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Why Islamism Failed in The Syrian Arab Uprising?

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Abstract

The Arab Spring has not fulfilled the desires of millions of demonstrators in Middle East. The desires to see the expanded role of the civil society has been muted by the Islamists and particularly by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Article puts the focus on the failure of Islamism in Syria during the uprising for several reasons, such as the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood to shape a new leadership, and its rejectionist agenda that had nurtured skepticism by the opposition factions. Furthermore, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had been unable to change its political motivation and kept insisted on shifting the Syrian political system. Moreover, the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was its dependency on regional powers and its cooperation of the with the extremist groups has put them on the side of the terrorist groups and neutralized the argument that the West and precisely the US has been circulating for years as Muslim Brotherhood could be considered a moderate Islamist organization. This article reveals the identical ideology and strategy of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the extremist groups in Syria which hasn't been studied before in past-present context.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Syria, The Muslim Brotherhood, Terrorism, Islamism.

INTRODUCTION

The uprisings spread in several Arab countries known as the Arab Spring, where the demonstrators took on streets demanding real changes that could bring solutions to the new challenges revealed in the Middle East such as high level of jobless youth, rural areas alienation, sociopolitical decay, economic inequality and so forth. The mentioned uprisings had opened a new era with the aim for real changes that were greatly different from the previous political situation facing the Middle East, where the incidents mainly had been circulated around the competition and confrontation between the Arab-nationalists and the Islamists factions that emerged after the post-colonial period starting from mid 1940's. The above-mentioned phenomenon has differed in its

shape and uprising's demands. If previously the confronting sides were advocates of Nationalism and Islamism presented by exact political parties or movements, this time the actors in this sense were apolitical and their demands were associated with social-economic improvements, reducing poverty, institutionalization of human rights and demands for civil participations in social and political life (Ramadan 2012) (Lefevre 2013). The Syrian uprising did not contain any desires of an act of confrontation or a designed plot for reaching to regime change or accusing the government for having an Alawi president at the beginning of the protests (Hokayem 2013). Although each Arab country has its specifications, and the domino effect uprisings should not be accepted as identical or noted generalized.

For instance, the uprising in Egypt was mainly about political decay and economic stagnation. The one in Libya was directed primarily against Qaddafi's existence. Tunisia had moderate Islamism and nurturing secularism that the leadership seemed authoritarian and unacceptable. The purpose of the uprising in Syria was neither for regime change, nor a demand for Islamists to come to power (Lefevre, *Ashes of Hama*, 2013) (Hokayem, *Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant*, 2013) (Dib, 2013). Interestingly, in Syria as well as in the region, Islamists, namely the Muslim Brotherhood has gained hold and took the uprisings to its orbit. In the given new circumstances, Islamists failed in Syria, due to its ideological exceptionalism and intolerance, structural decay and sectarian arm struggle. In the first part of the essay, I will define Islamism that would characterize the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and reveal the aspects of its failure in the Syrian crisis time period. In the second part of the essay, I will stress upon the ideological, structural and operational setbacks and failures the Syrian Muslim brotherhood had performed which resulted to its failure by examining the period from the outbreak of the uprising till its shift to a full-scale war. The majority of the works such as the "The Revolution in Syria," and "Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant," have not presented the role of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is failing the desires of the demonstrators and actively political actors that wanted evolutionary change in Syria in political and social spheres, instead, the mentioned books particularly on Syria have either blamed the Syrian government for its actions, or the crisis and the war in Syria

have seen from the lenses of sectarian war. The purpose of the article is to study the ideology, tactics and the motivation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, that has been not satisfactory in shaping the alternative to the Syrian government and it stayed either marginal or fell in the list of the extremist groups by cooperating with armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army, al Qaeda and ISIS.

