The Decline of the Male Breadwinner and Persistence of the Female Carer: Exposure, Interests, and Micro–Macro Interactions

Alice Evans

Published online: 03 Jun 2016.

Submit your article to this journal ⬀

Article views: 412

View related articles ⬀

View Crossmark data ⬀

Citing articles: 2 View citing articles ⬀

The Decline of the Male Breadwinner and Persistence of the Female Carer: Exposure, Interests, and Micro–Macro Interactions

Alice Evans

Department of Geography, University of Cambridge

Although female labor force participation is rising across the world, men's share of unpaid care work has not increased commensurately. Why has there been a major change in one domain of gender relations yet marked continuity in another? This article tries to answer this question by doing three slightly unusual things. It uses the same theoretical concepts (exposure and interests) to analyze change and continuity across different domains of gender relations. It examines long-term processes of social change through ethnographic (rather than social survey) data from Zambia. Additionally, it explores commonalities in the Global North and South—thereby bringing together silos of knowledge. The argument is that flexibility in gender divisions of labor increases when there is a shift in both interests and exposure. This has occurred in the case of paid work: A decline in men's incomes and job security has led many to regard women's employment as advantageous. The resulting critical mass of women performing socially valued, masculine roles seems to have undermined gender ideologies, relating to competence and status—fostering a positive feedback loop. Few people are exposed to men sharing care work, however, as this mostly occurs in private spaces. Accordingly, many assume that such practices are neither common nor socially accepted. These norm perceptions furnish men with self-interested reasons to shun housework. These micro- and macrolevel interactions perpetuate asymmetric flexibility in gender divisions of labor. *Key Words: care work, gender, gender divisions of labor, paid work, sub-Saharan Africa.*

尽管全球女性劳动力正在增加，但男性对于不给薪的照护工作之分担却未相对增加。为什麼在性别关係的一个范畴中有了巨大的改变，在另一个范畴中却显示出持续性呢？本文试着藉由从事三件稍微不寻常的事来回答上述问题。本文运用相同的理论概念（显露与利益）来分析不同性别关係范畴中的改变与持续。本文透过来自赞比亚的民族志（而非社会调查）数据来检视社会变迁的长期过程。此外，本文探讨全球北方与南方的相同性——藉此汇集知识的孤岛。本文主张，当利益与显露同时有了转换时，性别劳动分工的弹性便会增加。而这发生在给薪工作的案例中：男性所得和工作安全的降低，使得许多人将女性就业视为具有优势。其所造成的展演社会所重视的男性气概角色的女性达到了临界值，似乎降低了有关能力和身份的性别意识形态——打造了正向的回馈循环。但鲜少有人接触分担照护工作的男性，因其大部份发生于私领域中。于是，许多人预设此般行为不但不常见，更不被社会所接受。这些规范认知，提供了男性迴避家务工作的自利理由。这些微观与巨观的互动，让性别劳动分工中的不对称弹性得以续存。 *关键词： 照护工作，性别，性别劳动分工，给薪工作，撒哈拉以南的非洲。*

Aunque la participación de la fuerza laboral femenina está aumentando en todo el mundo, la cuota de los varones en labores hogareñas no remuneradas no se ha incrementado proporcionalmente. ¿Por qué ha ocurrido un cambio notable en un sector de las relaciones de género en tanto se mantiene una marcada continuidad en el otro? Este artículo trata de responder a esta pregunta haciendo tres cosas ligeramente inusuales. Se utilizan los mismos conceptos teóricos (exposición e intereses) para analizar el cambio y la continuidad a través de diferentes dominios de las relaciones de género. Más que basándose en estudios sociales, el artículo examina en Zambia procesos de cambio social a largo término por medio de datos demográficos. Adicionalmente, se exploran características compartidas en el Norte Global y en el Sur Global—para juntar de esa manera silos de conocimiento. El argumento es que la flexibilidad de las divisiones de trabajo por género se incrementa cuando se presenta un cambio de intereses y exposición. Esto ha ocurrido en el caso del trabajo remunerado: Una reducción en los ingresos y seguridad en el trabajo de los varones ha llevado a muchos a considerar como ventajoso el empleo de las mujeres. La masa crítica resultante de mujeres que se ocupan desempeñando papeles masculinos socialmente valiosos parece haber socavado ideologías de género relacionadas con competencia y estatus—estimulando una vuelta positiva de retroalimentación. Sin embargo, muy poca gente puede constatar qué tanto trabajo familiar no remunerado comparten los varones por cuanto esto generalmente ocurre en espacios privados.

En consecuencia, muchos asumen que tales prácticas no son ni comunes ni socialmente aceptadas. Percepciones normativas de este tipo proveen a los varones con razones acomodadas a su propio interés para rehuir el trabajo doméstico. Estas interacciones a niveles micro y macro perpetúan la flexibilidad asimétrica de las divisiones del trabajo por género. *Palabras clave: trabajo social, género, divisiones laborales por género, trabajo remunerado, África subsahariana.*

This article examines a global phenomenon—the asymmetry of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labor—and aims to build on the rich geographical literature on gender and work (Moser and Holland 1997; McDowell 2001; McDowell et al. 2005; Chant 2007; P. England 2010; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010; Gerson 2011; Ansell, Tsoeu, and Hajdu 2015). First, whereas other geographers have emphasized the importance of ideological factors, I seek to sharpen our conceptualizations: distinguishing between internalized ideologies and norm perceptions.[1] Second, higher level abstraction to two theoretical concepts (exposure and interests) enables me to compare, contrast, and learn from change and continuity in two different domains. Why is there growing support for female employment but not an equitable redistribution of care work? Moreover, what does rising female employment tell us about the drivers of (and prospects for) sharing care work? Third, I explore micro–macro interconnections between individual psychologies and wider socioeconomic forces (reflecting the relational turn in geography).

These issues are explored by analyzing ethnographic data from Zambia. This is an apt case study, as there has recently been significant (albeit asymmetric) rupture to the British colonial ideology of male breadwinner and female housewife. Further, there is a wealth of historical anthropological research (Powdermaker 1962; Epstein 1981; Ferguson 1999), enabling an investigation of long-term change and continuity in gender ideologies and practices. Drawing on such data, this article seeks to identify commonalities and differences in the Global North and South. At present, the paucity of comparative work that learns from both high- and low-income countries intellectually blinkers us to shared and also country-specific drivers of change and continuity. I seek to dismantle these unhelpful North–South silos. This reflects a progressive, postcolonial trend within geography, to develop theory through Southern experiences (Jarvis, Kantor, and Cloke 2009; Robinson 2011).

This article is structured as follows. It first presents the central theoretical debates. It then describes my methodology and introduces the Zambian case study. Worsening economic security (a shift in perceived interests) has led people to regard women's paid work as advantageous. The resulting critical mass of women in paid work signals that other people now regard women as suited to socially valued roles. This appears to have shifted norm perceptions and amplified female labor force participation—fostering a positive feedback loop. No such changes—in perceived interests or exposure—have occurred for unpaid care work, however (i.e., cooking, cleaning, collecting water, caring for children as well as the sick and elderly). Although men are more likely to share care work if they are exposed to such practices, such exposure is uncommon due to its privacy[2] as well as countervailing interests, emanating from norm perceptions and lopsided marriage markets. By illustrating these micro–macro-level interactions and asymmetries, this article seeks to contribute to our collective understanding of a global phenomenon: unidirectional growing flexibility in gender divisions of labor. The empirical data also enable me to make a broader theoretical contribution, illustrating the significance, heterogeneity, and malleability of individuals' norm perceptions (which differs from macrolevel conceptualizations of social norms).

Debating Change and Continuity

This section outlines contrasting perspectives on the causes of change and continuity in gender divisions of labor. Key questions concern the individual-level psychologies that perpetuate or potentially disrupt gender divisions of labor, as well as how they are influenced by macrolevel dynamics.

