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26
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Introduction
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HSE University
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- Associate Professor
Publications
Publications (26)
Online Appendix to 'How should we score athletes and candidates: Geometric scoring rules'
Scoring in Multi-Event Tournaments
How much is a first place worth? Is the athlete who came first once and third twice better than the athlete who came second three times? Different sports value these positions differently: (60, 54, 48) in IBU biathlon, (25, 18, 15) in F1 racing, (8, 7, 6) in Diamond League athletics. Are these choices based on any...
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not overly bad for particular individuals or groups). In a context where the latter is our main concern, veto-based...
Scoring rules are widely used to rank athletes in sports and candidates in elections. Each position in each individual ranking is worth a certain number of points; the total sum of points determines the aggregate ranking. The question is how to choose a scoring rule for a specific application. First, we derive a one-parameter family with geometric...
Given the ranking of competitors, how should the prize endowment be allocated? This paper introduces and axiomatically studies the prize allocation problem. We focus on consistent prize allocation rules satisfying elementary solidarity and fairness principles. In particular, we derive several families of rules satisfying anonymity, order preservati...
Given the final ranking of a competition, how should the total prize endowment be allocated among the competitors? We study consistent prize allocation rules satisfying elementary solidarity and fairness principles. In particular, we axiomatically characterize several families of rules satisfying anonymity, order preservation, and endowment monoton...
We study ex-post fairness and efficiency in the object allocation problem. A matching is individually fair if it minimizes the number of envying agents, we call it minimal envy matching, and conditional on being minimal envy also minimizes the number of envying agents in a reduced problem, we call it minimal envy-2 matching. A matching is socially...
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not overly bad for particular individuals or groups). In a context where the latter is our main concern, veto-based...
It follows from negative plant growth response that the solar UV-B wavelengths that penetrate the ozone layer (≥286 nm), in contrast to those absorbed (<286 nm), must leave growth inhibition fingerprints on plants. These fingerprints are expected from the growth of the Sphagnum genus, which are dominant in boreal and subarctic peatlands and have in...
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of the majority’s most preferred candidates is t...
A tournament can be represented as a set of candidates and the results from pairwise comparisons of the candidates. In our setting, candidates may form coalitions. The candidates can choose to fix who wins the pairwise comparisons within their coalition. A coalition is winning if it can guarantee that a candidate from this coalition will win each p...
Among the bryophytes, biological growth rhythms have not yet been identified due to a lack of long‐term precision observations. Here we carry out precision field monitoring of the growth of the peat moss Sphagnum riparium using the recent geotropic curvature method. For four years, using the observation intervals of 2‐5 days, we measured 116 469 sh...
Online Appendix to 'Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules'
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of their most preferred candidates is the measu...
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects -- minimal envy matching. A matching is fair from social perspective if it is supported by majority against any oth...
The paper is devoted to game-theoretic methods for community detection in networks. The traditional methods for detecting
community structure are based on selecting dense subgraphs
inside the network. Here we propose to use the methods of cooperative game theory that highlight not only the link density
but also the mechanisms of cluster formation...
Continuous high-resolution monitoring of Sphagnum growth can provide insights into the biological rhythms of moss growth. Moss Sphagnum riparium is a convenient model for growth monitoring. Application of the method of geotropic curvatures has enabled a three-year monitoring with two to five-day intervals. We measured the increment in ca. 85000 sho...
This paper considers a voting problem in which the individual preferences of electors are defined by the ranked lists of candidates. For single-winner elections, we apply the criterion of weak positional dominance (WPD, PD), which is closely related to the positional scoring rules. Also we formulate the criterion of weak mutual majority (WMM), whic...
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the qualified mutual majority criterion (q, k)-MM. For a fixed total number of m candidates, a voting rule satisfies (q, k)-MM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks...
We study practically relevant aspects of popularity in two-sided matching where only one side has preferences. A matching is called popular if there does not exist another matching that is preferred by a simple majority. We show that for a matching to be popular it is necessary and sucient that no coalition of size up to 3 decides to exchange their...
Final version: Kondratev, A. Y., & Nesterov, A. S. (2022). Minimal envy and popular matchings. European Journal of Operational Research, 296(3), 776-787.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331274422_Minimal_Envy_and_Popular_Matchings
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352513232_Minimal_envy_and_popular_matchings
Final version: Kondratev, A. Y., & Nesterov, A. S. (2020). Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules. Public Choice, 183(1), 187-210.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334726701_Measuring_majority_power_and_veto_power_of_voting_rules
The paper is devoted to game-theoretic methods for community detection in networks. The traditional methods for detecting community structure are based on selecting denser subgraphs inside the network. Here we propose to use the methods of cooperative game theory that highlight not only the link density but also the mechanisms of cluster formation....
In situ growth of Sphagnum riparium Ångstr. shoots were monitored during the 2015 and 2016 growing seasons in Karelia, Russia. It was established that shoot growth rates fluctuated with a period of around 30 days, that is, showed a circatrigintan rhythm. Such rhythms from mosses have not been previously reported. Correlation of growth rates with th...
Final version: Kondratev, A. Y., & Mazalov, V. V. (2020). Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory. International Journal of Game Theory, 49(1), 119-145.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333085593_Tournament_solutions_based_on_cooperative_game_theory
This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position
based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of
alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary
to construct a characteristic function via the filled ballot paper profile of
voters. The Shapley value serves as the r...
