

CORRUPTION: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT

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In recent years, anticorruption has become a major industry, with global expenditures growing to an estimated one hundred million dollars per year.¹ To date, however, few successes have resulted from this investment. We clearly speak more about corruption than we used to and spend more money combating it, but there is little evidence that all this activity is accomplishing much. The handbook published by Transparency International (TI) cites as best practices the laws or institutions adopted in various countries, but their effects have yet to be measured.² The World Bank's *Anticorruption in Transition* also discusses ongoing programs rather than already demonstrated successes.³

Political corruption poses a serious threat to democracy and its consolidation.⁴ One year after the widely acclaimed Orange Revolution in Ukraine, one could already buy, though not very cheaply, a seat in the Ukrainian parliament. The lack of success in curbing corruption, combined with ever more widespread discussion of the issue, renders voters extremely cynical and threatens to subvert public trust in emerging democracies.

Why do so many anticorruption initiatives fail? Can a more successful approach be built based on the very few successes we have witnessed in recent years? The argument I advance is that many anticorruption initiatives fail because they are nonpolitical in nature, while most of the corruption in developing and postcommunist countries is inherently political. In fact, what we label corruption in these countries is not the same phenomenon as corruption in developed countries. In the latter, the term corruption usually designates *individual* cases of infringe-

ment of the norm of integrity. In the former, corruption actually means “particularism”—a mode of *social* organization characterized by the regular distribution of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power within such societies.⁵ Few anticorruption campaigns dare to attack the roots of corruption in societies where particularism is the norm, as these roots lie in the distribution of power itself. Instead, anticorruption strategies are adopted and implemented in cooperation with the very predators who control the government and, in some cases, the anticorruption instruments themselves. Based on my personal experience as an initiator of a successful anticorruption campaign in Romania (as well as a researcher of many failed efforts), I believe that electoral revolutions can lead to consolidated democracies only if they are followed by revolutions against particularism, and that nothing short of such a revolution will succeed in curbing corruption in countries where particularism prevails.⁶

Old Particularism and New Corruption

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines corruption as the “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery and favor.” This definition of corruption rests on the presumption that the state operates under some norm of universalism and that public integrity is understood as equal treatment of citizens, which may occasionally be infringed by favoritism. Even a brief historical review, however, shows that until modern times those societies in which the private and the public spheres are clearly delineated and the goal of government is the public welfare of equal citizens, have been scarce—and they are still relatively few. Corruption can therefore only be understood in conjunction with the stage of development of a particular state or society; it makes little sense to discuss corruption in relation to a patrimonial or absolutist state, as the norm that applies within such societies is certainly not universalism. Only after the modernization of the West European state was completed—and government became firmly based on the assumption that public goods (from law and order, to jobs in the public sector) would be distributed equally and fairly *as a norm*—can we meaningfully begin to discuss corruption in Europe. Authors who ask why modernization and democratization seem to bring more corruption, and then look for answers in the process of modernization itself, miss the fact that prior to modernization, a universal delivery of public goods by the state existed only exceptionally.

As Max Weber puts it, only in the modern state is public office no longer considered a source of income to be exploited for rents

[I]n exchange for the rendering of certain services, as was normally the case in the Middle Ages. . . . It is decisive for the modern loyalty of an


office that, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person, like the vassal's or disciple's faith under feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes.⁷

Wherever the above does not apply, we encounter collectivistic and hierarchical societies based on the organizational mode called *particularism*. It runs directly counter to *universalism*, the norm and practice of individualistic societies, where equal treatment applies to everyone regardless of the group to which one belongs. In the latter type of society, individuals expect equal treatment from the state. In the former, their treatment depends on their status or position in society, and people do not even expect to be treated fairly by the state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status. Max Weber originally defined status societies, which are ruled by particularism, as societies that are governed by convention rather than law, where certain groups monopolize the powers of domination and sources of income. Status can best be understood in terms of the distribution of power, as it reflects an individual's distance from the groups or networks that hold power. In other words, *the closer an individual is to the source of power, be it a charismatic leader or a privileged group, the better positioned he or she is to enjoy a superior status, and therefore more influence*. Individuals who enjoy this privilege are linked in status-based groups such as castes, orders, or networks, and have much greater access to public goods.