One possibility is that men and women conform to gender divisions of labor because they perceive this as in their self-interest. For the purposes of this article, interests are subjective: whatever fulfills someone's desires. For instance, wives might be reluctant to bargain for an egalitarian redistribution of care work for fear it would jeopardize the economic security secured through marriage (as argued by Kabeer 1994; Agarwal 1997).

Compliance might also stem from self-interested concerns about how one will be perceived by others. Unpaid care work is often devalued, considered low status and feminine, symbolizing deference to the male household

head (Agarwal 1997; Slegh et al. 2013; van den Berg et al. 2013). Men who take time off to undertake unpaid care work could suffer a loss in lifetime earnings and social respect (as illustrated by a wealth of research from the United States, e.g., Croft, Schmader, and Block 2015; even in Sweden managers are seldom perceived as supportive; e.g., Allard, Haas, and Hwang 2011; but see also Thao [2014] on growing acceptance of stay-at-home fathers in rural Vietnam). Concerns about norm perceptions might thus furnish men and women with self-interested reasons to shun care work (as suggested by P. England [2010] and Simpson [2005] for Zambia and the United States alike). Men's self-interested concerns to assert their masculinity by abstaining from "feminine" activities could be heightened by their difficulties in performing masculinity through breadwinning (see Silberschmidt 1999; Chant 2002; Tichenor 2005; Legerski and Cornwall 2010, on Latin America, Kenya, and the United States). According to this interest-based explanation, gender divisions of labor will only shift when norm perceptions change (such that care work is no longer widely regarded as feminine) or when compliance with norm perceptions is no longer perceived as advantageous.[3]

Besides interests, gender divisions of labor could persist due to unquestioned acceptance. They might be regarded as "natural" and unalterable (as Crehan [1997] observed in northwestern Zambia). This could stem from insufficient exposure to egalitarian alternatives. By seeing men and women performing roles of disparate social value, people might come to assume that men are typically more competent in socially valued domains and more suited to privileged positions (as Ridgeway [2011]; and Croft, Schmader, and Block [2015] argue for the United States). Observation of sex-differentiated practices might reinforce gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status. Change thus requires exposure to egalitarian practices and discourses.

Although interests and exposure constitute two contending hypotheses with distinct policy implications, they are not mutually exclusive. Because individual psychologies are shaped by both beliefs (developed through exposure) and desires, it seems improbable that attitudes toward care work could be entirely determined by either one. Having found empirical support for both hypotheses, Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) called for more research exploring their interactions over the long term: How do shifts in perceived interests change practices and amplify exposure to egalitarian alternatives? This article seeks to answer this question through ethnographic research: listening

to people's life histories (as called for by Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010).

Another query to be examined in this article concerns which kind of exposure is most significant in reshaping gender divisions of labor. We know—from research in Chile, India, Mexico, South Africa, the United States, and Zambia—that early exposure to paternal care-giving can enable men to realize the benefits of flexibility in gender divisions of labor, become accustomed to such practices, and question prescriptive gender stereotypes (Cunningham 2001; Simpson 2005; Kato-Wallace et al. 2014). But how important is firsthand exposure to countersterotypical behavior? Can those without it come to adopt more egalitarian practices through gender sensitization? Can unpaid care work be reframed and discursively degendered, such that men do not fear discrimination and stigma (as suggested by Croft, Schmader, and Block 2015)? Would it help to make caregiving part of the formal curriculum—as recommended by *State of the World's Fathers* (Levtov et al. 2015)? Studies in Rwanda and South Africa suggest that small-scale, participatory projects can increase men's share of care work (Slegh et al. 2013; van den Berg et al. 2013). But what happens when these interventions are scaled up? To contribute to this literature, this article seeks to identify which kinds of exposure encourage flexibility in gender divisions of labor in the Zambian Copperbelt.

Another aim of this article is to link micro- and macrolevel variables, revealing intersections across geographical scales (as called for by Nagar et al. 2002; Coltrane 2010; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). The broader context impacts individuals' perceived self-interest, as it shapes the socioeconomic consequences of their decisions. When considering how to distribute care work, families are likely influenced by financial considerations emanating from workplace inflexibility, child care affordability, and parental leave. These have all been shown to mediate the effects of individual-level characteristics (e.g., gender beliefs and income) on care work distribution (Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Gerson 2011).

Social norms might also be significant—as indicated by cross-national research in high-income countries. For instance, work in marriage tends to be more equally distributed in countries where divorce is more widely practiced and accepted (Yodanis 2005) and where more women are in parliament (Ruppanner 2010). Further, in more gender-egalitarian societies (as measured by the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index), women are more likely to perceive inequitable divisions of labor as unfair (Greenstein 2009). This quantitative research

raises a question about causality: Why are individual couples' domestic arrangements affected by women's aggregate shares of professional and political positions (as measured by the Gender Empowerment Measure [GEM] and the Gender Gap Index) and other people's views of divorce?

I suggest that one way the macro and the micro are connected is by norm perceptions. This term refers to an individual's perceptions of the attitudinal and behavioral norms in their societies (Tankard and Paluck 2016). These include assumptions about the gender stereotypes endorsed and enforced by others in their society. These stereotypes might be either descriptive (e.g., women are naturally better at care work) or prescriptive (women should perform care work). Whereas other theorists (e.g., Lee 2002; Fuwa 2004; McDowell et al. 2005; Yodanis 2005; Brickell and Chant 2010; Brickell 2014; Ansell, Tsoeu, and Hajdu 2015) typically conceptualize social norms as macrolevel phenomena, I focus on an individual's perceptions of them because it is only through individual psychologies that the macrolevel phenomenon becomes causally efficacious, influencing individual behavior. I argue that norm perceptions are learned by exposure. Through observation and personal experience, individuals discover which behaviors are widely practiced and supported in their communities. They come to anticipate that they will be praised according to the extent to which they conform to norm perceptions for their presumed sex category. Their exposure thus shapes their norm perceptions, which in turn affect their perceived interests—for social respect.

Importantly, norm perceptions are conceptually distinct from internalized gender stereotypes. A man night privately critique gender stereotypes prescribing

inequitable divisions of labor yet nonetheless conform due to self-interested concerns about how he will be perceived and treated by others. This distinction—between individual norm perceptions and internalized gender stereotypes—could explain Fuwa's (2004) finding that wives with egalitarian attitudes toward housework are more able to secure an equitable distribution of that labor if they live in high-GEM-scoring countries. Perhaps exposure to a critical mass of women in prestigious (historically male-dominated) positions in employment and politics shapes a woman's norm perceptions. It might lead her to believe that she will not be negatively judged for deviating from gender divisions of labor. Accordingly, she might not perceive an egalitarian redistribution of housework to be against her interests. The concept of norm perceptions thus allows us to connect changes in individual psychologies to macrolevel variables, as well as interests and exposure.

This article seeks to contribute to geographical research by examining the macro- and microlevel drivers of change and continuity in gender ideologies and practices. Drawing on ethnographic research in Zambia, it argues that worsening economic security has led people to regard female labor force participation as advantageous and thereby amplified exposure to women doing men's work but not vice versa. Through this case study, it endeavors to make a theoretical contribution, demonstrating the significance, heterogeneity, and malleability of individuals' norm perceptions. These beliefs seem strongly influenced by firsthand exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labor (or lack thereof), rather than abstract discourses of gender equality. Participants more exposed to men sharing care work tended to presume that others would not condemn such behavior. If norm perceptions are heterogeneous, malleable, and causally efficacious on behavior, it appears analytically important to focus on these rather than the more conventional (singular, macrolevel) "social norms."

Methods

This article is based on sixteen months of ethnographic research in Kitwe, the largest city in the Zambian Copperbelt, in 2010 and 2011, and in rural Luapula in 2015. Although the rural study informs my background understanding,[4] this analysis draws on the urban sample: fifty-eight detailed life histories (see Table 1), as well as group discussions and observation of a further 200 participants.

Table 1. Detailed life histories, participants grouped by occupational category.

