Alexander Hölken

Alexander Hölken
Ruhr-Universität Bochum | RUB · Institut für Philosophie II

Master of Science

About

2
Publications
58
Reads
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0
Citations
Citations since 2017
2 Research Items
0 Citations
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20172018201920202021202220230.00.20.40.60.81.0
20172018201920202021202220230.00.20.40.60.81.0
20172018201920202021202220230.00.20.40.60.81.0
Introduction
PhD student at the Ruhr-University Bochum. Interested in the multilevel dynamics of cognitive systems and applications of Complex Systems Theory to various issues in the Philosophy of Mind. My favorite band is the 4E's.
Additional affiliations
October 2019 - March 2022
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Position
  • Master's Student
September 2017 - September 2019
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
Position
  • Bachelor student

Publications

Publications (2)
Presentation
Full-text available
Presentation about how embodied processes in the brain support the generation of reliable episodic memories during recall. Held at GEM2021 at the Ruhr-University Bochum (https://for2812.rub.de/gem2021program)
Conference Paper
Full-text available
In a paper from 2008, Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen argue, among other things, for the existence of four levels of self-representation: Two prereflective, nonconceptual levels, one featuring momentary representations, one stable representations, followed by a conceptual and a metarepresentational level. Each of these levels makes a specific contribu...

Projects

Projects (2)
Project
In this thesis, I argue for a position which is essentially that of moderate anti­-intellectualism: Knowledge-that and knowledge -how are distinct kinds of knowledge. However, I believe there are good reasons to assume that knowledge­-how is more fundamental to our cognitive processes, and that, while knowledge­-that isn’t reducible to knowledge­-how, it is dependent on it. I argue for this position by looking at what Jung (2012) calls their "object" of these two kinds of knowledge, as well as the structural differences in how they relate to their objects.