Beate Krickel

Beate Krickel
Technische Universität Berlin | TUB · Institut für Philosophie, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte

PhD

About

24
Publications
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Introduction
Beate Krickel currently works at the Institute of Philosophy, Literary Studies, History of Science and Technology at TU Berlin. Beate does research in Philosophy of Mind, Science and Metaphysics.

Publications

Publications (24)
Article
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Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to centre stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” shoul...
Preprint
Full-text available
Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the discussion of the unconscious mind back to center stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? In the present paper, I will suggest a new strategy for answering this question. This strategy rests on the idea that...
Article
Full-text available
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00396-z
Chapter
Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out d...
Preprint
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Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists' mutual manipulability (MM) account. In this paper, I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedn...
Article
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Cartwright, Pemberton, and Wieten (2020) and the new mechanists agree that regular behaviors described in cp laws are generated by mechanisms. However, there is disagreement with regard to the two questions that Cartwright at al. ask: the epistemological question (“What kind of explanation is involved?”) and the ontological question (“What is going...
Article
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While ideal (surgical) interventions are acknowledged by many as valuable tools for the analysis of causation, recent discussions have shown that, since there are no ideal interventions on upper-level phenomena that non-reductively supervene on their underlying mechanisms, interventions cannot—contrary to a popular opinion—ground an informative ana...
Chapter
Many areas of science are animated by the search for mechanisms: experiments are designed to find them, explanations are built to reveal them, models are constructed to describe them, funding is disbursed to prioritize their discovery, and translational research is premised on their value for manipulation and control. Over the last twenty or thirty...
Book
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The aim of this book is to develop a metaphysical account of mechanisms. So far, the new mechanistic literature has mainly focused on epistemic issues such as scientific explanation, scientific discovery, and causal modelling. This book takes a difference stance: I will investigate in which sense mechanisms are things in the world; what our ontolog...
Article
Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack...
Article
Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this relation is Carl Craver's mutual manipulability approach (MM) to constitutive relevance. Recently, MM has come under attack (Baumgartner and Casini 2017; Baumgartner and Gebharte...
Preprint
Full-text available
Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attac...
Chapter
The Acting Entity-characterization of mechanisms, defended in the last chapter, is rather broad. It allows for almost all causal goings-on to be mechanisms. Let us call the AE-characterization of mechanisms as formulated in the previous chapter the minimal notion of a mechanism (Glennan 2017). In the following sections I introduce a taxonomy of mec...
Chapter
What kinds of things are we committed to if AE-mechanisms exist? Defenders of the AE-approach to mechanisms argue that mechanisms are organized entities and activities. This entity–activity dualism is understood as a metaphysical claim: the fundamental units of mechanisms are entities and activities that cannot be reduced to anything more fundament...
Chapter
In Chap. 2 we learned that there are etiological mechanisms that are responsible for phenomena by causing them and that there are constitutive mechanisms that bring about phenomena by constituting them. Still, many questions remain unanswered. First, as argued in Chap. 5, the interventionist approach to constitutive relevance is confronted with sev...
Chapter
What distinguishes those EIOs that are components of a particular mechanism from those EIOs that are not? What, for example, distinguishes the hippocampus’s generation of spatial maps, which is a component in the mechanism for spatial memory, from the blood circulating through the brain, which is not taken to be a component in that mechanism? The b...
Chapter
The notion of a phenomenon plays a crucial role in the new mechanistic thinking. But what are mechanistic phenomena? In this chapter, I discuss and reject a view that is common in the new mechanistic literature: the view that constitutive mechanistic phenomena are capacities. My argument, roughly, is that this view is incompatible with the metaphys...
Chapter
The contemporary philosophical literature contains different views on what mechanisms are. All approaches agree on certain central assumptions; but they differ in various respects, some of which are crucial when it comes to analyzing the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic approach. Roughly, the different approaches to mechanisms can be...
Chapter
I started this book with a quote by Peter Machamer et al. (2000). They posited that without thinking about mechanisms we cannot understand the life sciences: we can neither reveal their ontological commitments, nor handle the various philosophical problems arising in that scientific context. In this book I have argued that one cannot understand the...
Article
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According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than another acting entity if and only if the former is a component in the mechanism for the latter. Craver and Bechtel (Biol Philos 22(4):547–563, 2007. doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8) argue that a consequence of this view is that there cannot be causal inte...
Article
Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful scientific explanation (Illari [2013]; Craver [2014]). The minimal claim is that scientific explanations have objective truthmakers, namely, mechanisms that exist in the physical world, independent of any observer, and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to-be...
Article
Full-text available
The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena (that is, of phenomena that are explained in constitutive mechanistic explanations). After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggest...

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Project
In contemporary psychology, two different notions of the unconscious are used. First, in cognitive psychology scientists talk about the "cognitive" or "new unconscious" to denote cognitive phenomena that occur without the awareness of the subject. It is called "new" since it is supposed to have not much in common with the "old" Freudian unconscious. Second, in the last 15 years or so, the Freudian unconscious--the so-called "dynamic unconscious"--has become a subject of a branch of neuroscience called neuropsychoanalysis. One research focus is the investigation of the neural mechanism of repression. So far, it remains unclear, what unconscious mental phenomena are supposed to be, whether there is only one theoretically and empirically coherent notion of the unconscious, how the cognitive and the dynamic unconscious exactly differ, and what the explanatory relevance of the postulation of unconscious mental phenomena is. One central claim I argue for is that cognitive psychology has to integrate the Freudian notion of the unconscious and it has to take seriously the idea of repression. To show this, my focus so far is on implicit biases such as implicit racial and sexist biases. I argue that in order to understand in which sense implicit biases are implicit and how this implicitness arises we have to analyze these phenomena in terms of repression.
Project
Further info: www.situated-cognition.com The debate on situated cognition concerns the question whether cognition is merely a feature of the brain, or rather a feature of a larger system involving not only the brain, but also other parts of the body (Embodiment), features of the external environment (Extendedness), or active interactions between the organism and the social and physical environment (Enactedness). These three E-statements essentially make claims about what constitutes cognition: cognition is constituted by features external to the brain. Opponents of the situated cognition framework reject this constitution claim: Cognition is a feature of the brain, while the body, the external environment, and actions merely provide causal inputs to the brain, and thus, are not parts of the cognitive system. Hence, much depends on what is meant by "constitution" in the context of the situated cognition framework and how this relation differs from causation. To approach this question, I will look into the new mechanistic literature, analyze how the distinction between causation and constitution is drawn there, and whether it can be applied to the debate on situated cognition. This strategy will profit from my earlier works on mechanistic constitution and will start with David Kaplan's ideas on the application of the mutual manipulability criterion to the E-claims. My approach to mechanistic constitution has already been applied to the enactivist notion of constitution by Shaun Gallagher.