	Female	Male	Unemployed
Health care worker	2		2
Homemaker	2		2
Politician	4	1	5
Professional/managerial	3		3
Service worker	1	1	2
Skilled manual worker, in a stereotypically	11	2	13
Student	5	1	6
Teacher	3	1	4
Trader	14	5	19
Unemployed	2		2
Total	47		58

My snowballed sample included men and women from across the socioeconomic and generational spectrum (ages ranging from fifteen to sixty), with differing experiences and gender beliefs: both those who ostensibly rejected and also those who endorsed flexibility in gender divisions of labor. Participants were invited to narrate their experiences and identify key influences, shaping their ideologies and practices. We communicated in Bemba, the local language (in which I am fluent). Names have been changed to preserve anonymity; some are prefixed with "Bana" (meaning "mother of") if participants introduced themselves in this way.

I opted for qualitative methods to investigate the causes of the statistical associations recorded by others in this field. I sought to understand why cultural context is important: how it shapes gender beliefs and interests. Interviews have their own limitations, of course—revealing only how people present themselves and their communities at that particular moment, as influenced by the researcher's perceived identity and agenda. To portray themselves as adhering to norm perceptions, group discussants might have underreported flexibility in gender divisions of labor. That said, exaggerated conservatism does not fit with many participants' expressed support for women's participation in employment and politics. Yet, given concerns about group influence, I also facilitated individual interviews. Here, too, though, self-portrayals might have been misleading. Perhaps they feigned agreement with egalitarian gender beliefs I might have been assumed to hold—perhaps because such discourses are promoted by white, Western donors or because I inadvertently signaled enthusiasm for particular responses.

Feigned egalitarianism, however, does not seem entirely plausible for four reasons. First, in narrating their life histories, participants seemed keen to tell me their stories about Zambia. They appeared to enjoy our discussions partly because they were talking about their own lives. Second, participants often expressed views contrary to my own: extolling marriage, childbearing, and heteronormativity and devaluing care work. Third, when I did mention some aspects of my own life (after participants had detailed their own), they were often surprised that I live with my partner without being married. Whereas younger women often expressed enthusiasm, older women were generally more conservative. Similarly, many repeatedly urged me to have a child—even if aware of my disinterest in mothering. They sought to persuade me to share their priorities. Fourth, in other discussions, not relating to

gender, participants rarely appeared to hold back from dissenting. In sum, the idea that they feigned egalitarianism does not seem consistent with my understanding of our interactions.

Their accounts were triangulated through observation. For the duration of my fieldwork, I lived with several households of differing structures and income brackets. This enabled a triangulation of claims made. Because I did not observe all participants' lives to the same extent, claims need to be interpreted cautiously. They might only reflect a change in beliefs and aspirations—although we can still explore the reasons for change and continuity in these. I also observed gendered interactions in public places (schools, markets, social, and political gatherings) as well as gender sensitization programs. These included nongovernmental organization (NGO) community outreach activities and (over a three-month period) civics classes, in which secondary students are taught and examined on the social construction of gender roles and responsibilities.

Data were transcribed and then coded using themes that emerged from the research process. This enabled identification of trends within my sample. Bemba and English written summaries of my findings were then discussed with participants. This feedback was important for accuracy as well as for accountability to research participants.

Asymmetric Social Change in the Zambian Copperbelt

For much of the twentieth century, the rich mineral deposits on the Zambian Copperbelt were mined and managed by men. From the 1930s to the 1960s, the British colonial government restricted female labor-force participation. Meanwhile, mining companies sought to stretch miners' low wages by training their wives in domestic skills, which lacked status in a cash-based urban economy. A further reason why the British colonial male breadwinner and female housewife ideology was increasingly adopted is that it was perceived as symbolizing modernity, due to its association with a privileged social group.

During the first decades of Zambia's independence (1960s–1970s), macroeconomic circumstances largely enabled men to provide for their families single-handedly. By acting as breadwinners, they complied with norm perceptions and secured social respect. A wife's employment would publicly reveal her husband's

Figure 1. Female share of employment, by occupation and age, urban Zambia, 2010. *Source*: Central Statistical Office (2012, 226) and author's calculations. (Color figure available online.)

shameful inability to provide for his family. As long as men's employment remained secure, women's was rarely seen as advantageous. Many women identified as "just housewives" (translated). Indeed, the 1969 Census presented Kitwe's working African population as including 36,017 men and 3,283 women (Central Statistical Office [CSO] 1973, 8).[5] As a consequence of these gender divisions of labor, people had minimal exposure to women performing socially valued, masculine roles. Accordingly, they tended to perceive women as less competent in socially valued domains and thus less deserving of status (Powdermaker 1962; Epstein 1981; Evans 2014, 2015b). These themes are conveyed by Helen (a low-income, elected local government councilor, with whom I lived):

> A long time ago … my mother was selling at the Green Market, there were very few women selling. The majority … were depending on their husbands because their husbands had jobs—they were working in industries, industries were all over. … Historically women were oppressed. Even if she was educated, men would not want that person to go and work, they just wanted her to be a housewife. She cannot participate in anything: in political parties, you cannot go at the market and sell, because her husband will be feeling shy, "Why is she selling? It looks like I'm not keeping her very well." … A long time ago women were very oppressed because men didn't want a woman to do things … to work or have her own money. (Evans 2015b, 353)

Worsening economic security in the late 1980s triggered a shift in perceived interests, according to my interviews. Neoliberal economic restructuring (liberalization, privatization, and reduced government expenditure) heralded spiraling living costs and precarious

employment (Ferguson 1999; Evans 2014). Life expectancy was also reduced in the shadow of HIV/AIDS. Such hardship fostered a shift in perceived interests: Families increasingly forfeited the social respect accrued by complying with norm perceptions (of male breadwinner) in exchange for the financial benefits of female labor-force participation. This shift in perceived interests catalyzed growing flexibility in gender divisions of labor. From 1990 to 2000, census data for the urban Copperbelt suggest that the proportion of women among those usually working increased from 22 percent to 30 percent. This included an increase in the total numbers of women and a decrease in men usually working (the latter fell from 204,393 to 165,004; CSO 2004). Census data for 2010 suggest that urban women comprised 45 percent of the usually working population and 42 percent of professionals. Female share of professional employment rose among the youth to 56 percent. Disaggregating by age thus indicates growing horizontal and vertical occupational desegregation (Figure 1). This is consistent with my ethnographic data.

This dimension of social change is captured in the following conversation between two women in their fifties, working in a collective for house building (a stereotypically masculine activity):

> BanaMwila (whose chronically ill husband remains at home): This time, it's difficult, it's tough. … A woman should not just sit at home. A woman should also be working. The husband is working, his wife is also working, just in case work finishes or the husband dies. But if you're just sitting, what will you do?

> BanaChemba (widow): Nothing.

> BanaMwila: Nothing [translated].

Figure 2. Support for gender equality in leadership and education in urban Zambia, 2012. *Source*: Afrobarometer 2015. (Color figure available online.)

Women's employment in Zambia initially went against norm perceptions. These appear to have changed over time, though. Over the past twenty years, growing exposure to women performing socially valued work has—slowly and incrementally—undermined widespread gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status. Having seen women fighting to provide for their families and educate their children, people increasingly perceive women as "strong," resilient, and resourceful—just as competent as men. A critical mass of women employed in socially valued domains also signals that others regard women as equally competent—thereby shifting norm perceptions. This has fostered a positive feedback loop, encapsulated in the locally popular slogan, "Women can do what men can do" (Evans 2014, 353).

Growing support for gender equality is also indicated by Afrobarometer surveys. In 2002 and 2003, 64 percent of urban men and 77 percent of urban women concurred with the statement, "In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do." By 2012, professed agreement had increased to 79 percent and 85 percent, respectively. Figure 2 provides additional Afrobarometer data, indicating high levels of professed support for gender equality in urban areas. Unfortunately, there are no panel data for two of the indicators, prohibiting longitudinal comparison. When contrasted with historical ethnographies and contemporary life histories (e.g., Helen's account earlier), however, these contemporary Afrobarometer data do suggest normative change over time.

