Amnon Rapoport

Amnon Rapoport
University of California, Riverside | UCR · Anderson School of management

PhD

About

285
Publications
30,476
Reads
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10,403
Citations
Citations since 2017
16 Research Items
2240 Citations
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Additional affiliations
January 2009 - July 2014
University of California, Riverside
Position
  • Distingushed Professor of Management
Description
  • My research focus on individual and interactive decision making with special interest in congestion in networks, dynamic pricing, common pool dilemmas, and sequential search by individuals and groups.
July 1997 - June 2008
July 1989 - July 2011
The University of Arizona
Position
  • Eller Professor of Management

Publications

Publications (285)
Article
This manuscript proposes a novel mechanism of multi‐issue bilateral bargaining under incomplete information. A single seller and single buyer negotiate the prices of multiple items by submitting offers and counteroffers in which the items are traded as a package deal. Trade occurs if the sum of the individual profits across all items is non‐negativ...
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We study the performance of heuristics relative to the performance of optimal solutions in the rich domain of sequential search, where the decision to stop the search depends only on the applicant’s relative rank. Considering multiple variants of the secretary problem, that vary from one another in their formulation and method of solution, we find...
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We present an experimental study of dynamic pricing in which two retailers compete to sell perishable goods over a finite horizon. Consumers arrive at the market one at a time and remain there for a single period. Each consumer compares the two simultaneously posted prices, one by each retailer, and then decides probabilistically whether to purchas...
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of incentive contracts in multi-partner project teams (MPPTs) on the agents’ effort expenditure and project performance, analyze how the agents allocate their efforts between production and cooperation and offer suggestions for project managers on how to design incentive contracts. Des...
Article
We propose a stylized model of cooperative effort expenditure in multi-agent teams which is driven by intention-based preferences for fairness. Differing from preferences about material payoffs, we consider agents with intention-based preferences for fairness who also care about the motivation that drives other agents’ actions. In the spirit of Rab...
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We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified voting rule. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of our model and then report two experiments on three-person committees with either uncorrelated or perfectly...
Article
We critically review laboratory experiments on route choice in transportation networks with a focus on strategic interactions among network users. Specifically, we present and evaluate a representative set of experimental studies on route choice in directed networks under strategic uncertainty. We are most concerned with the following question: do...
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Within the last decade, there has been a dramatic bloom in ridesharing businesses along with the emergence of new enabling technologies. A central issue in ridesharing, which is also important in the general domain of cost-sharing in economics and computer science, is that the sharing of cost implies positive externalities and hence coordination pr...
Article
The present paper studies the effects of alternative modifications of a subsidy for electricity used to pump groundwater on the behavior of profit maximizing groundwater users. It proposes a stylized model for groundwater extraction, and then numerically derives general results by simulation. The model is applied to aquifers in Leon, Guanajuato, Me...
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Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then tested experimentally with subjects assigned the roles of sellers and buyers. We investigate behavior in...
Article
The Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the netw...
Article
The Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the netw...
Article
Pervasive energy subsidies for groundwater pumping pose a challenge to policy makers around the world, who have to cope with lower water tables due to increased reliance on groundwater resources for irrigation. The present paper outlines a laboratory experiment aimed to study the groundwater extraction decisions of stakeholders under alternative su...
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The literature on team cooperation has neglected the effects of relative kindness intention on cooperation, which we measure by comparing the kindness intentions of an agent to her group members to the kindness shown by other members to this same agent. We argue that the agent’s emotional reaction to material payoff inequity is not constant, but ra...
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Axelrod’s celebrated Prisoner’s Dilemma computer tournaments, published in the early 1980s, were designed to find effective ways of acting in everyday interactions with the strategic properties of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The winner of both tournaments was tit-for-tat, a program that cooperates on the first round and then, on every sub...
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This study reports the results of an experiment on directed networks with positive externalities induced by cost-sharing. Subjects participated in a network game in which they had to choose between private and public transportations. If a player chose public transportation, then she shared the travel cost equally with other players making the same...
Article
Whereas experimental studies of common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas are frequently terminated with collapse of the resource, there is considerable evidence in real-world settings that challenges this finding. To reconcile this difference, we propose a two-stage model that links appropriation of the CPR and provision of public goods in an attempt to...