A culture of privilege reigns in societies based on particularism, making unequal treatment the accepted norm in society. Individuals struggle to belong to the privileged group rather than to change the rules of the game. There is widespread infringement of the norms of impartiality and fairness. Influence, not money, is the main currency, and the benefits to an individual anywhere in the chain are hard to measure: Favors are distributed or denied as part of a customary exchange with rules of its own, sometimes not involving direct personal gain for the "gatekeeper." Bribery often occurs as a means of circumventing inequality; for the many people with lower status, bribing an official may be the only way to secure equal treatment.

Obviously, societies in the real world do not all neatly divide into the categories of particularism and universalism, but can be placed on an imaginary continuum between these two poles. To simplify, regimes can be classified into three rough types using corruption as the main variable (see Figure, horizontal axis). The left end of the horizontal axis represents a monopoly of power and the right end represents liberal democracy. Most contemporary societies, as well as most non-European societies over the past hundred years, fall somewhere between these two extremes.

The first category includes patrimonial regimes and purely particu-

FIGURE—EVOLUTION OF CORRUPTION BY REGIME TYPE

laristic states. In these societies, rulers, their families, and their cliques are unaccountable, and can seize the property of any of their subjects. They must, however, also show some restraint so as not to push their subjects to rebellion. Thus, although the spoils of corruption can be large, traditional unlike modern autocrats tread carefully, and corruption remains limited, even in the absence of proper accountability.

The demise of traditional authority (or neotraditional authority, in the case of communist countries) is seldom followed by liberal democracy, but rather tends to lead to intermediate regimes. In these cases, the monopoly of power gives way, but the ensuing competition for power and spoils is not restricted by formal or informal constraints. Not only are institutions of accountability missing, but the distribution of power is unbalanced in favor of certain social or ethnic groups. The main prize in the competition for power is the state and all of its resources: Whoever seizes the state, seizes the day.⁸

Even when formal democratic institutions are kept in place, as was the case in many former British colonies in Africa, regimes developed that were even less concerned with public welfare than the traditional ones had been. The historian Barrington Moore, Jr., labeled rulers in such regimes “predatory elites,” who, in the process of generating prosperity for themselves, produce a degree of poverty otherwise unwarranted in that specific society.⁹

Where political change has occurred through revolution, we might expect more accountability to follow, but this is often not the case. Revolutions aim at rapid progress, and revolutionary leaders often gain legitimacy through charisma. They are less concerned with building institutions of accountability than with completing the takeover of the state from the previous rulers (with the notable exception of the American Revolution).

Within the intermediate category of regimes described above, which I call “competitive particularism,” corruption explodes. But because popular expectations change greatly once the traditional regime is gone, social acceptance of corruption is no longer the norm. As it becomes

clear that free elections can bring about changes of government, albeit changes that do not produce better governance, forces within society start pushing for mechanisms to hold rulers accountable. Even in poor illiterate societies people do not tolerate corruption among new leaders as readily as they once tolerated abuses by traditional rulers. The defense mechanisms against predatory elites vary greatly across “competitive particularist” societies, which include Latin American delegative democracies, African competitive anarchies, and postcommunist electoral democracies. The differences among these regimes, however, are outweighed by their main similarity—the combination of premodern and modern corruption, or rather of old particularism and new corruption. Unlike in traditional societies, where only a small group of people are above the law, in these regimes multiple groups compete for this privileged position. Moreover, the unaccountable behavior of rulers legitimates unlawful behavior by citizens, and the distance between formal institutions (rule of law) and informal ones (real practices) grows. In such a situation, democracy risks being discredited for good, and “captive states” are likely to result.