Change, however, is partial. Although women have gained respect and responsibility for household financial provision, there has not been a commensurate redistribution of care work, according to my observations and interviews (see also Abrahamsen [1997] on Kitwe; Moser and Holland [1997] for parallels in Lusaka).

The remainder of this article explains this unidirectional flexibility in gender divisions of labor by arguing that men are more likely to share care work if they are exposed to such practices, but such exposure is uncommon due to the privacy of care work as well as countervailing interests (emanating from norm perceptions and lopsided marriage markets[6]). Thus, the society-wide changes that seem significant in the case of paid work (shifts in interests and then growing exposure) do not appear to have occurred for unpaid work. Nor is there any indication that such changes are likely to happen. There is no positive feedback loop.

Exposure to Men Sharing Housework

In the Copperbelt, unpaid care work has a low status: It shows respect to the household head and, unlike financial contributions, is rarely appreciated. Homemakers who only performed this form of labor were commonly referred to as "doing nothing" or "just sitting" (translated). Besides having low status, it is also a (descriptively and prescriptively) stereotypically feminine activity, labeled "women's work" (translated).

Contrary to norm perceptions, however, some boys grow up sharing care work. This is usually at their parents' behest, either because they wish their sons to become self-reliant bachelors or because males are the numerical majority among siblings. For example,

Chezo (a forty-seven-year-old, national-level trade union leader) explained that because she was the only girl among seven siblings, her parents taught her brothers to cook. She did not recall them expressing egalitarian beliefs. Their push for flexibility in gender divisions of labor thus appears to result from chance circumstances (i.e., household composition). Market trader BanaMwimba's children also share jobs equally because there is only one girl. Her husband also sweeps; he had become accustomed to this by growing up without sisters.

In contrast, when girls outnumber boys, their parents generally see less need for flexibility in gender divisions of labor, as girls share work among themselves, thereby reducing the individual burden. Only occasionally does demand for redistribution come from children themselves. If their household status is insecure (e.g., if fostered by their extended family), girls are often very reluctant to complain, as this might jeopardize their economic security. Even in natal families, some adolescents do not push for change, knowing that breaking with norm perceptions is likely to be resisted by their parents—which clashes with their interest in peace at home.

Men who grew up sharing care work commonly identified three effects. First, they did not regard it as an expression of femininity. Second, some boys came to enjoy care work: They took pride in their cooking, cleanliness, and capacity to wash white shirts. Given enjoyment, they did not regard these tasks as inimical to their interests. In short, they became accustomed to such behavior, identified advantages therein, and saw reason to reject prescriptive stereotypes that only women should undertake care work. Third, those who grew up in homes where parents did not treat male and female children significantly differently and where girls were not expected to serve their brothers commonly said that they grew up believing that there was no difference between the sexes. For example, Hamadudu (a twenty-nine-year-old art teacher) previously performed care work when living with his brothers. Having become accustomed, this labor is now part of his identity (rather than eschewed as feminine). As I observed while staying with them, he often puts his young daughter to bed and washes his wife's nursing uniform, especially when she works night shifts.

Women who had shared care work with brothers similarly explained that this experience had made them critical of gender stereotypes. Chezo (the previously mentioned trade unionist, who cooked and slashed grass with her brothers) explained:

> We worked together, we were equal: we didn't appear different as males and females.

Such women recalled that they did not grow up expecting to serve men but rather to work with them as equals.

Exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of unpaid care work not only seems to affect internalized gender stereotypes but also norm perceptions. This can be seen from comparisons between women with different experiences. Interviewed women without exposure to men performing care work often privately expressed resentment for women's sole responsibility for this as unfair. They appeared resigned to accept their fate, however, as they had no evidence that this tradition was likely to change. This is exemplified by BanaCollins (a market trader supporting an unemployed husband):

> Here in Zambia, a woman doesn't have time to rest. ... We were born into this system. Every woman must be strong. It's just tradition. We are all accustomed to it. We can't change it.

In contrast, women who had grown up sharing care work with brothers were commonly more optimistic about social change. Besides wanting to share care work, they also anticipated social support. It seems, therefore, that women with different experiences have different norm perceptions. This heterogeneity can only be analytically accommodated with a conceptual shift from (singular, macrolevel) social norms to individuals' (diverse) beliefs about them. A further reason why shifting our focus to individual psychologies is important is that it reveals a positive feedback loop. My life history narratives suggest that women are more likely to initiate the redistribution of care work if they believe such efforts will be supported by others. Such optimism about social change seems more common among those formatively exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labor.

Interviews with rural–urban migrants indicate that exposure in adulthood can also be significant. Some explained that their husbands had started to share care work after seeing other men doing so in town. The following dialogue features Chilando (a forty-one-year-old, selling tomatoes in Kitwe's central market), who left her village four months ago so that her children would focus on education rather than marriage. She explains why her husband started washing plates after three months of living in town:

Chilando: They are very different, the village and town. … Here in town men cook and help with washing up but that can't possibly happen in the village! He [my husband] helps me here. They see women going to the market … we become tired; they come so we can help each other. … [In the village] we used to get tired but they didn't feel mercy. … Because the rules in the village are very tough; they'll be laughing at you. Here he's found his friends helping their wives. Things are very different in the village.

Author: Does he often wash plates?

Chilando: Only sometimes …

Author: Not every day?

Chilando: No, because he's working [he makes flower pots].

By mentioning social ridicule in the village (something I also observed in rural Luapula), Chilando suggests that her husband's self-interested concerns changed with social context. Exposure to urban men sharing care work might have led him to revise his norm perceptions in town.

In suggesting that "many" of her husband's urban friends wash plates, Chilando's narrative challenges my depiction of unidirectional flexibility in gender divisions of labor in Kitwe. Perhaps men's share of care work is widely underreported. This is certainly possible, given that I did not triangulate all interviews with observations of domesticity. When paired with her subsequent description of infrequency ("only sometimes"), however, Chilando's narrative seems more intended to emphasize rural–urban differences than convey urban men's equal input. Even if men sharing care work is more likely in urban areas, exposure remains atypical. Whereas the sight of a female electrician often inspires young women to follow suit (Evans 2014), male carers are largely hidden from view. Thus, even if care work is redistributed, it is often unseen and so does not undermine other people's norm perceptions or enable a positive feedback loop. The privacy of care work thus slows social change.

Men sharing care work are typically only seen by others in that household. Thus, initial exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of care work generally occurs in one's own natal home. I suggest that the apparent importance of formative experiences (illustrated earlier in this section) is not because formative experiences determine subsequent attitudes but because exposure to men's care work generally occurs in one's own home. Not all care work, however, is performed indoors. In low-income compounds with outdoor taps, dishes, vegetables, clothes, and children are all washed outside. Although often partially concealed by wall fences and hedges, such activities might still be seen by neighbors. This possibility shapes interest structures, as elaborated on next.

Countervailing Interests: Norm Perceptions

A number of male participants—from across the class and generational spectrum—maintained that they would perform unpaid care work but for concerns about what others would think of them. Mr. Zimba (teaching civic education and history at a high-cost private high school) explained:

There are expectations, "a man should do certain things." … I think I'm a very good cook but … if it went out that I enjoy cooking then they would think there's something wrong with my wife: she's not looking after me. She can even be forced out by my sisters.

Samuel and Owen (two young mechanics) similarly identified norm perceptions (rather than their own stereotypes) as binding constraints:

Samuel: Yeah, we can wash, but what are people out there going to think? No, our tradition is against that.

Owen: You can help her [your wife] when she has a lot to do.

Samuel: It's difficult for people to understand you're just helping her. "*Balimubelesha*"—he's being used. … My father, when he finds you in the kitchen, preparing relish for yourself or washing plates, he'll be angry at you, "What are you doing in the kitchen? You're a man, just go in the sitting room. The girls will do everything for you." What can you advise me?