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Full-text available
Axelrod's celebrated Prisoner's Dilemma computer tournaments, published in the early 1980s, were designed to find effective ways of acting in everyday interactions with the strategic properties of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The winner of both tournaments was tit-for-tat, a program that cooperates on the first round and then, on every sub...
Article
Most common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time and they are managed under environmental uncertainties. We propose a stylized dynamic model that integrates these two dimensions. A distinguishing feature of our model is that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the users’ collective decisions. In...
Article
We report the results of an experimental study of route choice in congestible networks with a common origin and common destination. In one condition, in each round of play network users independently committed themselves at the origin to a three-segment route; in the other condition, they chose route segments sequentially at each network junction u...
Article
This paper studies the effects of pre-trip information on route-choice decisions when travel conditions are congested and stochastic. We adopt a model based on the classical two-route network in which free-flow travel times and/or capacities on each route vary unpredictably due to such shocks as bad weather, accidents, and special events. We show t...
Article
In many sequential search situations, decisions are reached by groups. We examine behavior in such situations experimentally using an extension of the “secretary problem”. In our setup, group members (players) with non-aligned preferences inspect alternatives or “applicants” one at a time with no backward solicitation. A minimal information structu...
Article
Whereas theoretical studies on dynamic pricing typically assume that consumers are either fully strategic or fully myopic, systematic empirical investigations into how consumers behave under dynamic pricing contexts are relatively rare. Focusing on scarce products, we constructed and experimentally tested a two-stage model in which a firm sells a s...
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We consider a class of dynamic tournaments in which two contestants are faced with a choice between two courses of action. The first is a riskless option (“hold”) of maintaining the resources the contestant already has accumulated in her turn and ceding the initiative to her rival. The second is the bolder option (“roll”) of taking the initiative o...
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Data from a previous study are reanalyzed. The study is typical 10-choice probability learning task including 1500 trials. The results demonstrate the feasibility of decomposing multiple-choice decision behavior into two distinct processes. The first process is concerned with the uncertainty of the response distribution, and the second process is c...
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In an optional stopping decision task Ss were presented with a random sequence of offers with a fixed cost per offer. Ss were instructed to maximize their gain by taking the best offer with as few observations as possible. Ss in group H received the highest offer observed by them, while Ss in group L received the last offer observed by them. Group...
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Goofspiel is a simple two-person zero-sum game for which there exist no known equilibrium strategies. To gain insight into what constitute winning strategies, we conducted a round-robin tournament in which participants were asked to provide computerized programs for playing the game with or without carryover. Each of these two variants was to be pl...
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We study network games in which users choose routes in computerized networks susceptible to congestion. In the “Unsplittable” Condition, route choices are completely unregulated, players are symmetric, each player controls a single unit of flow and chooses a single origin-destination path. In the “Splittable” Condition, which is the main focus of t...
Article
The two-person centipede game is one of the most celebrated paradoxes of backward induction in complete information extensive form games. An experimental investigation of a three-person centipede game shows that the paradoxical results are strongly affected by the size of the stakes. When the number of players in the game is increased from two to t...
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Research on social dilemmas has largely been concerned with whether, and under what conditions, selfish decisions by autonomous individuals jointly result in socially inefficient outcomes. By contrast, considerably less emphasis has been placed on the extent of the inefficiency in those outcomes relative to the social optimum, and how the extent of...
Article
We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al., 2007) shows that there are successive markdowns in equi...
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We compare experimentally two contest designs. In the between-group design (BGD), cohorts compete with one another in stage 1 and a single cohort is then advance to stage 2. In stage 2, members of this cohort compete for a single prize. In the within-group design (WGD), the order of the competition is reversed. Our findings support the theoretical...
Article
We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing models, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other...
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The Braess Paradox (BP) is a counterintuitive finding that degrading a network that is susceptible to congestion may decrease the equilibrium travel cost for each of its users. We illustrate this paradox with two networks: a basic network with four alternative routes from a single origin to a single destination, and an augmented network with six al...
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In this paper, we examine the impact of information on the routing decisions that drivers make in a congestible two route traffic network. We present a model and theoretical predictions of driver choices in this network and compare outcomes under conditions of full information and partial information regarding the capacities of each route. In certa...
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The Braess Paradox is a major finding in the equilibrium analysis of routing decentralized traffic in directed networks that are susceptible to congestion. It demonstrates that removing one or more links from a network that is subject to congestion may under certain combinations of cost structure and number of network users decrease the cost of tra...