A special note should be made for the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, which bred considerable corruption, though they had explicit and extensive modernization goals. The essential contradiction embedded in the communist power structure, which allowed status groups such as the *nomenklatura* to enjoy political and economical monopolies, subverted the regimes’ modernizing designs. The communist system created a “politocracy,” as power was the main instrument of allocating social rewards and political office was closely intertwined with social status, generating what Andrew Janos called a “modern version of the old tables of rank.”¹⁰ Examples of such status-holders during the communist period ranged from the *apparatchik*, to the “director,” to the party member, to the civil servant in charge of distributing resources, always in short supply, to the members of any officially acknowledged group, such as the Union of Writers and Journalists or even a sports club. As other sources of wealth and forms of social stratification were gradually annihilated by communist regimes, status became the sole foundation of social hierarchy, justifying Ken Jowitt’s label of “neo-traditionalism.”¹¹ It is this original vicious distribution of influence, not democratization, that is to blame for the corruption we encounter in postcommunist societies.

In Western Europe and North America, the historical process of building accountable government and creating a politically neutral and professional civil service was generally lengthy and time-consuming.¹² Depending on the historical context, various actors, from Swedish aristocrats to British financiers and American intellectuals, put forward assertive demands for professional and accountable government. These demands for accountability led to changes in both formal and informal

institutions. Thus in the third type of regime, liberal democracy (see Figure on p. 89), the opportunities for corruption decrease and it becomes less common. Once a balance of power has been achieved among social groups through an organic and gradual process, universal rules and norms serve as significant constraints on major actors and their strategies within a given polity. Corruption does resurface, however, when accountability becomes weak or nonexistent (see, for instance, the international government of Kosovo or the UN Oil-for-Food Programme).

Where the norm of universalism is not enforced and widely respected, democracy does not take root, even if elections are held regularly; hence the significant association between the Freedom House (FH) freedom score and the TI corruption-perception index.¹³ In the 2000 World Values Survey, people who perceive more corruption within official ranks and a weak rule of law in their respective countries are also the most democratic, endorsing democracy as the best form of government despite its imperfections. The dissatisfaction of these citizens with the outcome of the democratic process seems therefore grounded in the failure of their governments to provide, at a minimum, rule of law, and at a maximum, fair policy making that does not favor certain groups over others.¹⁴

Diagnosis, Not Just “Anatomy”

In recent years, it has become fashionable for governments to invite international corruption-assessment missions and, at least rhetorically, to proclaim their commitment to curb corruption. The problem is that both the assessment instruments (which result in a descriptive “anatomy of corruption”) and the resulting anticorruption strategies seem to be simply replicated from one country to another. Donors gather in grand anticorruption meetings, but they all result in the same stereotypical strategies. Impressive efforts have been undertaken to formulate better theories of corruption, to develop comprehensive strategies to battle it, and to review anticorruption efforts around the world. Yet we still cannot properly diagnose corruption. A proper diagnosis means that we understand the causes of a malady in the context of a given organism. Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina* famously opens with the observation that happy families are all alike, while unhappy ones are each unhappy in their own way. A family therapist therefore has to solve each riddle on its own terms.

To reach a proper diagnosis of corruption in a given society I suggest a qualitative strategy. *Our goal is to understand whether corruption is the exception or whether it is the norm.* For each society, we must ask: Are we dealing with modern corruption, where corruption is the exception to the norm of universalism? Or are we dealing with particularism

and a culture of privilege, where corruption itself is the norm? Or, as is frequently the case in the postcolonial world where the modern state was defectively implanted on a traditional society, are we dealing with a combination of the two? If so, to what extent is the government guided by universalist norms and to what extent is its main task to promote patronage and cater to specific interest groups?

Direct and indirect indicators can be summoned to help answer these questions. What are the chances of an excellent company winning a contract under a program such as Oil for Food if it is not networked with either the UN or the Iraqi government? What is the likelihood of a contractor winning a bid for public works if the owner is not related to anybody in the government distributing the funds? How many of such companies have managed to win tenders in past years? Even when no domestic watchdog monitors appointments to the public service or bids for public money, an analysis of past contracts combined with minor investigatory work can establish the facts.