Author: Does it bother you?

Samuel: It bothers me very much. I feel I'm capable of doing that. … I'm feeling like helping her and I'm afraid of my father and she's afraid of my father.

Empathizing with his sisters, Samuel would like to help them but is constrained by his father. Even when he has his own home, after marriage, he anticipates being limited by other people's gender beliefs. Such self-reports might be unreliable, however. Perhaps Samuel and Mr. Zimba did not really want to share care work and were just shirking responsibility for this gender division of labor.

To further interrogate the significance of norm perceptions (as opposed to internalized gender stereotypes) I recorded how people claimed to act in different social spaces. For example, some women only kneeled to serve food to their husbands in the presence of visitors. Middle-income couple Michael (who supplies food to prisons and hospitals) and Lillian (a bank worker) only conformed to gender divisions of care work when visitors came. Privately, he would cook and wash plates. Together they would laugh about such matters. BanaBwalya, a low-income widow living in an informal hillside settlement, similarly explained that her twenty-eight-year-old son, Jacob, only sweeps inside (not outside) the house, for "he feels shy to be seen sweeping." Because sweeping has the same cultural meaning in the two contexts, this behavior is likely to reflect Jacob's norm perceptions rather than his internalized gender stereotypes.

These narratives, from across the class spectrum, illustrate interactions between exposure and interests. Jacob's and Michael's observations of sex-differentiated practices have led them to presume that men will be chastised if seen undertaking care work. These norm perceptions lead to self-interested reasons to eschew care work in public.

Not everyone prioritizes social respect, however. Some male participants shared popular norm perceptions of gender divisions of labor but did not conform to them. For example, Hilda (a widowed primary school teacher) narrated that her late, unemployed husband used to do all the care work (including cooking, washing, and ironing her clothes). She recalled that "other people said you put *muti* [herbal medicine] there [in his food] but it was love. His friends were laughing at him but he didn't mind because he loved me." Care work was shared by another young couple, with whom I lived. As previously mentioned, Hamadudu often puts his young daughter to bed and washes his wife's nursing uniform. He also cleans their child's bedroom. "It's just love," Hamadudu explained. His empathy for his wife, Sarah, motivated him to undertake care work for her. Further interviews, however, revealed that his desire to enact his love in this way stemmed from his exposure: From his youth, he had been accustomed to flexibility in gender divisions of labor.

Norm perceptions (as learned through exposure to sex-differentiated practices) thus appear to furnish men with self-interested reasons to avoid care work in public view. This impedes popular exposure to such performances, reinforcing common norm perceptions. Although some participants prioritized other concerns

(besides neighbors' approval), they were very much the minority in my sample.

Countervailing Interests: Lopsided Marriage Markets

Marital insecurity is another reason why many women are reluctant to push their husbands to share care work. In 2010, at the time of fieldwork, 25 percent of male and 34 percent of female Copperbelt residents were unemployed (CSO 2011). When employment is found, it is typically precarious. In this context, young men often delay marriage because they do not feel financially competent to provide for a household:

> Most of them they are not married because they're scared, "If I got married what am I going to be giving my wife?" (Michael, a middle-aged food supplier to prisons and hospitals, who employs manual workers)

Similar observations have been made by earlier research in South Africa and Zambia (Hansen 2008; Hunter 2010). Likewise, in the United States, the age of marriage increased following the Great Depression (Ruggles 2015). There is thus a meager supply of men seeking marriage. The demand, however, is high among women looking for financial support, given their own unemployment and socialized dependence on men's earnings. Furthermore, marriage is revered widely, especially in terms of child care. In 2007, 63 percent disapproved of single mothers (World Values Survey 2015).

Intimate relationships can be extremely insecure because there is so much competition from other women, keen to find husbands and financial providers. Thus, although some women might have improved their marriages by labor-force participation (Evans 2014), their marriages remain threatened by other women's unemployment. To preserve their marriages, women are strongly encouraged to perform all care work—as I observed in social fora and especially in women's church groups. These observations were triangulated through interviews, in which women—from across the class spectrum—volunteered concerns that redistributing care work might imperil their relationships:

> Penelope (studying to become a social worker): The in-laws, if they see the man cooking they'll chase you from the house and the marriage is over.

> Susan (training as a teacher): You will destroy marriage.

Concerns about marriage breakup are amplified by the stigma of being unmarried, as detailed by Helena (a pastor's wife):

> It's very bad in Africa [if your husband leaves you] because people will not respect you. They'll think that you're a prostitute . . . maybe you can get their husband. Every woman wants to get married: they want everyone to call them Mrs. Who, Mrs. Who [laughs]. . . . In the church, when you're not married they don't consider you; they don't put you in leadership.

Although Helena's portrayal of social norms might be particularly conservative, given her institutional position, it was widely shared in my sample. Likewise, in a low-income area of Lusaka, Moser and Holland (1997, 60) observed that "[f]or women, the stigma of single parenthood—and its association with prostitution—means that women try to remain married whenever possible." Paid work appears to improve a woman's economic but not her social fallback position. These self-interested concerns about social norms stem from exposure: observation of others condemning flexibility in gender divisions of labor and marital breakup.

In Kitwe, women rarely seem to regard it as advantageous to urge their husbands to share care work. Countervailing interests predominate, about preserving marriages made insecure by lopsided marriage markets yet that are still integral to social respect.

Exposure to Abstract Messages of Equality

In Kitwe, redistribution of unpaid care work is promoted by a range of media, including radio, television, and newspapers; NGO community outreach; and school civics lessons. The mode of such awareness-raising activities varies, from didactic information provision to participatory group discussions. These sessions typically commence by differentiating between biologically determined sex roles and socially constructed gender roles. The facilitator might then draw attention to the adverse consequences of gender divisions of labor. Other topics promoted in gender sensitization include gender equality in education, employment, and household and political decision making—encapsulated in the slogan "women can do what men can do."

Exposure to the abstract idea that men should perform care work does not seem sufficient to undermine long-standing gender beliefs. Comparisons between participants indicate the importance of two factors: the mode of sensitization and firsthand exposure to disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes. Participants tended to retain their prescriptive gender stereotypes that women should perform care work if they had not collectively reflected on the social construction and costs of gender inequalities. Few programs are participatory. Although gender equality has been institutionalized into the school curriculum (in civics), such classes often consist of rote learning. Uninspired by their teachers and lacking experiential evidence of the benefits of deviating from gender stereotypes, such students typically disregard taught content, forgetting it soon after their exams.

Participants seemed more inclined to query *prescriptive* stereotypes (that women should perform care work) if they were already skeptical of *descriptive* gender stereotypes (that there are significant differences between men and women). Such critique was much more common among those exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labor (either in terms of men doing women's work or vice versa).

Even then, though, privately questioning gender stereotypes does not seem sufficient for behavioral change. Many were discouraged by concerns about how they would be perceived by others. They only tended to revise these norm perceptions through exposure to men performing care work or exposure to others' endorsing such practices (e.g., through participatory gender sensitization). Without exposure to public approval, they remained discouraged—unconvinced of the possibility of social change—as exemplified by Penelope (who is studying to become a social worker):

> We learned about gender in school. But still, it's just the culture here in Zambia that a woman should do care work, unless she is pregnant or unwell. That's just how it is, how we found it. Whether he helps depends on his character. We're accustomed to this; we don't worry about it. It's tradition.[7]

Conclusion

Growing flexibility in gender divisions of labor in Kitwe appears contingent on shifts in interests and exposure. Economic restructuring and financial hardship from the 1980s led households to perceive female employment as advantageous. The resulting critical mass of women in employment is increasingly perceived as disconfirming evidence of norm perceptions: that other people now regard women as suited to socially valued roles. Shifts in perceived interests have

thus catalyzed behavioral change, amplified exposure, and fostered a positive feedback loop.