METHODS

The Method used in the article is performed by qualitative method in analyzing the Ideology and the organizational performance of the Muslim Syrian Brotherhood during the protests has taken place in Syria amid the Arab Spring. Additionally, the article has elements of comparative theory used to describe the similar enmity in Syria in the past between the secularists and Islamists.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Different faces of Islamism

It is evident that there is no single definition that, could clearly define Islamism, but there are several frameworks that clearly defines Islamism by experts that it could be framed in exact categories. For Instance, to some, Islamism means participation of Muslims to the existing political systems to reflect their political views and pressure governments for reform (Piscatori, 1996). In other words, Islamists are the Muslims with politically active, willing to work in the existing secular political systems with abilities to pressure states for reforms. Another definition of Islamism refers to the willingness of Islamists to seize power and its ultimate goal

is to Islamize the society by implementing sharia law instead of the existing secular law (Tibi, 2012) (McCants, 2017) (Roy, 1994) (Noor, 2003). Following the last notion, it means Islamism has no differentiated or developed tendencies in itself and all participants whether in different timeline or country possess the same demand of implementing sharia law and declaring Islamic state. This view of Islamism even put the Islamist and Islamic version of political Islam into the same categorization by implying that Islamic State is the core element in political Islam, whether it is achieved by Islamist or Islamic methods (Tibi, Islamism and Islam, 2012). It aims on educating the masses to integrate Muslim Identity through education and lifestyle and Islamists are mainly perform in bottom-up methods, where taking power is not a priority. On contrary to this notion, there is the implication that Islamism contains opportunist tendencies and will struggle to power as soon as the chances turn visible (McCants, Rethinking Political Islam, 2017) (Pargeter, 2013) (Dib, Crisis in Syria, 2013). In terms of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the version of the Islamism hasn't been limited by showing political views or pressure the governments further into reform.

Furthermore, its creation has been a reaction to colonialism and against foreign imported cultures. Similarly, the Islamism in Syria orchestrated by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has been a reaction to the emergence of secular nationalism in Syria. Thus, its political participation hasn't been hugely to spread religious sentiments within the society, as much as a political attempt to come to power and implement sharia law.

The ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize the Syrian opposition and assert its agenda had been its short-term success, but failure in the long run. The Islamism presented by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had contained not only elements of identity recognition as Fukuyama describes in his "Identity" book, but had been primarily an attempt to perform megalothymia: a desire to be recognized as superior (Fukuyama, 2018). Thus, the Islamism performed by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood could be seen not only as a clash of civilizations in the Syrian context between the Islamist and Nationalist ideologies, but also a clash of identity driven and nurtured by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Meaning that the feeling of superiority over other factions in the society means that the Islamism of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood sees its version of Islam is the right path and its unwillingness to enter cooperation with other factions such as its longtime adversary (Dib, The Syrian War, 2015), or in case of cooperation toward forming broad oppositions; the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood tends to be in ruling positions (McCants S. H., 2017) (Hokayem, Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, 2013) (Lund, 2013) (Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 2013). It means, that the Islamists of Syria revealed to the arena newly are advocates of such a political Islam that had identity assertiveness, selfish and not keen for cooperation on the basis of equality and non-sense of power sharing. The above-mentioned reality showed clearly the unreadiness of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood for progressive civil participation and it will impose its rules if the chance has given to be entered in the Syrian political arena. Thus, unresponsive

attitude is a sign of structured ideological formation of the organization not immune for changes.

Ideological decomposition of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood

The evaluation of the return of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism to the Syria arena couldn't be evaluated positive or negative without examining the activities of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood prior to the uprising taken place in Syria. Thus, although the Muslim Brotherhood in were outlawed in Syria, the organization performed in exile and had put forward essential announcements such as "National Honor Charter" and "Pledge and Charter" (McCants S. H., *Rethinking Political Islam*, 2017) (Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 2013) that implied its moderate stance in terms of its readiness to work with other political factions not related to the Islamist agenda and acknowledges that social and political variety of Syria. The mentioned announcements seem transformed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood even to a progressive Muslim politics, where the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood recognizes not only the political actors of different ideologies, but accept to cooperate with Syria's religious and ethnic minorities as well. The above mentioned two announcements undoubtedly has put the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood into the evolutionary stance, where could be translated as a shift from confrontational method to cooperative. An Islamism that is not reactionary, but engaging. Moreover, an Islamist Muslim Brotherhood that its identity is not assertive, but implies for identity that stresses on civil Muslimness rather than imposing its Islamist identity upon the rest factions in the society. Furthermore, the

