teddy bears over arcade game consoles to huge structures such as a replica of Seattle’s Space Needle—to a community of like-minded users. The audience often applauds and asks questions about the exact techniques employed in designing the objects on display. Thus friendly competition plays an important part in peer-to-peer teaching but is not a factor in the actual design activity. This is exactly the role Huizinga finds competitive ritual to have in the development of the arts. Competition is not a factor in the physical crafting of works of art but in their social reception (Huizinga 1949, p. 169).

Craftsmanship—alea is not a viable combination since corporeal anticipation requires stability in the material at hand. The craftsman’s painstakingly adjusted, minuscule hand movements becomes meaningless if the material is not predictable.

Craftsmanship—ilinx. The loss of self, which is the fundamental feature of *ilinx*, can be found in the practice of all craftsmanship. A sense of self includes, arguably, having a goal for one’s activities but the practising craftsman’s patience entails temporary suspension of goal-directedness. As already noted, Sennett sees a link between practising a craft and Zen Buddhism, and one of Csikszentmihalyi’s respondents also reports an “egoless [...] Zen feeling” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, p. 62). What replaces the sense of ego during craftsmanship is, however, not exactly a Zen feeling of “nothingness” but material consciousness: creative engagement with the material at hand.

6 Conclusion

Play is often defined in opposition to work but the concept of craftsmanship allows that opposition to be avoided, at least when it comes to computer games, because

craftsmanship has two key characteristics found both in working and in playing computer games. Firstly, craftsmanship entails patient, material consciousness: the creative, possibility-widening attention to the material at hand pleurably builds up through rehearsal and based on the temporary suspension of goal-directedness. Secondly, craftsmanship entails the satisfaction of seeing the end result of one's labours, for example in the shape of an avatar. Unlike other games, computer games make craftsmanship possible.

In a historical perspective then, what is novel about computer games is that they are not pure games but cultural objects allowing for the contamination of the playful desires identified by Caillois—*agon*, *alea*, *mimicry*, *ilinx*—with craftsmanship, the desire to do a job well for its own sake as defined by Sennett.

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