This reflects a geographically wider trend: Deindustrialization, demechanization, and deregulation have reduced the number and wages of male working-class jobs, triggering rising female employment. In the United States, for example, female employment rose as the median wage of young males declined from $41,000 in 1973 to $23,000 in 2013 (Ruggles 2015; see also McDowell 1991; Chant 1996, 2007; Moser and Holland 1997; Crompton 2006; Ansell, Tsoeu, and Hajdu 2015, for parallels in Britain, Costa Rica, Lesotho, Mexico, The Gambia, and Zambia). Financial hardship seems to motivate a trade-off: Some people become more inclined to accept gender flexibility, even though this goes against norm perceptions.

In some contexts, female employment has risen with the growth of sectors with demand for feminine characteristics. In Britain, between 1978 and 2008, rising female employment was concentrated in the public sector (health, education, and public administration) and financial services (McDowell 2009; Scott et al. 2012). Besides increasing demand for women workers, the growth of social welfare services (e.g., child and elderly care) also shapes supply: reducing women's reproductive workload (McDowell 1991). Female employment has also risen in export-oriented manufacturing and high-value agriculture, as women are often deemed more "malleable" by employers (Barrientos, Kabeer, and Hossain 2004, 10). This again can be understood as a shift in perceived interests: the growing opportunity cost of women staying at home.

Rising female employment generally seems to precede attitudinal change. For instance, although many working mothers in Britain expressed concerns that preschool children suffer with maternal employment, 46 percent changed their views within two years of employment. Changes in behavior, exposure, and attitudes appeared to foster a positive feedback loop (Himmelweit and Sigala 2003; Crompton 2006; see also Diekman et al. 2005; Zhang [2007] for similar findings in Brazil, Chile, China, and the United States). Ruggles (2015) likewise argued of the United States, "Attitudes are ordinarily a barrier to change, not a cause of change: there must be a source of exogenous pressure for people to reject the values with which they were raised. . . . The shift in attitudes about married women's work outside the family occurred significantly after the rapid ascent of married women's wage labor" (1807). In countries where there has not been a shift in perceived interests favoring female employment (e.g., Middle Eastern and North African oil producers) and such exposure remains low, patriarchal beliefs persist (Ross 2008). A geographically diverse literature thus suggests that flexibility in gender divisions of labor fosters (rather than follows) a shift in gender ideologies.

This article has sought to learn from these changes in paid work to understand continuities in unpaid care work. Using these same theoretical concepts (interests and exposure) to analyze Zambian narratives about unpaid care work indicates common drivers of egalitarian social change. Echoing parallel trends for female employment, exposure to men sharing care work undermines gender ideologies. One significant feature of care work, however, is that it is often performed in private spaces. Although the privacy of the home enables egalitarian-minded men to undertake care work without public scrutiny, the concomitant invisibility of their performances constrains popular exposure. Thus, forerunners do not lead others to revise their norm perceptions. There is no positive feedback loop between behavior and attitudes.

My suggestion that the spaces of care work influence gender ideologies and practices builds on existing geographical research. That care work is largely unseen has been widely emphasized (Cox 1997; K. England and Lawson 2005; McDowell 2009). Geographers have further shown how domestic and home-based work curb women's social networks, autonomy, and self-esteem (in both contemporary Singapore and nineteenth-century Hackney; Massey and McDowell 1994; Huang and Yeoh 2007). Given these constraints, feminist geographers have often underscored the significance of female mobility and employment in public places in shifting gender ideologies about women (e.g., Massey and McDowell 1994). My contribution is the mirror opposite: The privacy of care work impedes the disruption of norm perceptions that it is rarely performed by men.

Reflecting on gender ideologies and practices more broadly, egalitarian change is particularly slow in the private domain: paid and unpaid care work, home-based subcontracted work, and also domestic violence. Might this intransigence be partly due to their spatial location? For example, even if some homes are peaceful in otherwise privately violent societies, this might be unknown by outsiders. Peaceful outliers might not disrupt widespread beliefs that domestic violence is normal and widely accepted. This "presumed tolerance of abuse" could lead to a vicious cycle: deterring survivors from speaking out (as Kedir and Admasachew

[2010, 446] found in Ethiopia). The corollary importance of public spaces and nonfamilial association in reconfiguring gender ideologies is illustrated by much geographical research. Hearing others condemn domestic violence can shift people's norm perceptions (as observed of street theater accompanied by open public discussions in India [Nagar 2002]; microfinance groups in Sri Lanka [Aladuwaka and Oberhauser 2014]; and likewise in the United Kingdom, calls to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children nearly doubled following public condemnation of Jimmy Savile's abuses [Ramesh 2013]). As Mohammad (2013, 1804) wrote of feminine Muslim spatialities in the United Kingdom, "The public realm is where the legitimacy of collective social norms and values is negotiated through visibility and presence." Space, I think, helps explain why progress toward gender equality is so uneven.[8]

One way of overcoming the privacy of care work, shifting norm perceptions and thereby normalizing such behavior, would be to produce television or community radio sitcoms or culinary competitions showing Zambian men doing the washing up or acting as cooks. Research elsewhere suggests that gendered ideologies and performances can be affected by watching soaps that portray alternative realities (Chong and La Ferrara 2009; Jensen and Oster 2009).

A further argument advanced in this article is that shared care work is seldom regarded as advantageous. Again, this is consistent with a geographically diverse literature. Although earlier research has typically pointed to deterrents emanating from government and organizational policies (Himmelweit and Sigala 2003; Crompton 2006; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Gerson 2011; Scott et al. 2012), my ethnographic data from Zambia suggest an additional deterrent. Despite their double burden of labor, many Zambian women are reluctant to push for change given lopsided marriage markets. To my knowledge, this connection between unemployment and care work has not been advanced elsewhere yet should be investigated in comparable countries with high youth unemployment. This particular obstacle aside, there seem to be many common causes of egalitarian social change and continuity in the Global North and South. I thus encourage feminist geographers to dismantle these artificial silos.

This article has also illustrated the significance, heterogeneity, and malleability of norm perceptions. These self-interested concerns might discourage women and men (even those who privately critique inequitable divisions of labor) from pushing for redistribution. This challenges the view that such inequalities persist because they are uncritically accepted. Importantly, these norm perceptions are not homogeneous: They can differ within the same socioeconomic group, such as female market traders. In my sample, those with limited exposure to flexibility tended to presume that redistribution would be reproached by others and thus perceived it as disadvantageous. In contrast, those exposed to flexibility tended to be more optimistic. Such heterogeneity has important implications for both policy and theory.

First, it suggests that interventions would be more likely to encourage redistribution if they enhanced people's confidence in the possibility of social change. Rather than suggesting that men should do more care work—as is typical of gender interventions in Kitwe—it might be more efficacious to signal that such practices are becoming more common. To explore how to best to do this, future studies (both cross-national and small-scale) might examine the lagged effects of different kinds of interventions (e.g., labor market and social policy levers, legislation, as well as participatory gender sensitization and other forms of association) on norm perceptions (as opposed to internalized stereotypes, which is the norm).

Second, heterogeneity underscores the analytical importance of reconceptualizing cultural expectation (as a singular, macrolevel phenomenon) to individuals' (diverse) beliefs about them. This conceptual modification also enables us to explore causal connections between micro and macro dimensions of the gender structure; that is, an individual's interests are influenced by his or her beliefs about what will be approved of by others in society. To recall, previous research has found an association between national-level support for gender equality and household practices, but causation was unclear (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010).

Besides cultural concerns, this article has illustrated the significance of economic macro–micro linkages: the lopsided marriage market. Thus, although some scholars in this field critique the focus on exposure and interests as blinkered to salient macrolevel phenomena, I have shown that we can extend the applicability of these concepts to incorporate (and further explore powerful connections with) macrolevel phenomena. These concepts contribute to geographies of gender by enabling us to create a unified theory of egalitarian social change, including unpaid care work and paid work. This contrasts with studies that focus exclusively

on care work, exploring the extent to which care work distribution is explained by relative resources, time availability, gender ideology, and so on.