Article
We study the departure time decisions of commuters traversing a traffic network with the goal of arriving at a common destination at a specified time. There are costs associated with arriving either too early or too late, and with delays experienced at bottlenecks. Our main hypothesis, based on the Nash equilibrium distribution of departure times,...
Article
The Braess Paradox consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that...
Article
A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game-theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within-team social dilemma in a between-team competition for an exogenously determined...
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Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by independently submitting integer bids in some discrete and commonly known strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highe...
Article
This chapter focuses on a series of experiments investigating decision behavior in single-stage, two-person bargaining over the exchange of a single commodity, where neither trader knows with precision the reservation value that the other places on the good or service being bought or sold. Uncertainty about the other trader's reservation value is r...
Article
Vickrey's seminal analysis of urban traffic congestion assumes a continuum of commuters acting selfishly and a continuous strategy space. We propose a discrete version of his model that assumes a finite number of commuters and a discrete strategy space. We then present an algorithm for numerically computing a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium so...
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Volunteer's dilemmas that evolve over time are presented and modeled as noncooperative n-person games in extensive form with symmetric players, discrete time, finite horizon, and complete information. Volunteering is costly, thereby giving rise to free riding. Reflecting on the observation that in many naturally occurring social dilemmas it is bene...
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We study a problem of selling a fixed number of goods over a finite and known horizon. After presenting a procedure for computing optimal decision policies and some numerical results of a simple heuristic policy for the problem, we describe results from three experiments involving financially motivated subjects. The experiments reveal that decision...
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In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483-521] evaluate the behavior of subjects in a two-person investment game...
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Full-text available
The Braess paradox (BP) in traffic and communication networks is a powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium solution. It shows that, paradoxically, when one or more links are added to a directed network with affine link cost functions that depend on congestion, and each user selfishly seeks her bes...
Article
This paper analyses, in a simple two-region model, the undertaking of noxious facilities when the central government has limited prerogatives. The central government decides whether to construct a noxious facility in one of the regions, and how to …nance it. We study this problem under both full and asymmetric information on the damage caused by th...
Chapter
There has been an increase in the incidence of firms who collaborate to develop and market new products. Partners in these collaborations often make investments that are idiosyncratic to the collaboration and have limited value outside the scope of the alliance. Amaldoss and Rapoport (2003) reports that the joint investment of a network does not de...
Article
We provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a selling mechanism used by an Internet web-site that combines important features of auctions and gambling. This is the first analysis of such a selling mechanism, which provides insights into how the two kinds of behavior might be related in real life. The winner of the object is the bidder with the...
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The present study has two purposes. First, we wish to test the descriptive power of the Nash equilibrium solution in a traffic network game with a new population of participants and a different experimental procedure. Second, we wish to determine whether the effects of prior investment and personal responsibility, that may lead people to commit to...
Article
We study a class of multi-level collective actions, in which each individual is simultaneously engaged in an intragroup conflict and intergroup competition. The intragroup conflict is modeled as an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing. The intergroup competition is for an exogenous and commonly k...
Article
We consider traffic networks with a common origin and common destination that are subject to congestion and susceptible to the Braess paradox. Users of such networks choose their routes simultaneously in an attempt to minimize travel cost. A counterintuitive implication of the equilibrium analysis of the users’ route choices is that, as demand for...
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We consider a class of sequential observation and selection decision problems in which applicants are interviewed one at a time, decision makers only learn the applicant's quality relative to the applicants that have been interviewed and rejected, only a single applicant is selected, and payoffs increase in the absolute quality of the selected appl...
Article
We study a class of sequential selection and assignment problems in which a decision maker (DM) must sequentially assign applicants to positions with the objective of minimizing expected cost. In modeling this class of problems, we assume that on each period the DM is only informed of the rank of the present applicant relative to the applicants tha...
Article
The depth of human reasoning in interactive decision-making situations can be assessed experimentally in dominance solvable non-cooperative games. We first review the studies employing two sorts of games—the Beauty Contest game and the Investment game. Studies employing these games show that: (i) people typically engage in relatively low levels of...
Article
We study a class of trust-based cooperation dilemmas that evolve in continuous time. Characteristic of these dilemmas is that as long as all n players continue to cooperate, their payoffs increase monotonically over time. Simultaneously, the temptation to defect increases too, as the first player to defect terminates the interaction and receives th...