As a rule, status groups are not hidden. In fact, they are rather conspicuous and easy to identify. Who owns the main TV networks? Who are the most influential publishers? What positions do their sons and in-laws hold? Are they, by chance, ministers or members of parliament? Are the same names always present when goods are divided? A chart of the most influential people and their connections is more telling than ten surveys on bribery, and can help us understand if corruption is the norm or the exception in a given society. Diagnosing particularism requires only minimal anthropological skills. If the power brokers and gatekeepers are always the same, regardless of a change of government, they are probably well known, and local people will be able to identify them. The amateur anthropologist would simply have to ask around to discover who is the person to talk to in order to solve a problem in a given area.

There are also several indirect indicators that can contribute to the diagnosis of particularism:

- Persistence of widespread popular perceptions of government corruption despite changes in government;
- Influential jobs being held by the same individuals or groups regardless of the outcome of elections;
- High political migration from opposition parties to the party in government;
- A widespread perception that politicians are above the law;
- A situation in which access to nearly every resource is intermediated by oligarchic networks;
- Failure to take legal action against even the most notoriously corrupt members of high-status groups.

Although regimes based on particularism have many similarities, they also differ significantly from one another. Particularism is not to-

talitarianism, and it can admit some degree of flexibility. Particularism's ability to survive comes directly from its capacity to keep open minimal channels for upward mobility—such as marrying into the right family or catering to the right patron—so that social entrepreneurs are more tempted to use those channels than to attempt to overthrow the whole system.

There is a difference between a state bribed to provide a tax break and a state whose executives are also its main businesspeople and gradually transform public assets into their own private property.

After a diagnosis of particularism, it is necessary to determine the degree to which a system is closed or open. A closed particularism will generate more frustration, and thus is more vulnerable to a severe crisis that will shake the whole system. A more open and flexible particularism, in which challengers are accommodated and socialized into the rules of the game, is likely to be more resilient.

This brings us to the next important question: *Are there regular losers from corruption, and is there anybody to speak on their behalf?* Also, are there credible actors to denounce corruption?

It is equally important to identify the nature of *what is being corrupted*. Do we find distortions of the universal pattern that the state should follow when treating its citizens? Do some companies benefit from more tax exemptions than others? Do specific individuals enjoy privileges that are granted by the government? Is the will of the voters being thwarted, or are public funds being diverted for private ends?

A related and important question is: *What are the main spoils of corruption?* Public influence is always a currency, but is it the main currency? Are the state and everything in it, from offices to public works, “privatized” informally by status groups and corrupted networks? In postcommunist societies, the state entered the transition as the overwhelmingly dominant actor in all realms of society. Therefore, the state is often the principal agent of corruption in these countries, and the private sector is a fiction that predatory elites create in order to move to a more refined stage of public-asset exploitation.

In postcolonial societies, where the state is only one of the actors competing for control of the territory or the economy, the principal actor may be found elsewhere, perhaps in the rebellious society, in foreign business firms, or in neighboring countries. There is an important qualitative difference between a state bribed by a firm to provide a tax break and a state whose executives are also its main businesspeople and gradually transform public assets into their private property (as is found in some post-Soviet states). In the first case, police work might help. In the second, those who direct the police are themselves the guardians of

TABLE 1—A TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION

I. REGIME	II. POWER DISTRIBUTION	III. “OWNERSHIP” OF THE STATE	IV. DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC GOODS	V. SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF CORRUPTION	VI. PUBLIC/ PRIVATE DISTINCTION
Patrimonialism/ Pure particularism	Monopoly	One or few owners	Unfair but predictable	Moderate	No
Competitive particularism	Uneven and disputed	Contested	Unfair and unpredictable	Low	Poor
Universalism	Relatively equal	Autonomous	Fair and predictable	Very low	Sharp

the corrupt system. In these cases, the system is also very likely to be organized hierarchically, much like a criminal group, with those at the bottom collecting bribes that feed the upper levels of the government.