In response to earlier questions about the primary importance of interests versus exposure, my findings illustrate synergistic interactions (as anticipated by Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). The multiplicity and interconnectedness of key influences can be surmised by considering class variation. Such trends have not been discussed in this article because they did not clearly emerge from my data set (in contrast to quantitative findings in Britain and the United States; e.g., Crompton 2006; Gerson 2011). On the one hand, wealthier households might be more likely to redistribute care work. As previously mentioned, they typically benefit from greater privacy—having indoor taps, a wall fence, and residing in low-density areas. This could lessen their self-interested concerns about norm perceptions, making them more inclined to enact their egalitarian gender beliefs, if they endorse them at all. Additionally, wealthier Zambian families might be more likely to privately support men sharing care work due to their unique access to satellite television. Watching international cookery programs and soap operas in which men perform care work might lead male viewers to enjoy such practices and cease to regard them as feminine—as was the case for some wealthier male teenage participants (and also found by Meah [2014] in the United Kingdom).

There are also reasons why wealthier households might be less likely to enact flexibility in gender divisions of labor. First, privacy is not guaranteed: A constant stream of impoverished kin seeking financial support frequented the upper middle-class household of Mwelwa (a supplier to the mines). Second, those without visitors, living in low-density areas, lack exposure to their neighbors' domestic arrangements. Unable to observe the social change occurring in other people's houses, they might not revise their norm perceptions. Third, middle-class marriages are particularly insecure, as high-earning husbands (e.g., Mwelwa, whose income rose with the price of copper) are commonly propositioned by women seeking financial support.

The heterogeneity of circumstances, interests, and exposure render class-based generalizations impossible— from my ethnographic data at least. What emerges then is a complex picture of mutually reinforcing macro–micro interactions, perpetuating asymmetric gender divisions of labor. This, however, could change. My analysis of rising female employment suggests that amplifying exposure to the men who do share care work might undermine widely held norm perceptions and thereby catalyze a positive feedback loop.

Acknowledgments

Funding

Notes

1. These analytical differences tend to be obfuscated. Geographers of work and gender sometimes equivocate between the two, interchangeably referring to cultural expectations (termed social obligations, social pressure, or normative constraints) and internalized ideologies (accepted gender norms and gender ideology; Lee 2002; McDowell et al. 2005, 448, 454, 457; Brickell and Chant 2010; Brickell 2014; Ansell, Tsoeu, and Hajdu 2015).
2. In urban and periurban Kitwe, care work is mostly undertaken indoors or within walled gardens. Fences, hedges, and breeze blocks obscure public exposure to private practices. The ultrapoor in illegal settlements do not have fences, however.
3. This might occur if there is an economic incentive for men to share care work. Higher demand for low-skilled, female labor in Hanoi's factories and informal economy has shifted perceived interests. Rural women are migrating to urban areas, leaving fathers to perform unpaid care work. "All because of economics!" explained Hien, a forty-six-year-old father. Such flexibility in gender divisions of labor is temporary, though, not enduring after return migration (Thao 2014).
4. My rural–urban comparative ethnography of gender ideologies and practices underscores the main argument in this article: the importance of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labor. Readers interested in this analysis might read Evans (2016).
5. Although see Evans (2015b) for a discussion of these data.
6. As will be elaborated on, there is a low supply of men seeking marriage but high demand from women.

7. Readers interested in the effectiveness of gender sensitization might wish to consult Evans (2015a).

8. This is not to present a dichotomous conceptualization of public and private spaces or disregard interconnections (as highlighted by Drummond 2000; Blunt and Dowling 2006, 19) but rather to show that some ideas do not permeate from private to public spaces.

References

Abrahamsen, R. 1997. Gender dimensions of AIDS in Zambia. *Journal of Gender Studies* 6 (2): 177–89.

Agarwal, B. 1997. "Bargaining" and gender relations: Within and beyond the household. *Feminist Economics* 3:1–51.

Aladuwaka, S., and A. M. Oberhauser. 2014. Out of the kitchen: Gender, employment and microfinance programs in Sri Lanka. In *Global perspectives on gender and space: Engaging feminism and development*, ed. A. M. Oberhauser and I. Johnston-Anumonwo, 35–52. London and New York: Routledge.

Allard, K., L. Haas, and C. P. Hwang. 2011. Family-supportive organizational culture and fathers' experiences of work–family conflict in Sweden. *Gender, Work & Organization* 18 (2): 141–57.

Ansell, N., S. Tsoeu, and F. Hajdu. 2015. Women's changing domestic responsibilities in neoliberal Africa: A relational time–space analysis of Lesotho's garment industry. *Gender, Place & Culture* 22 (3): 363–82.

Barrientos, S., N. Kabeer, and N. Hossain. 2004. The gender dimensions of the globalisation of production. Working Paper No. 17, ILO, Geneva, Switzerland.

Blunt, A., and R. Dowling. 2006. *Home*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bolzendahl, C. I., and D. J. Myers. 2004. Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and men, 1974–1998. *Social Forces* 83:759–89.

Brickell, K. 2014. "Plates in a basket will rattle": Marital dissolution and home "unmaking" in contemporary Cambodia. *Geoforum* 51:262–72.

Brickell, K., and S. Chant. 2010. "The unbearable heaviness of being": Reflections on female altruism in Cambodia, Philippines, The Gambia and Costa Rica. *Progress in Development Studies* 10 (2): 145–59.

Central Statistical Office (CSO). 1973. *Census of population and housing, 1969*. Lusaka, Zambia: CSO.

———. 2004. *Zambia 2000 census of population and housing, Copperbelt province: Analytical report*. Lusaka, Zambia: CSO.

———. 2011. *Living conditions monitoring survey report 2006 and 2010*. Lusaka, Zambia: CSO.

———. 2012. *Zambia 2010 census of population and housing, national descriptive tables*. Lusaka, Zambia: CSO.

Chant, S. 1996. Women's roles in recession and economic restructuring in Mexico and the Philippines. *Geoforum* 27 (3): 297–327.

———. 2002. Researching gender, families and households in Latin America: From 20th into the 21st century. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 21:545–75.

———. 2007. *Gender, generation and poverty: Exploring the "feminisation of poverty" in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Chong, A., and E. La Ferrara. 2009. Television and divorce: Evidence from Brazilian novelas. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7:2–3, 458–68.

Coltrane, S. 2010. Gender theory and household labor. *Sex Roles* 63:791–800.

Cox, R. 1997. Invisible labor: Perceptions of paid domestic work in London. *Journal of Occupational Science* 4 (2): 62–67.

Crehan, K. 1997. *The fractured community: Landscapes of power and gender in rural Zambia*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Croft, A., T. Schmader, and K. Block. 2015. An underexamined inequality: Cultural and psychological barriers to men's engagement with communal roles. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 19 (4): 343–70.

Crompton, R. 2006. *Employment and the family: The reconfiguration of work and family life in contemporary societies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Cunningham, M. 2001. The influence of parental attitudes and behaviors on children's attitudes toward gender and household labor in early adulthood. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 63:111–22.

Diekman, A., A. Eagly, A. Mladinic, and M. C. Ferreira. 2005. Dynamic stereotypes about men and women in Latin America and the United States. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36 (2): 209–26.

Drummond, L. 2000. Street scenes: Practices of public and private space in urban Vietnam. *Urban Studies* 37 (12): 2377–91.

England, K., and V. Lawson. 2005. Feminist analyses of work: Rethinking the boundaries: Gendering, and spatiality of work. In *A companion to feminist geography*, ed. L. Nelson and J. Seager, 77–92. London: Blackwell.

England, P. 2010. The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender & Society* 24 (2): 149–66.

Epstein, A. L. 1981. *Urbanisation and kinship: The domestic domain on the Copperbelt of Zambia, 1950–1956*. London: Academic.