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood even declared its willingness to go for negotiations with its longtime adversary before the Syrian Crisis and during the Crisis as well that turned into a bloody war. Undoubtedly, such strategies shift the image of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's image to positive; taking into account its distorted image, due to the Islamist insurgency during 1970's in Syria by followed assassinations and assassination attempts of key figures in the Syrian government (Dib, *The Syrian War*, 2015). Conversely, the readiness and willingness of broad cooperation kept merely a political declaration and the voices inside the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood for reconciliation with the government had been muted.

The ideological shift of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood from the cooperative and pragmatic field back to the sphere of intolerance and assertive posture could be translated by either its incompetence or due to ideological-intellectual decay. Nevertheless, prioritizing the old school and spreading the readings of Qutb- the champion of radical vision, the radical branch ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the mostly read radical jihadist thinker to this day- in its educational system and alienating the books that advocate moderation (Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 2013), its one implication that the majority of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership were away from evolutionary progressive Islam and the organization in more than three decades hasn't seen any ideological changes or innovations. Similarly, the isolation or elimination of the moderates from the ranks of the leadership also implies the rejection of the leadership of the Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood for moderate views, cooperative atmosphere and shows its unwillingness to go for any discussion or negotiation with the Syrian government. In other words, The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood based on its operations on the ground, has differed greatly from the image it wanted to show to the world. Although in exile, the Syrian Muslim brotherhood with its unconditional rejectionist stance seems declared enmity toward the Syrian government similar to the notion of uninterrupted revolutions of the Marxist Trotsky a century ago. Thus, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had shown its determination to keep the scope narrowed to preference to such strategy that imposes its Islamist version from up to bottom whenever the right chance to enter the Syrian political sphere might appear.

Moreover, more importantly, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood played behind the scenes during the Syrian uprising, but has the decisive role in holding the decisions of the opposition in its hands (Hokayem E. , 2013) (Dib, The Syrian War, 2015). It could be argued that the opposition in Syria namely the Syrian National Council and subsequently the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, had formed by different factions, personalities with different ideological and religious belief. As a matter to the pretended notion of diversity, the leaders were chosen as being secular figures such as liberal Burhan Ghaliun, and Christian Marxist George Habash. The opposition had Kurdish, socialist and factions from Alawi community as well as well. Thus, the image had been created that the opposition had elements and components from nearly all

sides of the Syrian Society and the struggle is not driven only by the Sunnis or the Islamists in particular (Dib, The Syrian War, 2015). Conversely, the mentioned figures were neither representative of proper number of opposition groups, not had any impact on the ground that could change any condition on the ground. Moreover, gradually the non-Sunni factions had complained for the assertive method of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood within the organization for imposing its rules in accepting agendas (Dib, The Syrian War, 2015). The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's influence on the formed opposition groups were strong to that from the start declared regime change and not to go for any negotiations with the Syrian government. The resignation of the moderate leader of National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces Moaz al-Khatib after his willingness to start negotiations with the Syrian government (Hokayem E. , Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, 2013) is a clear indication both on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's influence upon the opposition groups and its rejectionist policy in going for any attachment with the Syrian government from the start. Thus, the strategy of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood seems as being opportunist, driven primarily to enhance operations that could lead to power seizure by overthrowing the secular Syrian government and after that declaring Syria an Islamic state (Muzaffar, 2011). Moreover, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, contrary to Ennahda in Tunis, failed to implement a pragmatic strategy that not only declared itself as a version of democratic Islam, but also came to power in a coalition with secular parties (Marks, 2017).