In examining the nature of the spoils, one also must look at electoral corruption. The will of the voters can be manipulated in many ways. In traditional systems in poor rural societies, resources are released by gatekeepers in exchange for votes. In these societies, the voters have no choice. Their vote is a commodity that they trade for their food, heating, or land. In more modern societies, voters can exercise an autonomous will, and the choice rests with them. Campaign funds are needed to make a case to voters in an open game of persuasion, but higher spending does not guarantee electoral success. American-style campaign-finance legislation, which mostly regulates and exposes private contributions to campaigns, is grossly irrelevant to countries where voters are illiterate and own no TVs. In these countries, the main funding for political parties is public, and the chief commodity of the campaign is not private money (still controlled by the state by various means) but rather administrative resources of every kind. Electoral corruption varies greatly from Kazakhstan to Nigeria to the United States. It is a gross and frequent error to think that the same solution might apply everywhere.

A systematic typology of corruption will roughly follow the categories laid out in column I of Table 1. Freedom House scores offer some initial indication of whether a country is at the stage of competitive particularism or liberal democracy. The distribution of power (column II) can be deduced from electoral history as well as other events such as the sanctioning of a powerful and influential individual by a court. Power is highly centralized in purely particularist societies, disputed among groups vying for status in competitive particularist ones, and distributed relatively equally in societies guided by the norms of universalism.

Determining “ownership” of the state is also helpful in diagnosing corruption (column III). The World Bank has developed an instrument to measure “state capture” versus state autonomy. But because it is based on surveys of businesses, it does not tell us all that we need to

**TABLE 2—STRATEGIES TO MAKE THE ADMINISTRATION
WORK FOR YOU**

STRATEGY	PERCENT OF POPULATION*	OBJECTIVE	SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE
Uses connections	20–25%	Personalize service	High
Uses regular bribes	10–20%	Increase efficiency of service	Fair
Uses occasional or no bribes	Greater than 50%	Get some service	Low or none

*Percentage varies across countries.

know about the nature of the state. We need to trace *networks of power and privilege*, to establish the extent to which public goods are distributed through them (column IV), and to determine how thick, how closed, and how influential they are.

Polls can usually be trusted to determine the social acceptability of corruption. For example, do people indicate in surveys that politicians, judges, and policemen stand above the law? As column V in Table 1 indicates, we will find moderate acceptance of corruption where particularism is the norm, low social acceptance in the phase of competitive particularism, and very low acceptance in universalist societies.

Measuring the distinction between the public and private spheres (column VI) is more subtle, but indicators can be easily found to determine whether there is no distinction (pure particularism), a poor distinction (competitive particularism), or a sharp distinction (universalism). Do executives in the public sector hire their relatives? Are subordinates in the public sector used to help with the domestic affairs of their bosses?

A diagnosis of corruption needs to include both qualitative and quantitative elements. Qualitative instruments such as representative surveys, however, are more reliable for an analysis of the causes of corrupt behavior than for providing precise figures on its extent. For example, Table 2 details an analysis, based on a European Union survey conducted in the Balkans, which suggests that particularism is the rule of the game. The analysis is based on cross-tabulating the strategies that citizens employ to obtain a range of public services and their level of satisfaction with these services. The results show that only those who have some important personal connection get satisfactory service. Those who lack such connections and are not related to the right groups have to give bribes to get the needed resources, but this leaves them only moderately satisfied. The great majority of people, who have no connections, must amass all of their resources for one indispensable extra payment (for instance to obtain surgery), and can afford to pay it only once, or not at all.¹⁵ We must therefore determine whether corruption provides the means by which those who are low on influence and connections can buy access by means of a supra-tax. Do individuals wind up paying more than others for *normal* treatment, or do they actually buy *privilege*? These are critical distinctions, as in the former case build-

ing an anticorruption strategy based on a judicial enforcement is certain to fail, while in the latter case it is indispensable.