Chapter
The centipede game is a finite N-person extensive form game with perfect information for which the backward induction solution yields paradoxical results. It raises important questions concerning beliefs, knowledge, and rationality in interactive decision-making, which can be examined both theoretically and experimentally.
Article
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that no...
Article
We present a generalization of a class of sequential search problems with ordinal ranks, referred to as “secretary” problems, in which applicants are characterized by multiple attributes. We then present a procedure for numerically computing the optimal search policy and test it in two experiments with incentive-compatible payoffs. With payoffs dep...
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This chapter reviews some of the uses of operations research methods in experimental psychology. We begin by describing some basic methodological issues that arise in the study of human decision making. Next, we describe in more detail research in exper-imental psychology that has used methods common to operations research—such as dynamic programmi...
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We report the results of an experiment on two-stage contests with budget-constrained agents competing to win an exogenously determined prize. In stage 1, agents first compete within their own groups by expending resources, and then in stage 2 the winners of each group compete with one another to win the prize by expending additional resources subje...
Article
In alliances jointly developing product and market, we first investigate how (a) the number of networks competing to develop a product, (b) the number of alternative technology platforms, and (c) market sensitivity to product development expenditures affect investments of partnering firms. We find that, in equilibrium, when the number of either com...
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We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on trans...
Article
In a recent paper, Lee et al. examined adaptive decision-making processes by training monkeys to play a competitive game against a computer programmed to play using various strategies. They found that the monkeys' responses were sensitive to the computer's strategies and consistent with reinforcement learning. Research such as this strongly complem...
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Budget-constrained and financially motivated members of independent groups participated in a series of two-stage contests to win a single, commonly valued, and exogenously determined prize. We present and test an equilibrium model that, in addition to the utility of receiving the prize, incorporates 1) a non-pecuniary utility of winning each stage...
Chapter
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This chapter considers arrival time and staying out decisions in several variants of a queueing game characterized by endogenously determined arrival times, simultaneous play, finite populations of symmetric players, discrete strategy spaces, and fixed starting and closing times of the service facility. Experimental results show 1) consistent patte...
Article
The impact of a budget constraint on individual expenditures is examined in two models of two-stage contests with homogenous and risk-neutral players competing to win a single, indivisible, commonly valued rent. The set of players is partitioned into equally sized groups. In the first model, one contestant from each group survives to compete on the...
Article
The Braess Paradox (BP) in traffic and communication networks is a powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium solution. It shows that, paradoxically, when one or more links are added to a weighted network with linear costs that depend on congestion with an attempt to improve it, and each user indepen...
Article
Full-text available
The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996, Group Decision and Negotiation, 5, 239–262) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference between the bu...
Chapter
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Mechanisms that structure bargaining between a potential buyer and potential seller are of perpetual interest to both academics and practitioners. An ‘ideal bargaining mechanism’ would enable bargaining parties to reach an agreement 100 per cent of the time when a deal is possible and collectively realize all possible gains from trade. However, the...
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We consider mixed populations (N=21) of genuine (humans) and artificial (robots) agents, repeatedly interacting in small groups whose composition is changed randomly from round to round. Our purpose is to study the spread of cooperative or non-cooperative behavior in the population over time by manipulating the behavior of the robots (cooperative v...
Article
We study a class of queueing problems with endogenous arrival times formulated as non-cooperative n-person games in normal form. With multiple equilibria in pure strategies, these queueing games give rise to problems of tacit coordination. We first describe a Markov chain algorithm used to compute the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solution,...
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We report the results of trust dilemmas that are modeled as non-cooperative n-person games evolving over time. As long as all the n players continue cooperating, their potential payoff increases exponentially over time. Simultaneously, the temptation to defect increases too, as the player who is the first to defect receives the present value of the...
Article
We consider sealed-bid, first-price, all-pay auctions with complete information, discrete strategy space, budget constraint, and symmetric players, and then construct the equilibrium solution in mixed strategies for both fixed and variable prizes. The equilibrium solution yields predictions concerning the effects of group size and value of the priz...
Article
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the CCP game and constructs its Nash equilibria. Section 3 first presents the experimental design for a special case of the CCP game in which the prizes offered by the different lotteries are all equal, and then summarizes the results. Section 4 tests and subsequently rejects two alternative mo...