As I have mentioned in the first part of the essay that it is not correct to generalize the incidents that have taken place in the Arab World as if they fit all explanations, but the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has the chance to shift its rejectionist attitude and push forward its leaders or the Islamists close to the organization to show pragmatism and evaluate the Syrian long term and short term reality, where the Secular-national ideology has its deep roots in the formation and the development of the country (Seal, 1988) (Dib, *The Syrian War*, 2015), regardless if the current government is authoritarian. It was evident before and during the uprising that the Syrian government has its supporters not only by the minorities as often emphasized, but from the Sunni Muslim faction that does not enthusiastically see an Islamist movement reach to power (Wagenen, 2022) (Hokeyam, 2013) (Landis, 2012) (Kepel, 2020). The pro-government demonstrations after the Islamist appearance were sufficient to grasp the sociopolitical formation of Syria. It is worth mentioning that Syria, unlike other countries that had been facing uprisings, the minorities are not in ghettos, or isolated from the social political formation of the country. For instance, the ethnic and religious identities play an essential role among the social interactions within the people in Syria. For instance, the Armenian community had played a visible role as a well-established community in Syria (Hovyan, 2013), the Kurds on the other hand had been seen as the manpower driving force. Although ethnically and religiously diverse, the majority of the Syrians—the majority of the minority included—have the strong notion of Syrian Nationalism that has been in clash

with not only Islamism, but also with foreign involvement in the internal affairs of Syria. Furthermore, the miscalculation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was its willingness to take the uprising hostage and impose its own agenda which not necessarily related to the current demands of the protestors or the correlated with Syria's issues. With such a move, the Muslim Brotherhood alienated itself from the aspirations of the uprising that took place in Syria.

Structural Bias that Leads to Isolation

It has been evident that the uprisings that took place in the Arab world in general and in Syria in particular were meant for bringing change in social, political and economic spheres of the countries and were not necessarily accompanied by regime change demands (Levant, 2013). The notion of regime change with the clear slogan of “The people want regime change” was a political demand that had been shaped after the Muslim Brotherhood movement orchestrated the opposition, took the developments under its control and brought the structure of the protests into political competition with the aim of toppling the secular regimes with a new form of governments that sharia law could be imposed. Stressing on the first phase of the uprising in Syria, as I have mentioned above, the demands of the protestors were for change and for new solutions in terms of recovering the sociopolitical atmosphere of the country and economic opportunities to reduce or end poverty. In this manner, the structure of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood seemed incapable of bringing such changes when the leadership of the organizations were mainly consisted of the old guards surfaced

by old fashioned Islamist notions that the ultimate goal only to reach to imposing sharia law and the declaring the state an Islamic, fueled with sectarian enmity towards the Alawis in the leadership of Syria and exiled for more than three decades unaware of the real problems and prospects of the country. Structural obstacle that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood faced had been the two main camps known as the Damascus, Aleppo and Hama factions. The Damascus branch had been formed by moderates, whereas the Aleppo branch were more of conservatives. In terms of the Hama branch, the members were of more radical tendencies advocated the participation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood into the arm struggle officially (Lund, *Struggling to Adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria*, 2013) (Wagenen, *Did the Syrian Revolution Have Popular Support?*, 2022) (Blair, 2012).

The reality which the decision making in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had been given to the more conservative and radical factions in the organizations, indicates that the organization had no tendencies in fact to bring evolutionary changes into the Syrian crisis, but used the right time to enter the Syrian political arena for seizing the power. Overall, the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood showed its unwillingness to give a chance for the new generation to emerge to leadership ranks that had reformist vision and were aware of the demands of the people willing for change in the Arab world and in Syria particularly (Pierret, 2013). The version of Islamism the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood thus had shown revealed not only signs of ideological vacuum, but also had structural decay that had not been able to

reshape itself with new faces in the leadership. Hence, the old notion kept the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood not only alien to the real demands and the causes of the uprising for being outdated and not aware of the new conditions surfaced the country for more than three decades, but also nurtured the sectarian enmity that has been missing from the Syrian arena for a long period.