Fighting Corruption Outside Courts

It is often said that corruption is universal, that it has existed at all times and in every society, and that it will persist as long as human nature does not change. This view blurs the crucial distinction between corruption as a mode of social organization—particularism—and the occasional individual corruption, that can indeed be found nearly everywhere. Electoral democracies cannot afford to blur this distinction, however, as particularism can prevent consolidation into robust democracies. Most Western countries fought the battle against particularism centuries ago, and they won. The case of U.S. lobbyist Jack Abramoff, who was convicted in 2006 of conspiracy to corrupt public officials, is illustrative: While it shows that political and economic development does not bring about spectacular improvements in human nature, it is proof that the system works and that culprits often do get caught regardless of their political connections. The challenge is to ensure that emerging democracies succeed in doing what the Swedes managed to do at the end of eighteenth century, and the British a century later: Build a government that is both accountable and fair, and construct societies that embrace universalism as the supreme principle governing relations between the people and government, and among the people themselves.

The overall message of the anticorruption industry is that corrupt countries should replicate the institutions of clean countries. Many countries, however, have adopted various Western institutions without affecting the core elements of particularism. The ombudsman, for example, which is a Scandinavian institution that has been reproduced in many emerging democracies, has been largely unsuccessful, as the historical process that promoted universalism at the expense of particularism in the Scandinavian countries has not been replicated as well.

Thus it is important to identify the institutional triggers of such historical processes. In this light “best practices” should include not only anticorruption *legislation*, but also anticorruption *initiatives* with measurable results. This is where we should look for inspiration. If courts and legal battles against corruption are conspicuously missing in this analysis, it is because in the countries I am concerned with courts are not autonomous from status groups, and legislation is frequently not implemented. Moreover, infringements of the law are so widespread that solving corruption through the courts under conditions of competitive particularism is simply impossible. Legal mechanisms can be effective only after the essentials of particularism have been dismantled.

Who and what can stimulate change in the face of institutionalized particularism? The answer is not obvious. Particularism cannot be fought

by government—that is a contradiction in terms. Historically, it has been the political opposition, civil society, or even enlightened despots who have promoted the greatest strides forward. Populist parties, by contrast, have typically competed for power with anticorruption slogans, only to end up as corrupt as their predecessors. In many new democracies, as well as in some older ones (the classic case is Italy), one can find status groups spanning the boundaries of political parties and agreeing to divide the public sector among themselves. The term *partitocrazia* was coined precisely to describe this situation.

The first step toward exiting the vicious cycle of particularism is to organize the losers in this system against the status groups and the predatory elites—in other words, to build an insurrectional army. This alliance should include not only idealists from civil society, but groups who stand to lose the most by corruption. If churches and unions join NGOs and independent media, an effective alliance can be formed. At least one political party should be lured into cooperation, creating incentives for other parties to compete in proving who is cleaner. If democrats and civil society activists fail to embrace this cause, nondemocrats, from right-wing populists to Islamists, will do so.

The second step is to institute the norms of universalism. The coalition should agree on some minimal criteria for fairness and integrity in public life, and make them part of a full political program. These criteria must be negotiated and widely debated across parties and with the government. Whether or not these criteria are incorporated into new legislation, they should be used to monitor top public servants and politicians, and the results should be made public. If one or more political parties adopt the criteria and promise to screen their members to comply with them, an important step forward will have been made, and they should be given credit for their efforts.

The third step—and here international assistance is crucial—is to push for the adoption of some “institutional weapons” that an anticorruption coalition or isolated anticorruption entrepreneurs can use. This goal cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the government, but its implementation cannot be ensured without the active involvement of civil society. Besides transparency legislation, the arsenal of “institutional weapons” includes the compulsory disclosure of wealth by politicians, civil servants, and magistrates.

The final step is to create incentives for actors to “go clean.” These incentives are provided by vigorous public monitoring and disclosure, especially under circumstances such as elections, which create a sort of market mechanism that maximizes incentives for politicians to avoid corrupt behavior. Using the institutional weapons at hand, the “army” should try to unseat the status groups in politics or the professions by waging disclosure campaigns and trying to end their monopoly of influence.