Evans, A. 2014. "Women can do what men can do": The causes and consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour in Kitwe, Zambia. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40 (5): 991–98.

———. 2015a. Gender sensitisation in the Zambian Copperbelt. *Geoforum* 59:12–20.

———. 2015b. History lessons for gender equality from the Zambian Copperbelt, 1900–1990. *Gender, Place and Culture* 22 (3): 344–62.

———. 2016. Urban social change and rural continuity in gender ideologies. Working paper. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299285622_URBAN_SOCIAL_CHANGE_AND_RURAL_CONTINUITY_IN_GENDER_IDEOLOGIES_AND_PRACTICES?ev=prf_pub (last accessed 19 May 2016).

Ferguson, J. 1999. *Expectations of modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Fuwa, M. 2004. Macro-level gender inequality and the division of household labor in 22 countries. *American Sociological Review* 69:751–67.

Fuwa, M., and P. N. Cohen. 2007. Housework and social policy. *Social Science Research* 36:512–30.

Gerson, K. 2011. *The unfinished revolution: Coming of age in a new era of gender, work, and family.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Greenstein, T. N. 2009. National context, family satisfaction, and fairness in the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 71:1039–51.

Hansen, K. T. 2008. The informalization of Lusaka's economy: Regime change, ultra modern markets, and street vending, 1972–2004. In *One Zambia: Many histories,* ed. J.-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, and G. Macola, 213–39. Leiden: Brill.

Himmelweit, S., and M. Sigala. 2003. Internal and external constraints on mothers' employment. Working Paper No. 27, ESRC Future of Work Programme, Leeds.

Huang, S., and B. S. A. Yeoh. 2007. Emotional labor and transnational domestic work: The moving geographies of "maid abuse" in Singapore. *Mobilities* 2 (2): 195–217.

Hunter, M. 2010. *Love in a time of AIDS.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Jarvis, H., P. Kantor, and J. Cloke. 2009. *Cities and gender.* London and New York: Routledge.

Kabeer, N. 1994. *Reversed realities: Gender hierarchies in development thought.* London: Verso.

Kato-Wallace, J., G. Barker, M. Eads, and R. Levtov. 2014. Global pathways to men's caregiving: Mixed methods findings from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey and the Men Who Care study. *Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy and Practice* 9:706–22.

Kedir, A., and L. Admasachew. 2010. Violence against women in Ethiopia. *Gender, Place & Culture* 17 (4): 437–52.

Jensen, R., and E. Oster. 2009. The power of TV: Cable television and women's status in India. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (3): 1057–94.

Lachance-Grzela, M., and G. Bouchard. 2010. Why do women do the lion's share of housework? A decade of research. *Sex Roles* 63:767–80.

Lee, W. K. M. 2002. Gender ideology and the domestic division of labor in middle-class Chinese families in Hong Kong. *Gender, Place & Culture* 9 (3): 245–60.

Legerski, E., and M. Cornwall. 2010. Working-class job loss, gender, and the negotiation of household labor. *Gender & Society* 4 (4): 447–74.

Levtov, R., N. van der Gaag, M. Greene, M. Kaufman, and G. Barker. 2015. *State of the world's fathers: A MenCare advocacy publication.* Washington, DC: Promundo, Rutgers, Save the Children, Sonke Gender Justice, and the MenEngage Alliance.

Massey, D., and L. McDowell. 1994. A woman's place? In *Space, place and gender,* ed. D. Massey, 191–211. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

McDowell, L. 1991. Life without father and Ford: The new gender order of post-Fordism. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 16 (4): 400–19.

———. 2001. Father and Ford revisited: Gender, class and employment change in the new millennium. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 26 (4): 448–64.

———. 2009. *Working bodies: Interactive service employment and workplace identities.* Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

McDowell, L., D. Perrons, C. Fagan, K. Ray, and K. Ward. 2005. The contradictions and intersections of class and gender in a global city: Placing working women's lives on the research agenda. *Environment and Planning A* 37:441–61.

Meah, A. 2014. Reconceptualising masculinity through men's contributions to domestic foodwork. In *Masculinities and place,* ed. A. Gorman-Murray and P. Hopkins, 191–208. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

Mohammad, R. 2013. Making gender ma(r)king place: Youthful British Pakistani Muslim women's narratives of urban space. *Environment and Planning A* 45:1802–22.

Moser, C., and J. Holland. 1997. *Household responses to poverty and vulnerability: Vol. 4. Confronting crisis in Chawama, Lusaka, Zambia.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

Nagar, R. 2002. Women's theater and the redefinitions of public, private, and politics in North India. *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 1 (1): 55–72.

Nagar, R., V. Lawson, L. McDowell, and S. Hanson. 2002. Locating globalization: Feminist (re)readings of the subjects and spaces of globalization. *Economic Geography* 78 (3): 257–84.

Powdermaker, H. 1962. *Copper Town: Changing Africa. The human situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt.* New York: Harper & Row.

Ramesh, R. 2013. NSPCC says reports of sexual abuse have soared after Jimmy Savile scandal. *The Guardian.* http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/aug/31/nspcc-reports-sexual-abuse-jimmy-savile (last accessed 20 February 2016).

Ridgeway, C. 2011. *Framed by gender: How gender inequality persists in the modern world.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Robinson, J. 2011. Cities in a world of cities: The comparative gesture. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35 (1): 1–23.

Ross, M. 2008. Oil, Islam and women. *American Political Science Review* 102 (1): 107–23.

Ruggles, S. 2015. Patriarchy, power, and pay: The transformation of American families, 1800–2015. *Demography* 52 (6): 1797–1823.

Ruppanner, L. 2010. Cross-national reports of housework: An investigation of the gender egalitarianism measure. *Social Science Research* 39:963–75.

Scott, J., S. Dex, H. Joshi, and A. Plagnol. 2012. Introduction. In *Gendered lives: Gender inequalities in production and reproduction,* ed. J. Scott, S. Dex, and A. Plagnol, 1–22. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Silberschmidt, M. 1999. *Women forget that men are the masters: Gender antagonism and socio-economic change in Kisii District, Kenya.* Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Simpson, A. 2005. Sons and fathers/boys to men in the time of AIDS: Learning masculinity in Zambia. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31:569–86.

Slegh, H., G. Barker, A. Kimonyo, P. Ndolimana, and M. Batterman. 2013. "I can do women's work": Reflections on engaging men as allies in women's economic empowerment in Rwanda. *Gender & Development* 21:15–30.

Tankard, M., and M. E. Paluck. 2016. Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. *Social Issues and Policy Review* 10 (1): 181–211.

Thao, V. T. 2014. When the pillar of the home is shaking: Female labor migration and stay-at-home fathers in Vietnam. In *Globalized fatherhood*, ed. M. Inhorn, W. Chavkin and J.-A. Navarro, 129–51. New York: Berghahn.

Tichenor, V. 2005. Maintaining men's dominance: Negotiating identity and power when she earns more. *Sex Roles* 3:191–205.

van den Berg, W., L. Hendricks, A. Hatcher, D. Peacock, P. Godana, and S. Dworkin. 2013. "One man can": Shifts in fatherhood beliefs and parenting practices following a gender-transformative programme in Eastern Cape, South Africa. *Gender & Development* 21:111–25.

World Values Survey. 2015. Online data analysis. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp (last accessed 19 May 2016).

Yodanis, C. 2005. Divorce culture and marital gender equality: A cross-national study. *Gender & Society* 19:644–59.

Zhang, H. 2007. China's new rural daughters coming of age: Downsizing the family and firing up cash-earning power in the new economy. *Signs* 32 (3): 671–98.

ALICE EVANS is a Lecturer in Human Geography in the Department of Geography at the University of Cambridge, Downing Place, Cambridge CB2 3EN, UK. E-mail: ace.alicevans@gmail.com. She is interested in inequality and social change. Current projects include rural–urban differences in gender relations, the politicization of inequality, and the politics of policymaking and implementation in Zambia and Southeast Asia.