Islamists Nurture Sectarianism and Shifted to Armed Struggle

If the uprising gradually took a shape of political demands such as widening the spectrum of political participation, or ending the harsh security methods by the security personnel, the tendency of the demands had been gradually changing towards not only requests for regime change, but also voices and slogans were being chanted against the Alawite and minority Christians such “Christians to Lebanon, Alawites to coffins”, or “No Iran, No Hezbollah,” (Mazur, 2021) (Wakim, 2012) that the former implies the unwillingness to see Christians in the country and they want to see Alawis dead. The other slogan is harsher, where they accept the president of Syria as a Shia supported by Iran and Hezbollah. Thus, the slogan also contains hatred and rejection towards Iran and Hezbollah; the two regional allies of Syria that is not necessarily accepted as Shia allies, but they represent the key actors of the resistance against Israel which became evident in the war when Israel launched an attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. The sectarian enmity had been returning to Syria with a clear agenda to direct the unrest toward the predated skirmish between Hafez al Assad forces and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood during

1960s-1980s, due to Muslim Brotherhood's rejection of seeing Assad as a president with Alawi-minority affiliation and secular nationalistic ideology (Casari, 2021) (Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 2013) (Commins, 2006). The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in that period of time declared an Islamist insurgency which had been crushed by the government forces and the Muslim Brotherhood crushed and went in exile. Similarly, after more than three decades, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, instead of using the opportunity to make a comeback with new ideological and operational agenda that might foster integration and cooperation, or could give new solution on advancing the country to the requirement that suits the current world, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had decided to enter the Syrian political arena with the motives of toppling the Syrian government by igniting sectarian enmities against the Alawi minority in particular and towards the other minorities in general. Thus, the Islamism the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had advocated after many years seems unchangeable and it integrates elements of Salafism when puts the stress on not only regime change, but also driven against a specific religious community or the minorities generally as alien to its understanding in the political sphere. Based on mentioned strategy, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had been part of not only bringing the sectarian hatred on streets initiating a Facebook Page from the early period of the uprising; that was essential for organizing anti-government protests inserted with sectarian contents, (Wegenen, n.d.) (Lund, Struggling to adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria, 2013) (Mazur

K. , 2021) but also praised the armed struggle against the government representatives and governmental objects. Moreover, it supported the fighter organization known as Free Syrian Army politically and materially (Lund, Struggling to Adapt, 2013).

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood took the initiative to confront the Syrian government in all means, even by consolidating with the Free Syrian Army and Islamic Salafi jihadi groups (Wagenen, Did the Syrian Revolution Have popular Support, 2022) (Cesari, 2021). In other words, the Islamist movement such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, had the capability to lean towards Islamic armed groups and integrate Salafi-takfiri ideology; to create ideological conservatism for the sake of regime change in Syria. It is worth mentioning that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had cooperated with ideologically more restrict school as Salafism when Islamists and Islamic struggle had been against Assad's government or against the secular socialist-nationalist ideology, which has been transformed from Egypt to Syria known as the Arab Nationalism. Thus, the outrage that followed a crisis and a war has brought the decades long confrontation between the secularist nationalist government elites of Syria and the Islamists led by the Muslim Brotherhood that has been in resistance to change Syria to an Islamic state and shift the constitution to a sharia-based law. In other words, the Muslim brotherhood's ideology and strategy has been focused on transforming the Arab nations into an entity ruled by sharia law in all political, economic, social and spiritual spheres The Syrian elite

has established a strategy to confront jointly with other nations in the region such as Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian authorities to confront the capabilities of Israel regionally which has been known as the “Assad Doctrine.” (Dib, *The Syrian War*, 2015) On contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood, generated the idea of establishing an Islamic state in Syria in 1980s at started an armed resistance against the officials, government personnel and governmental institutions by a demand for regime change, which has ended with the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Hama battle. It is worth mentioning that the orchestrated rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood had intensified during the period the “Assad Doctrine” has been known and it received regional and American assistance from political factions such as some of the Christian political parties in Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the US administration that have been against advanced regional influence of Syria that could minimize their influence in the region. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has been activated and launched armed struggle for regime change not only to rule Syria with its Islamist agenda per se, but to minimize Syria’s role in the regional confrontations that eventually has been standing against the idea of the formation of Greater Israel.