When are circumstances ripe for such insurrections against particular-

ism? In situations where most people are content with existing arrangements and do not feel that they personally have anything to lose by corruption, you simply cannot fight particularism. Thus it is best to attack such systems during economic crises or other periods of societal stress. Great political turning points can also provide a favorable environment. An example is the case of postcommunist countries joining the European Union, where groups are able to invoke EU conditionality in the fight against particularism. In any case, civil society is a more effective auditor and a more credible ombudsman than public institutions in such societies, and it should be supported financially so that it may perform these functions until the state becomes mature enough to take over.

There are also longer-term desiderata, including a mix of domestic and international action, that can help to facilitate the success of anti-corruption efforts:

- The international community should maintain strong external pressure for more accountability and transparency.
- The dependence of citizens on the state should be addressed and gradually reduced by having fewer employees on the public payroll, fewer resources directly controlled by the state, and so on.
- Mechanisms of free and fair competition should be built in each and every sector.

These nonexhaustive guidelines, inspired by a handful of successes on the ground, are not meant to cast aside the vast arsenal of anticorruption tools that technical-assistance programs can provide.¹⁶ Rather, they are meant to warn against reliance on the wrong instruments for certain environments. An anticorruption agency might work well in democratic Australia, with its tradition of an independent judiciary, but the same kind of institution would fail to indict or arrest anybody who is “somebody” in the former Soviet Union. The cooperation of governments is ideal if one can get it, but particularism cannot be fought by *relying* on governments. There are no “win-win” anticorruption campaigns. Somebody stands to lose, and in the societies we are most concerned with, those who stand to lose are on top. The fight against particularism in such societies is an intrinsic part of the greater modernization and democratization process. It may at times look like civil war, but as the history of democracy shows, civil wars are sometimes needed to advance the cause of accountable government.

NOTES

1. See Michael Bryane, “The Rapid Rise of the Anticorruption Industry: Toward Second Generation Anticorruption Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe?” *Local Governance Brief* (Spring 2004): 17–25. http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2004/254/LGB_spring_2004.pdf.

2. Transparency International’s *Corruption Handbook: National Integrity Systems in Practice*, available at <http://www1.transparency.org/ach/index.html>.

3. World Bank, *Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate* (Washington: World Bank, 2000).
4. See Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 92.
5. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 46–47.
6. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "The Story of the Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (April 2005): 154–55. For a full case study see www.sar.org.ro/Romanian%20Coalition_for%20a%20Clean%20Parliament.pdf.
7. Max Weber, *Economy and Society III* (New York: Bedminster, 1969): 159.
8. The phrase "Seize the state, seize the day," belongs to Joel Hellman. The model is described at length in Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
9. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1978).
10. Andrew Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern World* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2000), 357.
11. Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder or the Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
12. Haile K. Asmerom and Elisa P. Reis, eds., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996).
13. Regression models conducted with democracy (FH score) as a dependent variable, and corruption (TI score), and development (World Bank GNI) as independent variables (2004 data), then with corruption as dependent and democracy as independent, controlling for development. The number of countries (191) is the total number of countries for which a TI corruption index is computed.
14. Based on a *World Values Survey* conducted by the European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2005). WVS models with subjective corruption (perception of how many officials are corrupted) as the dependent variable, and the endorsement of the democratic regime, the satisfaction with the present outcome of democracy, the satisfaction with performance of law and order agencies, and basic social status controls, as the independents.
15. Based on an EU survey conducted in five Balkan countries. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "Deconstructing Balkan Particularism: The Ambiguous Social Capital of Southeastern Europe," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5 (January 2005): 49–68.
16. This review is based on three very recent evaluations, including both success stories and failures: Bertram I. Spector, ed., *Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries: Strategies and Analysis* (Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2005); Martin Tisne and Daniel Smilov, *From the Ground Up: Assessing the Record of Anticorruption Assistance in Southeast Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004); and *Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament 2005: A Quest for Political Integrity* (Iasi, Romania: Polirom, 2005).