In the current situation, the sectarian enmity and the emergence of armed struggle paved the way to a war that turned it into a global conflict with two hegemonic pillars the Sunni countries and the Shia country with its allies (Kissinger, 2014) (Hokayem E. , *Syria's uprising*, 2013). The return of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to the Syrian arena and its monopolized position among the oppositions had turned Syria into a field

of regional competition each forcing its own agenda. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s sectarian driven agenda also regionalized the Islamist version of the Muslim Brotherhood, when it became evident that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood ‘s closest allies in the region are Turkey and Qatar (Wakim, *The Struggle of Great Powers on Syria*, 2012). It is worth mentioning that in contrast, Ennahda of Tunisia although somehow praised the Turkish Islamism in terms of its pragmatic tactical advantages, but criticized the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt for its assertive policies and signs of intolerance towards the rest (Marks, *Rethinking Political Islam*, 2017). Moreover, Ennahda as an Islamist power, has been able to localize its version of Islamism, distanced itself from the Muslim brotherhood of Egypt (marks, 2017), in order to be capable of facing the changes and become eligible to country’s aspiration. In this regard, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood insisted on performing a strategy that could be based on exceptionalism, intolerance, ideologically imposing Islamic tendencies and cooperative with Salafi jihadi organizations which John L. Esposito describes it as a “contentious commonality.” (Esposito, 2018). Thus, perpetual confrontation atmosphere had caused the Middle East and Syria particularly to wage an existential struggle.

CONCLUSION

The deformation of the Syrian uprising into a conflict had been primarily due to the miscalculations of the opposition and namely the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The requirements of the new situation in Syria had created a chance for new ideas and solutions, in which the

version of Islamism the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood obtained had shown irrelevant to the reality of Syria and the demands of the population that were protesting in the streets for better conditions. It became evident that the requirements were not related to religion or demands for more religious integration in the lives of the Syrians. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood seemed incapable of showing such ideological strategy that could not only give solution to the raised problems, but also progress itself and its ranks to a level that political Islam could be seen not as a toll to seize power or ignite confrontations, but to harmonize the diverse society of Syria with the notion of participation, but not imposition upon the majority of the society that either are Muslims not Islamist or minorities with active social, political and economic participation in Syria. Moreover, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood showed its incapability of uniting its ranks and bringing to the leadership a new generation acquainted with the innovations of world today with a desire to share the world and the policy of the county withy other factions of the society not only through declaring vague announcements, but on the ground. The version of Islamism that Ennahda performed is the contrary what Islamism played a role in Syria. It generated a new vision and new actors that brought the movement not to a sectarian war, but to lead the country with coalition factions distinct from the Islamist camp. Moreover, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood also was not able to join the Syrian opposition with a new start that brings solutions to today's problems. Instead, it came to a new situation with old conflicts and with sectarian hatred. Not only maximized the unrest and

advocated for an arm struggle, but also turned the Syrian crisis into a regional conflict that Syria has been an arena for imposing agendas by regional power. The Islamism of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood imposed, turned the regional player Syria in a battlefield for regional calculations. At last, the sectarian war nurtured in Syria with the help of the Islamists, have paved the way for Islamic jihadi organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS to reach to Syria. This article has revealed that the failure of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood generated a vacuum for the movements to emerge in the context of Islamism and Post-Islamism, and the dramatic ideological downfall of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood will halt the Islamist and post Islamist movements to emerge in Syria in the near future.

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